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GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES 

IN CONTINENTAL 

EUROPE 



BY 




A. LAWRENCE LOWELL 



IN TWO VOLUMES 
VOL. II 







a 



BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

flBfoe 0ttoer?itie $re£& Camfiri&oe 

1896 









Copyright, 1896, 
Br ABBOTT LAWRENCE LOWELL. 

.4// n<jffas reserved. 



The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
Electrotyped and Printed by H. 0. Houghton and Company. 



iv CONTENTS. 

The Emperor's character and theories . „ .... 52 

Dangers of his policy 54 

The growth of discontent 55 

Improbability of popular government in Germany ... 56 

Absence of class conflicts in English history 57 

Their frequency in Germany 59 

Class strife an obstacle to popular government . . . .63 

Nature of true democracy ; vertical and horizontal parties . . 65 
Organic changes popular government would cause in the Empire . 67 



CHAPTER VIII. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY : AUSTRIA. 

The convulsion of 1848, and the reorganization of 1867 . . 70 

The different races 72 

The fundamental laws 74 

The Emperor and his functions 75 

The ministers and the bureaucracy 77 

Their autocratic power 79 

Protection afforded by the Reichsgericht 83 

The Reichsrath 84 

The House of Lords 85 

The House of Representatives 85 

The five classes of voters 87 

The powers of the Reichsrath 89 

The provincial diets 90 

The church question 94 

The race question : attitude of the various races .... 95 

The conflict of tongues 98 

Failure to solve the question 99 

History of parties 100 

The Reichsrath of 1867 100 

The Liberal " Ministry of Doctors " 102 

Division of the Liberals and breaking up of the cabinet . 103 

The Reactionary ministry of Hohenwart, 1871 .... 106 

The Liberal ministry of Auersperg, 1871-79 .... 107 

The Liberals offend the crown and upset the cabinet . . . 109 

Taaf e's ministry, and its relation to the parties (1879-93) . Ill 

The failure of his Bohemian compromise and his resignation . 114 

The cabinets of Windischgratz, Kielmansegg, and Badeni . 117 

Taafe's policy postponed but did not solve the political problem . 118 

The difficulties of that problem 119 

The lack of a consensus • 120 

Futility of forecasting Austria's destiny 122 



i^— — —IM^— — 



O 



L*6 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VII. 

GERMANY: THE WORKING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 

PAGE 

The relation of the Chancellor to the Emperor .... 1 
The imperial and Prussian governments must be controlled by 

the same man 2 

It may be the Chancellor or the Emperor .... 3 

Difficulties that arise in this last case 5 

The relation of the Chancellor to the Reichstag .... 7 

History of parties 8 

Origin of the principal parties 8 

Bismarck's earlier relation to them 11 

The Kulturkampf and its effect on parties .... 12 

Bismarck's first difficulties 18 

His disagreements with the Liberals 20 

His offer of a portfolio to Bennigsen 21 

His change of base 22 

The protective tariff of 1879 24 

The end of the Kulturkampf and the breaking up of the Na- 
tional Liberals 25 

The weakening of the middle parties 28 

The contest over the septennate 29 

Bismarck's struggle with the Socialists 31 

His quarrel with William II., and his fall .... 33 
The Emperor's attempt at personal government . . .34 

The Prussian education bill of 1892 37 

The struggle over the army bill ....... 38 

The disintegration of parties 41 

Dissensions among the ministers in 1894 44 

Causes of the subdivision of parties 46 

Lack of homogeneousness among the people . . . .46 

Intense individualism in opinions 47 

Bismarck's dislike of parties and a free press . . . . 48 

Irresponsibility of the parties 50 



J*; 

-Sr I 



CONTENTS. v 

CHAPTER IX. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY : HUNGARY. 

The different races 124 

The Roumanians, Slavs, and Germans 124 

The Magyars . 126 

The ancient institutions 128 

The struggle with the Habsburgs 131 

The revolt of 1848 132 

The compromise of 1867 136 

The King . 137 

The ministers 138 

The Table of Magnates 139 

The Table of Deputies 140 

Local government 143 

The problem of race 144 

Transylvania 145 

Croatia 146 

Its new relation to Hungary 148 

Its organs of government ....... 149 

Consistent policy of the Magyars 151 

Present aspect of the problem 152 

History of parties . 153 

The rule of Deak's party 153 

The fusion with the Left, and the rule of Tisza . . . 155 

Tisza's successors 156 

The religious bills 157 

The nature of the parties 158 

CHAPTER X. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY : THE JOINT GOVERNMENT. 

The constitutional treaties 162 

The monarch 163 

The delegations . 165 

Their lack of true legislative power 168 

Their relation to the ministers . . . . .170 

The joint ministries 170 

The army 171 

Finance 172 

The customs union . 174 

The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..... 175 

The character of the union 177 



vi CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XI. 

SWITZERLAND : INSTITUTIONS. 

Races and religions . 180 

Formation of the Confederation 182 

Its relation to the cantons 184 

Executive powers of the federal government small . . . 185 

Its legislative powers broad 187 

They are constantly increasing 189 

Method of amending the constitution 190 

Organs of the federal government 191 

The Federal Council 193 

The President of the Confederation 194 

The duties of the Council 195 

Its relation to the Federal Assembly 197 

Contrast between its position and that of a parliamentary cabinet 198 

Not a partisan body 200 

Permanent tenure of the members 203 

Limited range of candidates 204 

Advantages of the system 205 

The Council of States 208 

Its influence 209 

The National Council 211 

The electoral districts 212 

Sessions and debates 213 

The Federal Assembly ; the joint sittings 214 

The Federal Tribunal 214 

Jurisdiction over private and public law 215 

Comparison with the Supreme Court of the United States . 218 

The cantonal governments 220 

The Landsgemeinde 221 

Other organs of government in these cantons . . . 226 
The Great Council and Executive Council in the other cantons 226 

Relations between the two 227 

Method of choosing the Executive Council . . . 228 
Methods of dissolving the Great Council .... 229 

Proportional representation 232 

Local government 235 



jrri 



CONTENTS. vii 



CHAPTER XII. 

SWITZERLAND : THE REFERENDUM AND THE INITIATIVE. 

The referendum due to lack of representative government . . 238 
The ancient referendum ; in the Confederation .... 239 

In the Grisons and the Yalais 240 

In Berne and Zurich 241 

The modern referendum 243 

The referendum for constitutional questions not a Swiss inven- 
tion 244 

Origin of the referendum for ordinary laws .... 246 

The veto ; its adoption 248 

Different kinds of referendum and their introduction . . 250 

Actual working of the referendum 252 

Number of laws rejected : 

In the Confederation ; list of the laws voted upon . . 253 

In the cantons 259 

Character of the laws rejected 265 

Radical measures and labor laws 265 

Laws that are too comprehensive 269 

Measures involving expense 270 

Criticisms of the referendum 271 

Smallness of the vote cast 271 

Absence of popular discussion 274 

Lowering of the sense of responsibility of legislators . . 276 

Swiss opinions of the referendum 277 

Views of M. Droz 279 

The Initiative 280 

Its adoption in the cantons . 281 

In the Confederation 282 

The method of operation 283 

Its actual working in the Confederation .... 284 

In Zurich 285 

Criticisms upon it 288 

It is not likely to be of real value 291 

The referendum in America 292 

Its present use 293 

Objections to its extension to ordinary laws .... 296 



Vlll 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XIII. 



SWITZERLAND ! PARTIES. 

History of parties 301 

The question of the refugees, 1848-50 301 

The question of the railroads and of Savoy, 1852-64 . . 303 

The question of revising the constitution, 1864-74 . . 306 

Parties since 1874 308 

The Right, the Left, and the Centre 308 

Continuity of parties since 1874 .... . . 310 

Relation of the parties to the government 311 

Absence of party machinery 313 

Stability of the parties . 314 

Its good effects 316 

Causes of the state of parties 318 

The method of electing the Federal Council .... 318 

The effect of the referendum 322 

The people do not vote on strict party lines . . . 324 

The referendum splits up the issues .... 326 

Draws attention to measures instead of men . . . 327 
Weakens the motives for a change of party . . . 328 
Changes the relation of a representative to his constituents 328 
The rejection of laws takes the place of a change of parties 331 
The character and traditions of the people .... 332 

Comparison of Greek and Swiss democracy 333 

Excellence of the Swiss government 335 



APPENDIX. 

The Constitutional Laws of France 337 

The Statuto of Italy 346 

The Constitution of the German Empire 355 

The Fundamental Laws of Austria 378 

The Constitution of Switzerland 405 



GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN 
CONTINENTAL EUROPE. 



CHAPTER Vn. 



GERMANY: THE WORKING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERN- 
MENT. 

After having surveyed the political structure of the 
Empire and the States, we are in a position to 
examine the actual working of the federal working of 
government. This may be said to turn upon ment de- 
the relation of the Chancellor to the three relation of 

. p _„ the chaneel- 

OrganS of the Empire ; tor, like a central lor to the 

111- ".111 ! 1 ° ther fed " 

wneel that is geared to all the others, the erai authorf- 
Chancellor comes into direct contact with 
each of the imperial authorities. The subject may, 
therefore, be conveniently treated under two heads : 
first, the relation of the Chancellor to the Emperor; 
and second, his relation to the Keichstag ; his relation 
to the Bundesrath having already been considered 
while dealing with the organization of that body. 

It is clear that the Chancellor would occupy an 
absurd position if he were confined to the matters that 
belong strictly to his office, for he would be the sole 



2 GERMANY. 

responsible minister of one of the greatest nations in 
the world, and yet his powers would be insiff- 

His relation a * • - «» • 

to the Em- nificant. Apart from foreign affairs, the 
Theim- nav y> anc ^ ^he selection of a few of the 
xo^gov- hig nes * military officers, his executive duties 
SSbe S would be almost entirely limited to watch- 
Dy n fhe C same m g over the administration of the imperial 
laws by the several States, and seeing that 
they complied with the ordinances and regulations 
issued, not by him, but by the Bundesrath. In regard 
to legislation, moreover, his very lack of executive 
powers would prevent his exerting an effective control. 
Representing in his capacity of Chancellor neither the 
King of Prussia nor the confederated sovereigns, he 
would be unable to acquire any considerable authority 
in the Reichstag or the Bundesrath. He would, it is 
true, preside over this last body ; but simply as chair- 
man he would be in a situation not much better than 
that occupied by the Vice-President in the Senate of 
the United States. Unless he could also speak in the 
name of Prussia, and cast her votes, he would have 
very little influence with the members, and could 
neither guide legislation nor direct the policy of ad- 
ministration. In order, therefore, that the Chancellor 
may be a real minister of state, and not a mere 
inspector and honorary chairman, he must be at the 
head of the Prussian delegation in the Bundesrath. 
But the delegation receives its instructions from the 
Prussian government, and it would be irrational for 
the Chancellor to be given instructions by men whose 
policy differed from his own. Hence he must be in 



THE EMPEROR AND THE CHANCELLOR. 3 

absolute accord with the Prussian government, so far 
as these instructions are concerned. Nor is this all. 
The friction between the Chancellor and the Prussian 
cabinet would be intolerable if the latter were to 
administer the imperial laws in a hostile spirit; and 
indeed the relations between the Empire and the King- 
dom are so interwoven that the machinery of state can 
work smoothly only on condition that both govern- 
ments are conducted in perfect harmony, and this can 
be true only in case both are directed by a common 
will. Now, in view of the fact that the Chancellor is 
the sole head of the imperial administration, while the 
Prussian ministers are seldom completely united, it is 
hardly conceivable that they should be able as a body 
to control his actions; and if one of their number 
should acquire a predominant influence in the state, he 
would find it almost impossible not to take the chancel- 
lorship. The common will must therefore be that of 
the Chancellor himself, who must also be the leader of 
the Prussian cabinet ; unless perchance the whole gov- 
ernment is directed by the Emperor in person. Let 
us consider this alternative a moment. 

If the Chancellor is also at the head of the Prussian 
cabinet, and is a man of any great personal 
force, he is likely to eclipse his imperial the Chancei- 
master, and concentrate all political power in 
his own hands ; for he has a right to appear and speak 
in four different legislative bodies, — the Bundesrath, 
the Reichstag, and the two Prussian houses, — and he 
can easily play them off against each other and against 
the crown. In fact, he can hardly help doing so, 



4 GERMANY. 

because he is obliged to conciliate all these bodies, 
and to modify his measures so as to obtain their 
approval; while the Emperor cannot appear in any 
of them, and must to a great extent accept his min- 
ister's statement of their temper and opinions. This 
was the actual situation under the rule of Prince 
Bismarck, who held both offices continuously, except 
for the one year when he resigned the post of president 
of the council in Prussia, only to take it again, de- 
claring that he had hoped to carry on the government 
as Chancellor, but found that his power was chiefly 
exercised as head of the Prussian ministry. His 
influence with William I. became irresistible, and he 
drew all the threads of politics into his own grasp. 
His resignation in 1890 was, indeed, precipitated by 
the young Emperor's demand that the reports of the 
Prussian ministers, instead of passing through the 
Chancellor's hands, should be presented directly to 
him, and that he should be informed of important 
interviews with the leaders in the Reichstag. 

Up to this time, the common will had been that 
of the Chancellor ; but now the second alter- 

Or it may . • i i pi 

be the Em- native was tried, the management 01 the 

peror. .^ 

whole government by the Emperor. W lfliam 
II. had determined to undertake the personal direction 
of public affairs, and he selected as Bismarck's suc- 
cessor von Caprivi, a Prussian army officer, who was 
expected to be more subservient to the throne. 
of wmiam At first, like his predecessor, the new Chan- 
cellor was also given the post of president of 
the Prussian council, but he held both offices only a 



THE EMPEROR AND THE CHANCELLOR. 5 

couple of years, for, owing to the crisis that arose 
over the school bill in the spring of 1892, he resigned 
as Prussian minister, although he still retained the 
position of Chancellor. One cannot help feeling 
that the young monarch saw how much his personal 
authority would be increased by a separation of these 
offices, and how much easier it would be to control a 
number of ministers, each responsible for the conduct 
of a single department, than one man who held in his 
hands all the reins of government. 

The Emperor's policy certainly increased his own 
authority and lessened that of the Chancellor. D iffieulties 
This result was, of course, due chiefly to the that arose * 
absence of Bismarck, for no other man could hope to 
win the reputation of the great statesman who had cre- 
ated the Empire. A spell, moreover, had been broken 
by his fall. For a moment all Germany held its breath ; 
but finding that the heavens did not crumble, it con- 
cluded that neither he nor any one else was essential to 
the salvation of the country. The separation of the im- 
perial and Prussian ministries, however, contributed also 
to the result, and for a simple reason. The chancellor- 
ship ceased to be the great office it once had been. 
Its possessor could not appear in the Reichstag in the 
same commanding way as the representative of all the 
powers in the state ; and his resignation no longer 
entailed such serious consequences as it did formerly. 
His prestige was diminished, and he was neither to be 
revered nor dreaded as of old. The same thing was 
true of the relation of the Prussian cabinet to the 
Landtag. The great minister had been divided in two, 



6 GERMANY. 

and neither half was big enough to treat the represen- 
tatives of the people in the old autocratic manner. 
The Emperor, it is often said, became his own Chan- 
cellor and Prime Minister so far as directing the 
policy of the government was concerned, and this was 
in great measure true ; but he could not appear in the 
Reichstag or Landtag and exert his personal influence 
as Bismarck used to do. He was compelled to work at 
arm's length, and was unable to bring a direct pressure 
to bear upon the chambers, and hence the parties there 
became more unmanageable than ever. It was not 
long before the separation of the chancellorship and 
the presidency led to another difficulty. The holders 
of these two positions, General von Caprivi and Graf 
zu Eulenburg, were in the nature of things rivals, 
who were under no necessity of reconciling or conceal- 
ing their differences ; and hence it is not surprising that 
in the autumn of 1894 they were so completely at 
variance with each other on an important question of 
policy that they could no longer work harmoniously 
together. The Emperor wisely dismissed them both 
and conferred both offices on Count Hohenlohe- 
Schillingsfurst, thus giving up, for the time at least, 
his attempt to ride two horses with nothing to hold 
them together but his own word of command. 

It would seem, therefore, that if the chancellorship 

and the presidency are held by different per- 

systemnot sons, the difficulties of carrying on the gov- 

to direct per- ernment are great; and if, on the other hand, 

eminent by they are held by the same man, he is liable 

the crown. J J . 

to overshadow the crown. The fact is that 



THE CHANCELLOR AND THE REICHSTAG. 7 

although in organizing the Empire Bismarck had no 
thought of making it easy to control the Emperor, he 
did intend to accumulate as much power as he could 
in his own hands, rendering it impossible for any 
colleagues to thwart his plans, and with that object he 
created for himself an office whose counterpart exists 
in no other Christian monarchy. All this does not 
mean a limitation of the monarchical principle, because 
the Emperor is absolutely free to select the Chancellor, 
and hence can determine the policy to be pursued. It 
means only that, as the government is organized, it 
is hard for him to take the immediate direction of 
affairs into his own hands ; and yet this appears to be 
exactly what William II. wishes to do. 

The relations of the Chancellor to the representatives 
of the people are no less important than his The relation 
relations to the Emperor. A parliament that ^iSr STe 
holds the strings of the public purse, and Reichsta ^- 
meets with tolerable frequency, has in its hands the 
means of compelling the monarch through his ministers 
to govern according to its wishes, and whether it does 
so or not depends very much on the condition of its 
political parties. If the members are divided into two 
parties only, so that one or other of them always has a 
majority, the parliament is certain in time to bring the 
crown under its control ; but if, on the other hand, there 
are a number of small groups, it is much easier for the 
government, by making from time to time special con- 
cessions to one or more of them, to secure a majority 
on all important occasions, and thus remain inde- 
pendent. This is the case in Germany, and a study of 



8 GERMANY. 

the history of parties there will help to make the matter 
clear. 

The bitter conflict between the King of Prussia and 

the House of Kepresentatives, which reached 
parties in its height shortly after Bismarck became chief 

of the cabinet in September, 1862, and lasted 
for the next four years, consolidated the different polit- 
ical elements in the Chamber into two hostile bodies, — 

the supporters and the opponents of the gov- 
vatives and eminent. The former, who shrunk at times 
schritt, to a mere handful of members, were called the 

Conservatives, while their enemies belonged 
for the most part to a new organization known as the 

Fortschritt or party of progress. The deci- 
warwith sive victory over the Austrians at Sadowa 

wrought a sudden change in public opinion. 
Instead of the tyrannical despiser of popular rights, 
Bismarck appeared in the light of the champion of 
German unity and even of liberty, and the result was 
a breaking up of the old party relations and a rear- 
rangement of the political groups on a new basis. 1 
The Conservatives, who had supported the government, 
ceased to be unpopular, and regained the seats they had 
lost ; but, what is more important, each of the great 

parties split in two. A number of the Con- 
Rise of the . -, . 

Free Con- servatives, who were more progressive in 
and National opinion than their fellows, and more in favor 

Liberals. ~; pii ipi 

oi the new iederal system, left the party to 
organize another under the name of Free Conserva- 

1 See the articles on the parties in the Reichstag in Unsere Zeit, by 
Oppenheim (1880, i.) and Johannes Berg (1882, i., ii. ; 1883, ii.). 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 9 

tives ; 1 and, on the other hand, a body of men, includ- 
ing the most influential leaders, separated themselves 
from the Fortschritt, and formed the National Liberal 
party. These men were less dogmatic than their 
former associates, were more inclined to sacrifice the 
ideal for the practical, and, above all, had more confi- 
dence in Bismarck. 

Thus two new middle parties arose, the four groups 
corresponding fairly well to the four divisions into 
which, according to the theory of Rohmer, 2 all man- 
kind is naturally divided, — the Reactionaries, the 
Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Radicals. Each 
of the four has continued to exist under one name 
or another ever since the formation of the North 
German Confederation ; for although some of the 
members have often broken away and formed new 
groups, these have disappeared after a short time, 
or been absorbed by one of the older bodies. It is 
therefore worth our while to consider these parties a 
little more closely. The two extreme ones — the 
Fortschritt and the Conservative — were almost ex- 
clusively Prussian, the Conservatives being recruited 
chiefly among the lesser nobility or Junkers, and the 
Fortschritt in the larger towns and cities. The Free 
Conservatives also came mainly from Prussia, the core 
of the party being the greater nobility, from whom 
the ambassadors and other high officials were mostly 
selected. The National Liberals, on the other hand, 

1 Called later the Deutsch-Reichspartei. 

2 Lehre von den Politischen Parteien. Cf . Bluntschli, Charalcter u. Geist 
der Pol Parteien. 



10 GERMANY. 

extended far more into the other States, and included 
during their era of prosperity almost all the deputies 
from the smaller North German States, and most of the 
men of liberal views from the South. This has been, 
indeed, the only truly national party that the Empire 
has ever known, all the other groups being mainly local, 
or founded on questions of sect or of race, rather than 
on general political issues. 1 Of the latter 
class are the Catholic party or Centre (which 
will be more fully described when we come to the time 
of its rise), and the various kinds of particularists so 
called. These last are irreconcilables, who complain 
that their province or their race has been unjustly 
treated, and has been forced into a union repugnant to 
The Poles *^s feelings. The most important of them 
Dane^and are the Poles? the Hanoverian Guelphs, the 
Alsatians. J) anes ^ anc [ the Alsatians, all few in numbers, 
but uncompromising fighters. The only other party 
that can make any claim to be considered national is 
The Social ^ na ^ °^ * ne Social Democrats. Small at first, 

Democrats. t y g j^y ^as g rQwn ra pidly f l a t e years, 

and with the increase of power has come greater mod- 
eration ; but recruited as it is from the discontented 
classes in the large cities, it is still too far removed in 
its aims from the field of actual politics, and too thor- 
oughly unpatriotic in its utterances, to be considered a 
really national party. 2 

1 Cf. Lebon, p. 128 et seq. 

2 When the North German Confederation was founded, there were a 
few other groups, such as the Old Liberals and the Left Centre, but 
these soon disappeared. From time to time other groups appeared, such 
as the Liberal Reichspartei and the Southern Democrats, but most of 
them have had no permanent importance. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 11 

It is worth while to observe here that the parties in 
the Prussian Landtag have always been sim- 
ilar to those in the Reichstag — except, of the state 
course, for certain groups like that of the 
Alsatians, which belong exclusively to other parts of 
the Empire, and do not appear at all; and, in general, it 
may be said that in each State the parties for national 
and local politics are very nearly the same, so that every 
party in the Reichstag corresponds to a local party in 
one or more of the States, and every considerable local 
party appears in the Reichstag either as a separate group 
by itself, or as part of a larger organization. It is not, 
however, possible to say that the parties are divided as 
in France, on national issues, or, as in Italy, on local 
ones, because neither class of issues has a predominant 
influence ; and, in fact, owing to the peculiar appor- 
tionment of power between the federal government and 
the States, the same question, as, for example, that of 
the rights of the Catholic church, is constantly pre- 
sented both in the Reichstag and in the state legis- 
latures. 

During the earlier years of his chancellorship Bis- 
marck relied for support chiefly on the two 

-B i sni cir c k s 

middle parties, the National Liberals and relation to 

» ti n • «i * ne P ar ^ es 

the Free Conservatives, while the extreme during the 

earlier years 

groups — the Fortschritt and the Conserva- °? the £m- 

° # A pire. 

tives — were in a position of more or less 
hostility. But in saying this it must be borne in 
mind that in Germany the parliamentary system does 
not exist, and hence no party consistently supports or 
opposes the ministry as it does in England. No one of 



12 GERMANY. 

these four parties was at this time avowedly hostile to 
the Chancellor, and none of them ever supported him 
with a blind devotion, even the Free Conservatives, who 
aspired to be his parliamentary body-guard, occasion- 
ally voting against his measures. As for the National 
Liberals, they always criticised and amended his bills 
with great freedom, and often forced him to accept a 
compromise. For some time, indeed, after they* were 
heartily in sympathy with his national policy, they 
remained intractable in the Prussian Landtag, on ac- 
count of his retention of the old reactionary ministers 
of state. 

Bismarck saw that the new nation must be founded 
on liberal principles, and as soon as the war with Aus- 
tria was over, he adopted a progressive policy. Not 
only was this true of his imperial plans, which led to 
the enactment during the first three years of a number 
of excellent laws, but before long he began to drop 
one by one the most reactionary Prussian ministers, 
replacing them by men of more liberal views. Up to 
the time of the close of the war with France, matters 
went smoothly ; for although some of the groups dis- 
agreed with many of Bismarck's measures, yet, except 
for the handful of particularists, he had no bitter ene- 
mies until he became involved in that unfortunate con- 
test with the Catholic church, which has become famous 
The Kui- under the name of the Kulturkampf. It is 
turkampf. ^ Q to ^tempt here to apportion the blame 
for a struggle that has proved a great injury to Ger- 
many. That Bismarck's policy was a mistake few 
people will now deny, for he raised a spirit which he 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 13 

was unable to quell, and which has continued to disturb 
politics seriously to the present day, although its cause 
was almost entirely removed long ago. As usual, in 
such controversies, it is hard to say which side began 
the aggression. It is clear, however, that the doctrine 
of papal infallibility and the taking of Rome by the 
Italian government furnished the occasion, if not the 
veritable cause, of the strife. No sooner had Pius IX., 
in the summer of 1869, issued his call for a general 
council, than the priests began to assume an aggressive 
attitude, which provoked opposition among the people, 
and soon brought religious questions into the political 
arena. There had always been a few ultramontane 
members in the Prussian Landtag, but in the autumn 
of 1870 they carried for the first time a considerable 
number of seats. They organized forthwith 
a regular party, which showed its real charac- tion of the 

i i- i -n t^ Centre. 

ter by sending to the JLmperor, on February 
18, 1871, an address urging him to endeavor to rees- 
tablish the temporal power of the Pope. A fortnight 
after this date the elections to the Reichstag were held, 
and the clericals, helped by the exertions of the priests, 
succeeded in choosing about sixty deputies. The new 
party, which acquired the name of " The Centre " from 
the seats it occupied in the chamber, proclaimed defi- 
nitely at the very opening of the session the attitude it 
intended to assume, by refusing to vote for the address 
to the crown on account of a clause condemning inter- 
ference in the affairs of foreign countries, — a clause 
designed to prevent any action in favor of the Pope. 
Meanwhile the bishops had been trying to force their 



14 GERMANY. 

clergy to accept the dogma of papal infallibility, and 
by so doing had got into trouble with the government 
and aroused popular feeling. All this led to active 
hostility between the Catholic church and the state, and 
in the autumn of 1871 the latter took its first decisive 
step. 

The government of Bavaria, which had long been 

struggling with an unfriendly clerical major- 
Cathoiic ity in the diet, proposed in the Bundesrath 

a statute to restrain the abuse by priests of 
pastoral functions for political purposes. This measure, 
known as the Kanzelparagraph, was passed both by 
the Bundesrath and the Reichstag, and became law. 
It was followed early in the next year by a Prussian 
school inspection law, reducing seriously the influence 
of the clergy in education. The conflict had now 
become a war to the knife. The bishops assembled at 
Fulda, and protested violently. The Pope supported 
them, and excommunications were hurled at rebellious 
sons of the church. Bismarck, on his side, was de- 
termined to persist to the utmost, and, in allusion to 
the humiliation of Henry IV. before Hildebrand, made 
at this time his famous remark, that he should not go 
to Canossa. In June, 1872, an imperial statute ex- 
cluded the Jesuits and all other kindred orders from the 
territory of the Empire ; and in May of the following 
year the Prussian Landtag passed the celebrated May 
laws, whose chief objects were to limit the disciplinary 
power of the church over its members, and to place 
the education and installation of the clergy under the 
control of the government. Again the bishops met at 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 15 

Fulda, and this time they declared boldly that the laws 
of the state were not the ultimate source of right, and 
ought not to be obeyed if contrary to the laws of God. 
Acting on this principle, they ignored the May laws ; 
whereupon the severity of those laws was still further 
increased, and an imperial statute was passed authoriz- 
ing the expulsion of ecclesiastics who had been removed 
from office for violation of their provisions. 1 Finally, 
in 1875, an encyclical letter of the Pope to the Prussian 
bishops, declaring all the anti-Catholic legislation in- 
valid, provoked the government so much that it brought 
into the Landtag and enacted five more statutes, of 
which the most important forbade all payments to the 
clergy from the state treasury without a promise on 
their part to obey the laws. 

These were the last important Kulturkampf laws; 
but, like all the others, they failed to accomplish their 
object. Some of the clergy did, indeed, submit ; but 
most of them followed resolutely the lead of the bishops, 
who persisted in their refusal to comply with the laws 
in spite of fines, imprisonments, and removals from 
office. The statutes were rigorously enforced, and 
before long eight of the twelve Prussian bishoprics, and 
no less than fourteen hundred curacies, were vacant; 
but all without avail. In the field of politics 

, t o -r». i » «• ill The effect 

the result ot Bismarck s enort to break down of the Kui- 

. . , . turkampf 

clerical opposition was even less satisfactory ; on the 

for at the elections to the Reichstag in 1874 

the Centre carried about a hundred seats, and in the 

1 This was in 1874. In this and the following year laws were enacted 
by Prussia and the Empire making civil marriage compulsory. 



16 GERMANY. 

Prussian Landtag it increased steadily until it had nearly 
that number of members. During the progress of the 
Kulturkampf, the party was, of course, bitterly hostile 
to the government ; but, although it had been built up 
in the heat of persecution, its strength remained undi- 
minished after the conflict was over, and indeed its dis- 
cipline is so much more perfect than that of any other 
party in Germany that alone among them all the num- 
ber of its members has hardly varied through all the 
subsequent changes in German politics. 1 

The effect of the Kulturkampf on the other parties 

was hardly less important. A great part of 
the Conser- the Conservatives had been alienated from 

Bismarck by the liberal policy he had pur- 
sued since the war with Austria, but their attitude was 
converted into one of positive hostility by the conflict 
with Rome. These men bore a relation to the Pro- 
testant church similar to that of the Ultramontanes 
towards the Catholic, and were by nature averse to 
any attack on established religion. Moreover, some of 
the measures of the government affected them directly ; 
for in the year 1872 there were enacted the Prussian 
school inspection law, which lessened the influence over 
education of the Protestant as well as the Catholic 
clergy, and the Kreis-Ordnung, which destroyed the 
absolute control hitherto exercised by the nobility in 
local affairs. At the end of this year Bismarck re- 
signed his place as chief of the Prussian ministry, on 

1 The Centre is, of course, recruited from the Catholic parts of Ger- 
many, and chiefly from Hanover, Westphalia, the Rhine Province, and 
Bavaria. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 17 

the ostensible ground that his manifold duties were too 
great for his strength. He said, however, in a letter 
to his successor, General von Eoon, that he was dis- 
couraged by losing the friendship of the Conservatives ; 
and Dr. Blum shrewdly suggests that his real motive 
may have been a hope that von Roon, who was 
sincerely attached to him, and at the same time in close 
sympathy with that party, would be able to win its 
support. In this hope he was disappointed ; for in less 
than a year von Roon, finding himself responsible for 
a policy of which he did not really approve, withdrew 
from public life. Bismarck, anxious to avoid an open 
breach with the Conservatives, offered a portf olio in the 
Prussian ministry to von Blankenburg, the leader of the 
party ; but the offer was declined, and the Chancellor 
again assumed the presidency of the Prussian cabinet. 
From this time the more extreme Conservatives gave 
full vent to their animosity. They intrigued to upset 
Bismarck, and put in his place Count Harry von Arnim, 
the ambassador at Paris, who helped them by a clandes- 
tine publication of secret diplomatic papers. Bismarck's 
peril was very great, for the Emperor was personally 
more in sympathy with the policy of the Conservatives 
than with that of his Chancellor, and an influential 
court clique, headed by the Empress Augusta, was bent 
upon his overthrow. This explains the vindictiveness 
with which he pursued von Arnim, until he brought 
about his condemnation and ruin. The Emperor, how- 
ever, in spite of his natural sympathies, remained true to 
Bismarck ; but the hostility of the high Conservatives 
became more bitter than ever, and their organ, the 
vol. n. 



18 GERMANY. 

" Kreuzzeitung," did not hesitate to accuse him and his 
colleagues of downright corruption. Thus the Chan- 
cellor was at war with the party from which he had 
sprung, and whose champion he had been during the 
earlier part of his career. The immediate result was 
more injurious to his enemies than to himself, for the 
Conservatives lost two thirds of their representatives, as 
they are apt to do in Prussia when they quarrel with 
the government. 

The effect of the Kulturkampf on the liberal par- 
ties was very different. They increased in 

Its effect on - 1 . . . 

the National numbers, and became more harmonious with 

Liberals and 

the Fort- each other and with the government, even 

s Clint t. m 

the Fortschntt supporting the anti-Catholic 
laws, and being less critical than usual about other 
matters. The National Liberals, indeed, together with 
the Free Conservatives who were always faithful, had 
nearly one half of the members both in the Reichstag 

and the Prussian House of Representatives, 
last Kni- and with the Fortschritt also they had a de- 
lays were cided majority in each of those bodies. So 
Bismarck long, therefore, as the Kulturkampf laws were 
hare being passed, Bismarck found the Reichstag 

easy to manage. But the last of those stat- 
utes had no sooner been enacted than he encountered 
obstacles in various directions. 

His first difficulty was not with the Reichstag, but 
with the Bundesrath, which rejected in 1875 an impe- 
rial railroad bill, fearing that it would cause a falling 
off in the profits of the railroads owned by the smaller 
States. In this form the measure had to be dropped. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 19 

On the other hand, it was clear that a law affecting the 
private roads alone had no chance of pass- 
ing the Reichstag, and hence a uniform ad- road bill 

P . . « i •ii nil rejected by 

ministration ot the railroads was possible only the Bundes- 

r J rath in 1875. 

in case all the more important hnes were 
acquired by the Empire. Bismarck had this project 
very much at heart, but the dread of increasing the 
power of the central government was so great among 
the smaller States that he did not even venture to bring 
the matter before the Bundesrath, and had to content 
himself with a purchase by Prussia of the roads within 
her own territory. 

This was the first check he had received, but another 
came almost simultaneously. The National 
Liberals had prospered under his favor, and socialist bill 

ii iii-i i-i mutilated 

had reached his: h- water mark with over one fey the 

Keichstag'. 

hundred and fifty members in the Reichstag. 
But the sympathy between Bismarck and this part of 
his supporters was far from complete, for they were 
liberal by conviction, and he only from policy. By 
nature he was intolerant, and his only method of over- 
coming resistance was the blood and iron policy which 
had proved so successful in the struggle with Austria. 
The aggression of the Catholics and the Social Demo- 
crats irritated him beyond measure, and late in the year 
1875 he brought before the Reichstag a bill to punish 
attacks on the state in speech or in print. Some of 
the clauses relating to the Social Democrats were so 
loose as to place excessively arbitrary powers in the 
hands of the government, and for that reason were 
popularly known as the " India Rubber Paragraphs." 



20 GERMANY. 

They went too far for the National Liberals, and even 
for some of the more conservative members ; and the 
Reichstag rejected them by heavy majorities, passing 
the bill in a very mutilated form. This was a prelude 
The Fort- to further trouble. In the following Decem- 
ca^peT her the Fortschritt became disgusted with a 
wSfm compromise made between Bismarck and the 

National Liberals, on the subject of trial by 
jury for press offenses, and fell into a condition of 
persistent opposition. But the question that was des- 
tined to create the greatest difficulty was that of the 
finances. 

The Empire had a comparatively small revenue of its 

own, and the difference between receipts and 
ment%-itii expenses was made up by the assessment of 

the National L . . . 

Liberals on the several btates m proportion to population, 
questions in Now these payments, called Matricularbei- 
trage, had grown very heavy and pressed hard 
upon the States, and as their amount could be deter- 
mined only from year to year they were peculiarly 
burdensome wherever the budget was voted for several 
years at a time. Bismarck wanted to reduce them by 
increasing the sources of imperial revenue. The Lib- 
erals also wanted to increase those sources, but were 
not willing to lessen the influence of the Reichstag, 
and inasmuch as a tax once voted could not be repealed 
without the consent of the Bundesrath, and in fact 
without the consent of Prussia's delegates in that body, 
they insisted that an increase in federal taxation should 
be accompanied by the creation of an imperial minister 
of finance responsible to the Reichstag, — a proposal 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 21 

to which the Chancellor was, of course, inflexibly op- 
posed. 

At this time Bismarck became discouraged, and in 
April, 1877, tendered his resignation. His ~ 

*■ 7 7 ° JDismarek 

religious policy had injured the church with- ^^£ 
out breaking her opposition ; his railroad pro- a^ave^f en 
ject had been defeated, and his financial absence - 
plans seemed doomed to fail. Not only was the Centre 
bitterly hostile to him, but he had quarreled with the 
Conservatives, and was losing the hearty support of the 
National Liberals. Moreover, a party at court, headed 
by the Empress, was trying to undermine him, and 
even the ministers were not fully in sympathy with his 
opinions. No one, in fact, seemed to be thoroughly 
faithful to him except the Emperor, who refused abso- 
lutely to consider his resignation, but granted him a 
long leave of absence. Bismarck saw the need of a 
change of tactics, and made up his mind that he must 
either bind the National Liberals to his administration 
in such a way as to insure their fidelity, or seek sup- 
port elsewhere. In the last days of 1877, His offer of 
therefore, he sent for Bennigsen, the chief to P theNa- 
of the party, explained to him his views, and Ssde- 15 
offered him a portfolio in return for the sup- 
port of his programme. One of the most important 
parts of that programme was a government monopoly 
on the importation and manufacture of tobacco, which 
Bismarck thought the best means of increasing the 
imperial revenues. Apart from the natural repugnance 
of the people to a system that would make tobacco 
both dear and bad, such a monopoly was disliked by 



22 GERMANY. 

the Liberals on political grounds, because it tended to 
lessen the control of the Reichstag over taxation ; and 
Bennigsen, after consulting the other leaders of the 
party, refused to consent to it. He also insisted that he 
could not accept the offer unless a portfolio were also 
given to Forckenbeck who, as a leader of the more 
radical wing of the party, was obnoxious both to Bis- 
marck and the Emperor. These conditions prevented 
an understanding, and the negotiations fell through. 
The Chancellor gave no public sign of displeasure, 
and made no announcement of any change in 
change of his opinions, but gradually reversed the pol- 



icy he had been pursuing ever since Sadowa. 
No more measures that pleased the Liberals were intro- 
duced, and after the Reichstag failed early in 1878 to 
agree to an increase of the tax on tobacco, which was 
avowedly a step towards the monopoly, three liberal 
Prussian ministers were replaced by men of more con- 
servative tendencies. An accident soon helped Bis- 
marck to lay a foundation for his new plans. An 
attempt to assassinate the Emperor in May of this year 
furnished an occasion for a bill to suppress the Social- 
ists. It was rejected by the votes of the National 

Liberals in the Reichstag. Again the Em- 

of the peror was shot at, and immediately the Reich- 

Reichstag _. . _ __ 

and its stag was dissolved, lnese events gave an 

opportunity to procure a legislature of a 

different party coloring, and the Chancellor was not 

disappointed in his hopes. The Conservatives, who were 

anxious to get back into favor, represented themselves as 

the truest supporters of the government, and although 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 23 

the latter did not acknowledge them as allies, the officials 
really helped their candidates. The result of the elec- 
tions was a loss for the Liberals and a gain by the 
Conservative parties. 

Still there was no open breach with the National 
Liberals, and the anti-socialist bill was ac- 
tually carried in a modified form by their party reia- 
assistance; but the party relations in the 
Keichstag had changed radically, although no one, 
perhaps not even the Chancellor himself, was fully 
conscious of the fact. 1 The support of the National 
Liberals for the new policy he was contemplating was, 
to say the least, extremely uncertain ; and as the two 
Conservative parties together did not make a third of 
the body, the Centre was likely to hold the balance 
of power. Meanwhile Pius IX. had died, and Leo 
XIIL, on his accession to the pontifical throne, had 
made overtures of reconciliation. Bismarck was, no 
doubt, weary of his long fight with the church, but as 
usual he said nothing, bided his time, and then made 
one of those unexpected moves that have been charac- 
teristic of his public life. He needed the help, or at 
least the neutrality, of the Clericals, and determined to 
remove the cause of their hostility by reversing his 
religious policy ; but for this the time was not yet ripe. 

The Chancellor's first open and avowed change of 

1 It is said that in reply to a National Liberal candidate, who com- 
plained in 1876 that the influence of the officials was thrown against him, 
the Chancellor remarked that the National Liberals were very useful, but 
must not be allowed to grow too strong. (Johannes Berg, in Unsere 
Zeit, 1883, ii. pp. 402-3.) Even if this tale is not true, it probably repre- 
sents Bismarck's state of feeling for a considerable period. 



24 GERMANY. 

policy took place in economic matters. Up to this mo- 
ment Bismarck, supported by the Liberals, 
tive tariff and, indeed, by the great bulk of the Conser- 
vatives, had been in favor of free trade, and 
had talked of a tariff for revenue only ; but he was now 
bent on creating a revenue for the Empire, and as his 
tobacco monopoly had failed, he turned his attention to 
customs duties as a fruitful source of income. No 
doubt he had really changed his opinions on the eco- 
nomic effects of protection, and in fact a great many 
people in Germany had done the same ; for the prevail- 
ing depression in business was popularly attributed to 
free trade, and especially to the abolition of the duty 
on iron. In February, 1879, the Chancellor laid before 
the Keichstag a bill for a protective tariff, which had 
been prepared by the Bundesrath. Parties were at 
once thrown into confusion, and men who had hitherto 
been free-traders found themselves to their surprise 
voting for the bill. This was peculiarly true of the 
landowners who had long believed in free trade, but 
who were now won over by the proposal of duties on 
iron and grain. In general, the representatives of 
manufacturing and agricultural districts supported the 
bill, while those who came from the trading centres 
opposed it. On this principle, the two Con- 

The attitude A A \ s> i 

of the par- servative groups, whose members sat tor rural 
constituencies, were strongly in favor of the 
measure, and for the same reason the sympathies of a 
large part of the Centre were on the same side ; while 
the Fortschritt, which represented a city population, 
was implacably hostile. The National Liberals were 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 25 

divided in opinion. Part of them wanted protection 
and part free trade, while Bennigsen, the leader of the 
party, supported by the moderate elements, was anxious, 
if possible, to keep the party together and effect a 
compromise. The two Conservative parties alone were 
not enough to carry the bill. The support either of 
the Centre or of the National Liberals must be secured ; 
and as neither of these parties was willing to vote for 
the measure without some guarantee of the control of 
the finances by the Eeichstag, the government opened 
negotiations with both of them. The terms 
they offered were not in substance very dif- votes for the 
ferent, but Bennigsen could not promise with 
certainty that all the members of his party would 
follow his lead, and hence Bismarck accepted the pro- 
posals of the Centre. 

By one stroke the Chancellor increased the revenues 
and broke the strength of the National 

. The Na- 

Liberals. This party had, indeed, been tionai 
thoroughlv shattered. It had been formed begin to 

. . . break up. 

to support Bismarck's liberal policy, and 
when he ceased to be liberal it fell apart like a pack of 
hounds when the fox doubles and throws them off the 
scent. A fraction broke away at once and voted for 
the tariff ; while the rest of the members were divided 
into right and left wings, which were constantly bicker- 
ing, and held together only until a definite occasion for 
a quarrel occurred. 1 Another unmistakable sign of 

1 See the articles on the parties in the Reichstag, in Unsere Zeit, by 
Oppenheim (1880, i.), Friedrich Boettcher (1881, ii.), and Johannes Berg 
(1882, i. ii. ; and 1883, ii.). 



26 GERMANY. 

Bismarck's change of policy was now given, for at the 
close of the tariff debate all the remaining liberal 
Prussian ministers retired. But the National Liberals 
had not vet adjusted themselves to the new conditions, 
and were not prepared to take a definite stand as sup- 
porters or opponents of the new policy. In April and 
May. 1880, they voted almost solidly in the Reichstag 
for the prolongation of the anti-socialist law, and for 
the bill fixing the size of the army for another seven 
years. The Centre, on the other hand, which had 
raised Bismarck's hopes by its coalition with the Con- 
servatives on the tariff, exasperated him by voting 
against these measures ; and, in order to conciliate this 
party or undermine its source of strength, he made 
another change of base which marks the final transition 
from the old order of things to the new. 

The Kulturkampf had failed to break the spirit or 

the political power of the Clericals, and when 

tion of the Leo Xm., on his election to the papacv in 

May laws, 

March, lo<k, made conciliatory overtures, 
Bismarck was glad of an opportunity of putting an 
end to the struggle. The negotiations, however, came 
to nothing, because the Holy See would not consent to 
allow the installation of priests to be subject to the 
approval of the state. But in spite of this the Prus- 
sian ministers brought into the Landtag, in May, 1880, 
a bill to give to the government a discretionary power 
in the application of the May laws, so that they might 
be enforced less rigorouslv. The bill went too far for 
the Liberals, and not far enough to please the Centre ; 
but a compromise was made with the right wing of 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 27 

the National Liberals, who then voted for the measure 
and insured its passage. This law furnished the occa- 
sion for the final quarrel among the National Liberals. 
The left wing refused to vote for it; and 
on August 30, after the close of the session, final split in 
about a quarter of the members of the party, Liberal 
including many of the most celebrated leaders, 
such as Forckenbeck, Stauffenberg, and Bamberger, 1 
formally seceded and formed a new group under the 
name of the Liberal Vereinigung, or Liberal Union. 
The right wing retained the old name, and under 
Bennigsen as its leader continued to follow Bismarck 
in spite of his change of front ; while the seceders pur- 
sued their former progressive policy. 

Bismarck had now reversed his political, his eco- 
nomic, and his religious programme, and had Bismarck 
transferred his favor from the Liberals to the obtain°a 
Conservatives. He had not, however, sue- ^Reich- 11 
ceeded in obtaining a submissive majority in stag ' 
the Reichstag, for the two Conservative parties, to- 
gether with the remnant of the National Liberals, were 
still in a minority. 2 The Centre held the balance of 
power, and understood its advantage far too well to 
give its services without an equivalent. The continual 
mitigation of the May laws ended in their almost 
total abrogation, and in a complete understanding with 
the Vatican ; but, in spite of this, the Clericals main- 
tained a position of general hostility, and never con- 
sented to the tobacco monopoly, because, by diminishing 

1 Lasker had left the party as early as March. 

2 In the Landtag these three parties together had a majority. 



28 GERMANY. 

the power of the Reichstag, it would have lessened at 
the same time their own influence. 

The years that followed are called by Dr. Blum the 
The weak- saddest period in the recent history of Ger- 
thTmiddie niany, and certainly at no time was there less 
parties. harmony between Bismarck and the represen- 
tatives of the people. The annals of the Reichstag are 
filled with accounts of the rejection of the Chancellor's 
most cherished bills, and of personal wrangles between 
the government and the leaders of the hostile groups. 
This result was brought about by the weakening of the 
middle parties, which has been an injury to Germany 
to the present day. The strength and usefulness of 
the Reichstag from 1867 to 1878 was due to the fact 
that its action was controlled by a great party com- 
posed of men of moderate opinions. But after the 
secessions of 1879 and 1880 that party never regained 
the numbers and still less the influence it had once 
possessed, and its loss of power left the extreme ele- 
ments unchecked. Hence politics tended to degenerate 
into a conflict between the violent parties, while 
struggles to promote the interests of a class or a 
faction took a more and more prominent place. The 
weakening of the middle parties was directly caused 
by Bismarck's change of policy. The modification of 
the May laws, the proposal to vote the imperial budget 
only once in two years, the appointment as Prussian 
Minister of the Interior of von Puttkamer, who used 
excessive official pressure at elections, and, above all, a 
dread of the tobacco monopoly, frightened people of 
moderate views so much that they turned away from 



HISTORY OF PARTIES, 29 

the candidates who favored the government. Hence 
the Free Conservatives and National Liberals lost a 
large number of seats to the more radical groups/ and 
what was even more important, the members of the 
new Liberal Union, who, as the left wing of the 
National Liberals, had formerly been kept in a mod- 
erate attitude by the influence of von Bennigsen, were 
driven to seek allies farther to the left. In 1884 they 
united with the Fortschritt, or rather merged into it, 
and, under the name of the Deutsch Freisinnige, or 
German Free-thinking party, formed a new group, 
which was guided by Eugene Richter, the radical 
leader. Thus the five old parties were substantially 
restored, but their strength and their relations to the 
government were different from what they had been 
before. The Conservatives were now the Chancellor's 
most faithful allies, the Free Conservatives almost always 
followed him, and although the National Liberals often 
voted against his bills, they, too, were counted among 
his supporters, while the Centre was usually and the 
Deutsch Freisinnige persistently hostile. 

The most serious conflict during this period took 
place in 1887 over the bill to fix the size of 
the army for the next seven years, known as over the 

s p*d t g n n 3j t g 

the septennate. The two Conservative parties 
and the National Liberals favored the bill, but the 
Deutsch Freisinnige, the Social Democrats, and all the 
various kinds of particularists opposed it. The fate of 
the measure hung upon the Clericals, and they decided 
to vote against it, in spite of the admonitions of the 

1 This was not the case in the Prussian Landtag. 



30 GERMANY. 

Pope, who had now reached an understanding with 
Bismarck. The Reichstag was i in mediately dissolved, 
and, owing to the fear of war, which was especially 
great in the southern States, the opponents of the 
septennate lost votes at the elections so heavily that 
the Conservative parties, together with the National 
Liberals, carried a majority of the seats. This seemed 
Election of to De * ne mos t docile Reichstag that Bis- 
fayorabfe^o marck had ever encountered. At his request 
lsmarck * it even lengthened the term of its successors 
from three years to five, and yet it was destined to 
be an instrument of his fall. 

On March 9, 1888, the old Emperor William died, 
Death of an( ^ n ^ s son Frederick, on whom the Liberals 
amUf™ 1 '' na( l se t their hopes, was much too ill to 
AceeSon of dismiss the Chancellor and begin a different 
iam " policy, even if he felt any inclination to 
do so. His most important act was the removal of 
the Prussian minister von Puttkamer, who had made 
himself thoroughly unpopular by using official pressure 
at elections. But except for this, his short reign of 
ninety-nine days left no permanent mark on German 
politics. With the accession of the present Emperor, 
however, a new era began, and this the Reichstag 
helped to inaugurate. 

One of the most difficult questions with which the 
government had been confronted arose from the agita- 
tion of the Socialists. Before the war of 1866 the 
Germans were a frugal, contented race, but after their 
victories they acquired a craving for material pros- 
perity. The result was speculation among the rich, 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 31 

the growth of large cities, and the development of a 

huge and discontented mass of workingmen, 

•who present one of the most serious dangers unsuccessful 

* -i -i • efforts to 

for the future ot Germany, — the alarming suppress the 

• v • • i t»- r Soeialists - 

spread of socialistic doctrines. Bismarck 

saw this danger early, and tried to meet it both by 
repression and by conciliation. He destroyed 
the press of the Socialists, broke up their ivemeas- 
meetings, and exiled their leaders from the 
great cities, but all without avail. In spite of his 
efforts, they grew in strength, and, except for the 
election of 1887, they carried an almost steadily in- 
creasing number of seats in the Eeichstag. 2 He tried, 
on the other hand, to remove their grievances His com . , 
by adopting a form of state socialism him- siSnce m ~ 
self. With this object he passed a series of laws " 
laws on the compulsory insurance of workmen, which 
were gradually extended until they covered accidents, 
sickness, and old age, and included almost all kinds 
of labor. But this policy, far from satisfying the 
Socialists, rather stimulated their ambition. 3 From the 
political point of view, therefore, it has not been a 
success ; and, indeed, the last of these laws, that on 
insurance against old age, which provided for a heavy 
contribution on the part of the state, has been so 

1 Cf. " Le Parti de la Democratic Sociale en Allemagne," J. Bourdeau, 
Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1 and April 15, 1891. 

2 In 1871, they elected three members; in 1874, 9; in 1877, 13; in 
1878, 9; in 1881, 12; in 1884, 24; in 1887, 11; in 1890, 35; and in 1893, 
44. 

8 The Social Democrats voted against all these laws on the ground that 
they were insufficient, a mere sop to Cerberus. 



32 GERMANY. 

universally unpopular among all classes, including the 
workingmen themselves, that for the present any 
further steps in this direction are improbable. 1 

Bismarck's measures for the repression of socialistic 

agitation were authorized by statutes of ex- 

sionofthe ceptional severity, which were enacted only 

istiaw for a limited number of years at a time, but 

reiected by 

the Reich- hitherto had always been renewed before their 

stag in 1890. . J 

termination. The last of them expired by 
its terms in the autumn of 1890, and at the end of 
1889 the Chancellor presented to the Keichstag a bill 
more drastic than the existing law. Not only were the 
Centre and the Kadicals opposed to the continuation of 
any exceptional legislation of this kind, but even the 
National Liberals were unwilling to vote for certain 
clauses which provided for the suppression of news- 
papers, and gave the government power to expel agita- 
tors from the cities. With their help these clauses 
were struck out, although Bismarck considered them 
important. The attitude of the Emperor on the 
measure is still a mystery, but it was generally believed 
at the time that he disagreed with his Chancellor ; and 
it is certain that, although he held a council of min- 
isters after the amendments had been adopted, no 
announcement of its conclusions was communicated to 

1 " The German Crisis and the Emperor," by L. Bamberger, in the 
New Review, April, 1892 ; " Le Socialism d'Etat dans l'Empire Allemand : 
Les Pensions aux Invalides," Ch. Grad, Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1, 
1890. 

For an adverse criticism of this law, see an article by William Bode, 
" Old Age Pensions: The Failure in Germany," in the National Review t 
March, 1892. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 33 

the Reichstag, and no attempt was made to effect a 
compromise with the National Liberals, which could 
probably have been done. The uncertainty about the 
opinion of the government, and the rumor that the 
Emperor was opposed to the bill, caused the Conserva- 
tives at the last moment to vote against it in its 
amended form, and it was rejected on January 25, 
1890. The term of the Reichstag expired The new 
just at this time, and the new elections may f^ableTo" 
be said to have gone against the administra- Blsmarck - 
tion ; for the Cartell, as the three parties friendly to 
the government who helped each other's candidates 
were called, lost many seats to the Radical groups, and 
the Centre obtained once more the balance of power. 

The loss of control over the Reichstag and some 
differences of opinion about current politics The causes 
hastened Bismarck's fall; 1 but in any case ofhisfa11 - 
the ambitious young monarch and the autocratic old 
Chancellor would have found it impossible to work 
peaceably together much longer. So long as he re- 
mained in office, Bismarck was certain to try to hold 
all the reins of government in his own hands, and to 
insist for that purpose in keeping his colleagues in 
strict subordination to himself. The Emperor, on the 
other hand, wanted to assume the personal direction of 
affairs, and this he could not do if he must consult 

1 A question arose at this time which was apparently a source of 
dissension, although, like all the matters connected with Bismarck's 
retirement, it is still wrapped in mystery. Early in February the Em- 
peror invited the Great Powers to an international conference on the 
labor problem at Berlin, a step to which the Chancellor was thought to 
be certainly opposed. 

VOL. II. 



34 GERMANY. 

only with the Chancellor as his one official adviser. 
For many months, indeed, Bismarck had found among 
the ministers, and still more in the case of the Chief 
of Staff, a lack of harmony with his views and a 
spirit of independence which showed a reliance on a 
higher protection than his own. He insisted, therefore, 
that in accordance with a cabinet order of 1852 all 
communications between the Emperor and the other 
ministers must be made through him. Instead of 
consenting, William asked for a repeal of the order. 
While the matter was still unsettled, the Chancellor 
had an interview with Windthorst, the leader of the 
Centre, about which false reports got abroad. The 
Emperor demanded an account of the conversation, but 
this Bismarck positively refused to give ; and when 
words ran high he added that he should be glad to 
resign. To his amazement the offer was accepted, and 
the great statesman who had united Germany, and had 
held her destiny in his hand for nearly thirty years, 
suddenly found himself a private citizen. 

A change now came over the spirit of German 

politics, and the centre of interest shifted 

peror's from the Chancellor to the Emperor, whose 

attempt to . . 

rule in per- personality became a decisive factor in affairs 

son, and " 

stand above of state. Bismarck was succeeded bv Gen- 

parties. *> 

eral von Capri vi, a soldier rather than a 
statesman, whose object was to carry out his master's 
wishes instead of ruling in his name. Before long the 

1 There is a valuable criticism on the Emperor's policy by G. Valbert, 
in the Revue des Deux Mondes (March 1, 1892), "L'Empereur Guillaume 
II., ses Ministres et sa Politique." 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 35 

other ministers were almost all replaced by new men ; 
and it is worthy of notice that these men were not 
selected from any one political party, but represented, 
on the contrary, quite different opinions, for the Em- 
peror not only wanted to keep each of the ministers 
strictly dependent on himself, but intended also to 
stand outside of and above all the parties in the 
country. In accordance with this idea, he made no 
attempt to form a solid party in the Reichstag to 
support his policy, and trusted to chance majorities 
or special coalitions to carry each measure, a practice 
which has not proved altogether satisfactory. 

The fall of Bismarck caused at first a lull in the 
strife of factions. His dismissal was, indeed, 

t -i i i i i The army 

a step so extraordinary and so bold that no bills of 1890 

i n and 1891. 

one knew what change of policy it might 
portend ; and although the Emperor declared that the 
course of the government would remain unchanged, 
the fact that the anti-socialist laws with their restric- 
tions on the press were allowed to expire encouraged 
even the advanced Liberals to hope that they might be 
destined to enjoy the favor of the court. Their illu- 
sions were not of long duration. Shortly after the 
Reichstag met, they voted against a bill to increase the 
strength of the army, which was, however, carried 
by the help of the Centre and the Poles ; and in the 
next year their opposition forced the government to 
abandon a bill to raise military salaries. This was 
more than Caprivi could bear, and he openly declared 
war with them by stating that he was willing to take 
good advice from any quarter, but that he could not 



36 GERMANY. 

find it among the Liberal groups, and therefore could 
not enter into closer relations with them. 

That the Emperor did not intend to follow the 
programme of the Liberals was made, indeed, 

The confis- \ ° . ... ? 

catedreve- abundantly evident by his submitting to the 

nues re- . . ^ ° 

tgraed to Landtag in this same year, 1891, a bill to 
restore to the Catholic bishops the revenues 
withheld during the Kulturkampf. In spite of objec- 
tions urged by the National Liberals, and even by the 
Free Conservatives, the measure was pushed through in 
accordance with Bismarck's practice of trying to secure 
the assistance of the Centre in critical moments by 
making concessions in church matters. The policy, 
however, has had no better results than before, for while 
the Clericals have occasionally saved the government 
from defeat, they have sometimes turned against it on 
the most important occasions. 

Although the Emperor did not adopt the principles 
The com- °f ^ ne Liberals, he was very far from accept- 
Seatiesof i n g * ne dogmas of the Conservatives. He 
abandoned the high protective tariff which 
had been the main basis of the alliance between them 
and Bismarck, and negotiated a series of reciprocity 
treaties that accorded far better with the economic 
principles of the Liberals. The Conservatives were, 
naturally, much provoked, and a large part of them 
voted against the treaties, which were, however, rati- 
fied in the Reichstag by a large majority on December 
17, 1891. 

So far the Emperor had succeeded in getting a 
majority for all his most important measures, and in 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 37 

framing his policy as he pleased, without much regard 
to the views of any political party; but in ThePrus- 
the year 1892 he was constrained to yield to SoSbauf 
the pressure of public opinion. It happened 
in this wise : King William has a horror of irreligious 
sentiments, to which he is inclined to attribute the 
spread of socialistic and other doctrines subversive of 
discipline and good order. With a view of counter- 
acting all such tendencies, and also, no doubt, for the 
sake of further conciliating the Clericals, a bill was 
presented to the Prussian Landtag, providing for the 
religious education of children by the clergy of the 
different sects. The measure would have increased 
very much the influence of the Catholic and Protestant 
churches over the schools, and for that reason was 
heartily approved by the Conservatives and the Centre, 
who were in close concert at this time. Now these two 
parties together had a majority in the Landtag, and 
hence could insure the passage of the law. But in 
the community at large the feeling against it ran so 
high that the Emperor, who had declared in a pub- 
lic speech that his course was right and would be pur- 
sued, was staggered, and suddenly ordered his ministers 
to withdraw the bill. The immediate effect of his 
change of mind was the resignation of the Minister of 
Education and surrender by Caprivi of his functions as 
Prussian Premier, though not of his position as Impe- 
rial Chancellor. Another result was a loss of prestige 
on the part of the government. The Liberals were, of 
course, overjoyed at their victory, but the Clericals and 
Conservatives were disgusted. The former had no 



38 GERMANY. 

hesitation in venting their wrath by voting against a 
naval appropriation ; while the latter, who did not dare 
to assume a position of open hostility, showed their 
irritation by quarreling among themselves. 

The effect of the government's loss of influence was 

seen in the defeat of the army bill and in the 

bill of 1892- elections that followed. This bill, which was 

by the brought into the Reichstag in November, 

Reichstag. & & 

1892, and came to a final vote six months 
later, was designed to increase the size of the army, and 
as an offset it was proposed to reduce the term of actual 
service to two years instead of two and a half. Now 
the Conservative parties and the National Liberals had 
not votes enough to carry it, and the help of a large 
part of the Centre was necessary to make up a majority. 
But although many of the Clericals in the Reichstag, 
who are by nature political traders, would have been 
glad to vote for the bill as the price of concessions to 
the church, yet the feeling among their constituents 
was so strong against the measure that only a few of 
them, representing the aristocratic Catholic districts of 
northern Prussia, ventured to do so. The result was 
that on May 6, 1893, the bill was rejected, 210 to 162. 
_. , . The Reichstag was at once dissolved, and the 

Dissolution. ° m 7 

The new government was so far successful in the cam- 
pa e sse?tSe P a % n that on J u ty 13 the newly elected rep- 
bm * resentatives passed the crucial clause in the 

form finally accepted by Caprivi by a vote of 198 to 
187, and afterwards the whole bill, 201 to 185. 

At first sight this appears to have been a great 
triumph for the government, but if we look closely the 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 39 

victory will be seen to be a very doubtful one. In 
the first place the form in which the bill was A doubtful 
finally passed, with the approval of the gov- the^ovem- 
ernment, was one that Caprivi had refused to ment " 
accept before the dissolution ; and in fact it would 
probably not have been difficult to procure the consent 
of the old Reichstag to the bill in that form. In 
the second place the candidates who favored the bill 
received at the election less than half of the popular 
vote. In the third place, the majority for the bill in 
the new Reichstag was very narrow, and depended in 
fact on the votes of the nineteen Polish members, 
whose opposition would have turned the scale. 1 Finally 
the majority, far from being a united party, was com- 
posed of inharmonious and uncertain elements. The 
National Liberals gained few seats at the elections, 
while the two Conservative parties hardly gained at all, 
and yet these three groups are the only ones on which 
the government can safely rely in the future. The 
rest of the majority was made up chiefly of Poles, of 
Anti-Semitics and of dissident Radicals, who cannot be 
expected to be constant allies. In the ranks of the 
opposition, on the other hand, the Socialists, the most 
implacable of all the enemies the government has ever 
had, gained about twenty per cent, both in seats and in 

1 In this case the Emperor reaped the reward of his own magnanimity, 
for the Poles had hated Bismarck, who pursued the policy of driving out 
of the country those members of the race that were not citizens of the 
Empire, and supplying their places with German colonists. King Wil- 
liam abandoned this practice, conciliated the Poles in administrative, 
educational, and ecclesiastical matters, and even raised one of them to 
the See of Posen, thereby winning the friendship of their representatives. 



40 GERMANY. 

popular votes ; * while the great party of the Centre, 
though slightly diminished in numbers, was more bit- 
terly hostile than it has been at any time since the close 
of the Kulturkampf. The Emperor might, indeed, 
draw some consolation from the fact that the Freisin- 
nige, or Radical party, broke in two, and lost nearly 
half its members, but this hardly counterbalanced the 
danger from the increase of the Socialists. 

Two marked tendencies shown in the recent elections 
T deserve especial notice. One of these is the 

e £ cies • a unpopularity of the Emperor's course in the 

shown in the r r J r 

i893 tionso£ sou th German States. This is as unmistak- 
Hostiktyof a °l e as it is unfortunate. Thirty-nine out of 
German the forty-eight members of the Reichstag 
elected in Bavaria, and fourteen out of the 
seventeen from Wurtemberg, were pledged to oppose 
the army bill ; and in fact the measure was saved only 
by a gain of supporters in Prussia and the other 
States north of the Main. The hostility of the south 
is due not to any want of loyalty to the Empire, but to 
a dislike of the attempt to rule the whole country from 
Berlin by treating the smaller States as dependencies 
of Prussia. It may also be traced not less certainly to 
the breaking up of the National Liberals, the only 
great national party in which the leaders from all parts 
of the Empire could act in concert. 

The other tendency to which allusion has been made 
is the increasing disintegration of the groups, and this 
is a direct consequence of the Emperor's attempt to 

1 They polled nearly two million votes, and elected forty-four depu- 
ties. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 41 

stand above all parties and select as his ministers 
men of different opinions. His policy has 
been neither altogether conservative nor en- dishfte^f- 
tirely liberal. On some subiects, such as the ties caused 

. J . . by the Em- 

tariff, the treatment of Socialists, and the peror's 

. . policy. 

press, he has followed a course highly satis- 
factory to the Liberals ; on others, such as education, 
and more especially the army, he has done quite the 
reverse. The result is that the several ministers have 
been far more independent of each other, less in har- 
mony, and more jealous of one another's influence 
than in Bismarck's day; while in the Reichstag the 
parties are even less clearly divided than before into 
supporters and opponents of the administration. Since 
the Emperor took the reins into his own hands, every 
one of the groups has been hostile to some measure of 
the government, and every one, except, perhaps, the 
Socialists, has approved of some of its bills. All this 
has naturally produced a lack of political cohesion 
and a confusion of aims. The parties to which the 
crown chiefly looks for support are, in fact, far from 
having the union among themselves that is necessary 
for a successful conduct of public affairs. During the 
campaign of 1893 the government was annoyed to find 
that the Conservatives, the Free Conservatives, and the 
National Liberals, instead of combining to carry the 
elections, set up rival candidates, and fought against 
each other. But it is hard to see how any other result 
could have been expected where the ministers were not 
in accord among themselves and made no attempt to 
organize and lead their followers. At that election the 



42 GERMANY. 

Prussian bureaucracy did not exert the customary pres- 
sure on the voters, and while this was in itself a great 
gain, it was unfortunately also a sign of a want of 
sympathy between the government and the parties 
on which it must rely for the support of its policy. 
Except for the Centre and the Socialists, who have 
succeeded in keeping their followers pretty well to- 
gether, in spite of serious differences of opinion, the 
process of disintegration has gone even farther among 
the opponents than the friends of the government. 
The present Reichstag is, in fact, subdivided to an 
astonishing degree ; for, in addition to the two Con- 
servative parties, the National Liberals, the Centre, 
the Socialists, and the four classes of Particularists, 
there are no less than five separate groups of Radi- 
cals, no one of which contains over twenty-fife mem- 
bers. 1 

Lord Bacon, in his essay on " Counsel," remarks 
that " It is in vaine for Princes to take Counsel con- 
cerning Matters, if they take no Counsell likewise 
concerning Persons ; " and it may be added that in 
a modern government with a representative assembly 
there is no use in considering programmes unless parties 

1 The different groups in the present Reichstag, and the number of 
their members, are as follows : — 

German Conservatives . . 72 Bavarian Peasants' Union . . 4 

German Imperial Party . . 26 Social Democrats .... 44 

National Liberals .... 53 Poles 19 

Anti-Semitics 16 Alsace Lorrainers .... 8 

Centre 96 Guelphs 7 

Free-thinking, Union ... 13 Independents 4 

Free-thinking, People's Party 23 Dane 1 

South German People's Party 11 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 43 

are considered also. But this is precisely the mistake 
that has been made of late years in Germany. The 
Conservatives to-day are, on the whole, decidedly an 
administration party; but as the present government 
does not try to reconcile its interests with theirs, — does 
not, in fact, seek to lead and control them, — they 
develop their own programme without always consider- 
ing the opinions of the ministers, and hence cannot be 
relied upon to do what the government desires. We 
have seen that when Bismarck found the National 
Liberals unwilling to submit to his dictation and adopt 
his policy, he turned to the Conservatives as a more 
docile and manageable party. The reason, indeed, 
that the German government hesitates to ally itself 
closely with the Liberals is that they become numerous 
under the favor of the crown, but cannot be sub- 
jected to discipline and made to obey their leaders. 
The Conservatives, on the contrary, rarely grow so 
strong as to be dangerous, and in Prussia, at least, are 
not independent enough to be exacting if properly 
managed. Now the present government, by departing 
from Bismarck's later policy of an intimate union with 
the Conservatives, has left them to a great extent 
without guidance. The result is that they have not 
only become weakened by internal dissensions, but have 
adopted agrarian theories, and taken up an attitude of 
aggressive hostility to the Jews, which the Emperor 
cannot sanction, and which cannot fail to be a source 
of great perplexity in the future. 

But perhaps the worst feature in the existing 
condition of politics is the constant diminution of the 



44 GERMANY. 

moderate elements. Less than one quarter of the 
members of the Reichstag can now be classed under 
that head, while all the rest are either particularist or 
belong to some extreme group. 1 

The practice of filling the highest offices of state 
Dissensions ^ tn men °^ different and even conflicting 
mTSe^in vi ews bore at length its natural fruit. The 
1894, Emperor had abandoned the repressive meas- 

ures against the Socialists, and had allowed the excep- 
tional laws for their suppression to lapse. But from a 
political point of view the policy of liberty was even 
less successful than that of persecution. Their associa- 
tions and newspapers revived, their members increased 
faster than ever ; and although freedom of discussion 
brought in its train greater moderation and fostered 
differences of opinion among the members, it did not 
prevent the body from remaining a source of danger 
to the state. Still less did it prevent the party from 
attacking the government both in the Keichstag and 
through the press. At last the Emperor made up his 
mind to resort again to repressive action of some kind ; 
but Caprivi the Chancellor, and Eulenburg the head 
of the Prussian cabinet, found it impossible to agree 
upon the matter, and the quarrel became so sharp that 
both of them were forced to retire from office. 

A few months later the so-called anti-revolutionary 
bill to punish glorification or justification of offenses 
against public order was brought into the Reichstag. 

1 The only groups that can fairly be reckoned as moderate are the 
Free Conservatives, the National Liberals, and the Freisinnige Vereini- 
gung. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 45 

It was, however, amended in committee by the Clericals 
until it lost much of its anti-revolutionary character, 
and became chiefly a measure for helping and protect- 
ing the church. So thoroughly did it change its 
character that at last it was ignominiously rejected 
by the Reichstag without even a formal division. 
About the same time the bill to increase the tax on 
tobacco was voted down by a large majority ; and in 
fact the government failed in this session to carry a 
single one of the measures that had been announced in 
the speech from the throne. The Reichstag had be- 
come thoroughly unmanageable. 1 Nor does a change 
in its attitude seem probable ; for the present state of 
party spirit is highly unfavorable to the government. 
The Conservatives, by reason of agricultural distress, 
have come under the influence of agrarians, who demand 
bimetalism and a state monopoly of imported cereals, 
neither of which can be conceded by the Emperor. 
The moderate elements have lost their strength. The 
Centre is defiant, the Radicals are hostile, and with 
the Social Democrats the government is engaged in a 
life and death struggle, breaking up their societies, 
and trying to silence their press by means of tyrannical 
prosecutions for libel. In short, it is not easy to see 

1 It also irritated the Emperor very much at the time of Bismarck's 
birthday. The former Chancellor had increased the difficulties of the gov- 
ernment by constant public criticism of its policy; and in order, perhaps, 
to put a stop to this, the Emperor finally became reconciled to his former 
minister. Bismarck's eightieth birthday was made the occasion for an 
ovation ; but the Centre, the Poles, the Radicals, and the Social Democrats 
could not forgive his treatment of them, and voted down a congratulatory 
address, which was proposed in the Reichstag. 



46 GERMANY. 

how the Emperor can hope to get a Keichstag with a 
majority of faithful supporters unless fortune offers a 
popular issue on which to base a dissolution. 

Such has been, in brief, the history of political par- 
Causes of ties in the German Empire. Let us now 
great pa^ study the causes that underlie their condition. 
In the first place the material is not adapted 
to the formation of great parties, for the Germans are 
Lack of ^ 00 little homogeneous, and their traditions 
ouSeSof" oi thought are too diverse, to allow any large 
t e people. ^^ £ ^ p e0 pj e ^ wor k together for a 

common end. One is constantly struck by the contra- 
dictions in the different phases of German character. 
Side by side with the dreamy, mystical turn of mind, 
there is a talent for organization and a submission to 
discipline that have made them the first military people 
of the day. Again, we are apt to attribute to German 
scholarship a peculiarly agnostic tendency, and yet no 
rulers in Christendom have the name of God so con- 
stantly on their lips as the German Emperors. Nor is 
there the least affectation or cant about this, for the 
Germans are at the same time one of the most religious 
and one of the most skeptical of races. The fact is 
that the people are divided into strata, social and intel- 
lectual, which are very different from one another in 
character and tone of thought. The various classes 
are, indeed, separated by an almost impassable gulf. 1 
At one extremity we find the noble landowners of 
Prussia, who form an aristocracy of the most exclusive 

1 See an interesting article entitled "Society in Berlin," by Professor 
Geffcken, in the New Review, August, 1892. 



CAUSES OF THE STATE OF PARTIES. 47 

type. They are conservative by temperament, military 
by taste and education, and the privilege which the 
officers still retain in most of the Prussian regiments of 
admitting as comrades only such men as they choose 
has enabled this class to keep the bulk of the offices in 
the army in its own hands. At the other end of the 
social scale are the workingmen, and these on account 
of their very isolation are peculiarly prone to socialism. 
Between the two extremes stand the commercial classes 
and the Jews, who are despised by those above them, 
and disliked by those below. The geographical differ- 
ences are also strongly marked in Germany. The 
south and west were far more thoroughly imbued with 
the principles of the French Revolution, and are far 
more democratic to-day, than the older parts of Prussia. 
The Prussians also are less German, as we commonly 
understand the German character, than the rest of the 
people. They are more practical, more military, and 
more bureaucratic ; and hence the sympathy even 
between the corresponding classes in different parts of 
the country is by no means complete. From a social 
point of view Germany is in fact extremely decentral- 
ized, as the limited and local circulation of the news- 
papers abundantly proves. 1 

This in itself might account for the absence of great 
national parties, but there are other reasons 

t n -, . -i n i s~i Intense indi- 

to be found m the nature oi the German vidnaiismin 

. opinions. 

considered as an individual. Heine declared 

that if twelve Germans were gathered together they 

1 See an article on " The German Daily Press," by Bamberger, in the 
Nineteenth Century, for January, 1890. 



48 GERMANY. 

would form as many separate parties, because each one 
of them would have an opinion of his own which dif- 
fered somewhat from that of any of the others. There 
is much truth in the remark, for the German has a 
strong love of intellectual independence, and dislikes 
the idea of subordinating his opinion to that of another 
man, or of being supposed to take his views wholesale 
from some one else. No group in the Reichstag, for 
example, wants to be considered a purely governmental 
party, at the beck and call of the Chancellor ; and in 
the same way the newspapers do not like to be treated 
as the mere organs of a party, and the parties do not 
like to be thought to be under the guidance of a news- 
paper. 1 All this, of course, makes party discipline a 
very difficult matter. 

Something must also be attributed to the policy of the 
Bismarck's government. 2 Bismarck hated parties, and 
party pofi- chafed under their criticism ; and when the 
tics * National Liberals grew strong enough to be 

formidable, and at the same time were too independent 
to be submissive, he wanted to be rid of them ; so he 
proceeded on the principle of divide et impera, and turn- 
ing against them he broke them to pieces. This course 
has been pursued even more thoroughly, if with less 

deliberate intent, since his fall. Another 
ment of the thing which Bismarck detested, but which is 

essential to the formation of great national 
parties, is a free press, and partly by favor, partly by 

1 Bamberger, Id. 

2 Cf. " Vaterlandsliebe, Parteigeist, u. Weltbiirgerthum," by Dr. J. B. 
Meyer, in Deutsche Zeit u. Streit-Fragen, 1893. 



BISMAKCK'S DISLIKE OF PAETIES. 49 

force, he succeeded in keeping the greater part of the 
German press under his control. By means of the 
anti-socialist laws he well nigh destroyed the socialist 
press; and during his rule prosecutions for libeling 
the Chancellor were so frequent that it became very 
dangerous to criticise the administration, although the 
governmental newspapers enjoyed an entire immunity 
in attacking his enemies. Through the press office, 
which grew to be an important wheel in the political 
machinery, the so-called " reptile press " was filled with 
inspired or semi-inspired articles, and no small part of 
the newspapers were held in subjection, by giving or 
refusing information, by official advertisements, and 
even by money. Fortunately for Bismarck, there was 
a considerable source of revenue available for the pur- 
pose, for when the Kingdom of Hanover was incorpo- 
rated in Prussia, a fund, known as the Guelph Fund, 
was formed from the proceeds of the royal property, 
and set apart for the benefit of the deposed king, sub- 
ject, however, to a condition that he should not receive 
it until he acquiesced in the loss of his throne. This 
he steadily refused to do, and hence the income, 
amounting to about a million marks a year, remained 
unspent in the hands of the Prussian government. 
Now there being no provision of law obliging the min- 
isters to account for the income, they were free to use 
it as they chose, and they placed a large part of it at 
the disposal of the press office. In this way the press 
became a weapon in the hands of the government, 
rather than an organ of public opinion. 1 Caprivi, more 

1 Cf. "The German Daily Press," by Bamberger, supra; and "The 
vol. n. 



50 GERMANY. 

liberal than his predecessor, gave up the practice of 
controlling the newspapers, and, since 1892, the income 
of the Guelph Fund has been paid to the Duke of Cum- 
berland, the heir of the late King of Hanover. It may- 
be hoped, therefore, that in time the press will acquire 
the influence that it ought to have in a free country ; 
but as yet it has not done so. 

The disintegration of the parties is also due to their 

peculiar position in the Reichstag and Land- 

spcmsibiiky tag-. Unlike cabinet officers who are respon- 

of the par- _ ° x 

ties helps to sible to parliament, the ministers in Germany 

break them * 7 J 

up - are not the chiefs of any party, but rather 

professional administrators. In fact, the line between 
officials and the rest of the community is very marked, 
and the leading men in the popular chamber do not 
aspire to be ministers, and are rarely selected for the 
great offices of state. So true is this that even when 
the National Liberals were most closely allied with 
Bismarck, it was not the adherents of this party, but 
the Free Conservatives who were appointed to impor- 
tant positions. It follows that the parties are inde- 
pendent of the ministers, and are not responsible for 
the conduct of the state. Their function is negative 
rather than positive, for they do not direct and control 
the government, but simply criticise and amend its 
measures. Such a lack of responsibility not only makes 
the parties hard to manage, but it relieves their 
members in large part from the necessity of agree- 
ing upon a programme. They are not kept together by 

Change of Government in Germany," in the Fortnightly Review, August, 
1890. 



PARTY ORGANIZATION. 51 

the need of cooperating for a common end, and hence 
there is nothing to prevent the parties from breaking 
up into fragments, according to the various shades 
of opinion they contain. This is, in fact, continually 
taking place. Every little while a fraction splits off 
from some party and forms an ephemeral group by 
itself, to be absorbed later by another organization. 
Strange results sometimes follow, and in the early days 
of the Reichstag the parties were such queer con- 
glomerates that one of them, on account of the 
heterogeneous elements it contained, was called in 
derision the party of the mixed pickles. 

Except in the case of the Social Democrats, and to 
some extent of the Centre, the only organi- The party 
zation in the party is the club, which is com- elubs * 
posed exclusively of deputies in the Reichstag, and is 
formed in order to discuss and decide upon the policy 
to be pursued there. But the Germans do not like 
binding decisions, except on the most important meas- 
ures, and it frequently happens, even on matters of 
serious consequence, that the members of the club do 
not all vote the same way. The most striking of these 
clubs was that of the National Liberals in their halcyon 
days ; for the discipline of that party was always loose, 
and the debates in the club were so animated that 
it resembled a small parliament by itself. With the 
negative objects for which the parties stand, the clubs 
alone would not suffice to hold the members together, 
and the real bond of union is the necessity for com- 
mon action at elections. But here, as in France, the 
requirement of a majority vote, with a second ballot 



52 GERMANY. 

in case no one obtains it, favors the existence of a 
multiplicity of parties. 

In all three of the countries we have been studying, 
there are a number of political groups, but the causes 
of this state of things are not the same in each case. 
In some ways, the parties in Germany differ very much 
from those in France and still more from those in 
Italy. Their object is to restrain rather than direct 
the government ; and in the element that binds their 
members together political principles form a larger and 
personal ambition a smaller element. 

One is always tempted to play at the hazardous 
game of prophecy, and to test the soundness 

Difficulty in & _ , . . J \ , . , 

prophesying or one s opinions by applying them to a 
future and therefore an unknown state of 
things. This is especially perilous in so complicated a 
matter as politics, where much depends on the personal 
qualities of the leading men, and where unforeseen 
events often upset the whole basis of calculation. It 
is peculiarly difficult in Germany on account of the 
number of factors that enter into the problem. One 
of the most important of these is the disposi- 
of the Em- tion and capacity of the Emperor ; and it is 

peror. 

not a little extraordinary that although Wil- 
liam II. has now been on the throne eight years, and 
has seized on every possible opportunity to declare his 
sentiments on every conceivable subject, his character 
is still an enigma. It is not clear whether he has really 
profound theories of government or not, and whether, 
like his grandfather, he has the strength of will to 
carry out his plans, in spite of serious opposition, or 



THE EMPEROR'S POLICY AND ITS DANGERS. 53 

whether, as his course on the education bill and during 
the recent friction with England about the Transvaal 
seem to indicate, he would give way before a deter- 
mined resistance. He has, however, one quality about 
which there can be no mistake, and that is 
his desire to identify himself personally and for personal 
publicly with his government, to make every 
act of the administration visibly his own. This is 
largely due, no doubt, to his craving for causes of 
theatrical display, and to his love of acting this ' 
the part of king in the drama of the world; but it 
arises also from his conception of his duty as a 
sovereign anointed by God. He apparently regards 
himself as commissioned, not only to govern the state, 
but to lead and guide his people in all matters. The 
most curious example of this was given in his address 
on the proper method of teaching history, made before 
a meeting of instructors in December, 1890. The 
address embodies, indeed, the Emperor's political ideas, 
and illustrates his practical tone of mind. He told 
his hearers that the present mode of teaching history 
was all wrong ; that instead of beginning with Greece 
and Rome and coming down to recent times, they 
ought to begin with the present century and then go 
backwards. He also remarked that the students ought 
to be taught that the French Revolution was an unmiti- 
gated crime against God and man, and that they ought 
to be shown the fallacies of socialism. In his opinion, 
the object of education is to teach politics, to create 
obedient subjects and loyal supporters of the crown. 1 

1 Valbert, in the Revue des Deux Mondes (Jan. 1, 1891, " L'Empereur 



54 GERMANY. 

The Emperor is, indeed, an ardent believer in the 
new monarchical theory which has recently 

His theory . • r* ■, 

of the mon- come into vogue in Germany, — a theory that 
decries universal suffrage and proclaims the 
military monarchy as the best possible form of govern- 
ment, — thus furnishing one of many examples of the 
way the end of the century is rejecting the principles 
and reversing the conclusions that have been laboriously 
developed during the last hundred years. 1 The fact 
is, that ever since the battle of Sadowa a profound 
change has been coming over the German character. 
The dreamy, poetical, mystical temperament has given 
way before the hard, practical, organizing spirit of the 
Prussians. 2 The unity of the Fatherland, which the 
dreamers failed to accomplish, was brought about by 
means of the drill-sergeant, and hence the nation is 
ruled by his methods. 3 

The Emperor's desire to make himself prominent in 
Dangers of public affairs is liable to prove a snare to 
this policy, ^ m . £ or j£ ne - g k nown £ direct in person 

the policy of the state, and the course of the govern- 
ment becomes at any time unpopular, which is certain 
to happen sooner or later, he cannot set himself right 

Guillaume II. et ses Vues sur la Re'f orme de l'Enseignement Secondaire "), 
comments on this speech and on the chauvinism of German historical 
instruction. 

1 Perhaps the best exponent of this theory is Professor Treitsclike. 
See a criticism of his works by J. Bourdeau, in the Revue des Deux 
Mondes (June 15, 1889, "Un Apologiste de l'Etat Prussien"). 

2 There is an interesting letter on this subject in the Nation of July 24, 
1890. 

8 For an amusing account of the excessive administration in Germany, 
see " An Over-administered Nation," Macmillan, May, 1892. 



THE GROWTH OF DISCONTENT. 55 

by dismissing his ministers, but will be held personally 
responsible, and must bear the blame. A similar habit 
helped to overturn the throne of Louis Philippe ; and 
while there is no danger of such a result in the case 
of the Emperor, it is not improbable that a false step 
on his part will be followed by a serious loss of repu- 
tation and authority, and will pave the way for the 
exercise of a larger influence by the representatives of 
the people. 

Two opposite forces are growing in Germany to-day : 
one is the belief in military monarchy, which 
is receiving no little support among scholars ; of discon- 
the other is a spirit of discontent, which is 
making fearful headway among the lower classes; and 
between the two the liberal elements are being pushed 
into the background. 1 In fact, both of these opposing 
forces derive much of their strength from a common 
source. The change from a theoretical to a practical 
point of view, that has lent potency to the doctrine of 
military monarchy, applies not only to politics, but also 
to private life, and here it has replaced the enthusiasm 
for ideal and intellectual aims by a craving for material 
prosperity and well-being. 2 The result, as we have 
seen, has been an immense increase in the power of the 
Social Democrats. It would be a great mistake, how- 
ever, to suppose that all the men who vote for the 
socialist candidates agree with their doctrines. Proba- 

1 Cf. Bamberger, "The German Crisis and the Emperor," New Review, 
April, 1892. 

2 Professor Bryce comments on this in " An Age of Discontent," Con- 
temp. Rev., Jan., 1891. 



56 GERMAOT. 

bly a small part of them do so ; 1 but the reactionary 
policy of the government, the burden of service in the 
army, and, above all, the difficulty of earning a com- 
fortable living, have made a great many people discon- 
tented, and these vote the Socialist ticket as the most 
effective method of protest. The size of the Socialist 
vote is, therefore, a measure of the amount of discontent 
in Germany, and as such it is sufficiently alarming. 
That it will continue to grow for the present is alto- 
gether probable ; but what will happen if the Social 
Democrats become strong enough to exercise a decided 
influence on politics is by no means clear. With their 
increase in numbers in the Reichstag, their leaders have 
already become less violent, 2 and power is likely in 
the future to bring moderation. It is probable also 
that if they cease to be in a position of mere blind 
opposition, their discipline will be relaxed, and they 
will break up like other German parties of the Left. 
Although the Emperor is liable by making mistakes 
in policy to lose some of his authority, and 
government although the spirit of discontent may give rise 
improbable to difficulty or even to disorder, it will proba- 

at present. 

bly be a long time before the representatives 
of the people obtain the direction of public affairs. In 
France popular government arose not because demo- 
cracy was strong, but because aristocracy had withered 
away and monarchy had become feeble ; but in Ger- 

1 Cf . Bamberger, supra ; J. Bourdeau, " Le Parti de la Ddmocratie 
Sociale en Allemagne," Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1, and April 15, 
1891. 

2 Cf. Bamberger, supra. 



POPULAR GOVERNMENT IMPROBABLE. 57 

many monarchy is a living force, and democracy can 
get control of the state only by becoming really power- 
ful. Now democracy cannot be strong until the peo- 
ple are sufficiently homogeneous to form a real public 
opinion, and this cannot happen while the classes in 
society are out of harmony with each other. 

In studying the history of European countries, one 
is struck by the comparative absence in Eng- Absence of 
land of struggles between the different classes, tw^nthe 
By the end of the reign of Henry II. the ^ST 
power of the great vassals had been so far hhtOTJ - 
broken, and the organization of the royal justice had 
so thoroughly established the authority of the crown, 
that there was more danger of oppression by the King 
than by the feudal nobles ; and the latter, f eeling their 
own weakness, had a strong motive for enlisting popu- 
lar sympathy on their side. They could not afford to 
disregard the rest of the people, who became, in fact, 
their natural allies against arbitrary rule on the part 
of the crown. The barons at Runnymede extorted 
from King John, not privileges for their own order, 
but a charter of liberties for all Englishmen; and dur- 
ing the next two hundred and fifty years the nobles, 
although often banded together to curtail the royal 
authority and acquire more power for Parliament or for 
themselves, were never united against the lower classes, 
except, perhaps, at the moment of the peasants' revolt 
under Richard II. 

This period of English history was brought to a close 
by the Wars of the Roses. In the terrible struggle 
that ensued the common people took little part, but 



58 GERMANY. 

the baronage fought among themselves with such fero- 
city that the most powerful families were exterminated, 
feudalism was destroyed, and the ground was prepared 
for the despotism of the Tudor s. 1 After that able 
line of rulers became extinct, and the sceptre passed 
to the feebler house of Stuart, political parties with a 
continuous life began to form in the state. Buckle, 
in his history of civilization in England, 2 speaks of 
the conflict with Charles I. as a war of classes; and 
it is certain that at no period of English history did 
party lines coincide so nearly with social ones as during 
the Commonwealth. In comparing the English move- 
ment with the Fronde on the other side of the Channel, 
Buckle attributes the success of the former to this very 
fact; but it would, perhaps, be more just to ascribe 

1 Stubbs (Const. Hist, of England, 3d ed. vol. iii. p. 519), says : "Tak- 
ing the king and the three estates as the factors of the national problem, 
it is probably true to say in general terms that, from the Conquest to the 
Great Charter, the crown, the clergy, and the commons were banded to- 
gether against the baronage ; the legal and national instincts and inter- 
ests against the feudal. From the date of Magna Charta to the revolution 
of 1399, the barons and the commons were banded in resistance of the 
aggressive policy of the crown, the action of the clergy being greatly 
perturbed by the attraction and repulsion of the papacy. From the acces- 
sion of Henry IV. to the accession of Henry VII., the baronage, the peo- 
ple, and the royal house were divided each within itself, and that internal 
division was working a sort of political suicide which the Tudor reigns 
arrested, and by arresting it they made possible the restoration of the 
national balance." In another place (Id., vol. ii. p. 195), he remarks : 
" We shall see in the history of the fourteenth century that local and per- 
sonal interests were strong in all the three estates, and that there was far 
more to draw them together, or to divide them, so to speak, vertically, 
than to separate them according to class interests." And again (Id., 
vol. ii. p. 320), " The whole period witnesses no great struggle between 
the lords and the commons, or the result might have been different." 

2 Introduction, chap. x. 



ABSENCE OF CLASS STRUGGLES IN ENGLAND. 59 

Cromwell's failure to establish a permanent form of 
government to the alienation of a whole section of the 
community. 

With the Restoration the antagonism between the 
classes again subsided, and since that time the parties 
have been based essentially on differences of opinion, 
not on social distinctions. Both the Whigs and the 
Tories always included in their ranks large numbers 
of the aristocracy, who acted as leaders to the rest of 
the people ; while every effort to extend the suffrage 
has found some of its strongest advocates among 
the Peers. This is due in part, no doubt, to the 
fact which the late Professor Freeman took so much 
pleasure in expounding, that the English nobility have 
never been a close caste, and hence have retained a 
strong sympathy with the people. But whatever the 
cause, the absence of class jealousy in the formation of 
party has been of vast importance to the nation, and 
explains the steady progress of political liberty. One 
cannot help regretting, therefore, the effort made of 
late years to foster enmity between the masses and the 
classes, an attempt which has not resulted in consoli- 
dating the former, but has tended to drive the bulk of 
the latter into one political camp. 

The history of Germany is very different. During 
the period when the English kings were ex- 
tending and consolidating their power, the quencyin 
Emperors were exhausting their strength in a 
fruitless struggle with the Papacy ; and by the time the 
line of Hohenstaufen came to an end the opportunity 
to create a strong central power in Germany had passed 



60 GERMANY. 

away. The forces that might have sufficed to establish 
the imperial authority on a firm basis in the north had 
been carried across the Alps, and wasted by battles on 
the plains of Lombardy and by Roman fever. The 
absence of an effective control on the part of the crown 
permitted each element in the Empire to develop inde- 
pendently, to pursue its own ends without regard to 
the common welfare ; and the result was that at the 
close of the Middle Aofes the Germans, far from being" 
a homogeneous people, with a uniform law and a com- 
mon national sentiment, were divided into classes 
sharply separated by differences of habits, of traditions, 
of aspirations, and even of laws. 1 

By the middle of the fourteenth century the antago- 
nism between the cities, the princes, the knights, and 
the peasants had reached a dangerous point. The cities, 
in which the commercial and industrial development was 
exclusively centred, conducted as a rule their own gov- 
ernment, administered their own justice, and, except for 
the payment of certain sums of money in lieu of taxes, 
were almost independent of the rest of the country. 
Meanwhile the princes, or great feudal vassals of the 
Empire, who were striving not only to bring all the 
social forces within their territories into subjection, but 
also to extend their authority in every direction, were 
extremely jealous of the wealth and power of the cities. 
The same jealousy was felt by the knights, or lesser 
feudal tenants of the Empire, who envied, moreover, 
the growing influence of the princes. Their own 
position had in fact become precarious, for their mili- 

1 Cf. Lamprecht, Deutsche GesctiicJite, Bd. iv. and y. hlf. i. 



THEIR FREQUENCY IN GERMANY. 61 

tary usefulness was fast disappearing, and they were 
often forced to eke out a livelihood by robbery and by 
oppressing the peasants on their lands. 1 The condition 
of the peasants was, indeed, miserable. For the most 
part they had been reduced to serfdom, and had been 
deprived nearly everywhere of political rights, being 
even denied a share in the government of their vil- 
lages. A political and social crisis was at hand. To- 
wards the end of the fourteenth century wars between 
the knights and the cities broke out all over central 
Germany. The cities appeared at first to have the 
better chance of victory, but by the help of the princes 
they were beaten ; and although they were very far from 
being subdued, their political power began from that 
time to decline. This was the first of the great social 
struggles, but the condition of the country rendered 
others inevitable. The ferment caused by the Eefor- 
mation precipitated a conflict between the remaining 
classes a hundred and fifty years later. Revolts of the 
knights and of the peasants followed each other in 
1522 and 1525, and both were suppressed by the 
princes, that of the peasants with great barbarity. 

The princes were now the predominant force in the 
Empire, yet they were still far from being the masters 
of their own territories, for the disintegrating process 
that had destroyed the power of the Emperor had been 
at work in the great fiefs also. During the troublous 
times, the estates drew into their own hands a large 

1 Riehl (Die BilrgerlicJie Gesellschaft, book i. part ii. ch. ii.) thinks that 
in the Middle Ages the Patter played the part of mediators between the 
classes, and that their isolation dates from a later period. 



62 GERMANY. 

part of the political authority of the princes, which 
they used to create privileges for themselves, and to 
grind down the lower classes in city and country. 1 
After the thirty years' war, however, a change took 
place. The nobility came out of that fearful struggle 
weaker than before, and in the Protestant districts of 
Germany lost the support they had hitherto obtained 
from the bishops. The princes, on the other hand, 
were strengthened, and began to reduce the power of 
the estates, and reorganize their governments on a 
more strictly monarchical basis. 

The process was carried out most thoroughly in 
Brandenburg, especially after it developed into the 
Kingdom of Prussia. 2 Here the crown subjected all 
classes to its own authority by means of a centralized 
bureaucracy, which was out of the reach of class 
influence, and was guided solely by the royal will. 
The princes of the House of Hohenzollern felt that 
their mission consisted in introducing order among 
the jarring elements of the state by standing above 
them all, maintaining an impartial attitude, and subor- 
dinating special interests to the common good. This 
they did so effectually that the hostile classes, sects, 
and races learned to look for peace and protection to 
the King. But although the nobles in Prussia were 
unable to prolong their political power by exerting 
a controlling influence at court, as they did in some 
of the other German States, they were very far from 

1 Cf. Gneist, Der Rechtstaat, 2d ed. pp. 19-22. 

2 Cf. Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte, in 19. J ahrhundert, 3d ed. vol. i. 
pp. 24r-86 ; Gneist, " Les Re'formes Admr. en Prusse," op. cit. 



SEPARATION OF CLASSES IN PRUSSIA. 63 

losing all their privileges ; for the Hohenzollerns made 
no attempt to fuse all the classes together, or to give 
all ranks among the people equal rights by creating a 
uniform system of law. Their theory of the state was 
an absolute monarchy, in which the citizens should be 
divided, as in Plato's republic, into a series of orders, 
each performing a special kind of duties. Hence they 
tried deliberately to keep the classes distinct, organiz- 
ing them separately, and assigning to each definite 
functions. The nobles were intended to pursue agri- 
culture on a large scale and to supply officers for the 
army ; the peasants were to do the smaller cultivation 
and furnish the common soldiers ; while the cities were 
to carry on commerce and manufactures and pay a 
larger share of the taxes. The hardships of excessive 
privilege were carefully lightened, and the condition of 
the peasants was vastly improved, but until this cen- 
tury there was no effort to abolish class privileges ; 
and indeed they can hardly be said to have disappeared 
altogether at the present day. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the classes are still sharply separated in 
Germany, and especially in Prussia. 

The condition of the classes has had a momentous 
effect on political development. The Prus- Il)Prussia 
sian nobility have never stood like the English ? s la a s * ^ fe 
as defenders of the lowly against the crown. ^1^° 
On the contrary, the crown has been the g0Temmentl 
shield of the peasants against the oppressions of the 
great landowners. The nobles, moreover, have be- 
longed wholly to one political party, so that Prussia 
has never known that division of its aristocracy into 



64 GERMANY. 

Liberals and Conservatives, each furnishing leaders to 
the people, which has been of such inestimable value 
in England. It is, in fact, the strife of noble with 
peasant, of city with country, compelling every one to 
look to the king as an arbiter, that has given to the 
crown, and the bureaucracy as its tool, so great an 
influence and renown. 1 The same cause must continue 
to produce the same effect, and the royal authority 
cannot be permanently reduced until a great party is 
formed which finds hearty support in every rank of 
life, and can speak in the name of the people without 
distinction of class. But this must be preceded by 
a long, slow process of social evolution. 

Nor is it desirable that the Reichstag should acquire 

supremacy in the state so long as the an- 

of the tagonism between the classes continues. The 

Reichstag . . . 1 . 

undesirable present system, in which the elective chamber 

so long as ~" . . . 

class antag- has a voice m public affairs, while the main 

onism lasts. 

control rests with the crown, has the advan- 
tages and the disadvantages of all hereditary mon- 
archies. It has the merit of enabling a vigorous and 
capable sovereign to act for the public good, without 
too much regard to the prejudices of the various classes 
or the selfishness of particular interests ; but, on the 
other hand, it makes the selection of the ruler depend 
on the hazard of birth, and the history of Prussia shows 
to what a point of exaltation or depression the fortunes 
of the nation may be brought by the personal qualities 
of the reigning prince. 

1 This was also true at one time of the monarchy in France, but hardly 
to so great an extent as in Germany. 



HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL PARTIES. 65 

Now, whatever opinion one may hold in regard to 
the relative merits of monarchy and demo- 
cracy, it must be observed that a transfer of true de- 
power from the Emperor to the Reichstag 
would not at present produce a true democracy. Pro- 
fessor Freeman, in his essay on the " Growth of the 
English Constitution," i remarks : " Democracy, accord- 
ing to Perikles, is a government of the whole people, 
as opposed to oligarchy, a government of only a part 
of the people. A government which vests all power 
in any one class, a government which shuts out any 
one class, whether that class be the highest or the 
lowest, does not answer the definition of Perikles; 
it is not a government of the whole but only of a 
part ; it is not a democracy, but an oligarchy." And 
in a note he adds : " It follows that, when the com- 
monwealth of Florence disfranchised the whole of 
the noble families, it lost its right to be called a de- 
mocracy." The conception of government Tr _,. , , 

J A ° Vertical and 

by the whole people in any large nation is, of Jj? 1 ? 2 . 011 *^ 

«/ J- J- «/ o 7 division ot 

course, a chimera ; for wherever the suffrage ^ axties - 
is wide, parties are certain to exist, and the control 
must really be in the hands of the party that comprises 
a majority, or a rough approximation to a majority, 
of the people. But the principle has nevertheless an 
important application. If the line of division is 
vertical, so that the party in power includes a consider- 
able portion of each class in the community, every sec- 
tion of the people has a direct share in the government ; 
but if the line is horizontal, so that the party is substan- 

1 Page 10. 

VOL. II. 



66 GERMANY. 

tially composed of a single class, then the classes not 
represented in it are virtually disfranchised so long 
as that party maintains its ascendency. Instead of a 
true democracy, we have government by a single class, 
which degenerates easily into oppression. In this case, 
indeed, the tyranny is likely to be far worse than it 
would be if the ruling class were legally the sole 
possessor of power, because there is a lack of all sense 
of responsibility towards the rest of the people, and 
because the alternation in power of different classes, 
which must inevitably occur, breeds intense bitterness 
of feeling. So long, therefore, as party lines are 
vertical, popular government is on a sound basis. But 
if all the rich meu, or all the educated men, are 
grouped together, the state is in peril; and if the 
party lines become really horizontal, democracy is on 
the high road to class tyranny, which leads, as history 
proves, to a dictatorship. This is the meaning of the 
classic publicists when they speak of the natural 
rotation from monarchy to aristocracy, from this to 
democracy, and then back again to monarchy. To 
them, democracy meant, not government by the whole 
people, but the rule of the lower classes. 1 A territorial 
division of parties, indeed, is not as dangerous as a 

1 Aristotle, who combated Plato's theory of rotation in the form of 
government (Politics, bk. v. ch. xii.), draws a distinction between a iroAi- 
Tcfo, where the citizens at large rule the state for the public good, and 
a democracy, where the interest of the poor only is considered. (Bk. 
iii. ch. viii. ; bk. iv. ch. iv.) Elsewhere he speaks of the former as a mix- 
ture of aristocracy and democracy, and treats it as more stable than either 
of them. (Bk. v. ch. vii.) He refers also to the peculiar dangers that 
arise when the middle classes disappear and the rich and poor are equally 
balanced. (Bk. v. ch. iv.) 



EFFECT OF HORIZONTAL DIVISION. 67 

horizontal division, because, although the former may 
lead to civil war, the latter leads to social anarchy 
and despotism. It follows that so long as the Ger- 
man parties are largely based on class distinctions the 
absolute supremacy of the Eeichstag will not pro- 
duce true democracy, and will not be a benefit to the 
country. 

At present, therefore, popular government in Ger- 
many is neither probable nor desirable. In p opi j ar 
fact, the existing institutions are by no means ^3dS! nt 
adapted to it ; and if the supremacy should Ganges in 
pass from the monarch to the representatives LatiSf of 
of the people, a profound modification must e mpl^e • 
necessarily take place in the organization of the Em- 
pire. The intricate connection between the Prussian 
and the federal machinery, which works very well so 
long as both are controlled by a single man, would 
hardly be possible if the people became the real source 
of power. Suppose, for example, that the Reichstag 
should succeed in compelling the Emperor to select a 
Chancellor who enjoyed its confidence ; suppose, in 
other words, that the Chancellor should become politi- 
cally responsible to the Reichstag, but that in Prussia 
the King remained free to choose his ministers as he 
pleased. It is clear the government could be made 
to work smoothly, only on condition that the spheres 
of action of the Chancellor and the Prussian cabinet 
became independent of each other, and this would 
involve a practical abandonment by the latter of all 
interference in federal matters. 

Again, suppose that the Landtag should also acquire 



68 GERMANY. 

the power to make the ministers responsible to itself ; 
and with its present organization it is highly unlikely 
that such a privilege would be won by the Prussian 
House of Representatives, without being obtained by 
the Reichstag as well. In this case, the functions of 
the Chancellor and the ministers might continue un- 
changed for a time ; but even if the same party con- 
trolled both bodies, so that the executive officers were 
its instruments both in Prussia and the Empire, it is 
not probable that they would long hold themselves 
responsible to two separate assemblies. The Reichstag, 
as the representative of a wider public opinion, would 
gradually assume the decisive authority in national 
questions, and hence Prussia would either become 
merged in the Empire, or else her government would 
be confined to local affairs. In either event, the Chan- 
cellor would cease to be in any degree a Prussian offi- 
cer, and would acquire a purely federal character. The 
Bundesrath also would suffer a severe loss of influence 
if the Chancellor became responsible to the Reichstag ; 
and it has shown its appreciation of this more than once 
when it has objected to 'the creation of responsible 
federal ministers. 1 The Chancellor would no longer 
speak to it as the delegate of Prussia, but as the 
representative of the Reichstag. In short, the Bundes- 
rath would fall to the subordinate position occupied 
by the upper chamber in all countries with a parlia- 
mentary form of government. It would not only lose 
the legislative authority it now wields, but it would 
hardly be suffered to retain the power to make ex- 

1 This it did in 1878 and again in 1884. 



POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM. 69 

ecutive ordinances and regulations, and so direct the 
policy of the administration. 

But all such changes are no doubt far in the future, 
and for the present the Reichstag must remain what 
it has hitherto been, not the directing force in the 
state, but nevertheless extremely valuable as an organ 
for the free expression of opinion and as a means of 
political education. 



CHAPTER Vm. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY I AUSTRIA. 

The spirit of the French Revolution was in its essence 
Race and humanitarian. It disregarded the narrow dis- 
nationaiity. Unctions of race and country, proclaimed 
the universal brotherhood of man, and offered to all 
the world the blessings of its creed. Yet the great 
political movements to which it gave rise have brought 
about an increase of race feeling so great that peoples 
of different blood can no longer live peaceably together 
under the same government, and the various branches 
of a race are unhappy until they are all covered by 
a single flag. Race, in other words, has become a 
recognized basis of nationality ; and this has produced 
in Europe two new states, and loosened the bonds of 
two old ones. Within a generation, the ties of blood 
have united Italy and Germany ; while England has 
gravely debated a plan for a partial separation between 
the Saxons and the Celts, and Austria has become very 
seriously disintegrated under the strain of racial 
antipathies. 

The convulsions of 1848, with the fury of their 

political, their social, and their race move- 

sions of 1848, ments, well nigh tore the Austrian monarchy 

organization in pieces. An insurrection in Vienna drove 

the Emperor from his capital, and his Italian 



THE REORGANIZATION. 71 

and Hungarian dominions broke into open revolt ; but 
with the help of Kussian troops the revolts were at 
last put down, and for a while the crown was again 
omnipotent. The people, however, remained discon- 
tented, and although after the defeat of Austria by 
Napoleon III. in the Italian campaign of 1859 a 
number of political experiments were tried, they all 
failed to satisfy the different races, or to organize the 
monarchy on a permanent basis. The war with Prussia 
brought matters to a crisis, for Austria was sadly 
humbled, and the Emperor felt that if he would regain 
his position in Europe he must set his house in order 
and content his subjects. The task was not an easy 
one, and the Emperor took the extraordinary step 
of .calling to his help a foreigner, Baron Beust, who 
had long been a minister of the King of Saxony. 
But, though a stranger, Beust understood the wants 
of the country better than his predecessors, and it was 
not long before he placed the government on a more 
satisfactory basis. The Italian provinces had already 
been lost by the wars of 1859 and 1866 ; with Hun- 
gary a new and peculiar relation, a sort of confedera- 
tion, was now established ; and for the rest of the 
Empire a constitution was framed which remains in 
force to-day. In this chapter the latter part of the 
monarchy alone will be considered. The next two will 
deal with Hungary and the joint government. 

In order to understand the institutions of Austria, 
it is necessary to know something of its peculiar geog- 
raphy and ethnology. The official designation of the 
western half of the monarchy — which for convenience 



72 AUSTRIA. 

I shall call simply Austria — is "the kingdoms and 
, lands represented in the Reichsrath " ' and 

Geography r 7 

nok> etl of ^e name implies the utter lack of unity in 
Austria. ^ na ti n. Austria is, in fact, a sort of 
residuum, consisting of all the territory which belonged 
to the Empire at the time of the compact with 
Hungary, and did not form a part of that kingdom. 
The country has a most irregular outline, touching 
the Lake of Constance on the west, extending on the 
north into the heart of Germany by means of the 
province of Bohemia, stretching one long arm east- 
ward above and even beyond Hungary, and another 
far to the south along the coast of the Adriatic. 

This curiously shaped state is divided into seventeen 
provinces, all enjoying extended political powers, and 
almost all the theatre of struggles between two or 
more of the different races. 2 Some idea of the num- 
ber of distinct races in the Empire can, indeed, be 
gathered from the fact that on the assembling of the 
Reichsrath, or parliament, it has been found necessary 
to administer the oath in eight different languages. 3 
Yet these include only a small part of the tongues 

1 Cf. Staatsgrundgesetz uber gemeinsame Angelegenheiten (Dec. 21, 
1867), § 1, printed in Geller, Oesterreichische Verwaltungsgesetze, Bd. I. p. 
12 ; Ulbrich, Oesterreich, in Marquardsen, p. 14. Gumplowicz contends 
that the use of the name Austria for the western half of the monarchy is 
correct. Das Oesterreichische Staatsrecht, p. 45, note 42. 

2 I call these divisions provinces for the sake of simplicity. Tech- 
nically, some of them are termed kingdoms, others grand-duchies, arch- 
duchies, duchies, counties, etc. Cf. Staatsgrundgesetz uber Reichsvertretung, 
§1; Geller, Bd. I. p. 78. 

3 " Austria : its Society, Politics, and Religion," Baroness de Zuylen de 
Nyevelt, Nat. Rev., Oct., 1891. 



THE DIFFERENT RACES. 73 

and dialects that are spoken in the land. Among the 
many races that inhabit Austria there are, however, 
only five important enough to have a marked influence 
on politics. These are : first, the Germans, who com- 
prise scarcely more than a third of the population, but 
possess a much larger share of the wealth and culture. 
They are scattered more or less thickly all through 
the country, and predominate along the Danube 
and in the provinces immediately to the south of it. 
Second, the Bohemians, or Czechs, who are the next 
most powerful race, and compose a majority of the 
people in Bohemia and Moravia. Third, the Poles, 
who form a compact mass in Galicia. Fourth, the 
Slowenians and other Slavs, living chiefly in the 
southern provinces in the direction of Triest. And 
fifth, the Italians, who are to be found in the southern 
part of the Tyrol, and in the seaports along the 
Adriatic. The numbers of the various races in Aus- 
tria, according to the census of December 31, 1890, 
are as follows : — 

Germans 8,461,580 

Czechs 5,472,871 

Poles 3,719,232 

Ruthenians 3,105,221 

Slowenians 1,176,672 

Italians 675,305 

Croats and Serbs 644,926 

Roumanians 209,110 

Others 430,496 

Total 23,895,413 

The division of the people into several different races 
is one of the most important factors in Austrian poli- 



74 AUSTRIA. 

tics, and we shall return to it when we come to consider 
Theconsti- *he ac tual working of the government; but 
tution. £ rs j. ^.j ie political organization of the coun- 

try must be explained. When this was remodeled 
after the war with Prussia, five statutes — all bearing 
the date of December 21, 1867 — were passed, and 
termed the Staatsgrundgesetze, or fundamental laws of 
the state. 1 They are, in fact, the constitution of Aus- 
tria, and can be changed only by a two thirds vote of 
both Houses of Parliament. 2 As they were all enacted 
on the same day, there is no obvious reason why they 
might not have been embodied in a single document, 
especially since they cover the same ground as the 
constitutions of other countries. One of them, that 
on the general rights of citizens, consists of a bill of 
rights, while the rest deal with the organization and 
powers of the different public authorities in the state. 
In considering these, the simplest and clearest order 
will be to take up first the executive and then the 
legislative branch of the central government, turning 
afterwards to the provincial institutions, which play a 
very important part in the politics of the Empire. 

1 Ulbrich, pp. 11, 16; Guniplowicz, §§ 25-27. These five laws are 
commonly cited by their titles, which indicate their contents. They are 
as follows : (1) Staatsgrundgesetz uber die Reichsvertretung (R. G. B. 141. 
Printed with the amendments of April 2, 1873, inserted in the text, in 
Geller, Bd. I. p. 78). (2) St. G. uber die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsburger 
(R. G. B. 142; Geller, Bd. II. pp. 1, 419, and Bd. I. p. 659). (3) St. G. 
uber das Reichsgericht (R. G. B. 143; Geller, Bd. I. p. 847). (4) St. G. uber 
die Richterlichegewalt (R. G. B. 144; Geller, Bd. I. p. 846). (5) St. G. uber 
die Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt (R. G. B. 145; Geller, Bd. I. p. 872). 

2 That is a vote of two thirds of the members present. One hundred 
members constitute a quorum of the lower house in other cases, but for 
this purpose the presence of one half the members is required. St. G. 
Reichsvertretung (as amended by the Act of April 2, 1873), § 15. 



THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 75 

The transmission of the crown in Austria is treated 
to an unusual extent as something lying quite The crown 
outside the scope of the fundamental laws; Rules of 
and although the rules of succession and the 
provisions about regency would doubtless not be changed 
to-day without the consent of Parliament, they have 
never been formally incorporated in the constitution. 
The rules of descent rest entirely on former imperial 
rescripts, and especially on the Pragmatic Sanction of 
December 6, 1704. 1 This famous ordinance, issued by 
Charles VI. to enable his daughter Maria Theresa to 
succeed him, has made the canons of inheritance some- 
what peculiar, for women are neither admitted to the 
throne as freely as in England, nor absolutely excluded 
according to the strict rules of the so-called Salic law 
as in most of the continental monarchies. The succes- 
sion follows primarily the principle known in the Eng- 
lish Common Law as tail male, that is, the crown passes 
only to male heirs, who trace their descent entirely 
through males. But if these fail, the succession goes 
by tail general; in other words, the nearest female heir 
or her descendant inherits. In such a case, however, 
the new sovereign starts a fresh line, so that the crown 
again passes by tail male, and only when the direct 
male heirs of the new line are exhausted can a woman 
again ascend the throne. 2 But although by law the 
succession is strictly hereditary, the next heir does 

1 Geller, Bd. I. p. 3. This ordinance is commonly spoken of as a 
fundamental law (cf. Ulbrich, pp. 8, 18), but it is not mentioned among 
the acts for whose amendment a two thirds vote of the Reichsrath is 
required. St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 15. 

2 See Ulbrich, pp. 18-19. 



76 AUSTRIA. 

not always succeed to the crown. Thus the present 
Emperor, Francis Joseph, was not himself the nearest 
heir, and it seems to be assumed that on his death the 
first of the archdukes is likely to be passed over in favor 
of a younger member of the family. This is done by 
means of the voluntary abdication of the person enti- 
tled to succeed, — a right which is universally recog- 
nized in continental countries, but more freely used 
in Austria than elsewhere. 

The powers of the Emperor are legally much the 

same as in other constitutional monarchies. 

the Em- His sanction is required for the enactment of 

peror. 

laws. 1 He has power to make treaties; 2 to 
issue ordinances ; 3 to appoint the officials ; 4 to create 
peers ; 5 to grant pardons and amnesties ; 6 and to sum- 
mon, adjourn, and dissolve the various legislative 
bodies. 7 The fundamental laws declare that he gov- 
erns by means of responsible ministers, 8 and by stat- 
ute all his acts must be countersigned by a minister 
of state. 9 The countersignature of all the ministers is, 
moreover, required for those ordinances which proclaim 

1 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 13. 

2 Subject to the approval of the Reichsrath in certain cases. See p. 89, 
infra. 

3 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 14 ; St. G. Regierungsgewalt, § 11. 

4 St. G. Regierungsgewalt, § 3. 

5 St. G. Reichsvertretung, §§ 3, 5. 

6 St. G. Richterlichegewalt, § 13. 

» For the Reichsrath, see St. G. Reichsvertretung, §§ 10, 19. For the 
provincial Landtags, see the various Landesverordnungen annexed to the 
Patent of Feb. 26, 1861, e. g. that for Lower Austria (Geller, Bd. I. p. 
125), §§ 8, 10. 

8 St. G. Regierungsgewalt, § 2. 

• Law of July 25, 1867, § 1. (R. G. B. 101 ; Geller, Bd. I. p. 873.) 



THE CROWN AND THE MINISTERS. 77 

the state of siege, suspend the constitutional rights of 
the citizen, or are issued with the force of provisional 
laws in case of urgent necessity when the legislature is 
not in session. 1 Practically, however, the ministers are 
the servants of the crown and not of the parliament, 
and hence the Emperor of Austria can really use his 
powers with great freedom. This result is due to the 
incessant quarrels between the different races, which 
are too bitterly hostile to combine, while no one of 
them is strong enough to rule alone, — a state of things 
that makes it easy for the government to play them off 
against each other, and have its own way. In theory 
the parliamentary system is in force, but in practice 
the Emperor is so far from being a figurehead that 
since the present constitution was adopted he has actu- 
ally refused to sanction a bill passed by both Houses 
of Parliament. 2 If we compare his position with that 
of the German Emperor we shall find that although 
the forms of parliamentary government are more closely 
followed at Vienna than at Berlin, yet, owing to his 
ability to manage the popular chamber, Francis Joseph 
is in fact quite as independent of popular control as 
William II. 

Of the legal status of the ministers, little need be 
said, because their position in Austria is not The minis . 
peculiar. They have the usual right to speak ters ' 
in either of the houses, 3 and can address the commit- 

1 As usual, ordinances of this last kind lose their force after the meet- 
ing of the Parliament, unless that body consents to ratify them. St G. 
Reichsvertretung, § 14 ; and see Ulbrich, pp. 115-16. 

2 This was the bill on Monastic Orders passed by the Reichsrath in 
1876. 

3 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 20. 



78 AUSTRIA. 

tees ; 1 but as we have already seen, their responsibil- 
ity in the parliamentary sense is delusive. It may be 
added that the elaborate procedure for impeachment 2 
Thebu- nas never been used. The bureaucracy, or 
reaucracy, ^ody of civil officials, demands, on the other 
hand, especial notice on account of its extraordinary 
power. As a rule, its members enjoy a stable tenure 
of office, and can be dismissed only for crime, or by 
means of disciplinary proceedings. 3 A large propor- 
tion of them are Germans, 4 but the bureaucracy seems 
non-parti- *° bring politics very little into its work. 
san ' Count Taafe, the late prime minister of Aus- 

tria, who was himself trained in the administrative 
service, steadily refused to use it as a party tool, and 
made few appointments or removals for party pur- 
poses ; and this although the Germans were generally 
opposed to him in Parliament. 5 The absence of the 
spoils system is all the more creditable, inas- 

but corrupt. , . , , , 

much as corruption appears to be deep seated 
in Austrian public life. I say appears to be, because 
there is nothing so difficult to determine in any country 
as the probity of the public officials, and the loudest 

1 Law of May 12, 1873, on the Order of Business in the Reichsrath 
(R. G. B. 94; Geller, Bd. I. p. 114), § 7. 

2 Law of July 25, 1867, on Ministerial Responsibility (R. G. B. 101 ; 
Geller, Bd. I. p. 873). 

3 Cf. Kais. Verord., March 10, 1860 (R. G. B. 64; Geller, Bd. II. p. 124); 
Gumplowicz, pp. 190-91. This does not, of course, apply to the high 
national or provincial positions. 

4 Cf . " Les Partis Politiques et la Situation Parlementaire en Autriche," 
Karel Kramar, Ann. de VEcole Lib. des Sci. Pol, 1889, p. 342. 

5 See " Politik und Verwaltung in Oesterreich," Anon., Unsere Zeit, 
1888, vol. ii. p. 444. 



THE BUREAUCRACY. 79 

outcry by no means indicates the greatest venality. 
There is, however, one piece of evidence in Austria 
that is directly in point. Some years ago, when the 
manager of a railroad was prosecuted for making profit- 
able contracts with himself, and taking a percentage on 
the gains of other contractors, a former Minister of 
State declared on the witness stand that the Trinkgeld, 
or tip, was peculiarly an Austrian institution, extending 
from servants and waiters to the very members of the 
cabinet. 1 If this is a fair statement, it makes one 
shudder to think what will happen in Austria if the 
parties ever get control of the bureaucracy, with its 
enormous power to interfere in every man's affairs. 

The bureaucracy has, indeed, almost unlimited power ; 
for, although the fundamental laws purport Its 
to guarantee certain personal rights, and one 
of them is framed for that especial object, yet in fact 
the guarantee is by no means thoroughly effective. 
Not only do these laws fail to impose a legal restraint 
on legislation, or render void a statute that infringes 
their provisions, 2 but some of their clauses are mere 
statements of general principles that still await legisla- 
tion to carry them into effect, while others are limited 
and qualified, if not actually contradicted, by statutes 
which rob them of most of their value. 3 Thus the 

1 Rogge, Oesterreich seit der Katastrophe Holienwart-Beust, vol. i. pp. 
420-21. A similar revelation was made at the trial of the customs 
fraud cases in September, 1892. Sidney Whitman, The Realm of the 
Habsburgs, pp. 235-36. 

2 The courts of law can pass upon the validity of ordinances, but are 
especially forbidden to inquire into the constitutionality of statutes. 
St. G. Richterlichegewalt, § 7. 

3 Cf . Ulbrich, p. 38 et seq. 



enormous 
power, 



over associa- 
tions, 



80 AUSTRIA. 

fundamental laws speak of a right to sue officials for 
injuries done in the exercise of their office, 1 but no 
law making this possible by providing a method of 
procedure has yet been passed. 2 Again the right of 
meeting and forming associations is recognized 
in principle ; 3 but, except for trading socie- 
ties and religious bodies belonging to particular sects, an 
association cannot in fact be formed without an official 
certificate, which may be refused in case its objects are 
illegal or dangerous to the state. 4 Copies, moreover, 
of the by-laws of societies, 5 of their reports to the mem- 
bers, 6 of their meetings, 7 of the business transacted, 8 of 
the officers elected, 9 and in the case of a political 
society even of the names of new members, 10 must 
be given to the government ; and, in order to prevent 
any possible conspiracy, all correspondence between 
political societies is specially forbidden. 11 The police 

1 St. G. Regierungsgewalt, § 12. 

2 Ulbrich, p. 67. 

8 "Die osterreichischen Staatsbiirger haben dasRecht, sick zu versammeln 
und Vereine zu bilden. Die Ausiibung dieser Rechte wird durch besondere 
Gesetze geregelt." St. G. All. Rechte der Staatsbiirger, § 12. 

4 Act of Nov. 15, 1867 (R. G. B. 134 ; Geller, Bd. H. p. 610). On 
appeal, the Reichsgericht is called upon to decide, not whether the objects 
are dangerous to the state, but only whether there are any grounds on 
which the officials could so consider them. (Dec. of R. G. Apr. 30, 
1874, cited by Geller, Bd. II. p. 611.) On this subject of associations and 
meetings, see, also, Ulbrich, pp. 51-52 ; Gumplowicz, §§ 192-93. 

5 Act of Nov. 15, 1867, §§ 4-10. 
« Id., § 13. 

» Id., § 15. 

8 If demanded. Id., § 18. 

» Id., § 12. 

w Id., § 32. 

n Id., § 33. 



CONTROL OF SOCIETIES AND THE PRESS. 81 

have also a right to be present at the meetings of 
associations, 1 with power to dissolve them or even break 
up the society itself, if anything is done which does 
not fall within its objects as stated in its by-laws. 2 As 
for public meetings held for any purpose by persons 
who do not belong to a regular association, the officials 
can virtually forbid them or disperse them at pleasure, 
so strongly does the dread of a free expression of 
opinion still maintain its hold. 3 

We find signs of this f eeling in most of the countries 
on the Continent, but nowhere outside of overtlie 
Russia in a more marked form than in P ress ' etc - 
Austria. It crops up again in the restrictions on the 
press ; for although the fundamental laws guarantee 
the right to express one's opinions, and declare that 
there shall be no censorship of the press, 4 yet the 
statutes provide that the business of printing shall not 
be carried on without a license, and that every number 

1 Act of Nov. 15, 1867, § 18. 

2 Id., §§ 21, 24. 

8 " Versammlungen, deren Zweck den Strafgesetzen zuwiderlauft, oder 
deren Abhaltung die offentliche Sicherheit oder das offentliche Wohl gefardet, 
sind von der Behorde zu untersagen." Act of Nov. 15, 1867 (R. G. B. 135; 
Geller, Bd. II. p. 616), § 6. On appeal, the Reichsgericht decides not 
whether the public order or public weal were in danger, but only whether 
the officials had reasonable ground for supposing that they might be. 
(Dec. of R. G., April 30, 1875, and July 13, 1881, cited by Geller, Bd. II. 
p. 617.) 

4 "Jedermann hat das Recht, durch Wort, Schrift, Druck, oder durch 
bildliche Darstellung seine Meinung innerhalb die gesetzlichen Schranken frei 
zu aussern. 

" Die Presse darf weder unter Censur gestellt, noch durch das Concessions- 
system beschrdnkt werden. Administrative Postverbote finden auf inlandlische 
Druckschriften keine Anwendung." St. G. All. Rechte der Staatsblirger, 
§13. 
vol. n. 



82 AUSTRIA. 

of a periodical must be submitted to the police before 
publication, so that it may be confiscated if it contains 
anything contrary to law. Moreover periodicals issued 
fortnightly or oftener cannot be started until a deposit 
has been made with the government to secure the pay- 
ment of fines, and they can be suppressed if this is 
not kept good, a provision which hinders the publica- 
tion of small newspapers, and gives the government a 
strong hold over the daily press. 1 Finally the constitu- 
tional right can be temporarily suspended altogether 
by a proclamation of the state of siege issued by the 
ministry. 2 

Other instances of statutory encroachment on the 
constitutional rights of the citizen might be given, 
but those already cited are enough to show how small 
is the restraint really placed by the fundamental laws 
on the power of the bureaucracy. [In short, the Aus- 
trian police is — one cannot say the most vexatious, 
because that implies that its conduct is disliked by 
the people — but the most inquisitorial, the most 
minutely and severely vigilant in the world. It fre- 
quently orders a newspaper to leave out of its columns 
an article which it deems offensive, and it is even in 
the habit of giving notice to the daily press that some 
particular subject had better not be touched upon for 
the present. VTt keeps up a careful supervision over 

1 Ulbrich, pp. 52-54 ; Gumplowicz, § 194. These provisions about the 
press are contained in the Act of Dec. 17, 1862 ; and in fact it is notice- 
able that all the statutes referred to in the text as limiting the constitu- 
tional rights of association, of meeting, and of the press, antedated the 
fundamental laws, but remained in force in spite of those laws. 

2 Cf. Ulbrich, pp. 115-16. 

3 See a letter of J. M. Vincent in the Nation, Dec. 10, 1891. 



THE KEICHSGERICHT. 83 

both citizens and strangers, watching their conduct and 
recording their movements. Its activity is, indeed, so 
rigorous and all-pervasive that every man habitually 
carries about his person an official certificate of his 
identity and good standing, just as a ship carries 
her papers on the high seas. 1 

There is, however, a curious institution designed to 
protect the individual against arbitrary con- p rotection 
duct on the part of the police. This is the tfe°RefciS 
JReichsgericht, whose composition and func- geric t# 
tions are peculiar, and in a strongly bureaucratic land 
not a little surprising. 2 In Austria we find the same 
dislike of any interference by the courts of law with the 
free action of the government that is almost universal on 
the Continent ; and hence side by side with the ordinary 
courts there is a separate administrative tribunal, which 
has jurisdiction over the acts of officials. 3 The Eeichs- 
gericht decides conflicts of competence between these 
two classes of courts. 4 So far its functions do not 
differ from those of the tribunals of conflicts in other 
countries; but a most important part of the so-called 
administrative justice is also placed in its exclusive 
control, for it is directly charged with the duty of 
protecting the rights guaranteed by the fundamental 
laws from infringement by the officers of the govern- 

1 There is a vast amount of legislation about the keeping of registers, 
giving notices of change of residence, etc., and issuing passports and 
certificates. See Geller, Bd. II. pp. 456-521, 531-49. 

2 Cf. Gumplowicz, §§ 123-25. 

3 St. G. Richterliche Gewalt, § 15. This tribunal was organized by an 
Act of Oct. 22, 1875 (R. G. B. for 1876, 30; Geller, Bd. I. p. 858); 
Gumplowicz, § 121. 

4 St. G. Reichsgericht, § 2 (a). 



84 AUSTRIA. 

ment. 1 The Reichsgericht is intended to be as secure 
as possible from official pressure, and hence the mem- 
bers not only hold their positions for life, but the 
Emperor can appoint at pleasure only the president, 
and must select each of the remaining twelve judges 
from a list of three persons presented by one of the 
Houses of Parliament, each house having a right to 
nominate candidates in this way for one half of the 
seats. 2 The court appears, in fact, to exercise its 
authority with great freedom, and although it has 
no means of giving effect to its decisions, 3 this does 
not prevent them from having a conclusive moral force. 
It must be remembered, however, that the Reichs- 
gericht cannot prevent the bureaucracy from using 
any arbitrary powers granted by statute, even when 
these impair the rights guaranteed by the constitution, 
because, like every other Austrian court, it is forbidden 
to question the validity of a statute which has been 
promulgated in proper form. 4 

The Beichsrath or Parliament of Austria consists of 
two chambers, of which the upper one, called the Her- 

1 The provision speaks only of " political rights," St. G. Reichsgericht, 
§ 3 (b) ; but the term is not used in the narrow sense of a right to take 
part in political action. See G-eller's notes on the St. G. All. Rechte der 
Staatsbiirger. The Reichsgericht has also jurisdiction over controversies 
between the central administration and the provinces, or between differ- 
ent provinces, in regard to the limits of their respective powers. Id., 
§ 2 (b) and (c) ; and finally it enforces claims against the state, so far 
as they are excluded from the ordinary courts, Id., § 3 (a). The con- 
struction of this last clause has been the subject of a good many decisions. 
Cf. Geller, Bd. I. p. 848, n. 

2 Id., § 5. 

8 Act of April 18, 1869 (R. G. B. 44 ; Geller, Bd. I. p. 850), §§ 39-40. 
4 Id., § 30. 



THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 85 

renhans or House of Lords, is composed of the princes 
of the imperial blood, of the archbishops and 
prince-bishops, of the heads of those noble rath. 
landowning families to which the Emperor The House 
grants an hereditary seat, and of members 
whom he appoints for life. 1 The power to create life 
members has been freely used on several occasions to 
insure the passage of measures which the ministry 
wanted to enact ; and this is said to have so far affected 
the character of the body, that it has to some extent 
lost its aristocratic qualities, and become a govern- 
mental chamber rather than an assembly of nobles. 2 
The rights of the two houses are the same, except that 
the budget and the bill fixing the number of recruits 
must be presented to the lower one first ; 3 and it may 
be observed that as the popular chamber has not de- 
veloped any great force, and has not succeeded in 
controlling the policy of the cabinet, the Lords do not 
feel obliged to give way in case of a disagreement. 

The lower chamber of the Keichsrath, called the 
House of Representatives, is elected for six 
years, but can be dissolved at any time by the of Repre- 
Crown. 4 The members were formerly chosen 
by the provincial diets. 5 This proved, however, to be a 

i St. G. Reichsvertretung, §§ 2-5. 

2 Rogge, Oesterreich von Vildgos bis zur Gegenwart, vol. iii. p. 205. 

s Act of May 12, 1875 (R. G. B. 94 ; Geller, Bd. I. p. 114), § 5. The 
president of the upper house is appointed by the crown. In the lower 
he is elected by the house itself. St. G. ReicTisvertretung, § 9. 

4 St. G. Reichsvertretung, §§ 18, 19. This power has been used fre- 
quently. 

5 Id., § 7. 



86 AUSTRIA. 

source of constant annoyance, because some of the races 
which were struggling for a greater degree of independ- 
ence insisted that the Reichsrath did not legally repre- 
sent the nation, on the ground that the fundamental 
laws had never been properly enacted, and whenever 
one of those races obtained control of a diet, it would 
refuse to allow the representatives to be chosen. A law 
was consequently passed in 1868 authorizing the gov- 
ernment to order direct elections for members of the 
house in any province where the diet failed to choose 
them. But this was in turn evaded, for the hostile 
diets elected representatives, who thereupon refused 
to take their seats. The practice of declining to at- 
tend, or leaving in the middle of a session, is, indeed, a 
common political trick in all the Austrian legislative 
bodies, being used as a form of protest, and as a means 
of hampering the dispatch of business, or, if possible, 
preventing a quorum. The trouble with the refractory 
diets was finally brought to an end on April 2, 1873, 
by an amendment to the fundamental law on the 
Reichsrath, whereby the diets were deprived of all part 
in the matter, and the election was placed entirely in 
the hands of the provincial voters. The number of "\ 
members was increased at the same time from two 
hundred and three to three hundred and fifty-three ; 1 
but the former principle of representing different inter- 
ests in the community was retained. 

This singular device, although a recent invention, is 
quite in harmony with the mediaeval system of estates, 
out of which modern parliaments have grown. 2 The 

1 In 1896 this was increased to four hundred and twenty-five. 

2 The mode of election in some of the smaller German States is similar. 



THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 87 

representatives for each province are distributed among 
five different classes of voters/ — the great 
landowners, 2 the cities, the chambers of com- ciasses V of 
merce, the rural communes, 3 and the new 
general class, — and the provinces are divided into elec- 
toral districts for each of these classes, so that several 
of the smaller cities, for example, form a district by 
themselves. Except in the case of the cities and the 
chambers of commerce the different classes are never 
combined for the election of a representative, and thus 
a constituency is composed wholly of great landowners, 
or of cities, or of rural villages, never partly of one and 
partly of another. 4 As a rule, each district elects a 
single representative, 5 except in the case of the great 
landowners, who, save in Bohemia and Galicia, vote 
together for a whole province, and elect all their repre- 
sentatives on one ticket. 6 The seats are so distributed 

1 The new fifth class was created in 1896. 

2 In Voralberg and Triest there is no electoral class of great land- 
owners. In Dalmatia there is a class of highest taxpayers instead, and 
in the Tyrol there is also an electoral class of high ecclesiastics. St. G. 
Reichsvertretung (as amended by the Law of April 2, 1873), § 7, and the 
same is true of Bukowina. Geller, Bd. I. pp. 86, 139. 

8 The city of Triest being a province by itself has no rural constit- 
uency. St. G. Reichsvertretung (as amended in 1873), § 7. 

4 In eight of the smaller provinces the cities and chambers of com- 
merce are combined. Ibid. The voters in the first four classes are not 
excluded from voting in the new general class, for which, however, sepa- 
rate districts are provided. 

5 Occasionally the cities or chambers of commerce return two mem- 
bers in one district, and one district of Vienna returns four. 

6 In the Tyrol and Bukowina the ecclesiastical electors choose their 
representative separately. A full table of the distribution of represen- 
tatives and of the districts by which they are elected will be found in the 
appendixes to the electoral laws of April 2, 1873, Oct. 4, 1882, and June 
14, 1896. (See Geller, Bd. I. pp. 102-13, and 1073-75.) 



88 AUSTRIA. 

among the five classes that eighty-five members are 
elected by the great landowners, 1 one hundred and 
eighteen by the cities, 2 twenty-one by the chambers of 
commerce, one hundred and twenty-nine by the rural 
communes, and seventy-two by the general class. 

The franchise in the various classes is naturally very 
different. In the general class it includes substantially 
all men not in domestic service ; in the cities and rural 
villages it extends to all municipal voters who pay five 
florins, or about two dollars, in taxes ; 3 while for the 
class of great landowners the qualification is the pay- 
ment of a tax, ranging in the different provinces from 
fifty to two hundred and fifty florins, 4 and assessed on 
land held by a noble or feudal tenure. 5 It is somewhat 
strange to find that in this class women can vote, 6 and 
that corporations acting through their representatives 
can do the same. 7 Another difference between the 
classes is to be found in the fact that in the rural com- 
munes alone the election is indirect, being carried on 

1 Not only is the distribution of seats between the classes based on the 
payment of taxes as well as on numbers, but the same is true of the 
allotment of seats among the different provinces. Gumplowicz, § 85. 

2 The cities and chambers of commerce unite in the choice of nineteen 
members, which I have credited entirely to the cities. 

8 Law of Oct. 4, 1882 (R. G. B. 112), § 9. The report accompanying 
the bill to create the new general class stated that the total number of 
voters would be increased thereby from 1,732,257 to 5,333,841. 

4 See the summary of the provisions of the various Landesordnungen, 
annexed to the Patent of Feb. 26, 1861, in Geller, Bd. I. pp. 151-52. 

5 Except in Salzburg, Gorz, and Istria. Ibid. 
« Law of Oct. 4, 1882, § 9. 

7 Law of April 2, 1873 (R. G. B. 41), § 13. Men in active military 
service can also vote in this class, though excluded from the franchise in 
the others. Id., § 14. 



THE FIVE CLASSES OF VOTERS. 89 

by means of electors, one of whom is chosen for every 
five hundred inhabitants. 1 It is worth while to notice 
that the separation into classes in no way applies to the 
candidates themselves, for every man who possesses the 
franchise in any class is eligible either by that class or 
any other in any part of Austria. 2 

The Reichsrath must be summoned to meet every 
year, 3 and its powers are similar to those of 
other parliaments. 4 Each of the houses can of the 

. _ . Reichsrath. 

pass resolutions and addresses, examine the 
legality of the acts of administrative officials, appoint 
commissions, interpellate the ministers, 5 and even im- 
peach them. 6 All statutes and appropriations, 7 all 
treaties of commerce, and all treaties that lay an 
economic burden on the state or impose a duty on the 
citizen, 8 require the consent of both houses, with one 
very curious exception. In case of repeated disagree- 
ments between them over items in an appropriation 

1 St. G. Reichsvertretung (as amended in 1873), § 7, C ; Laws of April 
2, 1873, § 10 ; June 14, 1896, Art. II. C. This is also true of the new 
general class in districts that are purely rural. An absolute majority is 
required for election in all the classes ; and if this is not obtained, a 
second ballot is taken which is confined to the candidates highest on the 
poll. St. G. Reichsvertretung, lb. ; Law of April 2, 1873, §§ 49-50. 

2 St. G. Reichsvertretung, lb., E. 3 Id., § 10. 

4 It is divided in the same way by lot into sections, which make a pre- 
liminary examination of elections (Law of May 13, 1867, R. G. B. 94), 
and choose the committees, when they are not elected by the whole house. 
Dickinson, Constitution and Procedure of Foreign Parliaments, 2d ed. p. 350. 

6 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 21. The two houses also appoint a joint 
commission, which helps to manage the public debt. Id., and see Laws of 
Dec. 13, 1862, Feb. 29, 1864, and June 10, 1868. (Geller, Bd. I. p. 120 
et seq.) 

6 Law of July 25, 1867, § 7 et seq. 

7 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 13. 8 St. G. Regierungsgewalt, § 6, 



90 AUSTRIA. 

bill, or over the size of the contingent of recruits for 
the army, the smallest figure voted by either house is 
considered as granted, — a habit strangely at variance 
with our ideas of parliamentary procedure. 1 

The powers of the Reichsrath extend, however, only 
itscompe- ^° ma tters falling within its competence, and 
iSd byThat that i s limited by the privileges vested in the 
£incii pr(> provincial legislatures. These privileges do 
not depend on the pleasure of the Reichs- 
rath, but are prescribed by the fundamental laws, which 
declare that all matters not specially placed under its 
control are reserved for the diets of the provinces. 2 
Austria, therefore, while theoretically a unitary State, 
has in practice very much the aspect of a confederation. 
The subjects within the sphere of the Reichsrath are 
carefully enumerated, and include among other things 
the whole domain of civil and criminal law ; but the 
catalogue is so long, so many topics are included in the 
list, and so few omitted, that it is much simpler to 
reverse the method adopted in the constitution and 
describe the powers reserved to the provinces. These 
The powers ma y De divided into two classes, in the first 
of the diets. of which tlie aui k or i ty f the diet is abso- 
lute, while in the second it is exercised in subordi- 
nation to general rules prescribed by the Reichsrath. 3 
The most important matters in the first class are : 
legislation concerning local government and agricul- 

1 St. G. Reichsvertretung, § 13. 

2 Id., §§ 11, 12. 

8 For the powers of the diets, compare St. G. Reichsvertretung, §§ 11, 
12, and the Landesordnung of Feb. 26, 1861, for Lower Austria (Geller, 
Bd. I. p. 125), §§ 16-25. Cf . Ulbrich, pp. 75-77; Gumplowicz, §§ 99-101. 



THE KEICHSRATH AND THE DIETS. 91 

ture ; the control of the high and polytechnic schools ; 
the provincial property, and charitable institutions main- 
tained by the province ; the raising of money by addi- 
tions to the direct state taxes ; and finally changes in 
the organization of a diet or the method of its elec- 
tion. 1 The second class includes legislation about 
churches, primary schools and gymnasia, and any mat- 
ters within the competence of the Keichsrath, so far 
as that body chooses to delegate to the provinces the 
regulation of details. 2 The practice of making general 
rules for the whole Empire in the Reichsrath, and leav- 
ing to the diets the task of enacting subsidiary laws to 
carry them out, does not work well, because some of 
the diets are apt to be hostile to the government, and 
hence either will not vote the required laws at all, or 
pass them in such a form that they cannot receive 
the approval of the Emperor. A great deal of diffi- 
culty arose from this source over the liberal school 
law of 1868, which several of the diets refused to 
supplement with the legislation necessary to give it 
effect. In some places the matter remained unsettled 
for many years, and the government felt obliged to 
stretch its authority by enacting the required provin- 
cial laws by ordinance, — a proceeding of which the 
constitutionality was very seriously questioned= 

Although the legislative power of the diets is small, 
their political importance is very great, owing to the 

1 This last requires a three quarters presence and two thirds vote. 
Cf . L. O., Feb. 26, 1861, Lower Austria, § 38. 

2 The diets are also required to give their opinions on any questions 
submitted to them by the officers of the crown. 



92 AUSTRIA. 

habit of using them as a sort of intrenchment in the 

war between the races. It is necessary, 

izationof therefore, to consider their organization. 

the diets. ~. , . in* • p 

In each province the diet consists oi a 
single Chamber, elected for six years, and containing 
members chosen by the four classes of great land- 
owners, cities, chambers of commerce, and rural com- 
munities, with which we have already become familiar 
in treating of the Reichsrath. 1 The relative propor- 
tion of the different classes varies a good deal accord- 
ing to the character of the province, but on the 
average it is nearly the same as in the central par- 
liament, except that the rural communes have a slightly 
larger, and the cities a slightly smaller, share of the 
seats. In addition to the elected members, the rectors 
of the universities, the bishops of the Catholic church, 
and in one or two provinces those of the eastern 
Greek church, have seats by virtue of their office. 
The size of the diets varies a great deal, and runs 
from that of Bohemia, with its two hundred and forty- 
one seats, down to little Voralberg, which has only 
twenty. The suffrage is essentially the same as in the 
case of the Reichsrath, and every man who enjoys 
the franchise in the province is eligible in any one 
of the four elected classes. 2 

1 In Triest, the functions of a diet are exercised by the city council. 
Verfassung der Stadt Triest, in the Patent of April 12, 1850 (R. G. B. 139; 
Geller, Bd. I. p. 187). 

2 For the composition of the various diets, see the Landesordnungen 
of Feb. 26, 1861, summarized with the various amendments in Geller, 
Bd. I. p. 125 et seq. For the districts, franchise, and method of election, 
see the Landtags- Wahlordnungen, annexed thereto (Geller, Bd. I. p. 138 
et seq.). 



THE PROVINCIAL DIETS. 93 

The profound distrust of the organs of local self- 
government, which is not uncommon in Powerof 
Europe, is shown in the provision that for- the part°of 
bids the diets to communicate with each thecrown - 
other, or to issue any publications. 1 Such a distrust 
is not unfounded in Austria, for the diets are tur- 
bulent bodies, and it often requires a stern exercise 
of authority to keep them within bounds. The power 
of the Emperor to control them is, indeed, very great. 
Not only do their measures require his sanction, 2 which 
is often refused, but he also appoints the presiding 
officer, who arranges the order of business, 3 can forbid 
the consideration of any matters not within the com- 
petence of the diet, 4 and when so directed by the 
crown can close the session or dissolve the diet at any 
time. 5 This right is used very freely ; and it has not 
infrequently happened in periods of great excitement, 
when a diet has become a centre for political agitation, 
that a session has been closed almost as soon as it was 
opened. 

It has been said that although Austria is virtually 
a federal state so far as legislation is con- 
cerned, yet as regards the executive branch trationof 

oi i - i • i -n the province. 

oi the government, which in the Empire is 

the more important of the two, it is centralized, be- 

1 E. g. The Landesordnung, of Feb. 26, 1861, for Lower Austria, § 41. 

2 Id., § 17. 

3 Id., §§ 4, 10, 36. This officer in most of the provinces is called the 
Landmarschall • in others the Landeshauptmann, Prasident, or Oberstland- 
marschall. 

4 Id., § 35. 

5 Id., § 10. 



94 AUSTRIA. 

cause the provincial executive is not responsible to the 
diets. 1 To a great extent this is true ; for the number- 
less matters that form a part of the general adminis- 
tration of the state are in the hands of a Statthalter 
or Landesprasident, appointed by the crown, and inde- 
pendent of local control. 2 But, on the other hand, the 
executive power of the province for affairs that are 
considered strictly local is vested in a Landesausschuss, 
or provincial committee. 3 The president of the diet, 
who is ex officio the chairman of this body? is alone 
appointed by the Emperor ; the other members — four, 
six, or eight in number — being elected partly by the 
diet as a whole and partly by the separate classes 
of which the diet is composed. 

Having now considered the structure of the Austrian 

government, let us take a glance at the con- 

issues in dition of poHtics. The two great questions 

Austria. 

that vex the nation are those of religion and 
of race; for although there are other points of dis- 
pute, such as centralization on the one hand and local 
self-government on the other, these issues have their 
origin and find their meaning chiefly in the two main 
questions. 

Nearly four fifths of the people of Austria are 
The church Catholic ; and, as in other Catholic countries, 
question. the last half f the present century has wit- 
nessed a struggle with Rome. The leaders of the 

1 Karel Kramar, "La Situation Politique en Austriche," Ann. de 
VEcole Libre des Sci. Pol. 1891, p. 662. 

2 Cf. Law of May 19, 1868 (R. G. B. 44; Geller, Bd. I. p. 946). 

8 E. g. Landesordnung of Feb. 26, 1861, for Lower Austria, §§ 11-15, 
26-32. 



THE POLITICAL ISSUES. 95 

clerical party are to be found among the bishops and 
the nobles, a large and influential part of the aris- 
tocracy being devotedly attached to the church. In 
spite of the bitter opposition of this party, the Liberals, 
when they came to power after the war with Prussia, 
passed a series of anti-clerical laws, freeing the schools 
from the control of the clergy, establishing civil mar- 
riage, and putting the relations between church and 
state on a basis more in accordance with modern ideas. 
But as yet the religious question is by no means at 
rest, and it will probably be long before it ceases to 
trouble politics, and furnish a ground for party division. 
More difficult, however, than the religious problem, 
and even farther from a solution, is the The race 
question of race. We have seen how many <i uestl0n - 
different races there are in Austria, and it is not too 
much to say that each of these is not only anxious 
to be entirely free from control by the others, but if 
strong enough wants supremacy for itself. It is there- 
fore clearly impossible to content them all, and the 
present policy is a sort of makeshift that contents 
none of them. The most powerful, the richest, the 
best educated, and the most widespread of 
the races, is the German, which assumes tude of the 
that Austria is, and ought to be, esentially a 
German country. This people would like to see its 
own tongue the official language in all the provinces ; 
but although the most powerful of the nationalities, it 
is weakened by a division into Liberals and Clericals, 
and still more by the tendency of the Liberals to fight 
among themselves. 



96 AUSTRIA. 

It is needless to say that the other races do not 
of the agree to the assumption that Austria is essen- 

Czechs; tially German. On the contrary, they are 
incessantly striving for greater recognition of their 
own rights. The most important of them, because the 
most numerous and the most aggressive, is that of the 
Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia ; but the Czechs have 
also suffered from a quarrel among themselves, the 
men of more moderate and more aristocratic views, 
called the Old Czechs, being bitterly opposed by those 
of more violent and democratic opinions known as the 
Young Czechs. The latter are of comparatively recent 
origin, but they have got the upper hand since 1890, 
when the Old Czechs agreed to a compromise on the 
race question, which was unpopular in Bohemia. 1 
Their views are extreme; for they demand what they 
call the restoration of the crown of Saint Wenceslaus, 
which means a union of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia 
as a separate kingdom, connected with the rest of 
Austria only by a tie similar to that which binds Aus- 
tria and Hungary together. However well-grounded 
such a claim may be from an historical point of view, 
it can hardly be allowed to-day, on account of the 
danger of breaking the monarchy to pieces, and re- 
ducing it to the rank of a second-rate power. 

The next most influential race is that of the Poles, 
who have the advantage of forming" a com- 

of the roles ; , . , , , 

pact mass in a single province, and who nave 
had the wisdom to understand the true basis of political 

1 Ladislas Pinkas, " La Question Tcheque," Ann. de VEcole Libre des 
Sci. Pol. 1894, p. 545. 



THE QUESTION OF RACE. 97 

power in Austria. They see that their fortunes must 
depend on the goodwill of the crown, and hence they 
are ready to vote with the government on important 
measures, in consideration of favors at home. Although 
they are divided in Galicia into an aristocratic and a 
democratic party, they present a united front at Vienna ; 
and as it is known that they are ready to assist any gov- 
ernment that treats them kindly, all parties are willing 
to buy their support with concessions. They have not 
obtained, it is true, all the autonomy they desire, but 
their political position is singularly fortunate, because 
they do not excite either jealousy or dread among 
the Germans and the Hungarians to the same extent 
as the various branches of the great family of Slavs. 
This is due to the fact that the Slavs — including 
the Czechs, who claim to belong to the race — form 
together very nearly a majority of the whole people 
of the monarchy, and a union of them all in one great 
party is the greatest danger that the Germans and 
the Magyars have to fear. The non-Slavic origin of 
the Poles insures, moreover, their absolute loyalty 
to the monarchy ; for in their exposed situation they 
would infallibly come under the yoke of Russia if 
Austria-Hungary should cease to be strong enough to 
protect them. 

The other important races in Austria, the Italians 
and the southern Slavs, have their hands of the 
pretty well filled by the quarrels among them- sout£Xn an 
selves and with the Germans. The Italians 
from the southern Tyrol would, indeed, like their part 
of the province separated from the rest ; but the 

vol. n. 



98 AUSTRIA. 

Slowenians and other Slavs are for the most part too 
anxious for help from the central government to pur- 
sue an active policy of disintegration. In short, the 
races that inhabit the coast of the Adriatic are chiefly 
occupied with struggles for supremacy over each other ; 
and although insurrections have more than once broken 
out in Dalmatia, they have been caused by a dislike of 
universal military service rather than by a desire for 
independence. 

The most common form the race question has 
The conflict assumed in Austria-Hungary is that of a 
of tongues. s t ru ggl e over the use of the different lan- 
guages by officials and in the schools. At times this 
has been carried to a point that is fairly ludicrous. 
When the Hungarians obtained autonomy in 1867, 
they insisted that Magyar should be exclusively used 
both in their parliament and in the delegation sent to 
Vienna to consult on the affairs of the joint monarchy. 
This was an heroic determination, because it prevented 
Baron Beust, the Imperial Chancellor, from addressing 
the delegation without the aid of an interpreter, and 
because some of the members themselves were much 
more familiar with German than with Magyar. One of 
the leading Hungarian statesmen was, indeed, obliged 
to decline a seat on the committee on finance, saying 
that although he knew the language well enough to 
make a set speech, he was not sufficiently familiar with 
it to answer unexpected questions in the course of 
debate. 1 The railroad officials were also compelled to 
speak Magyar, and it is related that a station-master 

1 Rogge, Oesterreich von Vildgos bis zur Gegenwart, vol. iii. p. 94. 



THE QUESTION OF EACE. 99 

and an engineer were seen making frantic attempts to 
understand each other, until in sheer desperation they 
violated the law and fell into German, which both of 
them could talk perfectly well. 1 Those persons who 
are always lamenting that sentiment has died out, 
and that people are actuated to-day only by material 
motives, can look at Austria and see a striking example 
to the coDtrary. It is clear that the Slowenians, for 
example, would be far better off from an intellectual 
and a material point of view if they all spoke German. 
The opportunities of their children to improve their 
condition in life, to increase their education, their 
wealth, and their influence, would be very much greater 
if they gave up their local dialect, and all used a 
language which is understood by the commercial and 
cultivated classes in Austria. Purely worldly consider- 
ations would therefore dictate a policy like that of the 
Eomance-speaking parts of the Swiss canton of the 
Grisons, where every child is obliged to learn German 
at school. But all these nationalities feel, and feel 
rightly, that their existence as distinct races depends 
on the preservation of their native tongues, and they 
are ready to sacrifice a chance of material prosperity to 
that end. 

The problem of race has long been a burning one 
in the monarchy, but outside of Hungary it Failure to 
does not seem to be any nearer a solution ^Hemof 
than it was at first. The difficulties are race * 
exceedingly great, perhaps too great for any ruler to 
overcome, yet to a foreign observer the course of the 

1 Rogge, Oesterreich seit der Katastrophe Hohenwart-Beust, vol. i. p. 101. 



100 AUSTRIA. 

Emperor, in whose hands the destinies of the country 
really lie, would appear to lack something of the neces- 
sary foresight and persistence. Francis Joseph is more 
truly beloved by his people than any other sovereign in 
the world, and he has devoted his life to the welfare of 
the state ; but the results of his policy in Austria have 
not been altogether fortunate, and one cannot help 
attributing this, in part at least, to the series of short- 
lived experiments and makeshifts which have stimu- 
lated the hopes of every faction and satisfied the desires 
of none. A sketch of Austrian history in recent years 
will illustrate this fact, and at the same time will throw 
some light on the character of politics in the Empire. 
After the war with France in 1859 it became evident 
that the existing autocratic form of govern- 

xtecent ins- , ■. , , , , 

tory of Aus- ment could last no longer, and new plans 
were adopted and changed so rapidly that 
within a single twelvemonth Austria was given three 
different constitutions, none of which set her difficulties 
at rest. 1 In 1866 came the war with Prussia and Italy, 
and again the state was remodeled. Hungary was set 
adrift, and the new fundamental laws were enacted for 
The Reichs- tne rest °^ tne monarchy. At this time the 
rath of 1867. hostility between the different races was al- 
ready fully developed, and was the most important fac- 
tor in determining their attitude toward the new treaty 
with Hungary. The Germans alone were decidedly in 
favor of the treaty, and hence Baron Beust, who was 
trying to carry it through, was obliged to favor them. 

1 The Patent of March 5, 1860 ; the Diploma of Oct. 20, 1860 ; and 
the Patent of Feb. 26, 1861. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 101 

It was in fact doubtful whether the diets controlled by 
the other races would consent to send representatives 
to the Eeichsrath at all. This was especially true of 
Bohemia and Moravia, where the Czechs formed a 
majority in the diets. Now Bohemia furnished more 
than a quarter, and Moravia over one tenth, of the 
whole number of deputies to the central parliament; 
and as a two thirds vote was required to amend the 
Patent of February 26, 1861, it was obvious that to 
insure the success of the imperial plans, the members 
from these provinces must not only be present, but 
must support the government. Beust therefore re- 
sorted to a measure which was afterward repeated with 
success on several occasions. Early in 1867 he dis- 
solved the diets of these two provinces, and prevailed 
upon the great landowners, who hold the balance 
of power, and who are always susceptible to the in- 
fluence of the court, to vote for Germans. By this 
means he obtained a German majority in each of the 
two diets, and procured the election of representatives, 
most of whom were in favor of his policy. The few 
Czechs chosen refused indeed to come to Vienna, but 
none of the other races followed their example, 1 and 
Beust was able by the end of the year to enact the 
treaty with Hungary and the fundamental laws for the 
Austrian half of the monarchy. 

Under the new arrangement Baron Beust retained 
only the administration of the matters common to both 
Austria and Hungary, while each of those countries 

1 The Poles were induced to attend by concessions about education, 
especially in the matter of language. 



102 AUSTRIA. 

was given a separate cabinet of its own. Now the 
The Minis- German Liberals, who were opposed by the 
toTs?Jan°. c i, Feudal-Clericals, the Italians, the Slowenians, 

and the Poles, had obtained a majority in 
the Reichsrath, and in accordance with the principle 
of parliamentary responsibility, which had been pro- 
claimed, they were entitled to have ministers appointed 
who agreed with their opinions. On January 1, 1868, 
therefore, a cabinet known as the Ministry of Doctors 
was formed, chiefly from members of that party, with 
Prince Charles Auersperg at its head. 1 For a while 
matters went smoothly at Vienna ; and although the 
anti-clerical laws on marriage, schools, and the rights 
of the different sects, which were enacted early in the 
year, provoked a great deal of hostility on the part of 
the clergy, they strengthened the bond between the 
government and the majority in the Reichsrath. 

The course of politics did not run so quietly in the 

provinces, for several of the diets refused to 
inthe * enact the school laws that were necessary to 

carry out the new imperial statute, and in 
some places serious trouble was caused by the race 
question. In Galicia the Poles who controlled the diet 
passed a resolution demanding a degree of independ- 
ence amounting almost to a separation from the other 
provinces. Strangely enough, this did not prevent 
their deputies from sitting in the Reichsrath, and even 
voting with the government on some critical measures, 

1 The cabinet contained a Liberal Pole, Count Alfred Potocki. Auer- 
sperg resigned in September, 1868, in consequence of the troubles in Gali- 
cia, but the rest of the ministers retained their positions, and in April, 
1869, Taafe was made the head of the cabinet. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 103 

in return for concessions about the use of the Polish 
language and about railroad matters. In Bohemia and 
Moravia, on the other hand, a conflict with the diets 
was avoided, thanks to the vigorous action of Baron 
Beust in the previous year. The Czech minority in 
these bodies, however, continued bitterly hostile, and 
protested in the customary manner by refusing to at- 
tend. The seceding members in Bohemia then signed 
a declaration, stating that the lands belonging to the 
Bohemian crown had nothing in common with the rest 
of Austria, except the dynasty ; and shortly afterwards 
a riot broke out in Prague, which was followed by a 
partial suspension of the freedom of meeting and of 
the press. At the same time the diets of the southern 
provinces were disturbed by the usual struggles between 
the Slavs, the Italians, and the Germans. During the 
following year troubles of another kind arose, which 
did more to weaken the reputation of the ministry. A 
serious insurrection, caused by the new compulsory 
military service, occurred in Dalmatia, and this was fol- 
lowed by extensive strikes at Vienna and Triest. 

All these difficulties might, perhaps, have been over- 
come, and it is altogether probable that they The Liber _ 
would not have shaken the position of the divided?"* 
cabinet, if the Constitutional party, as the 
German Liberals were called, had only held together. 
But before long, signs of division appeared in their 
ranks. A radical section began to develop, which was 
not willing to follow the lead of the ministers in all 
matters ; and finally there came a split in the cabinet 
itself. Count Taafe, the head of the ministry, thinking 



104 AUSTRIA. 

that the course of the government during the last 
two years had tended to sharpen rather than 
breaks to soften the hostility of the different races, 
wanted to pursue a policy of conciliation, 
and favored a moderate revision of the constitution for 
that purpose, — a view which most of his colleagues 
did not share. The conflicting opinions were laid 
before the Emperor, and as both branches of the 
Keichsrath appeared to favor the majority of the cabi- 
net, Taafe with Potocki and one other minister resigned 
on January 15, 1870. Their places were filled, but the 
reorganized cabinet had a short existence. It did not 
get on well with the Reichsrath, and at last the Poles 
and Slavs, becoming provoked, refused to attend, and 
left barely a quorum behind them. At this time, it 
will be remembered, the deputies were still chosen by 
the diets, so that the dissolution of a diet involved a 
fresh election of deputies. The ministers proposed, 
therefore, to dissolve the diets whose deputies had 
refused to sit, in order to get new members elected 
in their stead, and thus restore the efficiency of the 
Reichsrath. The Emperor, however, feeling that he 
might be drawn into the impending war between Ger- 
many and France, and especially unwilling on that 
account to exasperate any part of his subjects, refused 
his assent, and on April 14 the cabinet resigned. 

Potocki and Taafe now returned to power, and 
formed a ministry containing men of various nationali- 
ties. They wanted to conciliate all the races, but in 
fact they did not receive the cordial support of any 
party, and after making fruitless attempts to reach an 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 105 

understanding with the Czechs and the Poles they dis- 
solved the Keichsrath and all the diets, in the 
hope of getting a stronger support for their Taafe form 
■programme. 1 Nothing, however, was grained but fail to 

V fi mi i-l J £ r getamajor- 

bv the move. Ine clerical and race feeling rtymthe 

J .... Reiclxsrath. 

was as violent as ever, and the majorities in 
the diets became, if anything, more unfavorable than 
they had been before. In Bohemia, indeed, the Czechs, 
with the help of the great landowners, succeeded in 
getting control of the diet. At the meeting of the 
Reichsrath in September, the speech from the throne 
urged the necessity of so revising the constitution as to 
reconcile the wants of the provinces and the Empire ; 
but it did not meet with a favorable response, for the 
German Liberals were bitterly hostile to the proposal, 
and although they had lost ground in the new elec- 
tions, they still had a majority in the Reichsrath, owing 
to the absence of the Czechs who refused to attend. 
In November, addresses condemning the federalist 
tendencies of the government were actually voted by 
both houses, and led to the resignation of the minis- 
ters. The policy of the cabinet had certainly not 
been a success. It had alienated the Germans without 
winning over the Czechs, who remained intractable 
in spite of the conciliatory attitude of the ministers. 
The attempt to allay the hostility between the races 
had, indeed, been made at an unfortunate time, for 
the Franco-Prussian War and the events in Italy had 
greatly intensified race feeling in Austria. 

1 The Bohemian diet was dissolved on July 30, the others on May 21. 
The new Bohemian diet having refused to choose deputies, direct elec- 
tions were ordered on Oct. 6, in accordance with the law of 1868. 



106 AUSTRIA. 

The Emperor then tried another experiment. In- 
Experiment stead of submitting to the Liberal majority, 
tfona^y min- as tne crown would have done in a strictly 
HoYenwlrt, parliamentary government, he went to the 
opposite extreme, and on February 7, 1871, 
turned to Count Hohenwart, the representative of the 
Feudal-Clerical and Nationalist elements in the state. 
He charged the cabinet, it is true, as one standing 
above party, to unite all the races in the country on the 
basis of the constitution ; but the new departure was 
believed to be the work of the aristocratic and federal 
factions, and its real meaning was perfectly well un- 
derstood. The cabinet brought in a bill increasing 
greatly the powers of the diets at the expense of the 
Reichsrath. Of course it was voted down by the Lib- 
erals in the House of Representatives, but the ministers 
had an effective weapon in their hands. 1 In August 
they dissolved all the diets controlled by the Liberals, 
and with the help of the great landowners succeeded in 
capturing two of them. In this way they not only 
secured a majority in the lower house of the Reichs- 
rath, but with the help of the Czechs could command 
the two thirds required for an amendment of the con- 
stitution. A rescript was thereupon issued suspending 
the fundamental laws in Bohemia, and acknowledging 
the peculiar rights claimed for that province ; and bills 
designed to give greater political power to the Czechs 
were laid before the diet. The excitement among the 

1 The Liberal majority might, perhaps, have forced the cabinet out of 
office by refusing to vote the budget, but they were not well enough dis- 
ciplined for that. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. - 107 

Germans throughout Austria became intense, while the 
ambition o£ the other races knew no bounds. The 
diets of Bohemia and Moravia voted addresses demand- 
ing a position for their part of the country similar to 
that of Hungary. 1 The southern Slavs and the Poles 
followed suit, and asked for like privileges for them- 
selves. Austria seemed to be on the point of break- 
ing to pieces when Beust, the Imperial Chancellor, 
and Andrassy, the head of the Hungarian government, 
fearing the consequences to the nation, persuaded the 
Emperor to check the mad career of his minister. 
Francis Joseph himself seems to have felt that matters 
were going too far, and several members of the cabi- 
net could not follow their chief in his approval of 
the Czechish claims. Hohenwart resigned after hold- 
ing office a little over eight months; and again the 
Emperor turned completely round, and appointed min- 
isters who were in sympathy with the Constitutional 
party. 2 

The new cabinet, which is known by the name of 
its president, Prince Adolf Auersperg, began c ti 
actively to undo the work of its predecessor, -founder 
Five of the diets were at once dissolved, and nov^isti- 
in three of them the Liberals obtained the Feb# ' 1879, 
control. The process was repeated a little later in 
Bohemia, where, as usual, the great landowners turned 
the scale in favor of the administration ; and by these 
means the ministers obtained a majority for their party 
in the Reichsrath. The effect of the change of gov- 

1 The most important of these was the famous Fundamentalartikel. 

2 The cabinet was not, however, composed of the leaders of the party. 



108 AUSTRIA. 

ernment was very marked. The nationalist agitation 
subsided, the Czechs in particular losing a great deal 
of their power by splitting into two mutually hostile 
groups; and although a series of laws were passed 
restricting the authority of the clergy, the friction 
with the church diminished also. A grievous source 
of annoyance, moreover, was taken away by the en- 
actment of the electoral law of 1873, which took the 
choice of the representatives in the Reichsrath entirely 
out of the hands of the diets, vesting it directly in 
the four classes of constituencies. This was a great 
improvement, for it deprived the diets of a means of 
opposition that had been grossly abused, and at the 
same time relieved the provinces of the commotion 
caused by repeated dissolutions of their legislatures. 
The vote upon the bill is noteworthy, because it illus- 
trates the peculiar result of Austrian political habits. 
The measure which had been under discussion for years 
involved a change in the fundamental laws, and hence 
required a two thirds vote ; but the Czechs, Poles, and 
Slowenians were strongly opposed to it, and the Ger- 
mans alone did not make two thirds of the lower house. 
The hostile races, therefore, could easily have pre- 
vented the passage of the bill. Instead of doing so, 
however, the Czechs refused to sit in the Reichsrath at 
all, because they would not acknowledge its legality, 
and thus left the Germans with the necessary two 
thirds majority, and threw away their most effective 
political weapon. 

Thanks to the firm but moderate course pursued by 
the ministers, they were enabled to remain in office for 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 109 

a longer period than any previous cabinet since the 
war with France in 1859, and this in spite The German 
of the severe commercial crisis that broke ^endthe 
upon the country in 1873. They might, in- qu^eiwik 
deed, have kept their places longer still if the e ca met ' 
Constitutional party had understood the real nature of 
Austrian politics. This party failed to see that the 
Emperor holds the ultimate power in his own hands ; 
that owing to his right to dissolve the various legisla- 
tive bodies, to his influence with the great landowners, 
and to the vast authority of the bureaucracy, he can 
obtain a majority in the Reichsrath in favor of almost 
any cabinet he chooses to appoint. If the German 
Liberals had learned that lesson from the experience of 
the last five years, they would have realized that they 
ought to be pliant in matters on which the Emperor 
had set his heart. Instead of this, they voted against 
bills which the court considered essential to the main- 
tenance of an efficient army, and they made a great 
deal of difficulty about the joint tariff and the National 
Bank in the treaties with Hungary in 1877, although 
the security of the state depends upon harmony be- 
tween the two halves of the monarchy. The party 
also failed to see that in the unsettled condition of 
affairs it ought to sacrifice all minor details to the 
vital questions, and give its hearty support to any 
cabinet that agreed with it in general principles. But 
like all German Liberals the Constitutionalists wanted 
to be independent, and could not resist the temptation 
to criticise every measure presented to them. The 
interest of the party clearly demanded that all its 



110 AUSTRIA. 

members should cling together and form a solid phalanx 
to protect the ministers from any attack on the part of 
the Federalists, whether made through the court or in 
the Reichsrath. By such a course they might have re- 
tained their supremacy for an indefinite time. But they 
did nothing of the kind. On the contrary, they broke 
into three factions, and the deputies in the Reichsrath 
belonging to each of these formed, according to the 
Austrian custom, a separate association, or " club," for 
the discussion of public questions and the determina- 
tion of the way the members should vote in the house. 
The Liberal clubs grew more and more independent of 
the ministry, criticised it, blamed it for not taking the 
clubs into its confidence, and repeatedly voted against 
it, until the cabinet found itself so completely unable 
to command a majority in the Reichsrath that it could 
no longer maintain its position. In 1877, and again 
the next year, the ministers tendered their resignations, 
which, however, the Emperor refused to accept; but 
finally, after the war between Russia and Turkey, and 
the treaty of Berlin that followed it, a part of the 
German Liberals carried through the House of Repre- 
sentatives an address censuring the foreign policy of 
the government. This was the finishing blow, and 
Auersperg's on February 6, 1879, the cabinet broke up. 
breaks* up, Auersperg, with one of his colleagues, re- 
1879 * signed, and Taafe again received a portfolio. 

The cohesion between the Liberal clubs had now disap- 
peared so thoroughly that a stable majority of any 
kind was no longer possible, and on May 22 the lower 
house was dissolved. The elections proved fatal to 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. Ill 

the German Liberals, who lost no less than forty-five 
seats, thus forfeiting their majority in the Keichsrath, 
and with it their position as the dominant party in the 
state. As soon, therefore, as the result of the vote 
was known, the ministers resigned, and Taafe formed a 
new cabinet of quite a different character. The fall 
of Auersperg and the return of Taafe to power mark 
the close of the first period of Austrian parliamentary 
history. The era of experiments, of extremes, of cabi- 
nets representing the aspirations of particular races, 
comes to an end, and the second period begins. 

During much the greater part of the twelve years 
that had elapsed since parliamentary govern- 
ment had been introduced, the German ministry, 
Liberals had been in control of the adminis- 
tration, but now an entire change took place. Taafe 
intended to stand above all parties and races, and 
his new cabinet contained a German Liberal, a Clerical, 
a Pole, and even a Czech ; but the Liberals The German 
who had enjoyed the whole power for the ^oppoS- 
last seven years were not in a mood to be tlon ' 
satisfied with a small fraction of it. At the first con- 
cessions made to the other races, they went into opposi- 
tion, and their representative in the cabinet resigned. 
The loss to the government by the defection of the 
Left was, however, partly compensated by a change in 
the attitude of the Czechs. The members of 
this race had hitherto refused to sit in the take their 
Keichsrath on the ground that it had no favor the 
right to act as a parliament for the whole Em- 
pire. Such a policy, known as that of passive resistance, 



112 AUSTRIA. 

was rational so long as the deputies to the Reichsrath 
were chosen by the diets, for whenever the Czechs 
had control of the Bohemian diet they could refuse to 
elect deputies at all, and the absence of any representa- 
tives from the largest of the provinces was a source 
of moral weakness for the government ; but after the 
law of 1873 had established direct elections, the policy 
lost its force, because German members from Bohemia 
were always present, and what had been a protest on 
the part of a whole province became only a protest 
by individual deputies. 1 Nevertheless the Old Czechs 
clung to the policy of passive resistance, and although 
the Young Czechs condemned it, and wanted to substi- 
tute an aggressive political campaign, their influence 
was not great enough to prevail until the long adminis- 
tration of Prince Auersperg had taught every one the 
futility of the old course. When Count Taafe formed 
his cabinet, the Czechs for the first time took their 
seats in the Reichsrath, and, what is more, the Old 
Czechs, who comprised at that date almost all the 
deputies of their race, became firm adherents of the 
government. 

The position of the parties was thus almost com- 
The Right pletely reversed. The Left was now opposed 
Taafe rt bnt to tne cabinet, which relied for its support 
Stlis on the Poles, the Old Czechs, the Slavs, the 
policy. Clericals, and the Conservatives. These vari- 

ous groups, or " clubs," collectively known as the 
Right, were very far from composing a united major- 

1 Cf. Ladislas Pinkas, " La Question Tcheque," Ann. de VEcole Libre 
des Sci. Pol. 1894, p. 545. 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 113 

ity. 1 On the contrary, it is hardly possible to find 
a single principle on which they all agreed. Some 
of them wanted to put the control of the schools into 
the hands of the church, and others did not. Most 
of them were anxious to increase the local autonomy 
of the provinces, while a few believed in centralization. 
Under these circumstances, the cabinet could hardly 
have been expected to carry out the wishes of its 
supporters, and it made no serious attempt to do so. 
Taafe professed, indeed, to hold aloof from parties, 
and the various races supported him not so much 
because he favored them, as because he did not favor 
the Germans at their expense, the real bond of union 
between the different sections of the majority being 
the dread of another ministry of German Liberals. 
The Right was not strong enough or sufficiently united 
to force upon the ministers a new programme, and on 
the other hand the two most important branches of the 
administration — the bureaucracy and the army — were 
decidedly hostile to any change that would involve a 
decentralization of the state. The substantive policy 
of the government, therefore, did not differ much from 
what it had been in the preceding years, for the con- 
cessions made to the Czechs and the Slavs, as a reward 
for their support, were not great. 2 A forcible illustra- 

1 For a description of the various " clubs " in the Reichsrath, see " Les 
Partis Politiques et la Situation Parlementaire en Autriche," Ann. de 
VEcole Libre des Sci. Pol. 1889, p. 342, and Sentupery, L' Europe Politique, 
pp. 297-306. See, also, " The Statesmen of Europe — Austria," Leisure 
Hour, 1891, pp. 516, 594. 

2 Some slight concessions were made in the matter of language. 
Moreover, by the Act of Oct. 4, 1882, § 9 (Geller, Bd. I. pp. 1071-72), the 

vol. n. 



114 AUSTRIA. 

tion of the strange relation of the parties to the cabinet 
was presented by the question of foreign policy, the 
Czechs and Slavs who voted with the ministers dislik- 
ing the triple alliance, while the Germans, who were in 
opposition, approved of it heartily. 

The most marked result of Taafe's rule was an 
Taafe'ssys- increase in the influence of the crown and 
Sasesthe * ne reduction of the Eeichsrath to a tool in 
of the* 06 the hands of the government. Every one 

learned that the Emperor had a majority 
always at command, because if one group turned 
against him he could easily conciliate another; and 
hence the parties were disposed to avoid everything 
that might offend the court. Now, Taafe, who had 
been an early friend of the Emperor, was known to 
possess his entire confidence, so that any attempt to 
overthrow the cabinet was manifestly futile. The clubs 
of the Right, therefore, strove only to keep in its 
good graces, and pick up such crumbs of favor as 
they could get. 1 

This curious parody of parliamentary life, in which 

the several parts of the majority were not in 
begins to harmony with each other or with the min- 

breakdown. . * / . 1 • i - i i 

istry, and in which the latter followed more 
nearly the programme of its enemies than that of its 

tax required for the franchise in the cities and rural communes was re- 
duced to five florins, a change which favored the Slavs ; and the class 
of great landowners was remodeled in Bohemia so as to give a larger 
share of power to the Czechs. 

1 For criticisms of Taafe's administration from a Czechish point of 
view, see the articles by Karel Kramar and Ladislas Pinkas, in the 
Annates de VEcole Libre des Sciences Politiques for 1889, 1891, and 1894. 



HISTORY OF PAETIES. 115 

friends, lasted about ten years. Then a change began 
to take place in the attitude of the parties. The 
Young Czechs, who condemned the fruitless submission 
of the Old Czechs, had gained in popularity and 
influence, and now held in the Bohemian diet more 
seats than their rivals. They complained that the 
electoral districts were so arranged as to give a grossly 
unfair advantage to the Germans ; that under the exist- 
ing system their province paid far more than her share 
of the taxes and received very little in return ; that 
Francis Joseph was the first Emperor, since Joseph II., 
who had not been crowned King of Bohemia, and that 
in 1865 he had promised to perform the ceremony, but 
had never done so. Moreover, they were violently 
hostile to the foreign policy of the monarchy. The 
German Liberals, on the other hand, had gradually 
learned wisdom. At first, they had formed a united 
party to oppose the cabinet, but they had again broken 
up into groups, and the more moderate among them, 
seeing that they could not upset Taafe, were inclined 
to draw nearer to him to prevent his falling com- 
pletely into the power of the other races. At this 
juncture, the Emperor determined to gather about his 
government all the moderate elements in the country, 
and rely on their support against the extreme factions. 
The settlement of the race problem in Bo- TheBo . 
hernia was an essential part of the plan, and ^^^oP' 
with that object the leaders of the Old Czechs 189 °* 
and of the moderate German Liberals were invited 
to a conference at Vienna early in 1890. Here a 
compromise was agreed upon, whereby the provincial 



116 AUSTRIA. 

councils for agriculture and education were to be 
divided into German and Czechish sections; the dis- 
tricts for judicial and electoral purposes were to be 
readjusted, so that each of them should contain as far 
as possible only people of one race ; and in the diet 
the representatives of each race were to have a limited 
veto on legislation. This scheme for the separation of 
the two races was designed to prevent the supremacy 
of either of them, and would have effectually blocked 
any attempt to create a Czechish kingdom of Bohemia. 
It was, therefore, fiercelv attacked bv the 

Its failure. s* 

Young Czechs, who were so generally fol- 
lowed by the people of their own blood that even the 
Old Czechs did not venture to defend it, and, except 
for the division of council of education, the govern- 
ment was unable to carry it out. 

The failure of the compromise induced the minis- 
ters to dissolve the Reichsrath in January, 

Taafe's at- 

tempt to 1891, and appeal to all the moderate groups 

reorganize _ . -in 

his ma- lor support. The most important result of 
the elections was the almost total annihila- 
tion of the Old Czechs, who had been faithful to the 
government for eleven years. Their defeat destroyed, 
for a time at least, the power of the crown to manip- 
ulate the parties in the Reichsrath as it pleased ; but, 
at the moment, Taafe had no difficulty in securing a 
majority, and in fact every considerable group, except 
that of the Young Czechs, was willing to support his 
cabinet provisionally. It was not long, however, before 
the German Liberals, who were more numerous than 
any other single group, became so dissatisfied that their 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 117 

newly appointed representative in the cabinet resigned. 
After struggling for a couple of years to keep his 
jealous followers together, Taafe made a bold attempt 
to undermine permanently the strength of the Left by 
doing away with the property qualification for voting 
in the cities and rural communes. But the measure 
struck at too many political interests at once, and was 
opposed by the three largest groups in the Reichsrath. 
In fact, it aroused so much personal hostility to the 
Premier as to endanger the passage of the army bill, 
and the sanction of the state of siege, which strikes, 
riots, and race quarrels had forced the gov- H - R fa11 
ernment to proclaim at Prague; and Count 0ct -> 1893 - 
Taafe, who had seemed at one time nearly as perma- 
nent an institution as the monarchy itself, saw no 
course open but to resign. 

The new cabinet formed by Prince Windischgratz 
in November, 1893, contained about half Thecabi _ 
of the former ministers, the only important disehjrltz^" 
change being the grant of a portfolio to Dr. ^ m and 
Plener, the leader of the German Liberals. adem ' 
It relied for support on a coalition between the Lib- 
erals, the Poles, and the Conservatives ; and for more 
than a year it enjoyed a honeymoon, during which 
even race struggles appeared to subside. The ques- 
tion of electoral reform, however, proved a stumbling- 
block, as it had done for Taafe. Dissensions on this 
subject broke out between the Liberals and the Con- 
servatives, and would no doubt have wrecked the min- 
istry had not another matter anticipated that result. 
In June, 1895, the German Left became offended at 



118 AUSTRIA. 

a proposal of the government to teach Slowenian in 
grammar schools in Styria, and by formally withdraw- 
ing from the coalition forced the cabinet to resign. 
Windischgratz was succeeded by Count Kiehnansegg, 
who formed a ministry of affairs without any distinct 
party coloring, but remained in office less than four 
months, when he was replaced by Count Badeni, the 
Polish governor of Galicia. Badeni announced that he 
should stand above parties, and lead instead of being 
led ; that his policy would comprise the appeasement 
and settlement of race antagonisms, but that the pri- 
ority of the Germans would be respected. Before he 
had been long in power he took a step of a decidedly 
liberal character, by forbidding the reckless confisca- 
tion of newspapers for criticising the conduct of offi- 
cials. The two great political questions, however, with 
which he was called upon to deal, were the renewal 
of the treaties with Hungary and the electoral reform. 
The first of these is not expected to present any in- 
superable obstacles, and in regard to the latter Badeni 
has been more successful than his predecessors, for he 
has prevailed upon the Reichsrath to create a fifth or 
general class of voters broad enough to include the 
workingmen. 

The last three cabinets could hardly have been ex- 
pected to make any great advance in the solu- 
ic^meknta tion of the race question. Count Taafe, on 
ment, not the other hand, was appointed with a view of 
creating a better feeling among the different 
nationalities, but he achieved little or no permanent 
results of this kind, and at his fall the racial passions 



DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM OF RACE. 119 

seemed to be at least as violent and deep-seated as ever. 
Except for the unsuccessful attempt at a compromise 
in Bohemia, his policy during his long tenure of office 
really meant an indefinite prolongation of the status 
quo and a postponement of the final solution of the 
race question to a future day; but although this policy 
was conducted with consummate skill, it may be doubted 
whether in the end it will prove to have been a wise one. 
The political problem in Austria is extremely diffi- 
cult. Two methods of dealing with it can Difficulties 
be imagined. One of them is the creation of ^problem" 
a centralized government, in which the Ger- mAustria - 
mans, like the Magyars in Hungary, should play the 
part of the dominant race and force the rest of the 
people to adopt their language, their habits and tra- 
ditions. Such a solution might, perhaps, have been 
possible at one time if the Germans had possessed the 
vigor and tenacity of the Magyars, if they had stood 
solidly together, and if they had been consistently sup- 
ported by the crown. But an attempt to carry out 
this policy would probably be hopeless now, for owing 
to the influence of the priesthood which dislikes their 
rationalistic tendency, and to the readiness with which 
in Austria they lose their national characteristics as 
compared with the other races, the Germans have been 
steadily declining of late both in numbers and in- 
fluence. 1 The other method of dealing with the 
problem is that of breaking up the Empire into a con- 
federation based upon the different nationalities. But 
if this were seriously attempted it would be like trying 

1 Cf. Sidney Whitman, The Realm of the Habsburgs, p. 25 et seq. 



120 AUSTRIA. 

to divide a cake among several children, one of whom 
wanted the whole of it, while another claimed a half, 
and three or four more were crying for a quarter 
apiece. There are other grave difficulties in the way. 
The position of Austria as a European power appears 
to demand a centralized government with an effective 
army ; and for this reason it is said that the Em- 
peror would prefer to rule with the aid of the Ger- 
mans, who are opposed to provincial autonomy, if they 
did not make themselves obnoxious by insisting too 
much on having their own way. Moreover, the Mag- 
yars would object strongly to parceling political power 
in Austria among the races, both because they want 
the monarchy to remain a great power, and because 
the grant of national rights to the Slavs in Austria 
would provoke an agitation for similar privileges on 
the part of their kinsfolk in Hungary. Whether any 
middle course between these extremes can be success- 
ful, it is hard to say ; but whatever policy is pursued, 
it is clear that no durable solution of the problem can 
be reached until the people have learned to regard it as 
permanent and legitimate. This sounds tautologous, 
but is really important. 

In the second chapter on France, the necessity of a 
consensus as the foundation of political life 

Lack of a _ . _ . * 

political was discussed, and in each ot the states so 

COI1S6I1S11S 

far considered we have found a certain num- 
ber of irreconcilables who do not accept the consen- 
sus. In France, there are the Monarchists ; in Italy, 
the Clericals ; in Germany the Guelphs, the Alsatians, 
and perhaps we may add the Socialists. In all these 



THE LACK OF A CONSENSUS. 121 

countries the people who repudiate the fundamental 
institutions of the land form a minority, and usually 
a small minority, of the nation ; but in Austria it is 
hardly too much to say that everybody is irreconcil- 
able. Almost the only people who really admit the 
legality of the existing constitution, or at least who 
do not want it radically changed, are the German 
Liberals, and almost all the time since Taafe came to 
power they have been heartily opposed to the govern- 
ment. The task of the ministers, therefore, has been 
hard. It has resembled that of an Esquimaux trying 
to drive a team of dogs, all of which want to break 
loose from the sledge, except the biggest and strong- 
est, which pulls the wrong way. Austria will never 
be free from danger until a majority at least of her 
people have reached a consensus on the rights of the 
several races. Now, for the creation of a consensus 
two things are requisite, — an unbroken continuation 
of the same system of government for a considerable 
period, and a belief that it is permanent and final. 
But Austria has not had these things. During the 
first part of the period that has passed since the consti- 
tution was established, the Emperor vacillated between 
the centralizing views of the German Liberals and the 
nationalist policy of Count Hohenwart, so that at times 
the people hardly knew what to expect on the morrow. 
During the last half of this period, on the other hand, 
there have been few sudden changes of policy, but 
everything has been provisional and temporary, and 
apart from the dynasty it is hard to point to any in- 
stitution that is generally expected to prove lasting. 



122 AUSTRIA. 

It is not surprising, therefore, that the national ques- 
tion has not been set at rest, and that the various races 
retain their hopes and fears. This lack of a settled 
policy is the more surprising because the Emperor has 
shown a great fixity of purpose in his dealings with 
the other half of the monarchy. He made up his mind 
just how far he would yield to the demands of the 
Magyars, and he has never swerved from that deter- 
mination. 

Any attempt to foresee the destiny of Austria seems 
Futility of t° be hopeless. The factors in the problem 
to forecaSf* are s0 complicated, and the play of forces so 
her destiny, ^^q^^ ^hat it is impossible to tell what a 
single decade may produce. The recent history of the 
country has been a bundle of contradictions. She has 
almost always been defeated on the field of battle, and 
yet she has gained more territory than she has lost. She 
is filled with explosives, and at one moment appeared 
to have been blown to pieces, but the fragments were 
reunited and have managed to stick together. Among 
her people socialism and its counterpart, anti-semitism, 
are perhaps more prevalent and more dangerous than 
anywhere else ; yet her finances, which were in a de- 
plorable condition, have become prosperous. Her fate 
in the future must depend a great deal upon the per- 
sonal character of the Emperor, and the next coro- 
nation may bring a great deal of good or evil on the 
state. Of one thing we may feel sure. Apart from 
wars and social convulsions, upon which no calculation 
can be based, the hostility between the nationalities is 
not likely to abate at present, for throughout Europe 



HER POLITICAL PROSPECTS. 123 

race feeling, or chauvinism, as it is called, is on the 
increase ; and much as we may lament its excesses, we 
cannot shut our eyes to its influence. This spirit is a 
source of trouble in several countries, but in none of 
them does it throw forward such dark shadows as in 
the dominions of the House of Habsburg. 



CHAPTER IX. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY I HUNGARY. 

Austria is a conglomerate of territories united 
The races in un der a common sovereign at widely sepa- 
Hungary. ra ted dates, some of the most important among 
them having been added in very recent times. Bohemia 
and Moravia, for example, were acquired by the House 
of Habsburg in 1526, while Galicia, Bukowina, and 
Dalmatia did not form a part of its dominions till the 
end of the eighteenth century. Under these circum- 
stances it is not surprising that the Empire has failed 
to become consolidated, and that many of the provinces 
and races still retain their national habits and aspira- 
tions. Hungary, on the other hand, has had a very 
different history. The boundaries of the kingdom have 
changed very little for the last eight hundred years ; * 
and hence one is astonished to find how much the 
various races have preserved their identity, how little 
they have become fused into a homogeneous people. 

There are four leading races in Hungary, the Mag- 
yar, the Slav, the German, and the Roumanian. 2 The 
oldest of these is the Roumanian, which claims to 

1 Except, of course, for the temporary occupation by the Turks. 

2 By the census of Dec. 31, 1890, the numbers of the races in Hungary 
were as follows : Magyars, 7,426,730 ; Germans, 2,107,177 ; Rouma- 
nians, 2,591,905 ; Croats and Serbs, 2,604,260 ; other Slavs, etc., 2,565,285. 



THE DIFFERENT RACES. 125 

have sprung from the Eoman colonists and the Roman- 
ized natives near the mouths of the Danube, The Rou _ 
and the members of the race certainly speak a mamans - 
language that has a close affinity with Latin. They 
live in the eastern part of the kingdom, and are espe- 
cially numerous in Transylvania. By religion, they 
belong partly to the Orthodox Greek church, and 
partly to the so-called United Greek church, — a body 
formerly Orthodox Greek which has become united 
to the Roman church, but has retained the married 
clergy and the right to pronounce the liturgy in the 
vernacular. 

The Slavs are, no doubt, the next most ancient race 
in Hungary, although the precise time of 
their migration into the country is obscure. 1 
They are now broken up into two distinct branches, 
that of the Slowachians in the north ; and that of the 
Croats and Serbs, who inhabit Croatia, in the south- 
west, and extend along the whole southern border of 
the kingdom. Croatia, indeed, whose popula- 
tion is almost wholly Slav, was never com- 
pletely incorporated in Hungary, and although subject 
to the Hungarian king after 1102, kept its national 
institutions, and was governed by means of a ban or 
viceroy, and a separate diet of its own. The Slavs are 
divided into Catholics, and Orthodox and United Greeks. 

The Teutonic hordes that swept over Hungary at 

1 For a short account of the settlement of the different races in Hun- 
gary, as well as a history of the country, see Leger's Histoire de VAutriche- 
Hongrie. For a more popular account, see the Story of the Nations — 
Hungary, by Professor Yamberg. 



126 HUNGARY. 

the time of the downfall of the Roman Empire of 
TheGer- the wes ^ nave kft n0 permanent traces, and 
mans. fae Germans who live there to-day are de- 

scended from the more peaceful immigrants of later 
times. They are found in considerable numbers in the 
cities throughout the centre of the land from west to 
east, but nowhere do they form the bulk of the popu- 
Transyi- lation, except in certain parts of Transylvania, 
vama. Here at the end of the twelfth century a 

large colony of Saxons was established, who preserved 
their Teutonic culture, and were allowed to govern 
their cities after their own customs. They enjoyed 
also in their districts extensive administrative privi- 
leges, which were exercised by a body called the 
National University and an elected magistrate with the 
title of Saxon National Count. In fact, Transylvania 
occupied a position similar to that of Croatia, and 
maintained a large measure of autonomy until about 
thirty years ago. It had a diet composed exclusively 
of Saxons, Magyars, and Szeklers, 1 for the Rouma- 
nians, who formed the majority of the people, were 
entirely unrepresented. 2 

The Magyars, who live chiefly in the vast plains that 
The Mag- cover the centre and west of Hungary, al- 
yars - though a decided minority of the whole peo- 

ple, are the most numerous and by far the most power- 
ful of the races. They have ruled the country ever 
since their first invasion at the close of the ninth cen- 
tury, and in fact they regard it as peculiarly, and one 

1 This race is closely allied to the Magyar. 

2 The Germans are partly Catholic and partly Protestant. 



THE MAGYAES. 127 

may almost say exclusively, their own. This people is 
of Turanian origin, but with their conversion to Chris- 
tianity under Stephen, their first king (997-1038), 
they acquired the civilization of the west, and lost their 
Asiatic traditions. The fact that the Magyars are not 
Aryans has probably been one of the chief causes of 
their failure to assimilate the other races, but in some 
ways it has been a source of strength. It has pre- 
vented them from looking for support and sympathy, 
like the Germans and the Slavs, to their kindred in 
neighboring countries, and thus by making them self- 
dependent has increased their cohesion and intensified 
their patriotism. 

Except in Croatia and Transylvania political rights 
were almost entirely confined to the nobles, 
who were supposed to be the descendants of and lesser 
the last race of conquerors, and were in fact 
Magyars. These men were divided into the greater 
nobility and the lesser nobility or gentry, and the two 
classes have played very different parts in the history 
of Hungary. The greater nobility were avaricious and 
tyrannous during the Middle Ages, and were constantly 
provoking resistance on the part of the gentry. At 
a later period, and particularly at the time of Maria 
Theresa, they were drawn under the influence of the 
court, became Germanized, and lost to some extent 
their sympathy with the aspirations of Hungary. The 
gentry, on the other hand, have always been thoroughly 
patriotic, and have been the chief force in creating and 
maintaining the national institutions of the country. 
To their efforts the present constitution is principally 



128 HUNGARY. 

due ; and although the higher nobility has become of 
late years far more national in tone, and some of the 
leading statesmen have come from its ranks, the gentry 
is still the main directing power in politics. As yet 
the lower classes have taken very little part in public 
affairs, but this is not likely to continue to be the case, 
because large numbers of the gentry have ruined them- 
selves by improvidence, ignorance of finance, and a 
passionate desire to spend money lavishly at elections. 1 
The nobility have not belonged to a single party, but 
have often been divided on the great public issues; and 
hence Hungary has not suffered from the political seclu- 
sion of its upper classes, which has been the curse of 
so many European nations. 2 It may be added that the 
Magyars are about half Catholic and half Protestant. 
The Constitution of Hungary, like that of England, 
is not contained in any single document. It 

The ancient . , , . -, . , . 

Constitution is embodied in a long series 01 statutes and 
diplomas of different dates, of which the old- 
est, and historically by far the most important, is the 
The Golden Golden Bull of Andreas II. 3 This venerable 
BuU - law was made in 1222, and was therefore 

nearly contemporary with Magna Charta, to which it 
bears a notable resemblance. The points, indeed, both 
of similarity and contrast between the histories of Eng- 

1 Cf. " Der Adel in Ungarn," Unsere Zeit, 1886, vol. i. p. 21. 

2 Cf. Sidney Whitman, The Realm of the Habsburgs, p. 56 et seq. 

3 The most important of the others are : sundry coronation diplomas ; 
the, laws of 1790-91 ; the three laws of 1832-44 on the use of the Hun- 
garian language ; the thirty-one laws of 1847-48 as amended in 1867 ; 
and the laws of 1868 and 1873 on the relations with Croatia. Cf. 
Ulbrich, pp. 16-17, 136, et seq. ; Gumplowicz, § 30. 



THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION. 129 

land and Hungary are very striking, and would well 
repay a careful comparative study. The Golden Bull 
recites the privileges of the nobles, and provides a 
most extraordinary sanction for their enforcement. It 
declares that if the King violates any of the rights 
guaranteed, the nobles may jointly and severally resist 
and contradict him, — a provision which was appealed 
to as a justification for the insurrection of 1848, al- 
though it had long been omitted from the coronation 
oath, and had fallen into oblivion. Of course the 
actual use of such a right, without some tribunal 
empowered to decide whether the King had violated 
the law or not, would have meant a state of legalized 
anarchy ; but the Golden Bull furnished another and 
more effective sanction. It decreed that the Parliament 
should be summoned to meet every year, and although 
this injunction was by no means literally carried out, 
and many years often elapsed between the sessions, yet 
the Parliament never became obsolete, and was always 
recognized as the great legislative council of the nation. 
The ancient political organization of the country 
was very loose. The Parliament consisted of The Parlia . 
a Table of Magnates, composed of the bish- STco^ty 
ops, high officials, and greater nobles ; and a assembHes - 
Table of Deputies, chosen by the congregations or as- 
semblies of the counties, and by the free cities. 1 It 
possessed a general power of legislation, but the county 
assemblies had a right, by making representations to 
the government, to suspend the operation of any meas- 

1 These cities did not form a part of the counties, but elected their 
own independent councils and magistrates. 
vol. n. 



130 HUNGARY. 

ure. Moreover, they elected and removed the adminis- 
trative and judicial officers, and hence a law passed by 
the Parliament if unpopular in any county remained a 
dead letter there. 1 Such a system made political prog- 
ress impossible ; but, on the other hand, the congre- 
gations of the counties, which were in the habit of 
communicating with each other, kept the national spirit 
alive when the King refused to summon the Parlia- 
ment, and hence were the means of preserving the 
liberties of the country. Under the older laws the 
political inequality was extreme. The nobles, many of 
whom had in time fallen to the condition of simple 
peasants, were exempt from all direct taxes, and yet 
the method of representation secured to them almost 
the sole enjoyment of political power. In the county, 
for example, all the nobles, in spite of their numbers, 
had a right to sit in the congregation, while the towns 
were represented only by deputies. The same jealousy 
of the cities, with their large German population, was 
shown in the organization of the Table of Deputies in 
the Parliament, where each of the counties, of which 
there were more than fifty, had a separate vote, but the 
free cities, although almost as numerous, had only a 
single vote between them. By this arrangement all 
men who were not noble, and hence not Magyars, were 
well nigh entirely excluded from any voice in the direc- 
tion of public affairs. 

1 Cf. Paul Matter, "La Constitution Hongroise, 1848-60," Ann. de 
VEcole Libre des Sci. Pol, 1889, p. 515 ; Laveleye, Le Gouvernement dans 
la Democratic, liv. xii. ch. xiii. The Foispan, the nominal chief magistrate 
of the county, was appointed by the crown, but the power was really 
exercised by the elected Alispan. 



THE STRUGGLE WITH THE HABSBURGS. 131 

In 1526 the Magyars, as the only chance of succor 
against the Turks, elected Ferdinand I., of 
Austria, King of Hungary, and from that gie with the 

, . , TT p Habsburgs. 

time the crown remained in the House ot 
Habsburg. The sovereigns of this line naturally found 
the special privileges of their various territories decid- 
edly inconvenient, and no sooner had the danger from 
the Turks begun to subside than they tried to under- 
mine the institutions of Hungary. The pretensions of 
the crown reached their greatest height under Joseph 
II. (1780-90), who despised everything mediaeval, and 
opened his reign by refusing to be crowned King of 
Hungary or to take the customary oath. Joseph was 
an ardent reformer of the most advanced type, an ex- 
aggerated example of the eighteenth century radical. 
His aim was to destroy the remnants of feudalism, and 
to substitute therefor an enlightened, but autocratic, 
uniform, and centralized administrative system. 1 His 
theories were, however, premature, and were not less 
disliked for the good than for the evil that they con- 
tained. The Magyars were exasperated by his edict 
introducing equality of taxation, as well as by his aboli- 
tion of the Parliament and the county assemblies ; and 
finally the opposition to his policy became so universal 
and so violent, that just before his death he was com- 
pelled to revoke all his most important innovations. 
But although the plans of Joseph II. were abandoned, 
the friction with Hungary was not at an end. The 
Austrian government still continued to interfere with 

1 Alfred Micbiels, Histoire de la Politique Autrichienne depuis Marie 
Therhe. 



132 HUNGARY. 

the national institutions, while, by means of the censor- 
ship of the press, it tried to stifle the complaints of the 
Magyars. From 1815 to 1825 the Parliament was not 
summoned at all ; and when at last it met, a change had 
begun in the character of the struggle with the crown. 
Joseph II. was a reformer, and the Magyars had hated 
all his reforms ; but now a large and constantly increas- 
ing number of the Hungarians had become imbued 
with liberal ideas, and wanted political and social inno- 
vations, to which the Emperor, under the influence of 
Metternich, was decidedly averse. 

The demand of the Magyars for a redress of griev- 
The revolt ances and for reform became louder and 
of 1848; louder, and the relations of the King with 
each successive Parliament became more strained, until 
the year 1848, which filled Europe with convulsions, 
brought matters to a crisis. The Parliament passed 
thirty-one laws, improving its own organization, extend- 
ing the suffrage, creating a responsible Hungarian 
cabinet, abolishing inequality of taxation and feudal 
privileges, and generally modernizing the institutions 
of the country. 1 A riot in Vienna had already caused 
a change of ministers, Italy was in open insurrection, 
and the Emperor Ferdinand, whose throne was totter- 
ing, felt constrained to sanction all these laws. 

Unfortunately for Hungary the movement there was 
based upon two distinct sentiments, one an attachment 
to constitutional rights and a generous desire for lib- 
eral reforms, and the other the Magyar pride of race. 

1 At this time the place of meeting of the Parliament was changed 
from Presburg to Buda-Pesth. 



THE EEVOLT OF 1848. 133 

The latter was shown in the treatment of the Croats 
and Roumanians. 1 In 1833 the Magyars had substi- 
tuted their own tongue for Latin in the proceedings of 
the Parliament, and now they insisted that it should 
be taught in all the schools in Croatia, and should be 
used in all communications between that province and 
the Hungarian government. The Croats replied by 
demanding a large measure of independence, and when 
the Hungarians threatened to subdue them by force, 
Jelacic, the Ban of Croatia, crossed the Drave with an 
army on September 9. The Emperor, who had mean- 
while been relieved by the suppression of the revolt in 
Italy, now took a different tone. He appointed Jelacic 
Governor of Hungary, and actual war began. But 
Ferdinand, who was surnamed the Good-natured, had 
not the character to deal with a crisis. Anxious to 
pacify his subjects, but lacking determination and 
perseverance, he had become weary of the struggle. 
Metternich, his minister, whose advice had been law 
for nearly forty years, had resigned at the outbreak of 
the storm, and at last, on December 2, 1848, Ferdinand, 
discouraged and perplexed, abdicated in favor of his 
youthful nephew, Francis Joseph, who wears the crown 
at the present day. The Magyars, however, were not 
in a mood to negotiate. The rapid march of events 
had thrust into the background Francis Deak and the 
moderate party of which he was the chief, and had 
thrown the control of the Parliament into the hands 

1 The Roumanians, who were exasperated by the laws about language, 
and by the incorporation of Transylvania, in which they had no voice, 
took an active part in the hostilities against the Magyars. 



134 HUNGARY. 

of Louis Kossuth, the leader of the extremists. The 
Hungarians refused to recognize the new Emperor, and 
in March, 1849, the latter, dissolving the constituent 
diet that had been assembled in Austria, decreed a 
constitution for the whole monarchy which ignored the 
laws of 1848. The Parliament at Pesth thereupon 
declared the entire independence of Hungary, confer- 
ring provisionally dictatorial power upon Kossuth. 
Reconciliation was now out of the question, and the 
fate of Hungary hung upon the sword. In spite of 
the quarrels between Kossuth and his generals, the 
fortune of war on the whole favored the Magyars, until 
the Emperor called in the Russians, with whose aid the 
Hungarian army was forced to capitulate at Yilagos on 
August 13, 1849. A month later the last of the insur- 
gents under Klapka surrendered at Komorn. Had 
the different races in Hungary stood together, instead 
of helping to crush one another, the movements of 
1848 might have had a very different result ; but their 
mutual jealousy made all their efforts unavailing, and 
laid the country at the foot of the throne. Unfortu- 
nately the victory of the Austrians was followed by 
executions, whiclf only served to enrage the Hungarians 
without demoralizing- them. 

One of the Emperor's first acts after the restoration 
Absolutism, °^ P eace was to set aside the constitution he 
1849-60. k a( j hi mse if granted, and for ten years his 
power was absolute. He found it impossible, however, 
to break the spirit of the Magyars, or to destroy their 
belief in the rights of Hungary, — a belief which their 
jurists kept alive by teaching three principles : first, 



ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION. 135 

that no change in the national institutions could be 
made without the consent of the Parliament; second, 
that the connection with the House of Habsburg rested 
on contract, and that the sovereigns of that House 
had violated the contract contained in the coronation 
oath ; and third, that Francis Joseph was not the legal 
king of Hungary, because he had never been properly 
crowned. The government found that it was making 
no progress, and after the war with France in 1859, 
which ended with the defeat of Austria and the loss 
of half of her Italian dominions, it decided to give up 
severity and try conciliation. At this time there ex- 
isted no imperial legislature of any kind, for the coun- 
cil that met at Vienna possessed only advisory powers, 
and was composed entirely of members appointed by 
the crown. A patent of March 5, 1860, now 
enlarged this body by the addition of mem- of March 5, 
bers nominated by the diets throughout the 
monarchy. But these and other concessions failed to 
satisfy the Magyars. On October 30 the 

TTi TV 1 

Emperor took a further step by issuing a ma^fOctT 
diploma which increased the number of depu- 
ties from the diets, gave to the council real legislative 
power over finance, the post-office, and the army, and 
left all other matters to be regulated in Hungary in 
accordance with the former constitution of the kingdom. 
The Magyars were pleased, but the German party in 
Austria condemned the Diploma as a triumph of fed- 
eralism. The ministers themselves were divided in re- 
gard to it, and some national demonstrations at Pesth 
sufficed to bring about a crisis and a change of policy. 



136 HUNGARY. 

Schmerling, a centralize^ was appointed the chief min- 
ister of state ; and on February 26, 1861, a 
of Feb. 26, new patent changed the council into a real 
central parliament, and extended its compe- 
tence to all matters not expressly reserved to the diets 
of the provinces. As this was a revocation of the rights 
granted four months earlier, the Hungarians protested, 
insisting that they would never send deputies to a cen- 
tral parliament, and demanding the constitution of 1848. 
Four more years of struggle followed until the 
Emperor, who had ceased to be in accord with Schmer- 
ling, went alone to Pesth, and declared his wish to 
restore harmony with his people. The negotiations 
that followed were interrupted by the Austro-Prussian 
War of 1866, but were resumed after it was over, and 
finally concluded at an interview held on 
promise of February 8, 1867, between the Emperor, 
Baron Beust, and Francis Deak. A respon- 
sible Hungarian ministry was then appointed, and on 
June 7, 1867, Francis Joseph was crowned King of 
Hungary with the ancient ceremonial. The Laws of 
1848 went into effect at once without any statute or 
decree for the purpose, — the Magyars claiming that 
they had never ceased to be in force, — and with some 
modifications they remain the chief source of the public 
law to-day. Deak, to whom more than to any one else 
Hungary owes the restoration of her liberties, had now 
acquired a controlling influence in the politics of his 
country, and carried through the compromise against 
the opposition of the radical party and of the extrem- 
ists who still followed the guidance of Kossuth. But 



THE KING. 137 

before considering the joint institutions which this 
compromise created, let us examine the internal govern- 
ment of Hungary. 

The monarch, who bears in Hungary the title of 
Kins:, presents to the Parliament before his 

5 A' 1 4. ' • "4. T1 *King. 

coronation a diploma containing a promise to 
maintain the fundamental laws and liberties of the 
land; and this is published among the statutes, to- 
gether with the coronation oath, which expressly con- 
firms the privileges granted by the Golden Bull, except 
the right of insurrection. The King has the ordi- 
nary powers of a constitutional sovereign, but these 
are somewhat more carefully guarded than usual, on 
account of the anomalous position in which the coun- 
try has stood so long. 1 No ordinance, appointment, 
or other royal act is valid unless countersigned by a 
responsible minister residing at Buda-Pesth ; the provi- 
sion about residence being explained by the fact that 
formerly the administration of the kingdom was mainly 
conducted by means of the Hungarian Chancery at 
Vienna. The Laws of 1848 substituted a cabinet at 
Buda-Pesth, and although a minister attending the per- 
son of the King was still retained, the feeling that he 
was liable at such a distance to be more or less out of 
touch with the people, and a good deal under the influ- 
ence of the court, caused him to be deprived of the 
power to countersign royal acts. The requirement of a 
countersignature is no mere formality, for the cabinet 
is far less subject to the control of the crown than in 
Austria, and is in fact really responsible in the parlia- 
i Ulbrich, pp. 149-53. 



138 HUNGARY. 

mentary sense of the term. The King, acting through 
the ministers, appoints all the officials of the state, 1 but 
he can appoint only citizens. He has the usual power 
to make ordinances for the completion of the laws, but 
police ordinances which affect the freedom or property 
of the citizen require the consent of the Parliament, as 
do all laws, and all treaties that relate to matters falling 
within the sphere of legislation. The King has power 
to summon, adjourn, and dissolve Parliament, and he 
must summon it every year. He has also an extensive 
authority over the Roman Catholic church, including 
the right to appoint the bishops ; 2 but it must be re- 
membered in this connection that the Roman Catholic 
church contains only about one half of the people of 
Hungary, the other half being divided between the 
Protestants and the adherents of the Orthodox Greek 
and United Greek churches. 

At the head of the cabinet is the Minister President, 
The minis- wno * n practice selects his colleagues, and has 
ters * a decided preeminence among them. They 

consist of the chiefs of the various departments estab- 
lished by law ; of a minister in attendance at the royal 
court, whose office has become of small importance; 
and of a special minister for Croatia, whose functions 
will be referred to hereafter. 3 The ministers can be 
impeached; but wherever, as in Hungary, the lower 

1 This does not apply to the elective local offices, nor to the two cus- 
todians of the crown who are chosen by the Parliament but have no 
political functions. The Parliament formerly took part in the selection 
of the Palatini but this office has not been filled of late years. Ulbrich, 
p. 150. 

2 Ulbrich, pp. 174-75. 3 Ulbrich, pp. 154-56. 



THE TWO TABLES. 139 

house has acquired the power to force the cabinet 
to resign, by a simple vote of want of confidence, the 
right of impeachment has no political value. 

The Parliament {Orszdggyules) is composed of two 
chambers, which bear the ancient names of ThePariia- 
the Table of Magnates (Fdrendihdr) and the ment ' 
Table of Deputies (Kepmselohar). The Table of Mag- 
nates, as the name implies, is an aristocratic 
body. It consisted formerly of the high of Mag- 
dignitaries of the Roman Catholic and United 
Greek churches ; of certain court officials ; of the 
Foispans, or chief magistrates of the counties; of 
three members chosen by the Diet of Croatia; 1 and 
of the whole titled nobility, that is, of all nobles who 
bore the title of prince, count, or baron. 2 The num- 
ber of members of this last class was about eight 
hundred, but the proportion that attended was so 
ridiculously small that in 1886 the table was reformed. 3 
No titled magnate is now allowed to sit unless he pays 
a land tax amounting to three thousand florins, or 
over twelve hundred dollars, and this has reduced the 
number of hereditary members to less than three hun- 
dred. At the same time, the great officers of the 
Protestant and the Orthodox Greek churches were 
given seats, and against violent opposition a provision 
was enacted empowering the King to appoint life mem- 
bers. Thirty of these were created at once, and more 
have since been added. 

1 Some of the hereditary magnates are Croats by race. 

2 Ulbrich, p. 156. 

3 Paul Matter, <-La Constitution Hongroise ; " " Der Adel inUngarn," 
ubi supra • Gumplowicz, § 87. 



140 HUNGARY. 

Unlike most of the upper chambers in Europe, the 
Table of Magnates is a native product, and was not 
copied from the English House of Lords. Before the 
reform of 1885, however, these two bodies bore a very 
remarkable resemblance to each other, but there is one 
important difference between them. The Hungarian 
magnates are not excluded like the British peers from 
the chamber in which the real work of government is 
carried on, and since 1848 they have frequently sought 
election to the Table of Deputies, renouncing for the 
time their hereditary seats in the other house. One 
would suppose that such an arrangement would draw 
the strongest men away from the Table of Magnates 
and leave it without force of will. But this has not 
proved to be the case, for within the last two years 
the table has made a very stubborn opposition to the 
anti-clerical measures of the government, although 
compelled in the end to give way. The fact is, that the 
hereditary magnates, who own among them one eighth 
of all the land in the kingdom, are a very powerful 
body of men, and by no means lack the courage of 
their convictions. 1 

The Table of Deputies 2 contains four hundred and 
The Table fifty-three members, but of these forty are 
of Deputies. e j ecte( i fcy the diet of Croatia, and take part 
only in matters that affect their province ; for Croatia 
has a right to regulate a large class of subjects in her 

1 Dickinson (Const, and Proc. of For. Paris., 2d ed. p. 296) says that 
the Table of Magnates never uses its right of initiative, and this is not 
Surprising in a truly parliamentary government. 

2 Ulbrich, pp. 156-59, 178-79. 



THE TWO TABLES. 141 

own diet, and is to that extent independent of the 
legislature at Buda-Pesth. 1 Hence there are, as it 
were, two parliaments, a smaller one which attends to 
all matters that relate to Hungary in the narrower 
sense of the name, and another, formed by the addition 
of the members from Croatia, which deals with the 
subjects that concern the whole kingdom. 2 The Table 
of Deputies for Hungary proper contains, therefore, 
four hundred and thirteen members, and these are 
elected on a limited suffrage. Except in the case of 
the learned professions, the franchise depends on the 
payment of a tax, which is not large, but whose size 
varies according to the nature of the property or in- 
come on which it is assessed, and is not the same in all 
parts of the country. 3 

Any voter is eligible who is twenty-four years old, 
can speak Magyar, and is not disqualified ; and among 

1 Cf. p. 148, infra. 

2 The plan of an " in-and-out " parliament ; that is, the device of leav- 
ing certain subjects to the local legislature, and reserving others, as 
matters common to the whole kingdom, to the Parliament, reinforced by 
representatives from the province who vote on these matters alone, 
derives an especial interest from the fact that it was adopted by Mr. 
Gladstone as the basis of his last Home Rule bill ; and although this 
part of the measure was rejected by the House of Commons, it gave 
rise to some of the most valuable debates on the bill. The plan was 
also adopted by Baron Schmerling for the Austrian Reichsrath in 1861, 
but as the diets beyond the Leitha refused to send any representatives 
at all, the scheme never went into effect. 

3 In Transylvania the rural communes choose electors who take part 
in the choice of deputies. The usual continental habit prevails in Hun- 
gary of requiring a majority vote for election, and taking a second ballot 
if needed. Ulbrich, p. 157. As in Austria, the seats are distributed not 
solely on the basis of population, but also in accordance with economic 
and other considerations. Gumplowicz, p. 113. 



142 HUNGARY. 

the disqualifications is that of being an officer of a 
railroad subventioned by the government and still un- 
finished, — a provision due to the frequent scandals 
connected with the building of railroads both in Hun- 
gary and Austria. A story is told of Francis Deak 
which illustrates forcibly the corrupt state of railroad 
legislation. 1 Deak once remarked in Parliament that 
as a boy he had a strong fancy for eating eels, until 
he discovered the foul kind of place in which they 
lived, when his feeling turned to disgust. In like 
manner, he said, his enthusiasm for railroads was 
checked when he learned the methods by which con- 
cessions for building them were engineered through 
the Parliament. The honest old statesman never at- 
tended the debates on railroad bills thereafter ; and if 
he chanced to enter the hall unawares when such a 
measure was under discussion, some of the members 
would cry, " Eels ! Eels ! " and he instantly slipped out 
again. 

The Table of Deputies was formerly chosen for 
three years, but in 1886 the term was lengthened to 
five years, in order to lessen the frequency of elections, 
for the candidates being nominated at the polls, and 
the voting being public and oral, violence, and even 
bloodshed, is by no means uncommon. 2 A great deal 
of money, moreover, is spent on such occasions ; no 
small part of it being used, it is said, for the direct 
bribery of voters. 3 

1 Rogge, Oesterreich seit der Katastrophe Hohenwart-Beust, vol. i. p. 305. 

2 Sidney Whitman, The Realm of the Habsburgs, pp. 64-65. 

8 Cf. "Der Adel in Ungarn," ubi supra. The procedure in the Table 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 143 

In regard to the local government of Hungary, it is 
only necessary for our purpose to point out Loeal gov _ 
certain tendencies, without entering into a ermnent - 
detailed description of the mechanism. 1 The counties 
formerly elected all the local officials, and were almost 
completely independent of the central government. 
Even after 1867 they retained a large part of their 
autonomy, but they do not appear to have used it 
well, for the local administration seems to have been 
inefficient, and it is said that justice was venal. Tisza, 
the leader of the Liberal party, who had objected while 
in opposition to all plans for reforming the counties by 
extending the authority of the ministry, proposed, when 
he came to power, to remedy the evils of the existing 
system by creating an organization more like that of 
other continental nations. With this object statutes 
were enacted in 1876, which placed the local administra- 
tion under the supervision of a committee composed in 
part of members elected by the congregations of the 
county, and in part of officers appointed by the crown. 2 
The new machinery does not seem to have worked as 

of Deputies is based on that generally in use on the continent. Bills 
appear to be referred, as a rule, first to standing or special committees, 
elected by the table, and their reports can either be considered at once 
by the table, or referred to the sections. There are nine of these last, 
selected by lot, and each of them chooses one member of the central 
committee which makes the final report. Dickinson, pp. 354-57. 

1 Cf. Ulbrich, pp. 159-63 ; Gumplowicz, §§ 142^3 ; Paul Matter, 
"La Const. Hongroise," ubi supra; an anonymous article in Unsere Zeit, 
1888, ii. p. 444, " Politik und Verwaltung in Oesterreich ; " and another 
article in the same review, by Dr. Schwicker, 1891, ii. p. 450, "Die 
Verwaltungsreform in Ungarn." 

2 In Hungary, as in Prussia, the highest tax-payers are given a definite 
proportion of the representation in the local bodies. 



144 HUNGARY. 

well as had been hoped, and in 1891 a law was passed 
which reduced still further the autonomy of the coun- 
ties, and set up a more thoroughly bureaucratic form 
of administration. Such a tendency is not, perhaps, 
to be regretted, for however firmly Anglo-Saxons may 
believe in the principle of local self-government, they 
must not allow any political creed to obscure the 
truth that in the art of government all principles are 
relative, not absolute, and that what is good for one 
country may be bad for another. It must not be for- 
gotten that Hungary is in a peculiar position. The old 
county system made progress almost impossible, and 
yet the country was backward and needed intelligent 
and energetic administration. Moreover, a difficulty 
arose from the fact that the Magyars not only need 
some restraint themselves, but are engaged in an inces- 
sant struggle for supremacy with the other races in the 
kingdom. 

This brings us to a consideration of one of the most 
The problem interesting problems in Hungarian public life, 
of race. — ^^ Q £ ^ f us i on f t k e (JifBereiit races, 

or rather of their absorption by the ruling nationality. 
The Magyars form less than one half of the population 
of Hungary, but they are more energetic, more aggres- 
sive, and better organized than the other races ; and 
the restricted suffrage, the oral voting, and the arrange- 
ment of electoral districts tell so strongly in their 
favor, that except for the forty members from Croatia 
they hold all but about a score of the seats in Parlia- 
ment. Moreover, they have long been the ruling 
caste, and have the habit of command. They feel that 



TRANSYLVANIA. 145 

Hungary belongs to them, and although since 1848 
they have admitted men of other blood to a share of 
political power, they do not intend to let the control 
slip from their own hands. No line is drawn between 
the races in the sense of excluding any person from 
civil or political rights on account of his birth. The 
test of citizenship, the qualifications for the fran- 
chise, are the same for every one ; and in fact the 
Magyars do not want to keep the other races distinct 
and in subjection : they propose to absorb them all, 
and make Hungary a homogeneous nation of Magyars. 
With this object they have insisted on proclaiming 
Magyar the national language. It must be exclu- 
sively used in Parliament, except by the members from 
Croatia, who are allowed to speak in their own tongue. 
It is the official language of the administration, the 
courts, and the university, and it must be taught in 
the public schools. The desire to stamp out all other 
languages was, indeed, carried so far, that at one 
time the municipal authorities at Pesth refused to ex- 
tend the license of the German theatre. 

The race problem in Hungary was complicated by 
the exceptional position of two provinces, — Transyi- 
Transylvania and Croatia. Transylvania pos- vama ' 
sessed peculiar institutions of its own, and enjoyed a 
considerable degree of independence until 1848 when 
it was united with Hungary. After the war was over, 
and the power of the Magyars had been broken, it 
regained its autonomy; but in 1867, when the new 
compact was made with Austria, it was again joined 
to Hungary, and by the laws of 1868 and 1876 it 

VOL. II. 



146 HUNGARY. 

was completely incorporated in the kingdom, and de- 
prived of its ancient privileges. 1 The diet was abol- 
ished, and the province was given seventy-five seats 
in the Hungarian Parliament, to whose authority it 
was absolutely subjected. The territory was cut up 
into new districts, the Hungarian administrative sys- 
tem was extended over it, and the laws on the use 
of the Magyar tongue were applied to it. The office 
of Saxon National Count was also abolished, and the 
National University was shorn of its power, and per- 
mitted to retain only the control of education. In 
short, the ancient institutions of Transylvania were 
destroyed, and it was made an integral part of the 
kingdom, and governed like the rest of the country. 
Of course there were loud and angry protests, but 
they were unavailing ; for the Magyars were determined 
to crush the national spirit of the Germans, and of 
the still more numerous, though far less cultivated, 
Roumanians. 

The other province, Croatia, was too strong, and its 
people were too homogeneous, to be treated 

Croatia. f r . _ . _ . _ f ' _ 

m quite so high-handed a manner. Its power 
was shown in 1848-49, when its hostility was fatal to 
the liberties of Hungary. But although it had ren- 
dered an important service to the crown at that time, it 
had afterwards alienated the sympathies of the court 
by refusing to send deputies to the central Reichsrath, 
created by the Emperor for all his dominions in 1861 ; 
and when the compact was made between the two 
halves of the monarchy, it was abandoned to the tender 

1 Ulbrich, pp. 141-42. 



CROATIA. 147 

mercies of the Magyars. In fact, to have dealt with 
it otherwise would not have been easy. Hungary in- 
sisted on the annexation, which was the more important 
to her because the country north of the Drave would 
hardly have been large enough alone to have enabled 
her to claim a right to equality with Austria. The 
Emperor, moreover, could not have recognized Croatia 
as a separate kingdom, and permitted her to elect a 
special delegation on imperial affairs, without conceding 
a similar privilege to Bohemia, and driving a fatal 
wedge into the western half of the monarchy. Croatia 
was, therefore, treated as a part of Hungary, and left 
to make the best terms she could with the government 
at Pesth. But the Magyars knew that they could not 
ride rough-shod over the Croats, as they did over the 
inhabitants of Transylvania, and they prepared to make 
concessions to the national sentiment. At first, it was 
not easy to effect a compromise, because most of the 
people in the province, under the lead of the cele- 
brated Strossmayr, Bishop of Diakovar, were opposed 
to annexation in any form. In fact, the Croatian diet 
passed a resolution demanding a direct representation 
in the central organ of the dual monarchy. By dis- 
solving the diet, however, and arbitrarily changing the 
election laws, the Hungarian cabinet obtained a favor- 
able majority. An agreement about the government 
of Croatia was then made, and ratified by both legisla- 
tures. 1 Not unnaturally, the compact was unpopular 
with the Croats, and its details had to be subsequently 

1 For an account of these proceedings, see Rogge, Von Vildgos bis zur 
Gegenwart, vol. iii. pp. 31-33, 123-25, 142-43, 190-91. 



148 HUNGARY. 

modified in a sense favorable to them. In its final 
form it is as follows : * — 

Croatia is declared an inseparable part of Hungary, 
its relation an0 ^ there is only one coronation for the whole 
to Hungary. rea j m? w ^h a s i n g] e crown, although the words 
" King of Croatia, Sclavonia, and Dalmatia " still form 
a part of the royal title. 2 The subjects of the army, 
trade, and finance are reserved as matters common to 
the whole kingdom, everything else being left to the 
local Croatian authorities. 3 

The common matters are placed, so far as adminis- 
tration is concerned, in the hands of the Hungarian 
cabinet, which must always contain a minister specially 
designated to supervise the relations with Croatia. So 
far as they involve legislation they come within the 
competence of the Hungarian Parliament, reinforced, as 
has already been mentioned, by members elected by the 
Croatian diet. 4 The province was, however, given a 

1 The relations with Croatia are regulated by the laws of 1868, 1873, 
1880, and 1881. See Ulbrich, pp. 177-84; Paul Matter, " La Constitution 
Hongroise," ubi supra. 

2 There was a great dispute about Fiume which, as the only seaport in 
the Hungarian half of the monarchy, has a peculiar importance. Finally 
an agreement was made whereby the town belongs provisionally to Hun- 
gary, and the rest of the coast line forms part of Croatia. 

3 This is, of course, a general statement. To be somewhat more pre- 
cise, the rights reserved to Hungary cover legislation concerning trade, 
mining, citizenship, associations, and passports ; and both legislation and 
administration in regard to treaties, the army, the post-offices, telegraphs, 
railroads, taxes, public loans, money, banks, insurance companies, patents, 
shipping, and kindred subjects. 

4 The deputies from Croatia in both tables are chosen for the term of 
the Hungarian Parliament, but in case the Croatian diet is dissolved 
they are elected afresh. 



CROATIA. 149 

direct influence in the affairs of the dual monarchy, by 
a provision requiring that one of the members elected 
to the delegation * by the Table of Magnates and four 
of those elected by the Table of Deputies shall be Croa- 
tians. Here again the question of language became su- 
premely important, and the Magyars made a concession 
which they denied to all the other races ; for not only 
was Croatian declared the official language in Croatia, 
but the deputies from that province were allowed to 
speak in their native tongue both in the Hungarian 
Parliament and in the delegation, — a privilege all the 
more gratifying, no doubt, to the Croats from the fact 
that at this very time German was used in the com- 
mittees of their own diet, because so few of the mem- 
bers could speak their national language. 2 It seems, 
indeed, hardly possible to exaggerate the absurd situa- 
tions into which race sentiment has led the people of 
the monarchy. 

It will be observed that a wide field is left to the 
local authorities in Croatia, including educa- Itsor ansof 
tion, police, the administration of justice, and s° vernment - 
a large part of the ordinary civil and criminal law. 
The province has its own organs of government, the 
most important of which is the diet, or legislature. 
This body must be summoned every year, but can be 
adjourned or dissolved at pleasure by the King, and 
requires the royal sanction for the validity of its acts. 
In saying this, however, it must be remembered that 

1 For the organization and functions of this body see the following 
chapter. 

2 Rogge, Oesterreich von Vildgos bis zur Gegenwart, vol. iii. p. 326. 



150 HUNGARY. 

the powers of the King are really exercised by the Hun- 
garian cabinet at Pesth. The diet consists of a single 
chamber, composed of the eight bishops; the Great 
Prior of Agram; the nine Fois2)ans, or chief magis- 
trates of the counties; 1 of thirty magnates; and of 
seventy-seven members elected for three years, on a 
limited and complicated franchise. At the head of the 
executive is the Ban, who is appointed by the King on 
the recommendation of the Hungarian premier. He 
countersigns all royal acts for Croatia, and is declared 
responsible therefor to the diet ; but, in fact, this re- 
sponsibility is illusory, for he is really the agent of the 
Hungarian ministers, appointed and removed as they 
think best, and responsible to them alone. The diet 
has, indeed, power to impeach the Ban, and any of his 
three chief secretaries; but this requires a two thirds 
vote, and the penalty is only removal from office. 2 
Through the Ban the Hungarian cabinet has the dispo- 
sition of a large patronage, which has been one of its 
chief means of controlling the politics of the province. 
The most curious provision in the compact is that which 
regulates the finances, for Croatia has no power to 
raise money even for the objects that are left within 
her own control. All taxes throughout the kingdom 
are voted by the Parliament of Hungary and collected 
by her minister of finance, forty-five per cent, of the 
net revenues from the province being then paid over 

1 The Foispans are appointed by the King on the recommendation of 
the Ban. 

2 If guilty of a crime, these officers can also be tried by the ordinary 
courts. 



CROATIA. 151 

to it, and appropriated for the local expenses by the 
diet. 1 

Croatia is, then, an integral part of Hungary, but 
has retained a considerable amount of auton- 

i T£c .1 • o ,i Consistent 

omy, and diners in tnis irom every other part policy of the 
of the kingdom. Whether anything will prove towards 
to be permanent in the dominions of the 
House of Habsburg, it is impossible to foretell, but 
apart from the shock of a European war, there seems to 
be no reason why the compromise with Croatia should 
not be lasting. It is clearly intended to be so ; for in 
this respect the course of Hungary in dealing with the 
race question has been exactly the reverse of that pur- 
sued by Austria. There have been none of the experi- 
ments, the changes of programme, the hand-to-mouth 
policy, the general uncertainty, that have characterized 
the government of the western half of the monarchy. 
The Magyars made up their minds what attitude they 
proposed to assume towards the other races, and they 
have maintained it through every change of ministry. 
Save in the case of the Croats, they have refused to 
allow any people or any district to enjoy special privi- 
leges, and they have tried to stamp out the national 
characteristics of the different races by insisting on a 
uniform administration, and, as far as possible, on the 
use of the Magyar tongue. Even in Croatia, where 
this policy could not be carried out, and where there 

1 This does not include the customs duties, which go to the dual mon- 
archy, or the taxes on the consumption of meat and wine, which are left 
to the communes. Croatia also owns, and has a right to dispose of, cer- 
tain religious and educational funds. 



152 HUNGARY. 

was no hope of changing the nature of the people, they 
enforced a limited subjection to the Hungarian gov- 
ernment, and, except for some changes in detail, have 
preserved it unaltered. While, therefore, the Croats 
are in no sense Magyars, their province has a definite 
and settled relation to the kingdom. 

The fusion of the different races in Hungary, which 
might have been expected to proceed natu- 
aspectof rally and almost unconsciously during the 
Middle Ages, has been left as a difficult task 
for the present generation. The Magyars have under- 
taken that task with a stern determination to accom- 
plish it. They have not tried to conciliate the other 
races, and it is perhaps too early to predict whether 
they will succeed in absorbing them by compulsion. 
The work is hard, and needs both time and persistence, 
but the first of these requisites will come of itself, and 
of the second the Magyars have no lack. The policy 
adopted has been harsh, and has produced a sense of 
oppression, which is one of the chief causes of the large 
emigration of Germans and Slavs; but the steadiness 
and firmness with which it has been pursued have begun 
to bear fruit. The agitation of the subordinate races 
appears, on the whole, to be lessening, and there are 
signs that they are becoming reconciled to their fate. 
The Magyars say of themselves that for centuries they 
have been a bulwark against the Turks, and now they 
are a bulwark against the Slavs. Their mission in this 
cause has begun at home, and so far it seems to have 
been successful. 

The recent parliamentary history of Hungary differs 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 153 

from that of every other country, on account of the 
peculiar relation of the cabinet to the parties in Reeent po _ 
the representative chamber. 1 The compro- ^ a J f h f r ' 
mise of 1867 with Austria was carried through mi ^ ar y- 
the Parliament by the party of Deak, against the objec- 
tions of a large body of men who did not want any con- 
nection between the two halves of the monarchy except 
that of a common sovereign. The latter were virtually 
irreconcilables, who could not be intrusted with power. 
Of necessity, therefore, the ministers were selected from 
among the followers of Deak ; and as that 

& .,,. , ,. The rale 

statesman was unwilling to accept public of Deak's 
office himself, Count Andrassy was intrusted 
with the formation of a cabinet. The majority in the 
Table of Deputies formed an association called the 
Deak Club, with which the ministers discussed and 
concerted the measures to be brought before Parlia- 
ment ; while the opposition consisted of the Extreme 
Left, composed chiefly of the Roumanians and Slavs, 
and of a much larger body known as the Left, which 
called itself liberal, but whose real characteristic was 
the intensity of its race feeling. On questions of 
race the Magyars of all parties habitually supported 
the government, but on other matters the Left voted 
almost invariably against it. 

The cabinet had a secure majority, and met no serious 
parliamentary difficulties so long as Andrassy remained 

1 Rogge, in his Oesterreich von Vildgos bis zur Gegenwart, and Oester- 
reich seit der Katastrophe Hohenwart-Beust, gives a good account of the 
political history through 1879. See, also, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
by Baron Henry de Worms, and La Prusse et VAutriche depuis Sadowa, 
by Emile de Laveleye. 



154 HUNGARY. 

at its head; but in 1871 he resigned to accept the 
post of foreign minister of the joint monarchy, and 
Lonyay took his place. The new premier was hardly 
installed when charges of wholesale corruption were 
made against him, and by the time he had been in 
office a year, his followers made up their minds that 
they could no longer defend him. He resigned on 
December 1, 1872, and was succeeded by Szlavy. But 
the golden days of the party were fast drawing to an 
end. In 1873 Deak, the real soul of the majority, 
retired from Parliament, and in the same year occurred 
the great commercial crisis, which threw the finances 
of the state into confusion, and brought to light the 
reckless if not corrupt manner in which concessions for 
building railroads had been granted. These revelations 
injured the reputation of the cabinet so much that on 
March 1, 1874, Szlavy tendered his resignation. An- 
other cabinet was formed under Bitto, which obtained 
the support of the old majority and of a fraction that 
had split off from the Left. The Deak party, however, 
was now going rapidly to pieces. The charges of cor- 
ruption and excessive expenditure had demoralized and 
discredited it, and the country would have been exposed 
to great peril had not the Left withdrawn its opposition 
to the compact with Austria, — a step, indeed, without 
which the Emperor could hardly have appointed its 
leaders to offices in the cabinet. 

The change of opinion on the part of the Left set- 
tled the future of Hungary, and removed all danger 
of another constitutional crisis ; for it meant that the 
union with Austria was approved by all the Magyars, 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 155 

except a few followers of Kossuth, who still clung ob- 
stinately to the revolutionary principles of 
18<±8. Tisza, the leader of the Left, an- with the 
nounced his party's change of base in Feb- 
ruary, 1875, and immediately the remnant of Deak's 
followers and all the more moderate members of the Left 
united to form a great Liberal party. A new cabinet 
representing this party was then appointed, The rule of 
and before the end of the year Tisza was Tlsza " 
placed at the head of the ministry, and for fifteen years 
he remained the real ruler of Hungary. His policy 
during his long tenure of office involved three cardinal 
points : the relations with Austria ; the treatment of 
the subordinate races ; and the question of local gov- 
ernment. In his treatment of Austria he maintained 
loyally the compact of 1867, but when the commercial 
treaty made in that year expired, he strove to procure 
greater advantages for Hungary, and especially insisted 
that the Austrian National Bank should be converted 
into a joint institution for the benefit of both halves of 
the monarchy. To the subordinate races he was even 
more rigorous than his predecessors. In this matter, 
indeed, he carried out the principles which the old Left 
had always professed; but on the question of local 
government he changed completely the attitude he had 
taken when in opposition. Before 1875 the county 
congregations had been the strongholds of the Left, 
which had opposed every attempt to diminish their 
authority. The change of situation wrought, however, 
a change of heart, and after the Liberals came to power 
the administration was ruthlessly centralized. 



156 HUNGARY. 

Thanks to the permanent fusion of the old parties. 
Tisza was steadily supported by a large majority, and 
opposed only by the Extreme Right and the Extreme 
Lett. 1 Moreover, the new administrative system fur- 
nished him with an abundant patronage, which he used 
with great effect in the interest of the party. 2 His 
tenure of office seemed to be secure for an indefinite 
time, and, in fact, the elections of 1SS7 brought him a 
larger majority than before ;, but, as is often the case, 
his popularity seems to have been worn out by the long 
duration of his power, and some remarks of a disparag- 
ing nature which he made about Kossuth gave rise to 
violent scenes in Parliament, and caused his resignation 
in March. 1890. 

His successor, Count Szapary, was one of his own 
Tisz ,- ; s .. .... colleagues : but although the same party re- 

cessors ' mained in power, the course of politics turned 
in a new direction. The Extreme Left, or Radicals, 
whose members increased decidedly at the elections 
of 1892. succeeded in forcing the o-overnment to deal 
with the relations of church and state. The nobles 
and the clergy were certain to be hostile to the policy 
proposed, and Szapary. who as a magnate and a Catholic 
was not prepared to face such an opposition, withdrew 
from office towards the end of 1892. He was succeeded 
by Dr. Wekerle, the Minister of Finance, the other 
positions in the cabinet remaining unchanged. 

1 The Extreme Left was decidedly the larger body of the two. having 
at times as many as ninety members. It was more radical in the usual 
sense of the word than the Liberal party, bat differed from it chiefly by 
a more intense Magyar feeling. 

: Rogge, passim, and the anonymous article in Unsere Zeit for 1S88, 
toL iL p. 4AA, " Polirik und Verwaltung in Oesierreieh." 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 157 

Early in 1894 the first of the religious measures, a 
bill to establish compulsory civil marriage, Ttereii- 
was voted by the Table of Deputies, but was e 1 ™ 8 ™ 3 - 
rejected by the Table of Magnates. It was immedi- 
ately passed again in the deputies by a large majority, 
and Wekerle asked the King to create a sufficient 
number of magnates to insure its passage by the 
upper house. The request was refused, and the min- 
istry resigned ; but the events that followed showed 
how deeply the principle of parliamentary responsibility 
has become rooted in Hungary. An attempt to form 
another cabinet was frustrated by the attitude of 
Wekerle's followers, who made it evident that no min- 
istry under a different chief could possibly command a 
majority of the lower house. In form the matter was 
compromised, but in substance the victory remained 
with the deputies and their minister. Wekerle with- 
drew his request for the creation of magnates, was 
reappointed to office, and stated in Parliament that His 
Majesty thought the bill must be enacted, and that the 
cabinet felt justified in hoping the magnates would also 
recognize the necessity, — a hope which enabled it to 
dispense with the creation of peers. Seeing that the 
King would not support them, the magnates gave way, 
and passed the bill by a small majority on June 22. 
The measures dealing with the religion of children 
born to parents of different faiths, and providing for 
the registration of births, deaths, and marriages by the 
officers of the state instead of by the clergy, were then 
passed by both tables, and all three laws received the 
royal assent on December 9. The triumph of the par- 



158 HUNGARY. 

liamentary principle had been the more decisive, because 
Francis Joseph was believed to be personally averse to 
the policy of the government. But although Wekerle 
had won a great victory, he had done it at the expense 
of his own position. The religious bills had aroused a 
good deal of resentment, which was naturally directed 
against the head of the cabinet, and at the same time 
the ministers were blamed for not taking notice of sedi- 
tious language used at meetings held in honor of the 
younger Kossuth. The Emperor was therefore of opin- 
ion that Dr. Wekerle had better retire, and this he did 
at the end of the year, a new cabinet being formed by 
Baron Banffy, who kept two of the former ministers. 
The new premier announced that he should continue 
the work of the late cabinet, and immediately brought 

in bills sanctioning the Jewish religion and establishing 

© © © 

freedom of worship. These in turn were rejected or 
mutilated by the magnates, but after being voted again 
in the lower house by an overwhelming majority? were 
passed by the other table and received the royal assent. 
In looking at the recent political history of Hungary, 
one is struck by the singular fact that, since 

Nature of .-,,.. . 

parties in a responsible ministrv was instituted twentv- 

Hungary. . J . 

eight years ago, no cabinet has ever fallen in 
consequence of a hostile vote in Parliament. Not that 
the ministers fail to recognize their responsibility to the 
popular chamber, but that no vote implying a lack 
of confidence in them, or a disapproval of their policy, 
has ever been passed. Nor have the ministers ever 
resigned on account of the unfavorable result of a 
general election. They have been forced to retire only 



NATURE OF THE PARTIES. 159 

by the fact that their personal popularity was on the 
wane ; and in spite of a system of committees and of 
interpellations that have weakened the authority of 
the cabinet in other countries, the Hungarian ministers 
have always succeeded in keeping a strong hold of the 
majority so long as they remained in office. 

In seeking the explanation of this phenomenon, one 
is led to observe that there has never been a change of 
party in the ordinary sense ; that is, one cabinet has 
never been replaced by another composed of the mem- 
bers of the former opposition. This is due to the 
fact that before 1875 the Left, on account of its 
refusal to accept the compact with Austria, could not 
be intrusted with the government, and since that date 
the Parliament has not been divided into two great 
hostile parties. Now the reason for the absence of a 
division into two parties must be found, as in the case 
of Italy, chiefly in the existence of a large body of 
men who play little or no part in the chambers, but are 
nevertheless the real political opposition. In Italy, 
this body consists of the Clericals ; in Hungary, of the 
subordinate races ; and in each case its presence tends 
to force the ruling class together, and prevent the 
normal development of parties. There is, indeed, a 
curious resemblance between the parliamentary history 
of Hungary, and that of Italy since the death of 
Cavour. In both countries the Bight governed until 
its work was done and its popularity exhausted. But 
while in Italy the parties thereupon broke up into 
groups which formed coalitions of all sorts, in Hungary 
the Eight and the Left united to form a single party 



160 HUXGAEY. 

which acquired a permanent control of the govern- 
ment. 

The lack of a division into two gTeat parties, such 
as ordinarily prevails in England, will explain why the 
Hungarian cabinet is never upset by an opposition 
whose leaders are ready to form a new ministry ; but 
it does not explain why the cabinet is not constantly 
overthrew nee and Italy, by a temporary 

coalition of groups, and replaced by another as feeble 
and ephemeral as itself. To account for this, we must 
revert to the fact already noticed that the majority in 
Hungary is not composed of a number of different 
groups, but of one solidly united party, which fur- 
nishes the government with a stable support. The 
rzi-:rL:e of a single great party, which distinguishes 
Hungary from all the other countries we have consid- 
ered, may be attributed to three causes : first, to the 
long political experience of the Magyars, acquired by 
local self-government, which makes them understand 
the value of strong political organizations and the ne- 
cessity : : : n : ei Ae I action : second, to the commanding 
personal influence of Deak and afterwards of Tisza ; 
third, to their position in relation to the other races. 
The danger to Hungary from this source is far greater 
than that to which Italy is exposed at the hands of the 
Clericals. It is a question of national life and death. 
If bv quarrels among themselves the Magyars should 
lose control of the state, they would run a terrible 
risk of being engulfed by the flood of Slavs by which 
they are surrounded. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that a majority of the deputies should combine to 



CAUSES OF THE STATE OF PAETIES. 161 

support the government, and present an unbroken front 
to the Croats, the Serbs, and the Koumanians. 

The Magyars have shown an extraordinary capacity 
for self-government, as is abundantly proved by the 
immense growth of material prosperity that has taken 
place since 1867. More especially they have shown a 
marked ability to reach and maintain an agreement on 
public questions. Such a statement may seem strange, 
in view of the intensity of party strife in Hungary, 
but it is nevertheless true. The compact with Austria, 
for example, was a new departure, and at first was 
strenuously opposed by a large fraction of the people, 
but after eight years it was almost universally accepted. 
The stability of the majority in Parliament is another 
result of the same quality. We have seen that in 
Austria the Irreconcilables are nearly, if not quite, as 
numerous and violent as ever, but in Hungary they are 
fast disappearing. Among the Magyars, very few of 
them are left, and even the Slavs seem more and more 
inclined to accept as permanent the existing institu- 
tions. 

vol. n. 



CHAPTER X. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: THE JOINT GOVERNMENT. 

The compact between the two halves of the mon- 
archy, which had been agreed upon between 
tutionai the Emperor, Baron Beust, and Francis Deak, 
was ratified, or rather enacted, by the Hun- 
garian Parliament in the form of a statute designated 
as Law XII. of 1867, and by the Austrian Reichsrath 
in the act of December 21 of the same year. These 
laws regulate the structure and functions of the joint 
government, but they do not form a constitution in 
the sense of a single authoritative document, for, 
although alike in substance, they are not identical in 
form. In fact, the Hungarian statute begins with a 
sort of declaration of the rights of Hungary, which 
has no counterpart in the Austrian act. The two 
principal statutes were supplemented by others. An 
Austrian act of December 24, and a corresponding 
Hungarian law (XV. of 1867), determined the quota 
to be paid by Hungary on account of the interest 
on the imperial debt. Another pair of statutes (Aus- 
tria, December 24, 1867 ; Hungary, XIV. 1867) regu- 
lated for ten years Hungary's share of the common 
expenses, and still another (Austria, December 24, 1867 ; 
Hungary, XVI. 1867) established a tariff and trade 
union for the same period. These last two pairs of 



THE COMPACT OF 1867. 163 

laws expired, and were renewed in a more comprehen- 
sive form by means of a series of statutes which bear 
in Austria the date of June 27, 1878. 1 They were 
again renewed in 1887 in a slightly modified form, 
and negotiations for their extension for another period 
of ten years are pending at this moment. The consti- 
tution thus established, if it may be so called, can be 
amended only in the way in which it was originally 
made ; that is, by concurrent action of the parliaments 
of Austria and Hungary, sanctioned by the Emperor. 

The first connecting link between Austria and Hun- 
gary is the monarch himself, whose functions The mon . 
in the two countries are, however, carefully avch ' 
distinguished. He begins his reign with two separate 
coronations, — one at Vienna, where he takes an oath 
before the Reichsrath, the other at Buda-Pesth, where 
he is crowned with curious symbolic rites, full of 
oriental pomp. This dualism is carried out even in 
his title ; for the Magyars are great sticklers about 
form in matters that involve a recognition of Hungary's 
equality with the rest of the monarchy. By an order 
of November 14, 1868, in place of the grandiloquent 
list of dignities in the old major title, medium title, 
and shorter title, he is to be styled simply " Emperor 
of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King 
of Hungary ; " 2 and he is to be referred to as Seiner 

1 Ulbrich, pp. 11-12. There are also a couple of subsidiary laws on 
the management of the debt. The Austrian laws relating to joint affairs 
may be found in Geller, Bd. I. pp. 12-73; and in the notes to the Act of 
Dec. 21, 1867, the differences that occur in the corresponding Hungarian 
statute are described. 

2 The right to bear the title of Apostolic King was conferred by Pope 



164 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Magestdt der Kaiser und Konig, or, shorter still, as Se. 
k. u. k. Apostolische Magestat. Imperial and royal, 
for it seems that the and is extremely important. In 
the designation of the army, unlike that of the other 
institutions of the joint government, the particle was 
omitted; and in 1889 this aroused so much feeling 
among the Magyars that the Hungarian ministers 
threatened to resign if it were not inserted. The 
military officers objected, on the ground that the 
change would indicate a division of the troops into 
two separate armies, but the Emperor felt obliged 
to concede the point, and thus the and obtained at 
last its full rights in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
Although the offices are kept distinct, the person of 
the monarch must always be the same. Hence the 
rules of succession are identical for the two countries, 
resting upon the House Laws, and especially on the 
Pragmatic Sanction, which has been ratified by both 
parliaments. Moreover the monarch, although free to 
abdicate entirely, is not at liberty to leave one throne 
and keep the other. 1 

The Emperor-King has the command of the joint 
army and navy ; supervises the administration of mat- 
ters common to both countries, and has power to make 
ordinances in regard to them. 2 He appoints for the 
direct control of these matters joint ministers for For- 
eign Affairs, for War, and for Finance, whose functions 
will be considered more at large under the head of their 

Sylvester II. in 1000 upon Stephen of Hungary, the royal convert to 
Christianity. 

1 Ulbrich, pp. 17-20. 2 Id., p. 17. 



THE DELEGATIONS. 165 

respective departments. 1 Finally his consent is required 
for the validity of any act of the joint legislature. 

The deliberative body of the dual monarchy is one 
of the most extraordinary political inventions The delega . 
of modern times. It consists of two delega- tlons< 
tions, 2 — one from Austria, the other from Hungary, — 
each composed of sixty members, of whom twenty are 
chosen by the upper and forty by the lower house of 
each parliament. 3 The delegations are reelected annu- 
ally, and must be summoned to meet by the Emperor at 
least once a year. In everything that relates to their 
sessions and procedure the most scrupulous regard is 
paid to the equality of the two countries. Their meet- 
ings, for example, are held alternately at Vienna and 
Buda-Pesth, 4 and the proposals of the government are 
laid before both bodies at the same time. In the Aus- 
trian delegation all the proceedings are in German ; in 
the Hungarian, in Magyar ; 5 while all communications 
between the two are made in both languages. It seems, 
indeed, to have been the object of the Hungarian 
statesmen, not only to maintain the equality of the two 
nations, but also to keep them apart, to avoid all ap- 
pearance of a common parliament, for the delegations 
debate and vote separately except in a single case. If 

1 There is also a common Court of Accounts, Ulbrich, p. 20. 

2 Cf. the Austrian Law of Dec. 21, 1867, §§ 6-35 ; Ulbrich, pp. 20-22; 
Gumplowicz, §§ 104-7. 

3 One half as many substitutes are elected in the same way. 

4 This is not required by the Act of Dec. 21, 1867, which provides 
(§ 11) simply that the meetings shall be held where the crown appoints, 
or, as the Hungarian Law (§ 32) says, where His Majesty is residing. 

6 An exception is made in favor of the Croats, who are allowed to 
speak their own language. See p. 149, supra. 



166 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

they disagree about any measure, and after the third 
exchange of communications an accord is not reached, 
either delegation may demand a common session. Here 
again the equality of the two countries is carefully pre- 
served, for the two presidents take turns in presiding, 
the journal is kept in both languages, and, what is far 
more extraordinary, it is especially provided that the 
same number of delegates from each country shall take 
part, the side which has most members present being 
reduced by lot until the two are equal. In the joint 
session no debate is permitted, and the only business 
transacted is the taking of a vote on the matter about 
which the delegations have failed to agree. The pro- 
cedure, therefore, is a peculiar one. The two bodies 
debate and vote separately, except in case of a dead- 
lock, when they vote but never debate together. 

The system appears to be so contrived as to insure 

to each half of the monarchy an equal influ- 
favors Hun- ence, but in reality it gives an advantage to 

Hungary. This is due to the fact that the 
Magyars have made themselves the dominant people 
in Hungary, and have stamped out the opposition of 
the other races, while the Germans have not done so 
in Austria. The method by which the advantage is 
secured is as follows. In Hungary the delegates from 
each house are chosen by majority vote without any 
restriction, except that the Croats are entitled to one 
delegate from the upper house and four from the lower. 
Now the Magyars hold far more than half the seats in 
each house, and hence they are able to fill all but five 
of the places in the delegation with men who will main- 



THE DELEGATIONS. 167 

tain their interests and support each other. Moreover, 
the lower house was in the habit, for many years, of 
electing all its delegates from the same party. In Aus- 
tria, on the other hand, it is provided by law that the 
delegates from the House of Representatives shall be 
chosen by the deputies from the several provinces in 
certain proportions ; * and, as the provinces are controlled 
by different races and parties, the Austrian delegation 
is composed of a number of hostile groups. It has, in 
fact, happened more than once that the party which 
formed the majority in the lower house of the Reichs- 
rath was actually a minority in the delegation. 2 The 
result is that the Hungarians act in concert far more 
than the Austrians, and it is often possible for the 
Magyars to persuade the Poles, or some other group, to 
vote on their side in the common session, and thus give 
them a majority. Common sessions are, no doubt, rare, 
but the mere knowledge of what the result of such a ses- 
sion would be is a powerful lever for forcing concessions. 
The far greater solidity of the Hungarian delega- 
tion causes the ministers to rely upon it for support, 
and gives it in turn a greater influence over their pol- 
icy. This state of things is the chief reason for the 
current saying that Hungary enjoys seventy per cent, 
of the power in the Empire for thirty per cent, of the 
cost. She certainly wields a much larger share of 
power than she could claim on the score of population 

1 Laws of Dec. 21, 1867 (R. G. B. 146), § 8, and April 2, 1873 (R. G. B. 
40), Art. II. 

2 This was the case in 1872, 1876, and 1878, when in the delegation 
the peers and the opposition parties outvoted the Liberals, who supported 
the Austrian cabinet, but were opposed to the policy of the joint ministers. 



168 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

or of wealth, as may be seen by the fact that during 
twenty-one out of the twenty-nine years that have 
elapsed since the union was formed the foreign affairs 
have been in the charge of a Magyar. A still more 
tangible proof of her influence was furnished during the 
current year, when a dissension between Baron Banff y, 
the Hungarian Premier, and Count Kalnoky, the Joint 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, arose out of the Papal 
Nuncio's public criticism of the religious policy of 
the Hungarian government. Although Kalnoky had 
managed the foreign relations of the monarchy with 
exceptional ability, and possessed the entire confidence 
of the Emperor, the influence of Banffy was strong 
enough to force him to resign. 

It is important to observe that the delegations are 
practically confined in their action to voting 

The deleg-a- . . 

tionshave suppHes, and exerting a control over the 

almost no . . . 

legislative administration. In fact, they can hardly be 

power. . . . 

said to possess any real legislative power at all. 
The compact provides that their competence shall ex- 
tend to all matters touching the common affairs ; 1 but 
on inquiring what those are, we find the following list: 2 
(1) Foreign relations of all kinds, but the ratification 
of treaties, so far as it is constitutionally required, is 
reserved to the two separate parliaments ; (2) Military 
matters, except the regulation of the number of re- 
cruits, the liability to military service, and the civil 
rights and duties of soldiers ; (3) The finances, so far 
as the common expenses are concerned, in short, appro- 
priations ; and fixing the conditions for raising, apply- 
1 Law of Dec. 21, 1867, § 13. 2 Id. t § 1. 



THE DELEGATIONS. 169 

ing, and paying loans, after the parliaments of Austria 
and Hungary have determined by parallel laws that a 
loan shall be raised. 1 Clearly there is very little room 
for legislation here. The compact then goes on to 
specify other matters which are not common, but are to 
be dealt with according to identical principles agreed 
upon from time to time. These are commercial affairs, 
and especially the tariff ; legislation about those indi- 
rect taxes which affect industrial production ; money 
and coinage ; railroads which concern the interests of 
both halves of the monarchy ; and the military system. 2 
This second class of subjects, most of which in other 
federal governments fall within the province of the 
central legislature, are regulated in the dual monarchy 
by concurrent statutes of the two parliaments, and 
thus nearly everything in the nature of positive law must 
be enacted separately in Austria and Hungary. In 
substance, therefore, the whole joint legislation of the 
monarchy is a series of treaties, partly permanent and 
partly temporary, which cannot be changed or pro- 
longed by any common legislature, but only by the 
contracting parties themselves. We have thus a unique 
case of almost absolute legislative decentralization, 
combined with a certain amount of administrative cen- 
tralization, the laws on matters of common interest 
being enacted by the separate legislatures, and only 
their execution being intrusted to the organs of the 
federal government. 

The work of the delegations consists, then, mainly 
in the control of the common administration, and in 

1 Law of Dec. 21, 1867, § 3. 2 Id., § 2. 



170 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

granting the annual appropriations. The control over 
the administration is exercised by examining 
tiontothe the accounts, by acting on petitions, by dis- 
cussing the reports of the joint ministers, and 
by addressing interpellations to them, for the ministers 
have a right to appear in the delegations, and are in 
fact constantly present. They can even be impeached 
by concurrent vote, but this has never been done. 
Now it is evident that, although the means of checking 
the policy of the government are not wanting, a strict 
ministerial responsibility cannot be enforced by bodies 
that meet only for a short time and debate separately. 
The joint ministers, therefore, are in a sort of general 
harmony with the delegations, but are under no such 
control as exists in a parliamentary form of government. 
We have seen that there are three joint ministries, — 
The joint those for foreign affairs, for war, and for 
ministries - finance. 1 The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
is at the head of the diplomatic corps, and has entire 
Foreign charge of the foreign relations of the whole 
affairs. country, for the separate halves of the mon- 

archy hold no direct communication with other nations. 
He consults frequently, however, with the premiers of 
Austria and Hungary, who, in turn, are often interpel- 
lated and make statements on the subject in their respec- 
tive parliaments. He also gives to the delegations such 
information as he thinks best ; but from the secret na- 
ture of diplomatic negotiation his reports are necessarily 
far more meagre than those of the other ministers. 

1 The Minister for Foreign Affairs formerly bore the title of Imperial 
Chancellor, but the Magyars thought this savored too much of a consol- 
idated state, and in 1871 it was changed. 



THE ARMY. 171 

The next department of the joint administration is 
that of war, and here again is found the 
strange mixture of federal union and inter- 
national alliance that is characteristic of the relations 
of Austria and Hungary. 1 The regular army The regular 
and the navy are institutions of the joint army * 
monarchy, although they are governed by separate 
standing laws of the two states, which are, of course, 
substantially identical. These laws determine, among 
other things, the number of the troops, and provide 
that the men shall be furnished by the two countries in 
proportion to population ; but the contingent of recruits 
required from each country is voted annually by its 
own parliament. It is useless to inquire what would 
happen if either half of the Empire should refuse to 
raise its quota of troops, for there is no possible means 
of compulsion, and in this, as in most other cases, the 
smooth working of the joint government depends ulti- 
mately on a constant harmony between the cabinets of 
Vienna and Buda-Pesth. After the recruits are en- 
listed they are under the control and in the pay of the 
joint administration. The Emperor, as commander-in- 
chief, appoints the officers, and regulates the organi- 
zation of the army. The minister of war, curiously 
enough, is not required to countersign acts of this na- 
ture, 2 but he is responsible for all other matters, such 
as the commissariat, equipment, and military schools. 

Besides the regular army, which belongs to the joint 
government, there are military bodies, called in Austria 

i Cf . Ulbrich, pp. 23-25. 
2 Law of Dec. 21, 1867, § 5. 



172 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

the Landwehr, and in Hungary the Honveds, which 
are special institutions of the separate halves 
wehr and of the monarchy. These troops are composed 
of the recruits that are not needed for the 
contingents to the regular army, and of the men who 
have already served their time in it. They form a 
sort of reserve, but cannot be ordered to march out of 
their own state without the permission of its parlia- 
ment ; except that in case of absolute necessity, when 
the parliament is not in session, the permission may be 
given by the cabinet of the country to which they be- 
long. After such a permission has been granted, how- 
ever, they are subject to the orders of the general 
commanding the regular army. The Landwehr and 
Honveds are organized under independent laws, which 
happen to be very much alike but are not necessarily 
so, and their ordinary expenses are borne entirely by 
the country to which they belong, only the increase of 
cost arising from their actual use in war being defrayed 
out of the joint treasury. 

The third department of the joint administration is 
that of the finances, which caused no little 
trouble when the compact was made in 1867. 
One of the most difficult questions was the share of 
The joint interest on the debt to be paid by each coun- 
l e mmo n n d try. The Hungarians insisted that they 
expenses. wou ld no t assume a burden that would em- 
barrass them, and they had a great advantage in the 
negotiation, because they openly urged repudiation, to 
which the Austrians would not consent. 1 After a good 

1 Rogge, Oesterreich von Vildgos bis zur Gegenwart, vol. iii. p. 42. 



THE FINANCES. 173 

deal of discussion it was finally settled that Hungary 
should contribute twenty-nine and a half millions of 
florins a year towards the interest on the existing 
debt, and that Austria should pay the rest, enjoying, 
however, the benefit of any reorganization, or in other 
words repudiation, she might make, — a privilege of 
which she subsequently took advantage in the form of 
a tax on the national creditors. It was agreed that 
new debts should be contracted only with the consent of 
both parliaments, and that the interest thereon should 
be paid in proportion to the share of the common 
expenses borne by each country at the time the loans 
were made. 1 In regard to the current expenses of the 
joint monarchy, it was arranged that they should be 
defrayed as far as possible out of the joint revenue, 
and that any balance should be paid, seventy per 
cent, by Austria and thirty per cent, by Hungary, that 
being about the ratio of the sums then raised by taxa- 
tion in the two countries. This arrangement about 
current expenses was made only for ten years. It has 
since been slightly modified ; for a strip of land along 
the southern frontier of Hungary, which had been 
under the direct government of the imperial military 
authorities, was incorporated in that kingdom, and in 
consideration of the revenue they would receive from 
this territory the Hungarians agreed to pay an addi- 
tional two per cent, of the net cost of the joint govern- 
ment. From the gross expenses of the dual monarchy, 
therefore, the revenues are first deducted ; two per cent. 
of the balance is then paid by Hungary, and the rest is 
1 Law of Dec. 24, 1867 (R. G. B. 1868, No. 3). 



174 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

assessed upon the two countries in the ratio of seventy 
and thirty per cent. 1 

Except for a few insignificant matters, such as the 
The customs ^ ease °f state property, the sale of old mate- 
nnion - rial, and the profits of the powder monopoly, 

the only direct source of revenue belonging to the joint 
government is the customs tariff, which rests upon a 
treaty between the two countries made for ten years at 
a time, in the form of identical acts of the two parlia- 
ments. 2 These laws establish a uniform tariff for the 
whole monarchy, and provide that neither country shall 
lay any duty on goods coming from the other, except to 
the amount of its own excise on the same commodity. 
The duties, however, although paid into the common 
treasury, are not collected by the joint government, but 
by the separate countries, which have nothing to do 
with each other's custom-houses, except the right of 
mutual inspection. 

The treaty goes beyond the mere subject of the joint 
revenue, and touches on other questions involving the 
economic condition of the people. It is provided, for 
example, that the monopoly on salt and tobacco, and 
the taxes on liquor, shall be regulated by parallel laws in 
the two halves of the monarchy. It is stipulated, more- 
over, that the citizens of the two countries shall have 
equal rights in all matters relating to trade ; for the 
union between Austria and Hungary is so far from 
being a complete federation that the citizens of one 
country are strictly foreigners in the other. 3 The treaty 

* Law of June 27, 1878 (R. G. B. 61). 

2 Cf. Law of June 27, 1878 (R. G. B. 62); Ulbrich, pp. 22-23, 28-31. 

3 Cf. Ulbrich, p. 38. 



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. 175 

also establishes a common standard of money, and pro- 
vides that patents and trade-marks acquired in either 
country shall be protected in both ; * that commerce on 
the high seas shall be governed by uniform laws ; and 
that the regulations about posts and telegraphs, and 
about connecting railroads, shall be similar. All these 
matters, which He at the very base of a common nation- 
ality, depend in the dual monarchy upon treaties, ter- 
minable by either party at the end of the ten years. 
The result is that one side has an opportunity to wring 
concessions from the other as the price of renewal, and 
in fact the Magyars did so in 1878, when they forced 
the Austrian s to consent to the transformation of the 
Austrian National Bank into an Austro-Hungarian Na- 
tional Bank, and thereby obtained a bank in high 
credit without raising any money for the purpose. 2 

Curiously enough, there is a district which forms 
part neither of Austria nor of Hungary, but, 
like Alsace-Lorraine in Germany, is ruled Herzego- 
directly by the federal officials. 3 The district 
did not belong to the monarchy when the compact 
of 1867 was made, but was acquired in 1878, after the 
Russo-Turkish war. At that time the Great Powers 
met at the Congress of Berlin, and agreed to protect 
Turkey against the grasping ambition of Russia by 
lopping off pieces of her territory for the benefit of 
one another. Austria's share of the booty consisted of 

1 Companies chartered in one country may open offices in the other. 
Law of June 27, 1878 (R. G. B. 63). 

2 The National Bank is governed by a pair of identical laws. Cf . Aust. 
Law of June 27, 1878 (R. G. B. 66). 

3 Ulbrich, pp. 27, 28. - 



176 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, although these provinces 
remained under the nominal suzerainty of the Sublime 
Porte, the administration of them being alone con- 
fided to Austria, they were virtually annexed for all 
purposes to the dominions of the House of Habsburg. 
Now it would have been impracticable to divide the ter- 
ritory between Hungary and Austria, and neither half 
of the monarchy would have consented to its annexa- 
tion as a whole by the other. Nor did the Germans or 
the Magyars want to imperil their supremacy at home 
by adding to the number of Slav deputies in their own 
parliaments. Hence the only possible course was to 
rule the provinces in common as a subject land. The 
two parliaments, therefore, passed laws providing that 
the administration of the provinces should be organized 
and carried on by the monarch and the joint ministers, 
reserving, however, to the cabinets of Hungary and 
Austria a right to an influence in the matter, that is, a 
right to be consulted in regard to it. The laws further 
provided that the cost should be defrayed as far as 
possible out of local revenues, and that any deficit 
should be covered by the delegations, but that the 
construction of railroads and other public works, and 
all measures which might affect the rest of the mon- 
archy, should require the consent of the two parlia- 
ments. The immediate government of the provinces 
is intrusted to the joint Minister of Finance, although 
the connection with finance is not very evident. In 
fact, the matter was placed under the charge of that 
department, not on account of any natural fitness, but 
simply because the Minister of Finance, having no taxes 
to collect, is less busy than either of his colleagues. 



NATURE OF THE UNION. 177 

If France has been a laboratory for political experi- 
ments, Austria-Hungary is a museum of polit- character of 
ical curiosities, but it contains nothing so tlieuiuon - 
extraordinary as the relation between Austria and Hun- 
gary themselves. The explanation of the strange con- 
nection is to be found in the fact that the two countries 
are not held together from within by any affection 
or loyalty to a common Fatherland, but are forced 
together by a pressure from outside which makes the 
union an international and military necessity. Austria, 
on the one hand, would not be large enough alone to 
be a really valuable ally to Germany and Italy ; and if 
not an ally, she would be likely to become a prey, for she 
contains districts which they would be glad to absorb. 
Moreover, there would be imminent danger of some 
of her different races breaking into open revolt if the 
Emperor had not the Hungarian troops at his com- 
mand. On the other hand, the Magyars without Aus- 
tria would not be sufficiently strong to block the ambi- 
tion of Russia, or resist the tide of panslavism. They 
would not only have little influence outside their own 
dominions, but they would run a grave risk of foreign 
interference in favor of the Slavs in Hungary. The 
union is, therefore, unavoidable, and it is very little 
closer than is absolutely necessary to carry out the pur- 
poses for which it exists. There is a common army, a 
common direction of foreign affairs, and a terminable 
customs union, which is, after all, the most convenient 
method of defraying part of the cost of the military 
establishment. 

In regard to the system adopted for accomplishing 
vol. n. 



178 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

this object, two points are especially noticeable. One 
is the privileged position of Hungary, which pays thirty- 
two per cent, of the expenses, and furnishes forty-one 
per cent, of the troops, but is given one half of the 
power by law, and practically enjoys even a larger 
share. 1 The other point is the clumsiness of the ma- 
chinery, which requires for its working an infinite 
amount of tact and skill. There is no single authority 
that has power to settle anything, but every measure 
involves a negotiation between the two delegations or 
the two parliaments, and government becomes in conse- 
quence an endless series of compromises between legis- 
lative bodies belonging to different races which are 
jealous of each other. Moreover, the true source of 
power lies in the two parliaments, and to these the joint 
ministers have no access. It is in fact specially pro- 
vided that they shall not be members of either cabinet. 
They are unable, therefore, to lead the parliaments ; 
and that the parliaments cannot control them was 
clearly shown in 1878, when the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was carried through against the wishes 
of both legislatures. The ministers of Austria are at 
least nominally responsible to the lower house of the 
Eeichsrath, and those of Hungary are actually respon- 
sible to the Table of Deputies, but the joint ministers 
are not in fact directly responsible to any legislative 
body. One would naturally suppose that a mechanism 
so intricate and so unwieldy would be continually get- 

1 This is curiously at variance with the internal policy of the two 
countries, for in each of them the apportionment of representatives is 
based in part on taxation. 



NATURE OF THE UNION. 179 

ting out of order, and in constant danger of breaking 
down. But political necessity is stronger than perfection 
of organization, and apart from some radical change in 
the western half of the monarchy, the forces that have 
made the dual system work smoothly in the past are 
likely to produce the same result in the future. 



CHAPTER XI. 

SWITZERLAND : INSTITUTIONS. 

There is a spot in Switzerland, famous as one of 
the most ancient passes over the Alps, where 
religions in the great mountain chains from the west, 
southwest, east, and northeast, are gathered 
into a knot. It is the St. Gothard : and not far from 
the summit of the pass lies the Furka, where the 
traveler can stand and look down, on one side, on 
the little torrent of the Reuss, whose waters, pouring 
into the Rhine, find their way to the North Sea ; and, 
on the other side, on the great glacier of the Rhone, 
from which springs the river of the same name that 
flows through southern France, and empties itself into 
the Mediterranean, near Marseilles. On the south of 
the Alps, the St. Gothard road winds along a stream 
that, falling into the Po, runs through the plains of 
Lombardy to the Adriatic, not far from Venice ; and 
a few score of miles to the east rises the Inn, a 
tributary of the Danube, which has its outlet in the 
Black Sea. Now the races of men in their migrations 
are prone to follow the courses of the streams they meet. 
Hence the valley of the Rhone is inhabited chiefly by 
Frenchmen, while the Germans and the Italians occupy 
the headwaters of the Rhine and the Po ; and it is 
a curious fact, although an accidental one, that along 



RACES AND CREEDS. 181 

the upper Inn a language is still spoken which has 
its nearest counterpart among the Roumanians at the 
mouth of the Danube. 1 Switzerland may, therefore, 
be considered the ethnological as well as the geo- 
graphical centre of Europe, the place where the rivers 
take their rise and the races meet together. 

Among these races the Germans preponderate heavily, 
counting, according to the last census, 2,083,097 mem- 
bers, against 634,613 French, 155,130 Italians, and 
38,357 Romance-speaking people. But a difference of 
blood is not the only thing that separates the Swiss 
from each other. They are also sharply divided on 
religious questions ; for «ome parts of the country, and 
especially the mountain regions, did not feel the effect 
of the Reformation and remained Catholic, while other 
districts became strongly Protestant. Except in the 
case of the Italians, who are almost entirely Catholic, 
the lines of religion and of race by no means coincide, 
and in fact it is often impossible to understand the 
religious condition of a canton without a careful study 
of its history. 2 The Protestants form to-day about 

1 To be more accurate, the French occupy the cantons of Vaud, Geneva, 
and Neuchatel, and parts of Freiburg, the Valais, and Berne. The 
Italians fill almost the whole of Ticino and parts of the Grisons. 
The Romance-speaking people also live in the Grisons. All the rest of 
the country is German. It is worth noting that, except for the city of 
Basle, which forms a half canton by itself, the three purely French can- 
tons have the greatest amount of wealth per capita, and the Italian canton 
of Ticino the least. 

2 The cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Freiburg, 
Ticino, the Valais, Appenzell-Int., and Soleure are Catholic, all but the 
last nearly solidly so. Zurich, Berne, Schaffhausen, Appenzell-Ext., 
Vaud, and Neuchatel are overwhelmingly, and Glarus, Basle, and 
Thurgau heavily, Protestant; while St. Gall, the Grisons, Aargau, and 



182 SWITZERLAND. 

three fifths of the total population, and indeed the rel- 
ative proportion of the churches varies very little from 
generation to generation. 1 

Now, if any one were asked what kind of govern- 
The forma- men ^ a f ree people so divided by blood and 
CoSfedera- by cree d would probably have, he would feel 
sure that it was not a highly centralized one. 
He would doubtless expect it to be a federation of 
some sort, and such is in fact the case. The devel- 
opment of Switzerland has been precisely the reverse 
of that of Austria. In the latter, the different races 
which were forced together under a single monarch 
have been straining apart, and striving to assert their 
independence ; while the history of the Swiss has been 
that of separate communities uniting voluntarily for 
mutual protection, and learning to reconcile their dis- 
cordant elements and draw closer and closer together. 

The heart of the ancient Confederation consisted of 
the forest cantons at the head of the Lake of Lucerne. 
One by one, other members joined the league, some of 
them rural communities in the mountains, some of them 
cities in the lower country, and thus the Confederation 
gradually extended over the greater part of the present 
Swiss territory; but still no real federal union was 
formed, and Switzerland remained an alliance of sepa- 
rate states loosely bound together, until the end of the 

Geneva are not very far from evenly divided. (In speaking of the 
cantons, I have used the names that seem most familiar to English 
readers.) 

1 By the census of 1850, there were 1,417,754 Protestants and 971,840 
Catholics; by that of 1888, 1,716,548 Protestants and 1,183,828 Catho- 
lics. 



FORMATION OF THE CONFEDERATION. 183 

last century, when the French Revolution swept over 
Europe like a tornado, uprooting everything in its 
track. Then the French Directory conferred upon the 
unwilling Swiss centralized institutions, resembling the 
last new pattern of perfect government that had been 
devised in France. The majority of the people did not 
appreciate a blessing which was unsuited to their habits 
and traditions, and in 1803 Napoleon tried to reconcile 
the hostile factions by the Act of Mediation. By this 
change, three new cantons were added to the territory ; 1 
as many more were carved out of the old ones ; 2 and 
a federal system was established, in which the power of 
the central government was far from strong. 

After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna 
gave to the country its present configuration by adding 
three more cantons, 3 and at the same time the ancient 
political order was partially restored by still further 
weakening the federal tie. A period of reaction then 
set in ; and, although after 1830 great changes began 
to take place in the cantonal governments, the form of 
the Confederation remained unaltered until religious 
dissensions led to the formation by the Catholic cantons 
of a separate league known as the Sonderband. This 
caused a civil war, in which the Catholic forces were 
quickly overpowered and the Sonderbund broken up. 
The struggle precipitated a crisis, and brought about 

1 St. Gall, the Grisons, and Ticino. The first two of these had pre- 
viously been Zugewandte Orte, or Affiliated States. 

2 Aargau, Thurgau, and Vaud. 

3 Neuchatel, Geneva, and the Yalais. These had all been previously- 
affiliated to the Confederation, though not a part of it. Neuchatel, 
however, remained to some extent connected with Prussia until 1857. 



184 SWITZERLAND. 

the creation of a stronger and more highly organized 
central government by means of the constitution of 
1848. In 1874 the power of the federal authorities 
was again increased by another constitution, which has 
often been amended in part but has never been super- 
seded, and still remains the basis of the Swiss federal 
system. 

The Confederation is composed of twenty-two can- 
tons, each with its own peculiar laws, cus- 

The relation . . n . 

of the can- toms, history, and habits of thought : or rather 

tons to the i 

Confedera- it would be more accurate to call the number 

tion. 

twenty-five, for three of the cantons have, 
from religious, historical, or other causes, split up into 
half cantons, each of which is entirely independent of 
its twin, and differs from a whole canton only in two 
respects. In the first place, it sends a single member 
to the Council of States, or federal senate, instead 
of two ; and, in the second place, it is entitled to cast 
only a half vote on the question of amending the 
constitution. The cantons correspond to our States, 
and in some respects the Swiss federal system is very 
similar to our own, although in others it is radically 
different. 

The Swiss national government, like that of the 
United States, has only the powers specially conferred 
upon it, the constitution expressly declaring that the 
cantons are sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not 
limited by that instrument, and as such are entitled to 
all the rights not delegated to the federal authorities. 1 

1 Const. Art. 3. The cantons have power to make conventions among 
themselves on matters that are not of a political nature (Art. 7), and 



POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 185 

The Swiss Confederation also resembles our own 
in being a union of states possessing equal 
rights, but the distribution of power between ecutive*" 
those states and the central government is federai°gov- e 

•it • t re in i eminent. 

based on quite a cliiierent plan trom that 
which prevails here. On this point Switzerland is 
much more closely akin to Germany than to America ; 
for, instead of assigning to the federal and state gov- 
ernments separate spheres of action, the Swiss, like the 
Germans, have combined legislative centralization with 
administrative decentralization, the federal laws being 
carried out as a rule by the cantonal authorities. 1 
Except for foreign affairs, the custom-house, the postal 
and telegraph services, the alcohol monopoly, the poly- 
technic school, and the arsenals, the federal government 
has scarcely any direct executive functions, but acts 
in the way of inspection and supervision. 2 Even the 
army is mainly under the management of the cantons, 
the Confederation making the regulations, appointing 
the superior officers, and having the command in the 
field. 3 Moreover, the federal court has to rely for the 
most part on cantonal machinery to execute its judg- 
ments, as it has no officials of its own for the purpose. 4 

even to make treaties with foreign powers on certain minor subjects 
(Art. 9). For a list of these, see Vincent, State and Federal Government 
of Switzerland, p. 51. 

1 Cf. Dubs, Droit Public de la Confed. Suisse, pt. ii. pp. 11 1 5. 

2 Cf . Adams and Cunningham, The Swiss Confederation, ch. ii. ; Dupriez, 
vol. ii. p. 234 ; Numa Droz, Etudes et Portraits Politiques, p. 392. 

8 Const. Arts. 13, 19-21 ; Adams, ch. xi. 

4 See Adams, p. 71 (the references to pages of Adams's work are 
to those of the translation, with notes, by Loumyer) ; Winchester, The 
Swiss Republic, p. 114. 



186 SWITZERLAND. 

On the other hand, the power of the national govern- 
ment to supervise the local administration is great, and 
extends beyond a mere oversight of the execution of 
the federal laws. Thus the Confederation is expressly 
directed to compel the cantons to provide free, compul- 
sory, and non-sectarian education, although it has no 
right to prescribe how that education shall be given. 1 
A wide opening for federal interference is furnished in 
the clause of the constitution whereby the Confedera- 
tion guarantees to the cantons, among other things, the 
liberty and rights of the people and the constitutional 
rights of the citizens. 2 In form, the guarantee runs 
only in favor of the cantons as such ; but in practice 
it has been held to authorize the protection of an 
individual against the cantonal authorities, and it has 
even been construed to empower the federal executive 
to prevent improper tampering with a local voting list. 3 
Another article of the constitution, of great impor- 
tance in this connection, is one which provides that if, 
in case of internal disturbance, the cantonal authorities 
are unable to call upon the federal government for aid, 
it may intervene of its own accord. 4 A few years ago 
an insurrection broke out in Ticino over a disputed 
election, and the cantonal authorities, though perfectly 
able to do so, refused to ask for help. Nevertheless the 
federal government felt authorized not only to interfere 
and suppress the tumults, but also to inquire into the 

i Const. Art. 27. 

2 Art. 5. Cf. Art. 85, § 7. 

8 Cf. Adams, pp. 69-71; Winchester, pp. 129-130. 

4 Const. Art. 16. 



POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 187 

validity of the election, and to take such steps as law 
and justice required. 1 

It will be observed, therefore, that the Confederation 
has very little direct executive power, but has a wide 
supervision over the administration, and in case of 
actual disturbance it appears as an arbiter with power 
to enforce its decisions. 

The legislative authority of the national government 
is much more extensive in Switzerland than 
in this country, for in addition to the powers legislative 
conferred upon Congress it includes such 
subjects as the regulation of religious bodies and the 
exclusion of monastic orders, 2 the manufacture and sale 
of alcoholic liquors, 3 the prevention of epidemics and 
epizootics, 4 the game laws, 5 the construction and opera- 
tion of all railroads, 6 the regulation of labor in fac- 
tories, 7 the compulsory insurance of workmen, 8 the 
collection of debts, and the whole range of commercial 

1 Cf. Salis, Schweiz. Bundesrecht, Bd. I. pp. 121-33; Vincent, pp. 36-37. 
On the occasion of the riots in Chicago in 1894, the United States govern- 
ment found means to interfere, but in accordance with the true principle 
of Anglo-Saxon development this surprising step toward centralization was 
accomplished through the instrumentality, not of the executive, but of 
the courts. The intervention of the Swiss national government, on the 
other hand, bears an obvious resemblance to the German system of fed- 
eral execution. 

2 Cf. Const. Arts. 49-57. 

3 Art. 32, Ms. 

4 Art. 69. 

5 Art. 25. 

6 Art. 26. 

7 And of the operation of emigration societies and insurance compa- 
nies, Art. 34. 

s Art. 34, bis. 



188 SWITZERLAND. 

law. 1 Beside all this, the central legislature is given 
power to interfere in other matters which are not di- 
rectly subject to its control. The streams and forests, 
and the most important roads and bridges, for example, 
are placed under its supervision ; 2 and the cantonal 
laws on the press, and on the right to acquire a settle- 
ment and vote on communal matters, must be submitted 
to it for approval. 3 In fact, as Dupriez remarks, the 
Confederation has been made a sort of tutor and super- 
visor of the cantons. 4 

In one direction the competence of the national 
legislature is more limited in Switzerland than in the 
United States, namely, in the matter of taxation, which 
is confined to customs duties levied at the frontier. The 
federal revenues are, in fact, derived entirely from in- 
come on national property ; from the proceeds of the 
customs, of the posts and telegraphs, and of the powder 
monopoly ; and from one half of the tax on exemptions 
from military duty. 5 If the expenditures are not cov- 
ered by the receipts from these sources, there is a pro- 
vision for defraying the balance by means of contribu- 

1 Art. 64. On some of these subjects the cantons cannot legislate at 
all; on others, action on their part is not excluded, provided it is not 
inconsistent with the federal statutes. The powers of the national gov- 
ernment are not enumerated systematically in the constitution, but are 
scattered through the various articles of the first chapter. 

2 Arts. 24 and 37. 

3 Arts. 43, 55. This is also true of the cantonal constitutions. 
Art. 6. 

4 Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 175. 

5 Art. 42. The other half of this tax goes to the cantons, and the net 
revenue from taxes on alcohol is also paid to them. Art. 32, bis. 



TENDENCY TO CENTEALIZE. 189 

tions assessed upon the cantons, but as yet it has not 
been found necessary to resort to them. 1 

The legislative power of the central government is 
not only greater in Switzerland than in the 
United States, but it is being increased much the federal 

government 

more rapidly by means of amendments to the pe increas- 
constitution, which are continually placing 
new subjects within the domain of federal law. While, 
therefore, both countries are centralizing to some ex- 
tent, the process takes place in America by a stretching 
of the existing constitution, but in Switzerland it is 
carried on by the more comprehensive method of adding 
new clauses to the constitution itself. One reason for 
the rapid increase in the powers of the Swiss Confed- 
eration is to be found in the small size of the cantons, 
which are not big enough by themselves to provide 
for the needs of a modern state ; for it must be remem- 
bered that the largest of them has only a little over 
half a million inhabitants, while the smallest has less 
than thirteen thousand, the average population being 
only about one hundred and twenty thousand. The 
cantons, moreover, realize how little they are much 
more keenly than they used to do, because, at the time 
the constitution of 1848 was adopted, several of the 
neighboring countries, such as Sardinia, Bavaria, and 
Baden, were small, but now those states have become 
parts of the great Italian and German monarchies, 
and this makes the Swiss cantons seem the more dimin- 
utive. 

Another reason for the progress of centralization is 

1 Vincent, p. 75. 



190 SWITZERLAND. 

the comparative ease with which the constitution can 
Themethods be changed; for, although the process of 
tL a einstit? amendment is not a little complicated, it is 
tion ' by no means so difficult to put in practice as 

in the United States, as is evident from the fact that 
of late an amendment of some sort has been adopted, 
on the average, every other year. The process can be 
carried on in a variety of ways. 1 In the first place a 
distinction is drawn between total revision, that is, the 
substitution of a new constitution for the old one, and 
partial revision, or the adoption of a specific amend- 
ment. If, at any time, both houses of the national 
legislature agree in wanting a revision of either kind, 
they can prepare the new constitution or the particular 
amendment, as the case may be, and, subject to a rati- 
fication by popular vote, they can pass it with the same 
formalities that are required for enacting an ordinary 
statute. But the change can also be brought about 
without the consent of the legislature, and in this case 
the procedure is not the same for both kinds of revi- 
sion. A total revision may be demanded by one house 
alone if the other does not agree to it, or by any fifty 
thousand voters, and if demanded in either of these 
ways a popular vote must be taken on the question 
whether a revision ought to be made or not. If a 
majority of all the votes cast throughout Switzerland is 
in the affirmative, the legislature is elected afresh for 
the purpose of drawing up the new constitution. 2 

1 Const, ch. iii., and Art. 85, § 14. 

2 In 1880 a solitary attempt was made by 50,000 voters to revise the 
constitution in this way, but the popular vote was in the negative. 



new 
initiative. 



AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 191 

Until 1891 a partial revision could be proposed only 
by both houses of the legislature, but in that The 
year a change was made in the constitution 
so as to allow fifty thousand voters to demand a partic- 
ular amendment. Here, again, there is another com- 
plication; for the petitioners can either present their 
amendment in its final shape, ready to be immediately 
submitted to popular vote, or they can describe it in 
general terms. In the latter case, the people must 
be asked whether they approve of the suggestion, and 
if they vote Yes, the amendment must be drawn up by 
the existing legislature. This right on the part of pri- 
vate citizens to propose a revision is called the initia- 
tive, and will be more fully explained in the next chap- 
ter, which treats of direct popular legislation ; but it 
must be noticed here that every change in the constitu- 
tion, whether a total revision or a partial amendment, 
and whether prepared by the legislature or by private 
initiative, has to be submitted in its final shape to 
popular vote, and does not take effect unless ratified 
by a majority both of the people and of the cantons, 
— the popular vote in each canton being taken for this 
purpose as the vote of the canton itself. 1 

The men who framed the constitution of 1848 were 
deeply influenced by the example of the 0r ans of 
United States, especially in regard to the com- * 
position of the national legislature, or Federal 



govern- 
ment. 



1 It is a curious fact that the votes of the people and the cantons have 
been on opposite sides of a constitutional question only once. That was 
in the case of an amendment proposed in 1866 giving the Confederation 
power to regulate weights and measures. 



192 SWITZERLAND. 

Assembly as it is called (Assemblee federate, Bundes- 
versammlung). This body consists of two branches, 
one of which, known as the National Council (Conseil 
national, Nationalrath), corresponds to our House of 
Eepresentatives, and is elected directly by the people ; 
while the other, called the Council of States {Conseil 
des Etats, Standerath), and corresponding to our Sen- 
ate, contains two members chosen by each canton, or 
one by each half canton. In the case of the executive, 
the American practice was not followed, for the Swiss 
have a dread of confiding authority to any single per- 
son, and always prefer a collegiate body. 1 Instead of 
a President, therefore, they instituted a Federal Coun- 
cil [Conseil federal, Bundesrath) of seven members. 
They also established a Federal Tribunal [Tribunal 
federal, Bundes gericht), which resembles, though not 
very closely, the Supreme Court of the United States. 

Now, while the Swiss federal government bears a 
marked likeness to our own in many of its general out- 
lines, in substance and actual working it is very differ- 
ent; for, as an observer has pointed out, it is strong 
where ours is weak, and weak where ours is strong. 2 
If a foreign critic were asked what parts of our na- 
tional government he considered the most successful, 
as compared with European systems, he would answer, 
without hesitation, the Senate and the Supreme Court ; 
and he would add that the House of Representatives 
and the President were not quite as satisfactory. Of 
late years, indeed, the Senate has suffered severely from 

1 Cf. Dubs, pt. ii. p. 101 ; Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 182. 

2 The Nation, Oct. 15, 1891. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 193 

the admission of a number of small States, — rotten 
boroughs, as they have been aptly termed. We may 
fairly hope that the loss of reputation from this cause 
will not be permanent, and it is certain that in the past 
the Senate and the Supreme Court have excited among 
foreign writers and statesmen more admiration than the 
other branches of the government. Now, in Switzer- 
land, precisely the reverse is true, for the Council of 
States and the Federal Tribunal are the weakest parts 
of the system, while the National Council, and still 
more the Federal Council, have worked extremely well ; 
and it is a significant fact that the institutions in each 
country that have proved to be the best are those which 
are most thoroughly native and original. 

The members of the Federal Council are all elected 
at the same time by each new Federal Assem- The Federal 
bly as soon as it meets. They are chosen for CounciL 
three years, or, speaking strictly, for the term of the 
National Council, because, if that body is dissolved 
before the three years have expired, the new Assembly 
elects the Federal Council afresh. 1 The work of admin- 
istration is divided into seven departments, which are 
allotted to the members of the Council by arrangement 
among themselves. 2 Each councillor thus presides over 
a separate department, and, for the sake of convenience 

1 If a vacancy in the Federal Council occurs, it is filled only for the 
unexpired term. Const. Art. 96. For the organization and powers of 
the Federal Council, see Arts. 95-104. 

2 According to the ordinance of July 8, 1887, these departments are 
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice and Police, War, Finance, Industry and 
Agriculture, and the Post-office and Eailroads. For the precise division 
of business between them, see Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 239-46. 

vol. n. 



194 SWITZERLAND. 

and greater efficiency, he usually retains the same one 
continuously. 1 The constitution declares that this dis- 
tribution is made only to facilitate the dispatch of busi- 
ness, and that all decisions emanate from the Council 
as a whole ; but in fact the members, who do the work 
both of political heads and chief under-secretaries of 
their departments, have not time to attend to current 
affairs outside of their special province ; and hence 
their administration is supervised only by the President, 
who does as much in that way as he can, in addition to 
the particular business of his own department. 2 

This officer, whose title is " President of the Swiss 
ThePresi- Confederation," is one of the seven council- 
dent. i ors? an( j j s e l ec ted, as is also the Vice-Pres- 
ident, by the Federal Assembly for a single year. The 
constitution expressly provides that the President shall 
not be elected President or Vice-President for the ensu- 
ing year ; and by the present custom the Vice-President 
is always elected President, so that the office passes by 
rotation among the members of the Council. 3 The Pres- 
ident is in no sense the chief of the administration. He 
has no more power than the other councillors, and is 
no more responsible than they are for the course of the 
government. He is simply the chairman of the execu- 

1 The allotment is nominally made afresh every year, and at one time 
there was a complaint that actual changes were too frequent (Dubs, pt. ii. 
pp. 101-2) ; but this is no longer the case (Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 1S3-S4), 
and in fact there are now complaints that changes are not made often 
enough (Droz, Etudes, p. 402). 

2 Dubs, pt. ii. p. 100 ; Droz, Etudes, pp. 402-4 ; Marsauche, La Confe- 
deration Helvetique, p. 24. 

8 Droz, Etudes, p. 266 ; Winchester, p. 100. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 195 

tive committee of the nation, and as such he tries to 
keep himself informed of what his colleagues are doing, 
and performs the ceremonial duties of titular head of 
the state. Until 1888 he was always intrusted with the 
conduct of the foreign relations, but as this involved 
an annual change in the management of a branch of 
public business which perhaps more than any other re- 
quires permanence, the practice was discontinued, and 
now the President takes charge of any one of the seven 
departments. 1 

The labors of the Federal Council are manifold, for 
besides the work of administration, it attends 
to a number of matters that are distinctly the Federal 
legislative or judicial. In Switzerland, in- 
deed, the separation of powers, although proclaimed 
in many of the cantonal constitutions, is by no means 
carried out strictly ; and the competence of the differ- 
ent branches of the national government is such that 
Dr. Dubs spoke of the system as an organic confusion 
of powers. 2 Owing to the distinction between public 
and private law which prevails in Switzerland, as in 
other countries of Continental Europe, the Its j udicia i 
Federal Council has extensive judicial func- powers - 
tions ; for in spite of the fact that the Federal Tribunal 
was created chiefly for the purpose of deciding con- 
troversies about public law, a large class of adminis- 
trative questions has been especially excepted from its 

1 Adams, pp. 62-64; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 191-92; Droz, Etudes, pp. 398- 
405. 

2 Pt. ii. p. 104. It may be observed, however, that the Federal Coun- 
cil has no general power to issue ordinances to complete or carry out the 
laws. Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 235-36. 



196 SWITZERLAND. 

jurisdiction, and since there are no administrative 
courts these questions are dealt with directly by the 
Federal Council, subject in most cases to an appeal to 
the Federal Assembly. 1 The result is that in deciding 
them the Council, not being a judicial body, has an eye 
to expediency and general considerations of policy as 
well as to purely legal principles, and hence exercises 
a good deal of discretion in the application of the law, 
sometimes taking a stand that appears decidedly arbi- 
trary. 2 

One naturally asks why such a system is not a source 
of oppression ; why the Council does not use its powers 
tyrannically. One reason is to be found, of course, in 
the traditions of a free people, and in the liberty, and 
widespread habit, of political association and discussion, 
which creates a healthy public opinion. Another is 
that the Council is not often called upon to pass judg- 
ment upon the acts of its own officials, but usually 
occupies the position of an arbitrator, because the fed- 
eral laws are executed as a rule by the cantonal author- 
ities. 3 The Council has, in fact, very little power that 
could be used tyrannically. The temptation to favor- 
itism and injustice in other continental nations arises 
chiefly from the vast mass of functions accumulated in 
the hands of the Minister of the Interior ; *but these 
have almost no place in the Swiss federal machinery. 
Like the Governors of the States in America, the Coun- 

1 Const. Arts. 85, § 12 ; 102, § 2 ; 113. See p. 198, note 1, infra. 

2 See an interesting letter to The Nation of Oct. 15, 1891, on the case 
of the Salvation Army. Cf. Winchester, p. 91. 

3 Another reason lies in the fact that the Federal Council does not 
represent a party. See pp. 200-1, infra. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 197 

cil is saved from the danger of an abuse of power by 
the fact that the administration is mainly carried on 
by independent local authorities. Unlike the Govern- 
ors, however, the Council is obliged to see that the 
local officials execute the law, a duty which necessarily 
involves a certain elasticity of interpretation. In order 
to be on good terms with the governments of the can- 
tons and prevail on them to carry out the laws, it must 
exercise great tact and discretion, and must therefore 
be allowed some latitude in the application of the law. 
The Council performs this, as it does every other duty, 
admirably, and there is rarely any difficulty ; but when 
trouble with a canton arises from any cause the method 
of compulsion is a little strange. The Council with- 
holds the subsidies due to the canton, and sends troops 
into it, who accomplish their mission without blood- 
shed ; for they do not pillage, burn, or kill, but are 
peaceably quartered there at the expense of the canton, 
and literally eat it into submission. 1 This is certainly 
a novel way of enforcing obedience to the law, but with 
the frugal Swiss it is very effective. 

The relation of the executive to the legislature in 
Switzerland differs from that of every other 
nation. The Federal Council is not like the the Federal 
President of the United States a separate the Federal 

i p i'ii Assembly. 

branch 01 the government, which has a power 
of final decision within its own sphere of action. It has 
been given no veto upon laws to prevent encroachment 
upon its rights, and even in executive matters it has, 
strictly speaking, no independent authority at all, for it 

1 Adams, pp. 69-71 ; Winchester, pp. 90-91. 



198 SWITZERLAND. 

seems that its administrative acts can be supervised, 
controlled, or reversed by the Federal Assembly. 1 In 
practice this power is rarely used to set aside acts that 
have already been performed, but every year the Coun- 
cil presents an elaborate report, 2 and the chambers take 
advantage of the discussion that follows to recommend 
any changes in the method of administration. 3 

In some ways the position of the Council resembles 
Contrast kh a ^ °^ ^ ne ca binet in a parliamentary govern- 
posiTfoTand ment ; for although the councillors are not 
parliament- suffered to be members of the Assembly, they 
aryca met. a pp ear j n j^^ chambers, take an active part 
in the debates, and exert a great influence on legisla- 
tion. 4 Not only do they lay before the Assembly such 
measures as they think proper, but it is very common 
for the chambers, by means of a resolution called a 
" postulat," to request the Council to prepare a bill on 
some subject ; and in fact all measures not introduced 

1 Adams, p. 53 ; Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 103-4 ; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 180-83, 
199-203, 216-18, 227-33 ; Orelli, Schweiz. Eidgenossenschaft (Marquard- 
sen), p. 37. The Assembly has even directed the revision of administra- 
tive regulations, and in such cases the Council has avoided a conflict of 
authority by yielding. Droz, Instruction Civique, p. 191. The control of 
administration by the Assembly must not be confused with the right of a 
person claiming to be injured in his rights to appeal to that body from 
a decision of the Council. The latter is not unlimited. Blumer, Hand- 
ouch des Schweiz. Bundesstaatsrechts, 2d ed. Bd. III. pp. 62-70 ; Salis, 
Bd. I. pp. 267-68. 

2 Const. Art. 102, § 16. 

3 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 228, 230-31. 

4 Cf. Const. Art. 101. "Still the relations between the Federal 
Council and the two houses come nearer to the English model than they 
do to the totally independent position of the American President and 
Congress." Freeman, quoted by Moses, Federal Govt, of Switz., p. 138. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 199 

by the Council are, as a rule, referred to it before they 
are sent to a committee or taken up for debate. 1 But 
while the connection between the executive and the 
legislature is quite as close as it would be under a par- 
liamentary system, the relations between the two are 
based upon an entirely different principle, because the 
federal councillors are not responsible in the parlia- 
mentary sense of the term, and do not resign when 
their measures are rejected. On the contrary, if the 
Assembly disagrees with them in legislative or exec- 
utive matters, they submit to its will as the final author- 
ity, and try loyally to carry out its directions. It is 
in fact a general maxim of public life in Switzerland 
that an official gives his advice, but, like a lawyer or 
an architect, he does not feel obliged to throw up his 
position because his advice is not followed. 2 So true 
is this that since 1848, when the Federal Council was 
created, there have been onlv two cases of a resigna- 
tion on political grounds, and it is noteworthy that 
only one of them was caused by a conflict with the 
legislature. 3 On the other occasion, the member who 
retired secured in the Assembly an approval of his 
policy, and resigned because it was afterwards rejected 

1 Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 219-20. By a rule adopted by both chambers 
in June, 1877, all bills relating to civil law, after having been amended, 
must be referred to the Federal Council before they are finally voted 
upon. 

2 Professor Dicey uses this simile in a letter to TJie Nation, Dec. 16, 
1886. 

3 Dr. Dubs resigned in 1872, when a constitutional revision of which 
he disapproved was voted by the Assembly. Dupriez says the Assembly 
refused to reelect him (vol. ii. p. 186, note). But see Mailer, Pol. 
GescJiicTite der Gegenwart, 1872, p. 303. 



200 SWITZERLAND. 

by the people at the referendum. 1 To the Swiss, in- 
deed, it seems as irrational for the state to lose a valua- 
ble administrator on account of a difference of opinion 
about a law, as it is inconceivable to an Englishman 
that a minister can retain his place with self-respect 
after his measures have been condemned by Parliament. 2 
If the position of the Council is unlike that of the cab- 
inet in England, it differs still more from that of the 
cabinet in France. The defiant attitude habitually as- 
sumed towards the ministers there is replaced by a spirit 
of mutual confidence, and the forms of procedure are 
free from the contrivances designed to harass them and 
trip them up. 3 

The Federal Council is essentially a business body, 
and in selecting candidates more attention is 
not a parti- paid to executive capacity than to political 
leadership. 4 Its duty consists in conducting 
the administration and giving advice on legislation ; 
but it is not expected to control the policy of the state, 
and herein lies the real secret of its position. Its 
members are not the leaders of a party, nor are they 
collectively pledged to any programme. In fact, they 
hold very divergent political views. The Council has 

1 This was in 1891, when M. Welti resigned in consequence of the 
rejection by the people of the purchase of railroad shares by the govern- 
ment. 

2 Cf. Droz, Inst. Civ., p. 90. 

3 The rules of both chambers provide for interpellations (C. of S. Art. 
60 ; Nat. C. Art. 68), but these are really simple questions, and in 1879 
the Council of States decided that an interpellant might declare whether 
he was satisfied with the answer to his question, but that no debate could 
follow (Re'glement du Conseil des Etats, ed. 1881, note to Art. 60). 

4 Droz, Etudes, p. 330. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 201 

habitually contained men from two out of the three 
chief groups, the Liberals and the Radicals, and of late 
the f eeling that it ought to represent all classes of opin- 
ion has grown so strong as to lead in 1891 to the elec- 
tion of Dr. Zemp, a Clerical from Lucerne, — an event 
that has an especial importance when we consider that 
the Clerical is the most violent of all the parties in 
Switzerland, and is decidedly opposed to the general 
tendency of current politics. Serious doubts have been 
expressed whether the attempt to mingle such very dif- 
ferent elements in a board can be successful ; * but that 
it has proved satisfactory so far may be inferred from 
the fact that although Dr. Zemp was blamed by the 
Radical majority in the Assembly for not taking an 
active part on the question of revising the tariff, he 
was elected President of the Confederation in 1894 by 
a vote of nearly three to one. 2 

It is indeed surprising that a body so composed should 
work smoothly, and the explanation must The mem- 
be sought partly in the habit of compromise obifgeFto * 
and submission to the majority; partly in the agree * 
fact that the final decision of all the most important 
questions rests with the Assembly ; and partly in the 
absence of any necessity for unanimity, such as exists 
in a parliamentary system. The councillors are not 
obliged to stand by each other, or even to pretend to 
hold the same opinions. None of them has a right, it 
is true, to propose any law in the Assembly without a 
vote of his colleagues, but it is often said that the 

1 Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 190-91. 

2 Bib. Univ., Jan., 1895, p. 214. 



202 SWITZERLAND. 

Council is very indulgent in authorizing its members 
to bring forward their favorite measures ; * and it is 
certain that a councillor does not feel bound to sup- 
port a bill because it has been introduced in accordance 
with such a vote. He is even at liberty to oppose it 
openly, and at times the members of the Council have 
argued against each other in the Assemblv, when 
sharply divided on important questions of policy. This, 
however, is not very common, for the councillors ex- 
ercise a good deal of prudence in urging then personal 
opinions. 2 Their situation in this respect is a little deli- 
cate. They are not required to hide their political 
views, and in fact they often take the stump actively 
when momentous issues come before the people at the 
referendum. But if, on the other hand, they were to 
carry then party principles too far, they would make 
it impossible for members of the various groups to 
sit together in the Council. Now it is clear that, with 
the peculiar organization of the Swiss federal system, 
a Council standing above parties is highly desirable. 
One of its most important functions is that of acting 
as a mediator between the different opinions, the dif- 
ferent interests, and the different political bodies in the 
Confederation and the cantons, and this it could not 
do if it represented a single party. Its influence 
depends to a great extent on the confidence in its 

1 See, for example, the Tribune de Geneve, June, 1890 ; Bib. Unit'., 
Jan., 1895, p. 216. 

2 Adams, p. 64, note by Loumyer; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 189-90, 221-22. 
Droz (Etudes, p. 384) remarks that, during the seventeen years he served 
in the Council, the members were very anxious to agree among themselves 
and stand as a unit before the chambers and the country. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 203 

impartiality, and hence its position is fortified by 
anything that tends to strengthen and perpetuate its 
non-partisan character. 

Not only does the Council contain men from dif- 
ferent parties, but the majority of the body Permanent 
does not always represent the dominant party JheYederai 
in the chambers. From 1876 to 1883, four co ™ cmors - 
out of the seven members were Liberals and three were 
Radicals, although the Liberals had become heavily 
outnumbered by the other two parties in the Assembly, 
and the Radicals alone had obtained a clear majority in 
the National Council, and very nearly in both branches 
of the legislature sitting together. In short, the Council 
reflects the past rather than the existing party coloring 
of the Assembly. This result is due to the fact that 
the Council is virtually a permanent body, for, while it 
is chosen afresh every three years, the old members 
are always reelected ; and, indeed, since 1848, only 
two members who were willing to serve have failed of 
reelection, one of whom lost his seat in 1854, 1 and the 
other in 18 72, 2 at times when party passion still ran 
high. The permanence of tenure becomes astonishing 
when we consider that from 1848 to June, 1893, there 
had been only thirty-one federal councillors in all, 
of whom seven were still in office. The average pe- 

1 Ochsenbein, one of the leaders of the war against the Sonderbund, 
was thought by his former supporters to have become too conservative, 
and was defeated by Stampfli. Henne-Am. Rhyn, Geschiclite des Schweizer- 
volks, vol. iii. p. 502, note. 

2 Challet-Yenel. See Droz, Etudes, p. 359 ; Dupriez (vol. ii. p. 186, note) 
does not refer to Challet-Venel, but counts Dubs as a case of failure to 
reelect, which would make three. Winchester (p. 95) also says two. 



204 SWITZERLAND. 

riod of service has, therefore, been over ten years ; and 
in fact fifteen members have held the position for 
more than that length of time, four of them having 
served over twenty years, and one more than thirty 
years. 1 

When a councillor dies or resigns, the range of 
possible candidates for the place is quite 
range of limited. In practice, they are almost in- 
variably selected among the members of the 
Federal Assembly, which is by no means a numerous 
body. 2 Moreover, by the constitution, the Council 
cannot contain two men from the same canton, and by 
tradition certain cantons are entitled to special consider- 
ation. At one time this was considered a grievance, 
and complaints were made about the so-called heptarchy 
of cantons that governed the Confederation. 3 At pres- 
ent, the system is not followed as rigorously as it was 
formerly, but still the privileges of the cantons are by 
no means entirely disregarded. Berne and Zurich, for 
example, have always been represented in the Council, 
and Vaud except from 1876 to 1881 ; while Aargau 
had a seat continuously until 1891. 4 An illustration 
of the narrow limits within which a choice is sometimes 

1 Droz, Etudes, p. 329, note. Since that time two of the members have 
died, so that there have now been thirty-three in all. 

2 Id., p. 330 ; Dupriez, pp. 184-85 ; Marsauche, p. 23. 

3 Dubs, pt. ii. p. 98. These privileges are clearly a survival from the 
time when the scanty executive powers of the Confederation were exer- 
cised in rotation by the largest cantons under the title of Vorort. 

4 Droz, Etudes, p. 324. Except from 1876 to 1881, five of the Coun- 
cillors have always been taken from the German and two from the 
Romance cantons, a distribution which agrees closely with the numerical 
proportions of the races. Id., p. 383. 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 205 

confined was given in 1879, when the councillor from 
Zurich died. Custom required that his successor should 
be a citizen of that canton, and at the same time an 
army officer was wanted to take charge of the war 
department. Colonel Hertenstein was the only member 
of the Federal Assembly who combined these two quali- 
fications, and he was chosen, although his conservative 
opinions would probably have prevented his election 
under other circumstances. 1 

The councillors, who perform many of the duties of 
chief under-secretaries as well as those of 
heads of departments, are decidedly over- lorsareover- 

, , . worked. 

worked, and at this moment plans are being 
discussed for relieving them of a part of their labors. 
Some of the suggestions made involve an entire re- 
organization of the Council, but as yet it is too early 
to guess what the outcome of the movement will be. 
M. Droz, who is one of the most eminent public men 
in Switzerland, and at the same time, perhaps, the most 
sagacious critic of her institutions, is of opinion that 
an increase in the functions of the subordinate officials, 
and a redistribution of business between the depart- 
ments, is far preferable to any more radical change. 2 

The Federal Council has been considered at some 
length, because, although its legal authority Advantage 
is not extensive, it may almost be regarded executive ^ 
as the mainspring, and is certainly the bal- system * 
ance-wheel, of the national government. It has been 
called, by a leading Swiss statesman, the Executive 

1 Droz, Etudes, pp. 258-59. 

2 Etudes, "La reorganization du Conseil federal." 



206 SWITZERLAND. 

Committee of the Federal Assembly, and in fact its 
position gives it some of the chief privileges of the 
English cabinet without the disadvantages. There is 
the same mutual confidence and intimate cooperation 
between the executive and the legislature, but there 
is also a possibility of including men of different 
opinions in the executive board of the nation ; for this, 
which adds to the strength of the Federal Council, 
would be a source of weakness in a parliamentary 
cabinet. A coalition ministry is always weak, because 
it is composed of men who, under the pretense of 
harmony, are continually trying to get the better of 
each other, and would not hold together if any part 
of them alone could control a majority in Parliament. 
But as the Federal Council is not the organ of a ma- 
jority in the Assembly, the representation of divergent 
views is frankly acknowledged. Instead of involving 
a state of smothered hostility, it arises from a real wish 
to give to openly different opinions a share of influence 
in the conduct of public affairs. Hence it strength- 
ens the Council by broadening its basis, disarming the 
enmity of the only elements that could form a serious 
opposition, and enabling it to represent the whole com- 
munity. Another advantage of the Swiss form of gov- 
ernment consists in a stability, a freedom from sudden 
changes of policy, and a permanence of tenure on the 
part of capable administrators, which can never be at- 
tained under the parliamentary system. The habit of 
selecting new members singly and at considerable in- 
tervals secures, moreover, a continuity of traditions 
which is invaluable, while at the same time it lifts 



THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 207 

the body above the transient impulses that stir the 
people. 1 

The removal of the executive beyond the reach of 
direct popular influence suggests another observation. 
There are two methods of treating public officers, one 
of which consists in holding them politically respon- 
sible for all their acts, the other in making them in- 
dependent, and trusting to their own conscience for 
a faithful performance of duty. The first method is 
carried out by means of short periods of office, or a lia- 
bility to removal at any time. Its objects are, to insure 
that the administration is always conducted in accord- 
ance with the wishes of the sovereign, and to prevent 
arbitrary conduct and the abuse of power from personal 
motives ; its dangers, the absence of a far-sighted, con- 
sistent policy, and in a democracy a subservience to 
any cliques, rings, and bosses who may control the 
nominations or elections. The objects and dangers of 
the second method are the converse of these, and the 
means of securing the result is permanence of tenure. 
Each method has its advantages, and the art of gov- 
ernment depends on a wise combination of the two. 
It is almost universally recognized, for example, that 
the judiciary ought to be independent, so that justice 

1 The proposal to have the Federal Council elected directly by the 
people, which has been discussed a great deal in Switzerland of late years, 
is considered hereafter in connection with its probable effect on political 
parties; but it is well to note here that, in view of the small amount 
of actual power vested in the Council, its great influence must be attrib- 
uted to the fact that the Assembly selects for the place men in whom it 
has a strong personal confidence, and the same degree of confidence 
would hardly be felt for councillors chosen by the people. 



-OS SWITZERLAND. 

may be administered without regard to persons or 
parties ; but current opinion requires that all executive 
officers should be held to a strict political responsibil- 
ity for their conduct. Now, in Switzerland, this last 
pri: in theory established, bur i s : : carried out 

in practice ? for although the Federal Councillors are 
elected only for three years at a time, their tenure is 
really permanent, and the certainty of reelection relie 
them from political pressure, and shields them from 
temptation. Thus custom, which is stronger than law, 
t t eloped a system in which the exe< irtually 

enjoys a high degree of political independence, while 
the danger of abuse is obviated by the fact that the 
Assembly inspects the work of the Council, controls 
its general course of policy, and has power to i 
us iiets. 

We now come to the Council of States, which con- 
The Coandi ^ ns ^ wo members from each canton and one 
of States, from each ha]f canton. 1 This body corre- 
sponds fet the Senate of the United States, and was 
arently expected by the framers of the constitution 
of 184S to occupy a similar position : but this it has 
failed to do for several reasons. 2 Unlike the Senate, it 
is given no special functions, the powers of the two 
houses being exactly alike. The members, moreov 
do not enjoy a fixed salary, a uniform method of elec- 
tion, or a long tenure of office; for the constitution, 

■ Orelli (p. 31) says it is not dear what position of the Council of States 
Senate and a French upper chamber. 



THE COUNCIL OF STATES. 209 

instead of regulating these matters, followed the tra- 
dition inherited from the ancient Diet, and left each 
canton to settle them as it saw fit. The result has 
been that the members are chosen in some cases by the 
legislature, in others by direct popular vote ; 1 while the 
periods for which they are elected vary all the way from 
one year to four. 

The history of the Council of States has in fact 
been almost the reverse of that of the Amer- Tra ^a^^ 
ican Senate. The latter was at first inferior ^^^^ 
to the other branch of Congress, both in influence and 
public esteem, but the second generation of statesmen 
discovered its advantages, and the presence of men 
like Webster, Calhoun, and Clay gave it a lustre that 
raised it above the House of Representatives. The 
Council of States, on the other hand, began its career 
with a high reputation. It contained at the outset 
most of the leaders in the movement of 18^8 ; and 
of the seven members of the first Federal Council six 
were chosen from its ranks. At this time the periods 
of service were usually Ions:, but owins: to the lack of 
any special functions, and to the shortening of the 
terms, the position ceased after a few years to attract 
the leading statesmen, who came to prefer seats in 
the National Council. 2 Promising young men began 
to look on the Council of States as a stepping-stone to 
the other chamber, and in fact the members changed 

1 The latter method of election is becoming more and more common. 
It exists now in ten cantons and six half cantons. 

2 Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 81-88 ; Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 209-11. There axe, 
however, some exceptions. See Adams, p. 55, Loumyers note. 

vol. n. 



210 SWITZERLAND. 

continually. 1 Now, of two bodies with equal powers, 
the one in which the political leaders are found is 
almost certain in the long run to carry the greater 
weight, and therefore it is not surprising that the 
Council of States enjoys less authority and influence 
than the National Council. It does not fill, how- 
ever, a distinctly subordinate position like 
power is still the upper chamber in countries with a parlia- 

considerable. no t • 

mentary iorm 01 government. It is not a 
submissive body, and is not overriden by clamor ; for it 
often disagrees with measures passed by the National 
Council, and not seldom has its own way or effects a 
compromise. Of late years the terms of service have 
increased in length, and there is a decided tendency to 
make them three years, like those in the National 
Council. 2 The members are also changed less fre- 
quently, and more care appears to be taken in their 
selection. 3 But the Council of States has not regained 
a position of equality, partly because the federal 
councillors are chosen as a rule from the National 
Council, 4 which has also the chief influence in guiding 
their policy ; and partly because the Council of States, 
on account of the small number of its members, gets 
through its work more rapidly than the other house, 

1 Orelli, p. 30. 

2 At present the members are elected for one year in three cantons and 
one half canton, for two years in one canton, for three years in nine 
cantons and four half cantons, and for four years in three cantons, while 
in three cantons and one half canton the term is not fixed by the consti- 
tution. 

8 Blumer (2d ed.), vol. iii. ch. i. § 7. 
4 Winchester, p. 71. 



THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. 211 

and, often having nothing to do, has acquired an unde- 
served reputation for idleness. 1 When we reflect on 
the comparatively small influence of the Council of 
States, and remember that it is the successor of the 
ancient Diet, and represents the traditional rights of 
the cantons, we cannot help feeling how great a gap 
democracy has made in Switzerland between the past 
and the present. 

/ The organization of the National Council is regu- 
lated entirely by the federal constitution. 2 ^e National 
The members are elected for three years by Couneil - 
direct universal suffrage, every citizen who is twenty 
years of age being a voter, unless he has been deprived 
of his political rights in accordance with the laws of 
the canton where he resides. A voter is not eligible, 
however, unless he is a layman, — a restriction aimed 
exclusively at the Catholic clergy, because a Swiss 
Protestant pastor can resign his ministry while he sits 
in the legislature, but by the rules of the Catholic 
church a priest cannot divest himself of his sacerdotal 
character. 3 The method of election is regulated by 
federal statute, and the usual continental habit has 
been followed of requiring an absolute majority of the 
votes cast. This is true of both the first and second 
ballots, and it is only at the third trial that a plurality 
elects. 4 
, The constitution leaves to the national legislature 

1 Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 83-84. 

2 Arts. 72-79. 

8 Adams, p. 44 ; Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 73-74 ; Marsauche, p. 15. 
4 Adams, p. 45. 



212 SWITZERLAND. 

the determination of the electoral districts and the 
The electoral num ber of members to be chosen therein, 
districts. j^j. p rov id es that no district shall contain 
parts of different cantons, and that one member shall 
be allotted to each canton for every twenty thousand 
people, and any fraction left over which exceeds ten 
thousand. The result is that the National Council 
has increased with the growth of the population, until 
there are now one hundred and forty-seven members, 
divided among fifty-two separate districts, which vary 
in size, and elect from one to six members apiece. 1 
The districts purport to be based on geographical, 
commercial, and political considerations, but the charge 
is often made that they are contrived with a view of 
preventing the Clerical party from getting a fair share 
of representatives by swamping Catholic minorities. 2 
Alleged unfairness in districting is an old and stand- 
ing grievance in Switzerland ; and, indeed, deliberate 
gerrymandering is by no means an unknown trick both 
in the Confederation and the cantons. 3 In Ticino it 
gave rise in 1890 to an insurrection that might have 
had very grave results had not the federal government 
interfered. The districts for election to the National 
Council have been little changed since their first 

1 Cf. Electoral Law of June 20, 1890. 

2 The Journal de Geneve, a Liberal organ, asserted on July 1, 1890, 
that the districts were contrived to secure the domination of a party, 
and caused the majority of the representatives to be elected by a minor- 
ity of the people. 

8 Cf. Dubs, pt. ii. p. 71 ; Droz, Etudes, pp. 74-75 ; Deploige, Le Re- 
ferendum, p. 83 ; Borgeaud, Etablissement et Revision des Constitutions, 
pp. 397-98. 



THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. 213 

arrangement/ but on the occasion of the last distribu- 
tion of seats in 1889-90 a struggle took place over 
the question, and the Clericals, with the aid of the 
Liberals and a few Radicals, succeeded in dividing a 
Bernese district that included the Catholic Jura. 2 The 
change did not, however, remove all ground of com- 
plaint ; and about the same time Mr. Ador, a Liberal 
from Geneva, made a motion in favor of proportional 
representation of minorities, which was killed by a 
proposal from the Radical side to couple with it a 
plan for unequal representation of the cantons in the 
Council of States. 3 

The sessions of the Assembly are very short, the reg- 
ular ones held in June and December lasting Sessionsand 
only about four weeks apiece, and the extra debates - 
session, which almost always takes place in March, be- 
ing shorter still. 4 In fact, the Assembly devotes itself 
strictly to the dispatch of business ; and in this it is 
no doubt aided by the absence of stenographic reports, 
and the meagreness of the accounts of the proceedings 
in the newspapers, which relieve the members of any 
temptation to address the public at large instead of dis- 
cussing among themselves. The debates are orderly in 
the extreme, although conducted in a curious polyglot ; 
for there is no one official language in Switzerland, 5 
and every speaker in the Assembly makes use of Ger- 

1 Cf. Orelli, pp. 29-30. 

2 Cf. Bib. Univ., Jan., 1890, pp. 202-4 ; July, 1890, p. 208. 

3 Marsauche, pp. 268-80. On the subject of proportional representa- 
tion, see page 232, infra. 

4 Dupriez, p. 206 ; Marsauche, pp. 15-16. 

5 Cf. Const. Art. 116 ; Orelli, pp. 44-45. 



214 SWITZERLAND. 

man, French, or Italian, according to his personal con- 
venience, while all the formal proceedings are read both 
in German and French, — the few Italian members 
being supposed to be able to understand one or the 
other of those languages. 1 All this contrasts strongly 
with the state of things in Austria-Hungary, and one 
rejoices to find that men of different races can live to- 
gether without making the confusion of tongues a 
source of oppression. 

Before leaving the subject of the Federal Assembly, it 
The joint * s necessary to add that for all their ordinary 
sittings. W ork the two chambers sit separately, but 
that they meet in joint session for three purposes : 2 the 
decision of conflicts of jurisdiction between the federal 
authorities ; the granting of pardons ; and the election 
of the Federal Council, the Federal Tribunal, the Chan- 
cellor of the Confederation, 3 and the Commander-in- 
Chief of the federal army. 

The Federal Tribunal is the only national court. It 
The Federal 1S composed of fourteen judges, and as many 
Tribunal. substitutes, elected for six years by the Fed- 
eral Assembly, which also designates the President and 
Vice-President of the court for two years at a time. 4 

1 Winchester, pp. 78-79. 

2 Const. Art. 92. 

3 The Chancellor is the chief clerk both of the Federal Council and of 
the Federal Assembly (Const. Art. 105). During the period from 1815 
to 1848, when he was the only permanent national official, he had a great 
deal of influence which has now disappeared. Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 95, 104-5. 

4 Before the Act of March 22, 1893, the number was nine. On the 
subject of the Federal Tribunal, see Const. Arts. 106-114 ; Dubs, pt. ii. 
pp. 105-147 ; Adams, ch. v.; Blumer, 2d ed. Bd. III. ch. iii. ; Marsauche, 
liv. i. ch. vii.; Winchester, ch. v. 



THE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL. 215 

As a compensation to French Switzerland for the fact 
that Berne was made the seat of government, and 
that the national polytechnic school was located at 
Zurich, the Federal Tribunal was established at Lau- 
sanne, in the canton of Vaud. Here it carries on the 
main part of its work ; but for criminal cases one 
section of the court sits in the five assize districts into 
which the country is divided for the purpose. 

In consequence of the existence of broad powers 
coupled with serious limitations, the jurisdic- Itg • urisdie _ 
tion of the Federal Tribunal has been in a ^Xh^i 
state of no little confusion ; and although an cases - 
act was passed in 1893 which revised and enlarged its 
competence, its functions are still far from simple. On 
the criminal side it has jurisdiction of cases of high 
treason against the Confederation, and violence against 
the federal authorities ; of crimes and misdemeanors 
against the law of nations ; of political crimes and mis- 
demeanors which are the cause or the result of disturb- 
ances that occasion armed federal intervention ; and of 
offenses committed by officials appointed by a federal 
authority when such authority relegates them to the 
Tribunal. 1 It has also by statute jurisdiction of cer- 
tain minor offenses, but fortunately its criminal pro- 
cedure is rarely put in operation. Its competence in 
civil matters is much more extensive, and is used with 
far greater frequency. By the terms of the constitu- 
tion it covers all suits between the Confederation and 
the cantons, or between the cantons themselves ; suits 

1 The constitution provides that in these cases questions of fact shall 
be decided by a jury. 



216 SWITZERLAND. 

brought by an individual against the Confederation ; 
and suits between a canton and an individual, if either 
party demands it. 1 The civil jurisdiction expressly 
conferred by the constitution has moreover been very 
much enlarged by virtue of a clause which authorizes 
the Confederation to place other matters within the 
competence of the court. The Assembly has, indeed, 
availed itself of this provision to make the Federal Tri- 
bunal virtually a general court of appeal from the can- 
tonal tribunals in all cases arising under federal laws, 
where the amount in dispute exceeds three thousand 
francs. 

In addition to its ordinary civil and criminal juris- 
it uri - diction, whereby it administers justice be- 
^stSns'of ^ween private individuals, or corporate bodies 
public law. fogj. a pp ear before it in the character of indi- 
viduals and litigate matters of private right, the court 
has important functions as an arbiter in questions of 
public law. In this respect Switzerland has followed 
the continental habit of regarding public law as some- 
thing distinct from private law. The procedure is en- 
tirely different, and in a suit brought to test a matter 
of public law the court is confined to a decision of 
the question of right, and is specially forbidden to 
award damages. 2 Dr. Dubs, one of the most eminent 
of the Swiss jurists, and for many years a member of 
the court, considered the expounding of public law as 

1 In the last two classes of cases the amount involved must be 3,000 
francs. This amount is fixed by statute. By the constitution the court 
has also jurisdiction of cases of citizenship and settlement, and of suits in 
which both parties voluntarily submit to its decisions. 

2 Act of June 27, 1874, Arts. 61, 62. 



THE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL. 217 

the chief duty of the Federal Tribunal, and the primary 
object of its existence. So strongly did he hold this 
view that he lamented the increase in civil jurisdiction, 
on the ground that it tended to obscure the real purpose 
and change the true nature of the court. 1 But his 
opinion has prevailed only in part, for the competence 
of the Tribunal has been extended with much greater 
liberality to private than to public matters. In the 
latter field it is given power by the constitution to 
decide conflicts of authority between the Confederation 
and the cantons ; disputes between cantons on matters 
of public law ; and complaints of the violation of the 
constitutional rights of citizens. 2 The last provision 
has been construed by statute to include rights guaran- 
teed by a cantonal as well as by the federal constitution, 3 
and in practice it has been applied with great freedom. 4 
But in another direction the Assembly has shown itself 
decidedly jealous of the court. After describ- 
ing the powers of the Federal Tribunal on tivJTaw 
questions of public law, the constitution de- for the 
clares that administrative controversies, as 
defined by statute, are reserved for the Federal Coun- 
cil and Federal Assembly ; thus giving an opportunity 
to take away a large part of the jurisdiction conferred 

1 Droit Public, pt. ii. p. 144. 

2 Also complaints by individuals of the violation of concordats and 
treaties. 

3 Act of June 27, 1874, Art. 59 (a) ; Orelli, § 12, xii. The Federal Tri- 
bunal has more than once held a cantonal law invalid as contrary to the 
cantonal constitution. Droz, Etudes, p. 97. 

4 Winchester, p. 113. 



218 SWITZERLAND. 

upon the court by the preceding clauses. 1 In accord- 
ance with this provision the Assembly has excluded the 
Tribunal from the consideration of & long list of sub- 
jects, such as the right to carry on a trade, commercial 
treaties, consumption taxes, game laws, certificates of 
professional capacity, factory acts, bank-notes, weights 
and measures, primary public schools, sanitary police, 
and the validity of cantonal elections. 2 

It will be observed that the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
The author- i s at a great disadvantage as compared with 
FlderafTri- the Supreme Court of the United States, 
pS wTSi from the fact that it stands alone, instead of 
Supreme e being at the head of a great national judi- 
United i cial system. A still more weighty disadvan- 
tage arises from an inferiority in the powers 

1 Const. Arts. 85, § 12, 113. What happens when one of these ad- 
ministrative questions arises incidentally in the course of a civil suit I 
have been unable to discover. The Act of Nov. 20, 1850, Art. 9 (Wolf's 
Schweiz. Bandesgesetzgebung), determining the competence of the federal 
and cantonal courts, provides that the court that has jurisdiction of the 
main question can decide subordinate ones that arise in the course of the 
suit. But this principle probably does not apply where a question of 
jurisdiction arises between the Federal Tribunal and the Assembly. A 
provision in the Act of June 25, 1880 (Art. 15), to the effect that in pro- 
ceedings of a mixed nature, where a civil as well as a public question is 
involved, damages can be awarded as in civil cases, seems to show that 
the two classes of questions are regarded as distinct, even when presented 
in the same cause of action. It is probable that when an administrative 
matter which the court is incompetent to decide arises in a civil suit, the 
Federal Council can raise the question of jurisdiction in some such way 
as the prefect does in France. 

2 Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 130-33, and see pt. i. pp. 179-80. Until 1893 most 
of the questions relating to religious liberty and the rights of the differ- 
ent sects were also reserved for the Federal Assembly, but as they gave 
rise to passionate debates rather than to a judicial consideration of ques- 
tions of law, it was finally agreed to transfer them to the Federal Tri- 
bunal. 



THE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL. 219 

granted to the Swiss tribunal in two respects; and 
these are especially important, because they not only 
explain its comparative lack of influence, but also throw 
light on the different degree of respect for law, or 
rather for the judicial interpretation of law, in Switzer- 
land and America. In the first place, the relation of 
the Federal Tribunal to the legislature is unlike that of 
the Supreme Court, for it is bound by an express pro- 
vision of the constitution to apply every law passed by 
the Federal Assembly. 1 It has, therefore, none of the 
peculiar authority vested in the Supreme Court of hold- 
ing statutes unconstitutional, and none of the exalted 
dignity which that authority confers. Some of the 
Swiss jurists are inclined to regard the American prin- 
ciple as more rational, and regret that it does not pre- 
vail in their own country, 2 but there is no apparent 
likelihood of a change. In the second place, owing 
to the method of dealing with administrative matters, 
which has already been mentioned, the Federal Tribu- 
nal has less authority over the public officials than the 
Supreme Court. On this point, indeed, Swiss juris- 
prudence has adopted a middle course between the 
Anglo-Saxon practice, whereby the ordinary courts can 
pass judgment on the legality of all official acts, and 
the French system, which reserves all questions of 
administrative law for determination by the govern- 
ment or by a special tribunal created for the purpose. 

1 Const. Art. 113 ; and see pp. 217, note 3, supra, 229, note 3, infra. 

2 Cf. Dubs, pt. i. pp. 175-76 ; pt. ii. pp. 133-34. With a general ref- 
erendum on all laws it would hardly be possible for the court to exercise 
such a power. Cf . p. 297, infra. 



220 SWITZERLAND. 

In Switzerland any citizen is at liberty to sue a federal 
official ; 1 but, on the other hand, a number of impor- 
tant matters are withdrawn from the cognizance of the 
court. It may be added that although conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the Federal Tribunal and a can- 
tonal authority are decided by the Federal Tribunal 
itself, conflicts between the latter and the Federal 
Council are decided by the Federal Assembly, so that 
the Tribunal has not power, like the Supreme Court, to 
pass upon the question of its own competence. 2 

Cantonal feeling is slowly diminishing with the 
growth in the authority of the national gov- 

The can- ,...,, .. 

tonal gov- ernment; but it is still so strong, and the 

ernments. pi -n 

powers of the cantons are still so extensive, 
that Swiss politics are only half understood without a 
knowledge of local institutions.' 



3 



1 The person injured must first apply to the Federal Council and then 
to the Federal Assembly, and if both fail to send the case to the Federal 
Tribunal, he can proceed before that tribunal on his own responsibility 
after giving security for costs. If the complaint is against a member of the 
Federal Council or one of the federal judges, and the Federal Assembly 
rejects it, the suit is brought against the Confederation, which assumes 
the responsibility for its functionary. A similar principle is applied in 
the case of all officials in many of the cantons. Dubs, pt. i. pp. 194-98 ; 
pt. ii. pp. 367-69. It may be observed that hitherto there have been 
no administrative courts in Switzerland (Orelli, pp. 114-15), while ques- 
tions of administrative law are withdrawn from the ordinary courts in 
every canton except Ticino. (Dubs, pt. i. p. 179 ; Const, of Ticino, 
Amend, of Nov. 20, 1875, Art. 9.) The new constitution of Berne adopted 
in 1893 (Art. 40) provides, however, for an administrative court. 

An official can be prosecuted criminally for acts done in the course of 
his employment, only with the consent of the Federal Council or Federal 
Assembly. Act of Dec. 9, 1850, § 41 ; Wolf's Schweiz. Bwidesgesetzge- 
bung. Cf. Const. Art. 112, § 4. 

2 Const. Art. 85, § 13 ; Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 127-28. 

8 The facts stated in this and the following chapter in regard to can- 



THE CANTONAL GOVERNMENT. 221 

The cantons are obliged to ask of the Confederation 
a guarantee of their constitutions/ which must The Consti . 
be granted if fchey contain nothing contrary to tuiions - 
the federal constitution, assure the exercise of political 
rights according to republican forms, representative or 
democratic, have been ratified by the people, and can 
be amended whenever the majority of all the citizens 
demand it. With this limitation the cantons are free 
to construct their governments and alter them as they 
please, and the constitutions are in fact amended with 
great frequency, especially in German Switzerland. 2 
In the four years from 1891 to 1895, for example, no 
less than twenty-three revisions took place, of which 
four were total revisions, that is, cases where a new 
constitution was substituted for the old one. Such a 
continual revision naturally involves the copying of one 
canton by another, and hence the process might be 
expected to result in making the constitutions all alike, 
so that a single type would prevail over the whole coun- 
try. To some extent that is the case; but a number 
of the older cantons have preserved their traditions, and 
still retain their ancient forms of government. 

By far the most picturesque of these is the Lands- 
gemeinde, or mass meeting of all the citizens. The Lands . 
This institution, which resembles closely the s ememde - 
New England town-meeting, is a survival of the primi- 

tonal institutions are taken from the collection of cantonal constitutions 
published by the federal government in 1890, and the annual supple- 
ments thereto through 1895. 

1 Const. Art. 6. In practice this is applied to every amendment, as 
well as to the adoption of a new constitution. 

2 Cf . Orelli, p. 97. 



222 SWITZERLAND. 

tive Teutonic folk-mote, and still exists in two cantons 
and four half cantons. 1 The late Professor Freeman, 
who went into ecstasies over it, was the first man to bring 
it into general notice; 2 and since he wrote, a number 
of graphic and charming accounts of it have been 
published. 3 These usually describe the meeting in the 
canton of Uri, at the head of the Lake of Lucerne, partly 
because it is the most easily accessible, and partly be- 
cause the open meadow near Altdorf where it is held, 
and the great mountains towering above, make the scene 
singularly impressive. On a Sunday morning in May 
the Landamman, or chief magistrate of the canton, 
accompanied by attendants dressed in the black and 
yellow livery of Uri, and bearing the huge horns of 
the wild bull, starts for the meadow, followed by 
all the people. When the procession reaches the spot, 
the Landamman takes his seat at a table in the centre 
of the field, while the men fill the space around him, 
and the women and children stand upon the rising 
ground beyond. The Landamman first recounts the 
events of the past year, and then offers a prayer ; after 
which the business of the day begins. The meas- 
ures to be proposed are brought forward, freely de- 

1 These are Uri, Glarus, the two Unterwaldens, and the two Appen- 
zells. Until 1848 it existed also in Schwyz and Zug, but in the latter its 
power had long been small, and in Schwyz it had become exceedingly dis- 
orderly on account of quarrels between different parts of the canton. 
Eugene Rambert, " Les Alpes Suisses," Etudes Historiques et Nationales, 
ed. of 1889, pp. 235-61. 

2 The Growth of the English Constitution, ch. i. 

3 See, for example, Adams, pp. 130-32 ; Winchester, pp. 151-57 ; 
MacCrackan, Teutonic Switzerland, ch. xi. By far the best account of the 
Landsgemeinde and their history is that of Rambert. 



THE LAXDSGEMEIXDE. 223 

bated and voted upon by the citizens, and finally the 
officers are elected for the ensuing year. Such in brief 
is the description of the Landsgemeinde as given by 
eye-witnesses, and in reading it one cannot fail to see 
how the people must be impressed with the dignity 
and responsibility of self-government, provided liberty 
does not degenerate into license, or influence over the 
masses into demagogy, — an evil that seems to have 
been happily escaped by these mountaineers. The 
form of the procedure is similar to that of the New 
England town-meeting, and must have the same value 
as a means of political education. In making this 
comparison, however, it must be remembered that the 
competence of the Assembly is far more extensive than 
in our towns ; for it not only votes the taxes, and usu- 
ally the loans and the more important expenditures, 
but it passes all the laws, and exercises the other powers 
that commonly belong to the legislature ; and what is 
more, it has absolute power to change the constitution 
of the canton. 1 

In order to enable a large public meeting to get 
through its work, and to prevent surprise and The pro _ 
hasty ill-considered action, it is necessary to cedure - 
prepare the business carefully beforehand, and in the 
case of the Landsgemeinde this is done by a council. 
At one time the councils tried to draw the whole con- 
trol of affairs into their own hands, so that no question 

1 In Glarus when the assembled people decide to make a total revision 
of the constitution, the council prepares the new draft and submits it to 
the next regular Landsgemeinde ; so that a revision of that kind cannot 
be carried through at one meeting. (Const. Glarus, Art. 88.) 



224 SWITZERLAND. 

could be brought before the Landsgemeinde without 
their approval ; l but after a struggle the right of pri- 
vate initiative prevailed, and it is now the rule every- 
where that one or more citizens can in some form 
propose any measure, provided notice is given to the 
cantonal authorities beforehand. A mass meeting of 
all the citizens is, of course, out of the question except 
in very small communities ; and the larger the number 
of persons present, the less perfect must the procedure 
be. The Landsgemeinde, indeed, seems to have nearly 
reached the extreme limit of size, for in all but one of 
the cantons where it exists, the crowd is so great that 
it has been found impracticable to allow amendments 
to be offered on the spot, and thus the power of the 
assembled people is limited to acceptance or rejection 
of measures in their original form. 2 In one canton, 
moreover, the meeting is so large that even debate is 
no longer possible. 3 In this connection it may be 
worth while to observe as explaining in some measure 
the survival of the mass meeting as the legislative 
organ in a modern state, that most of the cantons 
where it still exists are extremely conservative in tem- 
perament, and their Landsgemeinde enacts very few 
laws. 4 



1 Keller, Volksinitiativrecht, tit. i. ch. ii.; Rambert, pp. 199-205, 282-83 ; 
Deploige, pp. 8-9. 

a It is strange that this one, Glarus, is the largest of those that still 
permit debate. 

3 This is Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, whose inhabitants numbered at the 
last census 54,109. 

4 Winchester, p. 160. This, however, is hardly true of Glarus and 
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden. Cf. Rambert, pp. 283-84, 304-5. 



THE LAKDSGEMEINDE. 225 

The council that prepares the business for the Lands- 
gemeinde plays an important part in the gov- 
ernment of the canton. Curiously enough it organs of 
is composed of members elected, not by the m the 

*■ Landsge- 

Landsgemeinde itself, but by separate elec- meinde 

° # ' . J x cantons. 

toral districts. The Landrath, or Kantons- 
rath, as the body is usually called, is in fact a sort of 
subsidiary legislature. It attends to all the details that 
cannot well be brought before the people, passes ordi- 
nances, votes the smaller appropriations, examines the 
accounts, and elects the minor officials. 1 There is also 
an administrative council (Begierimgsrath or Standes- 
Jcommission) usually composed of seven members, and 
always elected directly by the Landsgemeinde. This is 
the executive body of the canton, and its chairman is 
the Landamman, who, as the official head of the state, 
also presides over the assembled people. His office 
brings with it little or no pay, 2 but it is one of great 
honor, and is usually held by a member of an old and 
wealthy family ; for it is a singular fact that the aristo- 
cracy in many of the mountainous districts have main- 
tained their hold upon the people, whereas the patricians 
who ruled in Berne and some of the other cities aroused 
such bitter enmity, that after 1848 they were driven 
from power, and have ever since held aloof from poli- 
tics. It is not, indeed, uncommon to find a Landamman 
the members of whose family have held the office sev- 
eral times before. A story is told of a man over whose 

1 In some of the cantons the executive council forms, ex officio, a part 
of this body; in others it does not. 

2 Winchester, p. 157. 
vol. n. 



226 SWITZERLAND. 

mantelpiece hung three swords ; one of them his own, 
another his father's, and the third his grandfather's, 
all worn when the owners were presiding over the 
Landsgemeinde of the canton; and this in the purest 
democracy in the world. 1 

If we now turn to the cantons that have no Lands- 
The govern- gemeinde, we shall find that all their gov- 
othercin? 6 ernments are constructed upon one general 
tons ' type. Each of them has a single legislative 

chamber, usually known as the Great Council, which is 
The Great elected by universal suffrage, and in all but 
Council. a C0U pi e f cantons is chosen for either three 
or four years. 2 It passes the laws, votes the taxes 
and appropriations, supervises the administration, and 
appoints a number of the more important officials. 
TheExeen- There is also a smaller executive council 

tive Council. e l ecte( J f or ffc e same term .3 T ^ wag f ormer l y 

a numerous body, but of late years it has been univer- 
sally remodeled upon the pattern of the Federal Coun- 
cil, and is now composed of five or seven members in 
every canton except Berne, where it contains nine. Its 

1 Andrew D. White, Am. Hist. Assoc. Papers, vol. iii. no. i. p. 163. In 
a memoir (Etudes, p. 143), M. Droz describes how the Landamman Heer, 
who was a member of one of the rich old families in Glarus, was deliber- 
ately educated with a view to political life, and how naturally his fellow- 
citizens took it for granted that he would hold public office as soon as he 
was old enough to do so. 

2 It is sometimes called the Kantonsraih or Landrath. In Freiburg it 
is chosen for five, and in the Grisons for two years. 

8 Except in the Grisons, where, by the constitution of 1892, its term 
is three years. This body is called in the French cantons the Cornell 
d'Etat j in the Grisons the Kleine Rath; and in the other German cantons 
the Regierungsrath. 



THE CANTONAL COUNCILS. 227 

work, moreover, is now divided in like manner into 
separate departments, over each of which a councillor 
presides. 1 

The relation of the executive to the legislature is 
very much the same in the cantons as in the 
Confederation, for although the great coun- between the 
cils do not seem to have the absolute power 
to reconsider and reverse administrative acts that is 
possessed by the National Assembly, 2 yet in consequence 
of their habit of debating the annual report of the 
executive council and voting recommendations in the 
form of postulats thereon, they have tended to draw 
the real direction and control of the administration into 
their own hands. 3 On the other hand, the executive 
council, like the Federal Council, supplies the chief im- 
pulse to the legislative body. Its members have the 
same habit of making reports and proposing measures ; 
of appearing and taking part freely in debate; and 
they follow the same practice of submitting to its deci- 
sions, and of retaining their places, although it does 
not support their plans. In fact they are usually re- 
elected without regard to any differences of opinion that 
may have occurred, in accordance with the Swiss prin- 
ciple that good men ought to be continued in office, 
even if their views do not in all respects coincide with 
those of their constituents. It is the general custom, 

1 Orelli, p. 109 ; Droz, Etudes, p. 386. 

2 Cf. Dubs, pt. i. pp. 173-74 ; pt. ii. p. 103. The constitutions do not 
clearly define the spheres of action of the executive and the legislature, 
but often mention among the powers of the great council that of super- 
vising the administration. 

s Orelli, p. 99. 



228 SWITZERLAND. 

moreover, to give the minority a part of the seats, and 
in the cantons of Berne and Aargau this is especially 
enjoined by the constitution. The principle that the ex- 
ecutive councillors ought not to be selected exclusively 
from one party has, indeed, become so well established 
that there are now only two cantons in which the minor- 
ity is not represented. 1 In short, the executive council, 
like the Federal Council, is not intended to be a partisan 
body, but rather a business committee, whose duty con- 
sists in advising the legislature, and carrying on the 
work of administration. 

The most important difference between the cantonal 
Method of governments consists in the method of choos- 
exeeuid?e tlie in g tnis bod y- Formerly the election was 
council. made in most cases by the great council, but 
with the spread of democratic theories the practice of 
direct election by the people has been steadily gaining 
ground, and will probably continue to do so. 2 Eleven 
cantons have now adopted this system, leaving only 
eight where the choice is made by the great council, 
and it may be observed that of those eight three are 
entirely and two others partly French. 3 The effects 
that were predicted from the election of the executive 

1 The exceptions are Neuchatel and Freiburg. Bib. Univ., June, 1893, 
p. 655. It is worth while to notice that Neuchatel is one of the cantons 
that have adopted proportional representation for the great council. See 
p. 232, infra. 

2 When the executive council is elected by the people, the canton is 
never divided into districts for the purpose, but the members are all 
chosen on one ticket for the canton at large. 

3 The eight are Neuchatel, Vaud, Valais, Freiburg, Berne, Lucerne, 
Schwyz, and Aargau. It must be remembered that we are speaking only 
of the cantons without Landsgemeinde. 



THE CANTONAL COUNCILS. 229 

council by direct popular vote have not been produced. 
The dreaded conflicts with the great council have not 
taken place, no doubt because the executive body is 
really subordinate, and is in the habit of giving way in 
case of disagreement. The party struggles over elec- 
tions, which were at first severe, have become milder ; 
and, in fact, election by the people seems on the whole 
to have helped the minority to get a part of the seats, 
the only two cantons where both parties are not repre- 
sented being among those in which the choice is still 
made by the great council. The people, moreover, have 
shown themselves conservative in their selection of 
candidates ; and although it is said that the quality of 
the men who hold the office has fallen, this may be 
attributed, in part at least, to the steady diminution 
in the political importance of the cantons, and the con- 
sequent difficulty in getting men of large calibre to 
accept the position. 1 

There is one provision to be found in several of 
the constitutions that is interesting, both for Method of 
its oddity and because it throws light on ^°^lt 
Swiss political ideas. The reader will ob- counciL 
serve that the whole legislative power in the cantons is 
vested in a single chamber, whose acts the executive 
has no power to veto, 2 and the judiciary has no power 
to set aside, 3 so that there are none of those checks on 

1 Cf . Droz, Etudes, pp. 320-21. 

2 In Geneva the Conseil d'Etat can require a reconsideration of any 
measure which it did not itself introduce. Const. Arts. 53-54. 

8 This is the general principle in Switzerland, but there are exceptions. 
Thus the constitution of the canton of Uri (Art. 51) provides that any 
person injured in his private property or rights by a determination of the 



230 SWITZERLAND. 

hasty law-making with which we are familiar in Amer- 
ica. For this reason, the Swiss dread the tyranny of 
the great council, and have devised sundry methods 
of preventing it. One of the most extraordinary is 
a process by which a certain number of citizens, vary- 
ing in the different cantons from one to twelve thou- 
sand, can require a popular vote on the question 
whether the great council shall be dissolved. If a 
majority of the votes cast is in the affirmative, the 
term of the council comes to an end, and a new elec- 
tion is immediately held. Such a provision exists in 
the constitutions of seven of the German cantons ; 
for democracy takes a somewhat different form among 
the Germans and the French in Switzerland. 1 The 
former, though more socialistic, are less ready to be 
guided and controlled by the government, while the 
French are inclined to respect the public authorities, 
and to regard them as commissioned to rule the people 
as their superior wisdom may direct. Hence it is in 
the Teutonic parts of Switzerland that we find most 
highly developed those institutions which are intended 
to limit the powers of the great council, and enable the 
people to protect themselves against any possible op- 
pression on its part ; that we find, in short, the greatest 
desire to substitute a pure for a representative demo- 
cracy. The device we are now considering, the right 

Landesgemeinde may protest, and if the meeting disregards his protest, 
the judge shall decide according to his conscience and his oath between 
the people and the claimant. There is a similar provision in the consti- 
tution of Unterwalden nid dem Wald.> Art. 43. 

1 These cantons are Berne, Lucerne, Aargau, Thurgau, Schaffhausen, 
Soleure, and Basle-City. 



DISSOLUTION BY POPULAR VOTE. 231 

of recalling the council, as it is termed, has not, how- 
ever, proved to be of much importance. Formerly it 
was sometimes used, and in one case, at least, with 
success ; 1 but, owing to the shortening of the periods 
for which the councils are elected, and the general 
introduction of the referendum, or popular veto upon 
laws, which will be described in the next chapter, it is 
practically obsolete. 

A less direct method of getting rid of the council, 
when it has ceased to represent the opinion of 
the people, is occasionally tried. It is that of by means of 

i . . „ . , ,, , constitn- 

revismg the constitution, tor in almost all the tionaire- 

i • • ii vision. 

cantons the question of revision must be sub- 
mitted to popular vote on the request of a certain 
number of citizens. The last instance of an attempt 
of this sort occurred in the canton of Ticino in 1890. 
The Radicals had been in power, until, owing to their 
errors, the Clericals obtained control of the great 
council, and proceeded to gerrymander the canton in 
their own interest. After a time the Radicals made up 
their minds that a majority of the people were on their 
side, although the condition of the electoral districts 
made it impossible for them to elect half the members 
of the great council; so they took advantage of a pro- 
vision in the cantonal constitution, which gives any 
seven thousand citizens a right to require a popular 
vote on the question whether the constitution shall be 
revised or not. They procured the necessary signa- 
tures, and hoped by this process to test public opinion 
and upset the existing council ; but the vote turned out 
1 This was in Aargau in 1862. Unsere Zeit, 1873, ii. p. 360. 



232 SWITZERLAND. 

so nearly even as to prove very little, and disturbances 
arose of such a serious nature that the federal govern- 
ment felt obliged to interfere. The incident illustrates 
how Swiss institutions are capable of being used, but 
it must not be supposed to be a fair specimen of can- 
tonal politics at the present day. Ticino is, in fact, 
the one turbulent member of the Confederation, and 
plays the part of spoiled child in the family. All the 
other cantons are now quiet, orderly, and free from 
excessive party struggles. 

Another device for preventing the oppressive use 

of power is that of proportional representa- 
representa- tion. This has recently been adopted in 

Ticino, Geneva, Neuchatel, Zug, and Soleure, 
being applied to the election of the legislative body, 
and in Ticino to that of the executive council as well. 1 
The method of procedure is not the same everywhere, 
and is necessarily of a somewhat complicated type, 
because there are, as a rule, more than two parties at 
Swiss elections, and hence the simpler forms of minority 
representation which take into account only a majority 
and minority would be entirely insufficient. This is 
true of the so-called cocked-hat system, whereby a man 
is allowed to vote for only two candidates where there 
are three places to be filled. The Swiss have, there- 
fore, adopted more complex systems, in which each 
group of voters is given a number of seats as nearly 
as possible in proportion to its size. 

1 Cf. Droz, Etudes, pp. 500^ ; Wuarin, Amer. Acad, of Pol. Sci., Nov., 
1895, p. 13. The system was introduced into Ticino, Geneva, and Soleure 
by constitutional amendments in 1891, 1892, and 1895. In the other two 
cantons it depends on statutes. 



PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 233 

Ever since the subject of proportional representation, 
was brought into general notice by Thomas Hare and 
John Stuart Mill, it has never ceased to interest polit- 
ical thinkers, and of late it has been advocated with 
great enthusiasm, and has given rise to quite a volu- 
minous literature. 1 It is not, however, peculiarly a 
Swiss institution, and to treat it properly would require 
far more space than can be devoted to it here. Nor has 
the principle been applied in Switzerland long enough 
to furnish any very valuable experience, for the first 
elections under it did not take place until 1892 ; whereas 
in Illinois, for example, it has been in operation for 
nearly a quarter of a century. It may suffice, there- 
fore, to point out that the condition of Swiss politics 
is singularly adapted for securing the benefits of the 
system and minimizing its defects. The benefits con- 
sist chiefly in making the elected body represent accu- 
rately the whole people, and in preventing gerryman- 
dering and party tyranny. Now, in Switzerland the 
habit of choosing a number of representatives in each 
district prevails generally, and under these circumstances 
an election by a majority gives a much less accurate 
reproduction of the divisions of opinion among the 
people than where the districts are smaller and elect 
only one representative apiece. 2 Moreover, the oppor- 
tunity of gaining a political advantage by a careful 

1 For a bibliography of the subject, see Appendix D. to Forney's 
Political Reform by the Representation of Minorities. 

2 Before proportional representation was adopted in Geneva, there 
were only three districts for the election of representatives to the great 
council. They are now chosen in a single district, but of course this is 
an extreme case. 



234 SWITZERLAND. 

arrangement of the districts is much greater. In regard 
to party tyranny, it may be observed when party feel- 
ing is hot in Switzerland, the issues are apt to turn 
on religious questions, and it is precisely in religious 
matters that there is the greatest danger of oppression. 
The most important objection to proportional repre- 
sentation is the fact that almost every form of it which 
has yet been suggested places absolute power in the 
hands of the machine politicians who control the caucus, 
and thus deprives the independent voter of nearly all 
weight in elections. 1 But, as will be explained in the 
next chapter, Switzerland has neither a political ma- 
chine nor independent voters at elections. The object 
of the reform there is not to prevent politics from de- 

1 A system of minority representation was recently adopted in Boston, 
by allowing each citizen to vote for only seven aldermen out of twelve. 
The result is that the two parties nominate seven candidates apiece, and 
the utmost the independent voter can accomplish is to defeat the worst 
two men out of the fourteen. Under the ordinary method of election the 
votes of the independents may turn the scale in favor of or against every 
man on the ticket, and hence the parties have a strong motive for select- 
ing candidates who will win their support. But under the present sys- 
tem the managers of the caucus, knowing that five of their candidates 
are sure of election, have ceased to trouble themselves about the inde- 
pendents, and the average quality of the aldermen has consequently 
deteriorated. A gentleman, who was himself advocating a different 
method of proportional representation, justly remarked that as things now 
stand we are certain to have ten bad aldermen. The increased power of 
the caucus seems also to have been seriously felt in Illinois, to judge 
from expressions of opinion from that State quoted in Mr. Forney's 
book (pp. 73-75). M. Droz regards the whole matter as still in the 
experimental stage in Switzerland. For his views upon it, see his review 
of McCrackan's Swiss Solutions of American Problems, in his Etudes, pp. 
500-4. That the Swiss themselves are not unanimous in regard to the 
merits of the system appears from the fact that it was voted down by the 
people of St. Gall in 1893, and of Berne in 1896. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 235 

generating into a corrupt trade, but simply to give to 
each class of opinion a fair influence in public affairs. 
There appears to be good ground for believing, there- 
fore, that proportional representation will work well in 
Switzerland. But it is curious to note that, as often 
happens, custom is stronger than law, for the habit of 
voluntarily conceding places in the executive councils 
to the minority has spread far more rapidly than the 
legal machinery which is intended to bring about the 
same result. 

The system of local government is not precisely the 
same in all parts of Switzerland, and differs The local 
especially in the French and German cantons, s° vernment - 
but still the principles on which it is based are so much 
alike everywhere that a general notion of them can be 
given in a few words. 1 The only local entities are the 
commune and the district. 2 The commune, The 
which is on the • average a smaller body than 
the American town or township, is the real centre of 
local political life, and as a rule in the German sections 
of the country its government resembles very closely 
that of the New England town. The general direction 
of public affairs, the decision of all the more important 
questions, and the appointment of the principal officers 
are vested in the assembly of all the citizens, or, as we 
should say, these things come before the town meeting. 3 

1 Cf. Adams, ch. viii. ; Vincent, pp. 136-39, and ch. xvi. ; Orelli, 
§23. 

2 In some of the smaller cantons there are no districts. 

8 A careful distinction is drawn between the matters affecting the whole 
body of inhabitants, and those relating to certain classes of public prop- 
erty, in which only a part of the citizens, the so-called Burger, are inter- 



com- 
mune. 



236 SWITZERLAND. 

For the conduct of current business, and the execution 
of the laws, the Assembly chooses a council, which cor- 
responds to the selectmen, except that the chief of the 
body (Gemeindeamman, Gemeindepresident, Sindaco, 
or Maire), unlike the chairman of the selectmen, has 
more power than his colleagues, at least in some of the 
cantons. 1 In most of the French parts of Switzerland, 
and especially in the larger communes, the assembly 
of citizens, instead of conducting public affairs directly, 
elects a general or communal council which attends to 
most of the matters that come before the whole body 
of citizens in the German cantons. The French com- 
munes have thus two councils, — a larger one which 
deals with questions of general policy and all matters 
of great importance, and a smaller executive body with 
the mayor at its head. The Swiss communes are sub- 
jected to much more administrative supervision on the 
part of the cantonal authorities than is the case in 
America; but, on the other hand, they are free from 
the constant interference by means of special acts of the 
legislature which is so common here. 

The district is an intermediate division between the 

canton and the commune; but, except in a 

few places, it is established merely for the 

convenience of administration, and is not a real polit- 

ested. This distinction between the rights of the Burger and Einwohner 
was formerly common, especially in German countries, and, although a 
good deal modified, remains in Switzerland to-day. What is said in the 
text applies only to the general administration which concerns the whole 
community. 

1 In Freiburg, which is less democratic than any other canton, this 
officer is appointed by the council of state. Deploige, p. 90. 



LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 237 

ical community. The chief official is usually elected 
by popular vote, and is sometimes assisted by a council 
whose powers are mainly advisory. He represents the 
cantonal government, and with the aid of his subor- 
dinates carries out its orders, executes the laws, and 
acts as a connecting link between the canton and the 
commune. 

From this brief description it will be observed that 
democracy in Switzerland is not merely a national or 
cantonal matter, but has its roots far down in the local 
bodies ; and this gives it a stability and conservatism 
which it lacks in most other continental nations. 



CHAPTER XII. 

SWITZERLAND: THE REFERENDUM AND THE INITIATIVE. 

Of all the remarkable institutions democracy has 
produced in Switzerland, the one that has 

The refer- 

endum arose attracted the greatest attention, and is the 

from the . ° . 7 

ahsence of most deserving of study, is the popular vot- 

representa- m ° J x x 

mlnf° vern " * n £ u P on ^ aws ? known as the referendum. 
The name, indeed, is not new, and was ap- 
plied to a practice that existed long before the greater 
part of the country became democratic ; but the mod- 
ern institution, which is based on the conception of 
popular sovereignty, is very unlike the old one, which 
sprang from the nature of the federal tie. The two 
have, moreover, little or no direct historical connec- 
tion with each other, and yet they may be traced to a 
great extent to the same cause, — the lack of a native 
representative system. It is curious that in Switzer- 
land, almost alone among the countries north of the 
Alps, representative government did not arise spontane- 
ously. In some other places the elected assemblies were 
smothered before they attained great strength, but in 
Switzerland they never developed at all. The fact is 
that owing to the absence of royal power, which was 
the great unifying force during the Middle Ages, the 
country did not become sufficiently consolidated to 
have a central legislature, and no one of the separate 



THE ANCIENT FEDERAL REFERENDUM. 239 

communities that made up the Confederation was large 
enough by itself to need a representative system. 1 
Some of the cities that were members of the league 
did, indeed, acquire great tracts of territory. This 
was notably true of Berne, and in her case traces of rep- 
resentative institutions made their appearance ; but by 
that time absolute government had begun to prevail 
in Europe, and the patricians of the city succeeded in 
drawing all the power into their own hands. Under 
these conditions there was no place for a true rep- 
resentative body either in the Confederation or the 
cantons, and the ancient referendum grew up in its 
stead. 

The Confederation being a mere league of independ- 
ent states, the delegates to its diet acted like The ancient 
ambassadors, in strict accordance with the referendum - 
instructions of their home governments; and, what is 
more, they were never given power to agree In the Con _ 
to a final settlement of matters of importance, federatlon - 
but were simply directed to hear what was proposed 
and report. They were said to be commissioned ad 
audiendum et referendum. The old federal referen- 
dum meant, therefore, the right of the members of the 
Confederation to reserve questions for their own deter- 
mination. It arose from a dread of intrusting any 
central authority with power to make binding decisions, 
and it did not disappear until Switzerland became a 

1 Switzerland was, it is true, a part of the Empire, but the connection 
was too slight to exert any marked influence on internal development, 
while the more immediate authority of the House of Habsburg was 
thrown off entirely. 



240 SWITZERLAND. 

united nation after the outbreak of the French Revo- 
lution. 

A similar condition of things existed also in the 
in the Grisons and the Valais, which were not 

Grisons. strictly a part of the Confederation, though 
closely affiliated with it {Zugewandte Orte). The 
Grisons had a government of the most marvelous com- 
plexity. 1 It was a confederation of three separate 
leagues, each of which was in turn composed of a num- 
ber of Gemeinde or districts. These last were the polit- 
ical units, the final depositories of power, and their 
action was taken in Landsgemeinde, or mass meetings 
of all the citizens. 2 There was a council for each 
league, and also a common diet for all three; but none 
of these bodies had power to act on its own authority. 
Except in case of emergency or on matters of secondary 
importance, all of their decisions had to be submitted to 
the Gemeinde for approval. 3 

This system seems to have developed about the time 
of the Reformation, at least so far as the triple league 
was concerned, and the subjects which the referendum 
covered appear to have become gradually more and 
more extended, until they included almost everything 

1 See Ganzoni, Beitrage zur Kenntniss des bundnerischen Referendums; 
Coolidge, " Early History of the Referendum," Eng. Hist. Rev. 1891, p. 674. 

2 They did not all, however, count equally, but had one or more votes, 
according to their quota of the land tax. Curti, Geschichte der Schweizer- 
ischen Volksgesetzgebung, 2d ed. p. 11. Sometimes, as in the case of the 
Upper Engadine, there was a referendum from the Gemeinde to the Dorf e 
or villages of which it was composed. Ganzoni, pp. 10-12. 

3 Questions were decided by a majority, or rather plurality, of the 
votes of the Gemeinde without regard to the majority in each separate 
league. Ganzoni, pp. 20-24, 69-71. 



THE REFERENDUM IN THE GRISONS. 241 

within the competence of the central diet. The pro- 
cedure was applied to foreign as well as to domestic 
affairs. The reception of representatives from other 
states, for example, was approved by the Gemeinde. 
An envoy to be sent abroad was selected, and his 
instructions were ratified by them ; and finally it 
was settled that no communication could be sent to a 
foreign power until it had received their consent. So 
completely, indeed, were they looked upon as sover- 
eigns that at last even the ceremonial announcements 
of royal births and marriages were duly forwarded to 
them by the central authorities of the triple league. 
Unfortunately the questions submitted to the Gemeinde 
were often so framed that they did not elicit a simple 
positive or negative response. Sometimes a direct 
question was not asked at all ; and hence the answers 
were of all sorts, and it was by no means easy to extract 
from them the prevailing opinion. The result was 
complaint and recrimination between the districts and 
the officials who classified the returns. In short, the 
system was not organized with precision. In spite of its 
defects, however, it continued until it was overthrown 
by the French in 1800. Three years later it was re- 
stored, and, although far too clumsy a piece of mech- 
anism for the nineteenth century, it lasted with some 
modifications down to 1854, when it was replaced by 
the modern referendum. At the same time, the federal 
character of the government was entirely swept away. 

The Valais was a confederation with a similar micro- 
scopic organization. 1 Here the districts, though twelve 

1 Curti, pp. 10-11. 
vol. n. 



242 SWITZERLAND. 

in number, were called Zehuten, or tenths; and the del- 
inthe egates from these met together to consult 

Vaiais. about common interests, taking the measures 

that were agreed upon ad referendum, that is, laying 
them before the Zehuten, whose votes counted equally 
in reaching the final decision. Here also the system 
lasted until the French Revolution, and was afterwards 
restored, to be replaced by a more modern form of pro- 
cedure in 1839. 

In the canton of Berne there existed at one time a 
custom that resembled much more closely the 
modern referendum. 1 Berne was not like 
the Grisons and the Yalais a confederation, but was 
governed by the aristocracy of the city, who ruled over 
the country districts, treating them like subject lands. 
In the middle of the fifteenth century, however, the 
stress of war induced the patricians to consult the 
country districts about levying an extraordinary tax. 
The process was repeated a score of times in the fif- 
teenth century and much oftener in the sixteenth, 
being used chiefly in regard to military and religious 
matters. At first each district was requested to send 
two deputies to Berne to express its views on the ques- 
tion at issue, — a practice that seemed destined to give 
rise to a parliament rather than to the referendum. 
Perhaps it was a presentiment of such a result that 
caused the government to change the procedure, by 
sending officials of its own to collect the opinions of 
the district assemblies, or by requiring them to be for- 

1 SeeCurti,pp. 8-10; Deploige, Le Referendum, pp. 25-29; Chatelanat, 
Zeitschrift fur Schweiz. Statistik, 1877, pp. 257-59. 



BERNE AND ZURICH. 243 

warded in writing to the capital. In neither form, 
however, was the habit so much a recognition of polit- 
ical rights, as a device on the part of the patricians to 
fortify themselves in their own policy. This may be 
inferred by observing that the result was almost always 
favorable to their wishes, and it is made very clear by 
the fact that although the government had expressly 
promised not to make treaties or declare war without 
the consent of the people, yet when the districts grew 
so bold as to reject repeatedly plans for military re- 
form, the practice of consulting them was given up 
altogether. It was used for the last time in 1610. 1 

A similar custom prevailed about the same time in 
Zurich, but it was never so fully developed. 2 

m , . . „ , In Zurich. 

Ine questions were not put m a torm that 
required a categorical answer, affirmative or negative, 
and, in fact, the procedure was not sufficiently definite 
to lay the foundation for a political system. 

So much for the ancient referendum. The modern 
institution is quite different in its form and The modern 
in its effects, and is based upon abstract referendum - 
theories of popular rights, derived mainly from the 
teachings of Rousseau. This writer had a 

, , . x Theinflu- 

strong aversion to representative government, ence of 

-i it* i'ii i n a Rousseau. 

and remarked in his celebrated " (Jontrat bo- 

cial," that the English with all their boasted liberty were 

not really free, because they enjoyed their liberty only 

1 An unsuccessful attempt to revive it was made in 1798, in hopes of 
sustaining the falling government of Berne. 

2 Curti, pp. 12-13 ; Stussi, Referendum und Initiative im Kanton Zurich, 
pp. 3-5. 



244 SWITZERLAND. 

at the moment of choosing a parliament, and were ab- 
solutely under its rule until the next election. He 
declared that in order to realize true liberty the laws 
ought to be enacted directly by the people themselves, 
although he saw no method by which this could be 
done in a state that was too large to permit of a mass 
meeting of all the citizens. Rousseau's ideas of popu- 
lar rights sank deep into the minds of his countrymen ; 
and when the Swiss, who as a rule is extremely practi- 
cal in politics, becomes fairly enamored of an abstract 
theory, he clings to it with a tenacity worthy of a 
martyr. 

In speaking of the modern referendum, however, 
as a Swiss invention, a distinction between 

The refer- . . it 

endumfor constitutional questions and ordinary laws 

constitu- * ^ 

tionai ques- must be borne in mind. The principle that 

tions not a x x 

Swiss a sanction by popular vote is necessary for 

invention. J l r j 

the adoption of a constitution cannot be said 
to have had its origin in Switzerland, for it has been 
recognized and acted upon in other places for more 
than a hundred years. As early as 1778 the General 
Court of Massachusetts submitted to the people a con- 
stitution which they rejected, and two years later the 
one that is in force to-day was drawn up by a conven- 
tion, laid before the people, and ratified by a two thirds 
vote. In New Hampshire one constitution was like- 
wise defeated at the polls in 1779, and another was 
accepted in 1784. The example of these two States 
was followed by Mississippi and Missouri on their ad- 
mission to the Union in 1817 and 1820. In 1821 the 
practice was adopted by New York, and since that time 



THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM. 245 

it has become almost universal. 1 In France also the 
constitutions of 1793, 1795, 1799, 1802, 1804, and 
1815 were submitted to the people and ratified by them, 
although the first of these was in fact brushed aside 
before it actually went into effect. 2 

In Switzerland the principle was adopted for the first 
time in the case of the ephemeral constitution of 1802, 
and then in a most illusory shape ; for although more 
votes were cast in the negative than in the affirmative, 
the constitution was declared adopted, on the theory 
that the citizens who did not vote at all should be 
treated as consenting. 3 After this no federal constitu- 
tional question was brought before the people until 
1848. The cantons, moreover, did not begin to submit 
their constitutions to popular vote before 1830, 4 and the 
habit did not become universal among them until the 
federal constitution of 1848 made it obligatory. 5 

The credit for the referendum on ordinary laws be- 
longs, on the other hand, entirely to the Swiss, for 

1 Oberholzer, The Referendum in America, ch. ii. Cf. Stimson, Amer. 
Statute Law, §§ 991, 995. 

2 Borgeaud, Etablissement et Revision des Constitutions, pt. iii. liv. ii. 
chs. ii., iii., and iv. The constitutions of the Second Empire were ratified 
in the same way. 

3 Curti, pp. 109-10 ; Borgeaud, pt. iii. liv. iii. ch. i. The Swiss con- 
stitution of 1798 contained a provision that amendments should be sub- 
mitted to the people, but it was never applied. Borgeaud, lb. 

4 In the course of 1830 and the four years following twenty revisions 
of cantonal constitutions took place, and everywhere, except at Freiburg, 
they were submitted to the people for ratification. Deploige, p. 37. 

5 Cf. Borgeaud, pt. iii. liv. iii. ch. ii. ; Stiissi, Ref. und Init. in den 
Schweizerkantonen, pp. 9-65. This statement does not apply to the can- 
tons with Landsgemeinde, or to Geneva, which had institutions of a simi- 
lar nature. Blumer, Schweiz. Bunderstaatsrecht, 2d ed. Bd. I. pp. 57, 61. 



246 SWITZERLAND. 

the still-born French constitution of 1793, which con- 
Thereferen- Gained a provision for a popular vote on laws, 
dh^ry°iaws never went into operation, 1 and, excepting 
is Swiss. a S p 0rac [i c use f the institution here and 
there, it has never existed in any other country. We 
are therefore led to consider the question to which al- 
lusion has been made in the beginning of this chapter, 
the question why it developed in Switzerland. The 
advocates of the referendum were prompted by a belief 
that it was an essential part of the sovereignty of the 
people rather than by a conviction of its utility, and 
in many of the debates on the subject its introduction 
it is due to was ur g e( l t° a great extent on theoretical 
fectionTof principles of abstract right, although usually 
se™tiv e e pre " opposed on purely practical grounds, the de- 
government, j^^g resem bl m g those one commonly hears 
on the question of woman's suffrage. 2 A study of the 
period points, however, to the conclusion that the ulti- 
mate basis of the demand for the referendum, the real 
foundation of the belief in the right of the people to 
take a direct part in legislation, lay in the defective 
condition of the representative system. 2 Nor is this 
surprising. Up to the end of the last century the 
Swiss had no experience of representative government. 
Except for the Grisons and the Valais with their pecul- 

1 Cf . Curti, pp. 83-85 ; Ganzoni, p. 4 ; Keller, Das Volksinitiativrecht, 
tit. i. ch. iii. (a). 

2 Curti gives abstracts of a number of these debates both in the Con- 
federation and the cantons. It is a striking fact that Curti, like many 
other Swiss writers who are ardent admirers of the institution, scarcely 
alludes to its actual working. 

3 Deploige is decidedly of this opinion. Le Referendum, pp. 52-55. • 



THE REFERENDUM FOR ORDINARY LAWS. 247 

iar federal structure, the cantons either made their laws 
by means of Landsgemeinde, and hence had no need 
of legislative chambers, or else the country districts 
were ruled by the dominant city, and the city by a few 
patrician families ; * while the Confederation itself was 
so loosely organized that its Diet was not a true legisla- 
tive body, but rather a congress of ambassadors. The 
result was that when representative institutions were 
copied from other countries after the French Kevolu- 
tion, the Swiss were not accustomed to them, and met 
with two difficulties. In the first place, they did not 
know how to provide the necessary checks and bal- 
ances, and set up single chambers with absolute powers ; 
and, in the second place, they had not learned to make 
those chambers reflect public opinion. The popular 
inexperience enabled the patricians to restore their 
ascendency in the cantons during the reaction that fol- 
lowed the fall of Napoleon, and although the movement 
of 1830 again broke their power and established demo- 
cracy on a firm basis, the people had not acquired the 
art of limiting or controlling the representative bodies. 
They continued to be jealous of the men they elected, 
and looked on them as masters instead of servants of 
the public. The legislatures were, or, what for politi- 
cal purposes is the same thing, were believed to be, out 
of sympathy with the majority of the people, and as 
they were virtually omnipotent, there was constant 
irritation and discontent. The struggle for political 

1 In Geneva a constant struggle for power, with varying results, was 
maintained between the government and the assembly of all the citizens. 
Cf. Keller, tit. i. ch. iii. (b) ; Curti, pp. 38-48. 



248 SWITZERLAND. 

equality was, therefore, no sooner at an end, and repre- 
sentative bodies based on universal suffrage were no 
sooner established, than the demand for direct popular 
legislation began. 1 Its introduction has acted like oil 
upon troubled waters, for within the last twenty-five or 
thirty years the course of politics in the cantons has 
been much smoother than it was before; and al- 
though this result was by no means always coincident 
with the adoption of the referendum, and must be 
attributed mainly to the attainment of skill in the art 
of self-government on a large scale, 2 it is also due in 
part to the fact that the referendum, by putting an 
end to doubts about the real opinion of the majority 
upon disputed questions, has removed at once a means 
of agitation and a source of discontent. 

Direct popular voting upon laws made its first ap- 
pearance in a limited form, under the name 
tionofthe of the veto, in the canton of St. Gall in 
1831. 3 The veto, as the name implies, was a 
process by which the people could refuse their consent 
to a law passed by the legislature ; and the member who 

1 Ganzoni (p. 6) remarks that the Grisons, which had a form of direct 
popular legislation, was the only canton without a Landsgemeinde in 
which disturbances did not take place. 

2 The Swiss have always had plenty of experience of self-government 
on a small scale by means of Landsgemeinde and communal assemblies, 
but before the French Revolution they had not tried it on a large scale. 

3 This applies, of course, only to the cantons without Landsgemeinde. 
The leading work on the history of direct popular legislation is that of 
Curti. A shorter but excellent account of it will be found in Deploige, 
pp. 38-78. See, also, Stiissi, Ref. und Init. in den Schioeizerkantonen, and 
for St. Gall, Nachweiser der Ergebnisse den Volksabstimmungen im Kanton 
St. Gallen, 1831-1894. 



THE VETO. 249 

proposed it in the constitutional convention had in 
mind the veto of the Roman Tribune of the People. 
The essential difference between the veto and the refer- 
endum consists in the fact that in the latter the fate of 
a law is determined by the majority of the votes actu- 
ally cast, while in the veto a law is rejected only in case 
a majority of all the registered voters have voted in the 
negative. In other words, the men who do not vote at 
the referendum are neglected, while in the veto they 
are treated as if they had voted affirmatively. 1 

The veto was adopted by Rural Basle in 1832, by 
the Yalais in 1839, 2 and by Lucerne in 1841 ; but the 
rejection by the people of St. Gall of a liberal law on 
the relation of church and state, and the fact that the 
veto in Lucerne was the work of the conservative gov- 
ernment, which had come into power, caused the insti- 
tution to be regarded as reactionary, and checked its 
extension for a time. In 1842 the great council of 
Zurich refused to introduce it, the Liberals, who cared 
more about progressive laws than about the means by 
which they were enacted, objecting to it as an obstacle 
to progress. It is, indeed, noteworthy that on a num- 
ber of occasions direct popular legislation was opposed 
by Liberals and favored by Conservatives, on the ground 

1 The names are not always used with precision. Even Curti some- 
times speaks of the optional referendum as the veto. 

2 The voting was done in the communal assemblies, and in the Valais 
the government summoned all the communal assemblies to consider every 
law. In the other cantons each communal assembly met only in case a 
demand was made by a certain number of its members, and unless a fixed 
quantity of votes were cast against the law by this process the rest of 
the assemblies were not convened. Deploige (p. 44) calls the system of 
the Valais an obligatory veto. 



250 SWITZERLAND. 

that it tended to prevent radical measures. During the 
following years the advance was slow. In 1844 the 
Valais exchanged the veto for an obligatory referen- 
dum, but abolished it four years later and returned to 
a pure representative system. The veto was adopted 
by Thurgau in 1849, and by Schaffhausen in 1852, and 
these were the last cantons to take it up. It was a 
clumsy device, ill adapted to ascertain the real opinion 
of the people, and henceforth it began to be replaced 
by a more perfect instrument. 1 

The referendum in Switzerland is of two kinds, one 
of which is called the facultative or optional, 

Different i i • • i i i i i , . I 

kinds of and this is where the law must be submitted 

referendum. 

to popular vote li a certain number of citizens 
petition for it ; the other is the obligatory, and requires, 
as the name implies, that all laws shall be submitted 
without the need of any petition. The obligatory form 
is obviously the most purely democratic, for it requires 
a direct popular action on every law ; but the Swiss 
statesmen themselves consider it preferable on practical 
grounds also, because it avoids the agitation necessarily 
involved in the effort to collect the signatures to the 
petition. 2 

Both these forms have been in general use, and it is 
itsintro- curious that the first to be adopted was the 
duction. obligatory. This, as we have seen, was in the 
Yalais in 1844 ; and although the rejection of a num- 

1 It may be added that in 1845 and 1846 Vaud and Berne gave their 
legislatures power to submit any measures to the people, but in the latter 
at least the great council did not care to avail itself of the privilege. 
Curti, p. 257. 

2 Cf. Dubs, pt. i. p. 214; pt. ii. p. 155 ; Adams, p. 89. 



THE ADOPTION OF THE REFERENDUM. 251 

ber of laws brought the experiment to a sudden end, 
an obligatory referendum for a limited class of financial 
matters was created in 1852. 1 Four years later a gen- 
eral optional referendum was adopted in Soleure, 2 and 
in 1858 Neuchatel established an obligatory referen- 
dum for large appropriations, which was imitated by 
Vaud in 1861. Soon afterwards direct popular legisla- 
tion began to advance rapidly. In 1863 Rural Basle 
adopted a general obligatory referendum, and in 1869 
and 1870 Zurich, Berne, Soleure, Aargau, and Thur- 
gau did the same, while Lucerne introduced it in the 
optional form. The example of these great cantons was 
followed before long by others, until at the present day 
all of them except the strongly Catholic and reaction- 
ary Freiburg possess a referendum of some kind for or- 
dinary laws, about half having the obligatory and about 
half the optional form. At last the Confederation itself, 
after a long struggle, adopted an optional referendum 
in 1874. 3 

1 In 1848 Schwyz and Zug gave up the Landsgemeinde, and the for- 
mer substituted the referendum. 

2 This was called a veto, but was really a referendum. In 1861 St. 
Gall virtually turned its veto into a referendum. 

3 The state of the referendum in the Confederation and the cantons 
without Landsgemeinde, together with the dates of its introduction, is as 
follows. (The referendum is everywhere compulsory for changes in a 
constitution. In regard to other matters, to which alone the following 
table relates, the extent of its application varies, the provisions in the 
constitutions differing a good deal. As a rule, it applies to all laws and 
to all measures of a general character, an exception being sometimes 
made of such of the latter as are urgent. In all the cantons except the 
two Basles, St. Gall, Neuchatel, and Geneva, it includes also appropria- 
tions above a certain sum, which is usually higher for single appropriations 
than for continuing ones, and which varies according to the size of the 



252 



SWITZERLAND. 



The actual 
working- of 
the refer- 
endum. 



The real importance of the referendum as an ele- 
ment in legislation varies a great deal in the 
Confederation and in the several cantons, as 
may be seen by an examination of its actual 
working. 

In the Confederation the referendum is obligatory for 
all amendments to the constitution ; that is, these must 

canton. The facts here stated, except the dates, are taken from the col- 
lection of constitutions published by the Federal Chancery in 1890, and 
the supplements thereto through 1895. There have been very few im- 
portant changes in the referendum of late years.) 

Confederation . . Optional . . . 1874 

Zurich Obligatory . . 1869 

Berne Obligatory . . 1869 



Lucerne . 
Schwyz . . 

Zug . . . 
Freiburg . 
Soleure 
Basle, City 
Basle, Rural 
Schaffhausen 
St. Gall . , 
Grisons 
Aargau 
Thurgau . 
Ticino . . 



Vaud 
Valais 



Optional . . . 1869 
( Obligatory (Gen.) ) 
loptiLl (Treaties) \ 184 * «* ""» 
. Optional . 
. None. . . 

Obligatory 

Optional . 

Obligatory 

Obligatory 

Optional . 

Obligatory 

Obligatory 
. Obligatory 

Optional . 
( Optional (Gen.) . 
( Obligatory (Fin.) 

Obligatory (Fin.) 



1877 

1869 (Optional 1856) 

1875 

1863 

1895 (Optional 1876) 

1861 and 1875 

1852 (But Fed. Ref . before) 

1870 

1869 

1883 and 1892 

1885 

1861 

1852 (For earlier Refs. see 

text) 
1879 (Obligatory Fin. 1858) 
1879 



Neuchatel .... Optional . . 

Geneva .... Optional . . 

In several of the cantons there are provisions that the great council, 
or a certain fraction thereof, can submit to the people matters that would 
not otherwise come before them, but this power is almost never used. 
Deploige, p. 113. 



THE FEDERAL REFERENDUM. 253 

always be submitted to popular vote for ratification. 1 
In the optional form, on the other hand, it ex- 
ists on the demand of thirty thousand citizens laws rt r ° 
or eight cantons, for all laws and all resolu- Confederal 
tions that have a general application, unless the 
Assembly declares the matter urgent, 2 — a power which 
that body is said to have used arbitrarily at times. The 
constitution nowhere defines a law or a vote of general 
application, and hence the question whether a measure 
falls within that description is determined by the Fed- 
eral Assembly itself. This has been the source of no 
little complaint, and in fact the decisions of the Assem- 
bly are hard to reconcile with any general principle, 
although some of them are obvious enough. It has 
been wisely assumed, for example, that the provision 
does not apply to the annual budget, to treaties, or to 
concrete questions such as the decision of a conflict of 
authority, or the approval of a cantonal constitution. 
It has also been held not to apply to subventions voted 
for the construction of roads or the diking of streams. 3 
In order to give time for presenting a petition for a 
referendum, the laws to which it is applicable do not 
go into effect until ninety days after they have been 
passed by the Assembly. 4 

As a matter of fact the cantons have never demanded 
the referendum, no doubt because it is less trouble to 

1 Const. Art. 123. 

2 Art. 89. Ordinary laws require only a majority of the popular vote, 
but amendments to the constitution need also the assent of a majority of 
the cantons. 

8 Deploige, pp. 95-98; Dubs, pt. ii. pp. 151-54; Droz, Etudes, pp. 465-66. 
4 Deploige, p. 98. 



254 SWITZERLAND. 

collect the signatures of thirty thousand individual 
voters than it is to call together eight legislatures and 
submit the action of each of them, as the law requires, 
to a popular vote of the canton. The power is, how- 
ever, freely used by the people, as is shown by the fact 
that from the time of its introduction in 1874 through 
November, 1895, the requisite number of voters peti- 
tioned for the referendum in the case of twenty out of 
one hundred and eighty-two laws to which it could 
have been applied; that is, on the average, in the case 
of one law out of nine. 1 Of these twenty laws the 
people ratified six and rejected fourteen, or exactly one 
thirteenth of all the laws passed by the Assembly. 

During the same period there have also been sub- 
mitted to popular vote ten constitutional amendments 
proposed by the Assembly, of which six were accepted 
and four rejected. 2 It will be noticed that the propor- 
tion of constitutional amendment accepted is greater 
than that of ordinary laws, a result which is, of course, 
accounted for by the fact that all the former go to the 
people, while a petition for a vote on an ordinary stat- 
ute is presented only in case it has provoked consider- 
able hostility. 

These figures are enough to show that the federal 
its use referendum is far from a mere formality. 

spasmodic. The use made of it has, however, been some- 
what spasmodic. During the first three years after the 
adoption of the present constitution five laws were re- 

1 Referendums Tafel, Dec. 1, 1895. 

2 This does not include the four constitutional amendments proposed 
by private initiative. 



THE VOTES ON FEDERAL LAWS. 255 

jected and only two accepted. Then there came a 
quiet period of five years, in which no measure passed 
by the Assembly was condemned by the people, and in 
fact a popular vote on an ordinary statute was asked 
for only once. The calm was followed in 1882 by a 
storm of discontent; for the people had become so 
thoroughly out of sympathy with the radical tenden- 
cies of their representatives, and were so disgusted at 
the conduct of the party in power, that for three years 
they rejected every measure presented to them. Their 
ill will culminated in May, 1884, when they voted down 
four laws at a single stroke ; but with this explosion 
the popular irritation seems to have exhausted itself, 
and perhaps we may add the legislators learned to be 
more cautious. Another period of quiet began, and 
during the next seven years the people again ratified 
everything. In 1891 the spell was broken; and out 
of five measures submitted to popular vote, two were 
voted down by large majorities. This was, indeed, the 
precursor of a third era of rejections, for during the 
last three years the popular vote has been negative 
in almost every case. 1 The spasmodic working of the 

1 Deploige (pp. 134-56) gives a very good description of the federal 
laws submitted to popular vote through 1891, with the T . 
reasons tor their acceptance or rejection. These laws, and federal ref- 
the subsequent ones (not including the measures brought erenda - 
forward by private initiative, which will be discussed later), are briefly as 
follows: — 

The federal referendum was first applied in 1875 in the case of a law 
defining the conditions, such as bankruptcy and pauperism, under which 
a citizen could be deprived of the right to vote, — conditions that had 
previously been determined by the cantons, and varied in the different 



256 SWITZERLAND. 

referendum in federal matters is, therefore, as marked 

parts of the country. This act was submitted to the people and rejected 
by a slight majority. 

On the same day a vote was taken on another law establishing uniform 
rules of marriage and divorce, and regulating the keeping of registries of 
births, deaths, etc. The clause relating to divorce was repugnant both to 
the Catholics and the conservative Protestants, but the provisions about 
registry were a real necessity, and as the law had to be accepted or 
rejected as a whole, it was ratified by a small majority. 

The next year an act to regulate the issue of banknotes was rejected 
by a heavy majority, the result being probably due to the fact that the 
voters did not understand the measure, for a similar law was enacted five 
years later without any demand for a referendum. 

In 1876 and in 1877 statutes were passed imposing on all citizens ex- 
cused from personal military service a property tax such as had previously 
been imposed by some cantons but not by others. On both occasions a 
popular vote was demanded, and the law was defeated at the polls. In 
the following year the measure was again passed by the Assembly with 
modifications which lightened the tax, and it went into effect without a 
petition for a referendum, — a result which is attributed less to the 
changes in the bill than to the fact that the people were tired of the 
question and felt that it must be settled. 

At the same time that the people rejected the second of these statutes 
they voted upon two other laws. One of them regulated labor in fac- 
tories, and was ratified by a small majority. The other defined the 
grounds on which a citizen could be deprived of the right to vote, and 
was more heavily rejected than the bill that had been presented on the 
same subject two years before. 

The first quiet period now began, and within the five succeeding years 
the referendum was demanded only in the case of the subsidy for the 
railroad over the St. Gothard, which was ratified. During this period an 
amendment to the constitution repealing the provision against capital 
punishment was also accepted. 

The era of tranquillity came to an end in July, 1882, when a law to 
prevent epidemics, which contained an extremely unpopular clause mak- 
ing vaccination compulsory, was rejected by a vote of nearly four to one ; 
and this statute carried down with it a constitutional amendment au- 
thorizing the enactment of a federal law for the protection of patents. 
The Swiss frequently assert that the people consider each measure inde- 



THE VOTES ON FEDERAL LAWS. 257 

as It is significant, and will be further considered in 

pendently, and are not influenced by other questions presented at the 
same time ; but if that is true as a general rule, this case is clearly an 
exception, for not only is it the universal opinion that the patent amend- 
ment would have been accepted if it had stood alone, but it was actually 
carried through five years later by the largest proportion of affirmative 
votes ever cast. 

In November of the same year a measure which created a passionate 
excitement came before the people. The federal constitution provides 
that primary education shall be controlled by the civil authorities, and in 
the public schools shall be such that children of all creeds can attend 
without offense to their feelings. (Const. Art. 27.) The injunction had 
not been observed by the cantons, and the Assembly voted to make an 
examination of the schools, and to appoint a secretary of education for 
the purpose. Instantly a cry was raised by the Catholics and Orthodox 
Protestants that the Radical majority intended to take religion away from 
the schools, and the measure was heavily voted down. 

In May, 1884, four acts were voted upon at the same time, and they 
were all rejected. One of them provided for the transfer of criminal 
cases from the cantonal courts to the federal tribunal when the impar- 
tiality of the former was doubtful. This was the only one of the four to 
which any serious objection could be made, and the rest would no doubt 
have been accepted if public feeling had been in a normal condition. 
They were in fact harmless enough. One organized the federal depart- 
ment of justice and police ; another repealed a tax on commercial travel- 
ers ; and the fourth made an appropriation to provide a secretary for 
the legation at Washington. The absurdity of taking a popular vote on 
such a matter as the last is generally recognized. 

Then came the second period, in which the people ratified every meas- 
ure that came before them. The first of these was an amendment to the 
constitution, giving to the Confederation a monopoly of the manufacture 
and sale of alcoholic liquors. Not unnaturally it aroused opposition, 
but it was nevertheless accepted by a large majority in October, 1885, 
as was also a year and a half later the law for carrying it into effect. 
Another was the constitutional amendment concerning patents, which was 
adopted in 1887, and to which a reference has already been made. The 
law on the collection of debts and on bankruptcy was, indeed, the only one 
during this period over which a fierce party struggle took place, but 
it was carried with a narrow margin in 1889. The next year an amend- 
vol. n. 



258 SWITZERLAND. 

connection with the extraordinary stability of the polit- 
ical parties. 

ment to the constitution, authorizing the passage of a federal law on the 
compulsory insurance of workmen, was ratified by an enormous major- 
ity. 

After this vote the second period of uninterrupted acceptances came to 
an end, and early in 1891 an act granting pensions to public officials who 
became incapacitated after long service was rejected by a majority of 
more than two hundred and fifty thousand votes, the largest that has ever 
been known; the result being due to a dislike of expense, and to the 
jealousy entertained by the mass of the people for what they term some- 
what unjustly the bureaucracy. 

During the same year three measures were accepted without very 
serious difficulty. One of them was an amendment of the constitution 
creating a right on the part of any fifty thousand citizens to propose a 
partial revision of the constitution and require a popular vote thereon, a 
matter which will be more fully discussed later. Another was an amend- 
ment giving the federal government power to establish a national bank 
with the exclusive right to issue notes. The third was a protective tariff, 
enacted in order to exert a pressure on France, and induce her to nego- 
tiate a commercial treaty. 

The last measure submitted to the people in that year marks the begin- 
ning of a third period of rejection, — not, perhaps, quite so violent as the 
one which had occurred at the beginning of the previous decade, but still 
strongly marked. This measure, the purchase by the Confederation of 
the stock of the Central Railroad Company, was opposed by men who 
disliked the idea of a great increase in the staff of federal officials, by 
men who did not approve of state ownership of railroads, and by men 
who approved of the principle, but complained that there was no gen- 
eral plan for carrying it out, and that the price, which they considered 
excessive, would go into the pockets of speculators. The opposition 
was so strong that the measure was rejected by a vote of more than 
two to one. 

During the next two years, the referendum was not demanded on any 
act passed by the Assembly ; but in March, 1894, a vote was taken on a 
constitutional amendment proposed by that body. This was designed to 
give the Confederation power to legislate on labor organizations, and was 
so broad in its terms as to authorize a law compelling workmen to join 
the trade unions. The opponents of socialistic principles, who are at 



THE VOTES ON FEDERAL LAWS. 259 

The Confederation furnishes an example of the work- 
ing of the optional referendum. In some of Number of 
the cantons the obligatory form can be studied, jeeTedhithe 
and an examination of the results in a few of cantons - 
them will show how far it is effective. 

present very numerous in Switzerland, were alarmed, and the amendment 
was defeated. (For this use of the referendum and those that follow, 
see the Bib. Univ., passim.) 

In 1895 three more measures came before the people. The first, a 
law organizing the diplomatic and consular service, seems to have been 
open to no grave objections, but was disliked by the parts of the country 
which had little commercial relations with foreign lands, on the ground 
that it would entail additional expense, and was voted down. 

The next, a constitutional amendment, conferring on the Confederation 
a monopoly of the manufacture of friction matches, was based on a 
desire to relieve the sufferings of a small colony of workmen, who 
contracted necrosis by making sulphur matches. It is said that the 
Assembly passed the amendment in the hope that the people would re- 
ject it, and, if so, they were not disappointed, for it was defeated by 
the votes of the men who are opposed to further centralization, and of 
those who object to state monopolies in general and to bad matches in par- 
ticular. 

The third was an amendment designed to place the army more com- 
pletely under the control of the national government. It was supported 
by the bulk of the political leaders and by almost the entire press, but 
was heavily voted down, the diminution of cantonal authority which 
it involved being repugnant to all but a few of the largest German 
cantons. 

Finally, in 1896, a code of discipline in the army, which increased the 
authority of the federal military department, was voted down by a huge 
majority, and a law of no great political importance, on the trade in 
animals, by a small one ; while at the same time a law on the accounts of 
railroads, which was a step towards state ownership, was ratified in spite 
of fierce opposition. The referendum is now pending upon an act creat- 
ing a government bank, with a strong probability of its rejection. 

The following is a summary of all the popular votes in the Confedera- 
tion since the adoption of the present constitution, including the matters 
brought forward by the initiative (in the case of constitutional amend- 
ments, the vote of the cantons is placed beneath the popular vote) : — 



260 SWITZERLAND. 

It is fortunate that very elaborate statistics have 



Date. 



1874, Apr. 19 

1875, May 23 

1875, May 23 

1876, April 23 

1876, July 9 

1877, Oct. 21 
1877, Oct. 21 

1877, Oct. 21 

1879, Jan. 19 
1879, May 18 



1880, Oct. 31 

1882, July 30 
1882, July 30 

1882, Nov. 26 
1884, May 11 

1884, May 11 

1884, May 11 

1884, May 11 

1885, Oct. 25 



1887, May 15 
1887, July 10 

1889, Nov. 17 

1890, Oct. 26 



1891, Mar. 15 
1891, July 5 



1891, Oct. 18 
1891, Oct. 18 



Constitution 

Deprivation of political 
rights 

Marriage and registry 

Issue of banknotes 

Tax on exemption from 
military service 

Labor in factories 

Tax on exemption from 
military service 

Deprivation of political 
rights 

Subsidy to Alpine R. R. 

Const, amend, to per- 
mit capital punish- 
ment 

Init. Total Rev. of Const, 
in order to create bank- 
note monopoly 

Prevention of epidemics 
Const, amend, on patents 

Fed. Sec'y. of education 
Organization of Dept. of 

Justice 
Repeal of tax on com'l. 

travelers 
Approp. for Sec. of Leg. 

at Washington 
Removal of criminal 

cases 
Const, amend, creating 

alcohol monopoly 

Liquor law 

Const, amend, on patents 

Bankruptcy law 
Const, amend, on compul- 
sory ins. of workmen 

Pensions for officials 
Const, amend, on right of 
initiative 

Const, amend, on bank- 
note monopoly 

The tariff 



Result. 


Aff. Votes. 


Acc. 


340,199 
14* 


Rej. 
Acc. 
Rej. 


202,583 
213,199 
120,068 


Rej. 
Acc. 


156,157 
181,204 


Rej. 


170,223 


Rej. 
Acc. 


131,557 
278,731 


Acc. 


200,485 
15 


Rej. 

Rej. 
Rej. 

Rej. 


121,099 

4£ 

68,027 

141.616 

7* 
172,010 


Rej. 


149,729 


Rej. 


174,195 


Rej. 


137,824 


Rej- 


159,068 


Ace. 

Acc. 
Ace. 

Acc. 


230,250 

15 
267,122 
203,506 

20* 
244,317 


Acc. 
Rej. 


283.228 
20i 

91,851 


Acc. 


183,029 
18 


Acc. 
Acc. 


231,578 
14 

220,004 



Neg. Votes. 



198,013 

7* 

207,263 
205,069 



184,894 
170,857 

181,383 

213,230 
115,571 



181,588 
7 



260,126 
171 

254,340 
156,658 

14* 
318,139 

214,916 

189,550 

219,728 

202,773 

157,463 

7 

138,496 

57,862 

li 
217,921 

92,200 

1* 

353,977 

120,599 

4 

158,651 

8 
158,934 



THE REFERENDUM IN THE CANTONS. 



261 



Zurich. 



been published in the case of Zurich/ the most dem- 
ocratic of the larger cantons, and one whose 
constitution expresses the Swiss democratic 
ideal in a singularly direct way when it says that " the 
people exercise the legislative power with the assistance 
of the cantonal council." 2 The obligatory referendum 
was introduced here in 1869, and applies to laws and 
all other measures passed by the cantonal council which 
are not executive in the strictest sense ; to single appro- 
priations of more than two hundred and fifty thousand 
francs; and to any others that entail a continuing 



Date. 


Measure. 


Result. 


Aff. Votes. 


Neg. Votes. 


1891, Dee. 6 


Purchase of stock of 










Central R. R. Co. 


Rej. 


130,729 


289,406 


lS93,Aug.20 


Init. Const, amend, on 










slaughtering animals 


Ace. 


191,527 


127,101 
lOi 


1894, Mar. 5 


Const, amend, on trade 










unions 


Rej. 


135,713 

8i 


158,492 
13i 


1894, June 3 


Init. Const, amend, on 
duty of state to furnish 










work for laborers 


Rej. 


75,880 



308,289 
22 


1894, Nov. 4 


Init. Const, amend, to 
divide customs duties 










among the cantons 


Rej. 


145,462 
Si 


350,639 
13i 


1895, Feb. 3 


Diplomatic and consular 










service 


Rej. 


124,517 


177,991 


1895, Sept. 29 


Const, amend, creating 
state monopoly of 










matches 


Rej. 


140,174 

n 


184,109 
141 


1895, Not. 3 


Const, amend, central- 










izing the army 


Rej. 


195,178 

4i 


269,751 
171 


1896, Oct. 4 


Trade in animals 


Rej. 


170.820 


211,638 


1896, Oct. 4 


Bailroad accounts 


Aec. 


219,011 


166,872 


1896, Oct. 4 


Military discipline 


Rej. 


75,571 


308,247 



1 Stiissi, Ref. und Init. im Kanton Zurich, 
Schweizerkantonen, 1893. 

2 Const. Zurich, Art. 28. 



1886 ; Ref und Init. in den 



262 SWITZERLAND. 

annual expense of over twenty thousand francs. 1 There 
are on the average two popular votings a year, at each 
of which three or four laws are presented. In the 
twenty-four years, from 1869 through August, 1893, 
there were submitted to the people one hundred and 
twenty-eight measures proposed by the cantonal council, 
and of these ninety-nine were adopted, and twenty-nine, 
or a little less than a quarter, were rejected. 2 During 
the same time twenty-nine federal questions were also 
voted upon, and of these the people of the canton 
approved of twenty-two and voted against seven. 

The obligatory referendum was established in Berne 

also in 1869, and from that time through 

April, 1896, the people voted on ninety-seven 

cantonal measures, of which sixty-nine were ratified, 

and twenty-eight, or about two sevenths, were voted 

do 



wn. 3 

In Soleure the proportion is not very different. 
From 1870 to 1891 fifty-one laws were rati- 
fied and fifteen rejected out of a total of 
sixty-six. 4 

1 Const. Zurich, Art. 30. 

2 This includes constitutional questions, but does not include any 
measures proposed by means of the initiative. These figures are taken 
from the tables at the end of Stussi's pamphlets, but do not agree pre- 
cisely with his own computation on page 38 of his Ref. und Init. im Kanton 
Zurich. 

3 This includes constitutional questions, but does not include a law 
brought forward by the initiative in 1895 and accepted. These figures 
through 1877 are taken from Chatelanat, Zeitschrift fur Schweiz. Statis- 
itk, 1877, pp. 228-29 ; for the subsequent time they have been kindly 
compiled for the author from the records by Herr Emil Hiigli, of Berne. 

4 The figures for Soleure and Aargau are taken from Deploige, pp. 
161-62. 



THE REFERENDUM IN THE CANTONS. 263 

In these three cantons, Zurich, Berne, and Soleure, 
the people have refused to sanction about a 
quarter of the laws passed by the legislature, 
but in Aargau the result is much less favorable. Here, 
as in Soleure, the referendum was adopted in the obli- 
gatory form in 1870, and from that year to 1883 there 
were submitted to popular vote forty-six measures, 
of which twenty-five were accepted, and twenty-one 
rejected. ¥rom 1885 to 1889 six more were accepted 
and four voted down, so that during all this time 
twenty-five out of fifty-six, or nearly one half, were 
lost. The proportion of laws rejected by the people 
under the obligatory referendum varies therefore in 
different cantons from a little less than a quarter to a 
little less than a half. 

In St. Gall, where the referendum for ordinary laws 
has existed in the optional form since 1861, 
its application had been effectually demanded 
through 1894 in the case of sixteen measures out of 
a possible one hundred and forty-two, — a proportion 
almost exactly identical with that of the Confederation. 
The fraction of laws rejected has, however, been 
greater, for of these sixteen only two were ratified and 
the rest rejected. 1 

A study of the working of the referendum in the 
cantons shows the spasmodic action that has spasmodic 
already been noted in the case of federal laws. working - 
This is true both of the obligatory and the optional 
forms, although in the cantons the periods of rejection 

1 Nachweiser der Ergebnisse der Volksdbstimmungen im Kt. St. Gallen, 
1831-94. 



264 SWITZERLAND. 

are not quite so regular in their recurrence, not quite 
so rhythmical, if such an expression may be used, as in 
the Confederation. 1 

The French cantons furnish no data of any value on 

the subject, on account of the different aspect 
dom Httie of democracy in that part of the country. 
French Among the Germans there is more jealousy 

and distrust of the government and more 
confidence in the direct action of the people, while the 
French are less democratic in the Swiss sense of the 
term, and more inclined to follow the lead of the reg- 
ular authorities. Hence the referendum is peculiarly 

1 In Zurich, where the referendum is obligatory, the negative votes on 
measures proposed by the cantonal council, arranged by years, are as 
follows : — 



1870. 


.2 


1876. 


.0 


1882. 


.1 


1888. 


.3 


1871. 


.0 


1877. 


.1 


1883. 


.0 


1889. 


.0 


1872. 


.3 


1878. 


.4 


1884. 


3 


1890. 


.0 


1873. 


.2 


1879. 


.4 


1885. 


.1 


1891. 


1 


1874. 


.0 


1880. 


.0 


1886. 


.0 


1892. 


.1 


1875. 


.2 


1881. 


.1 


1887. 


.0 


1893. 


.0 



In Berne, where it is also obligatory, they are as follows : — 
1869. .0 1873. .4 1877. .3 1881. .1 1885. .2 1889. .0 1893.. 1 
1870. .0 1874. .0 1878.. 2 1882. .0 1886. .2 1890. .1 1894. .1 
1871.. 1875. .0 1879. .2 1883. .0 1887. .0 1891. .1 1895. .1 
1872. .0 1876. .0 1880. .0 1884. .0 1888. .2 1892. .0 1896. .5 

In St. Gall, where the referendum is optional, the negative votes are 
as follows (not including six amendments to the constitution proposed by 
private initiative in 1878 and rejected) : — 

1862.. 1867. .0 1872. .0 1877. .1 1882. .0 1887. .0 1892. .1 

1863. .4 1868. .2 1873. .2 1878. .0 1883. .0 1888. .0 1893. .1* 

1864. .0 1869. .0 1874. .0 1879. .1 1884. .0 1889. .0 1894. .0 

1865. .0 1870. ,1 1875.. 7 * 1880. .0 1885. .1 1890. .0 

1866. .0 1871.. 1876.. 1 1881. .0 1886. .0 1891. .0 

* Constitutional amendments for which the referendum is compulsory. 



CHARACTER OF LAWS REJECTED. 265 

a German institution; and although the French have 
adopted it, they have taken it almost exclusively in the 
optional or milder form, and have made little use of it. 1 
In Vaud, indeed, it does not appear to have been put 
into operation at all, and in Geneva and Neuchatel it 
has been used only twice, one of the measures having 
been adopted and the other rejected in each canton. 2 

These figures prove that in the Confederation and 
the German cantons the referendum is an 
effective institution, for they show that it pre- of laws 
vents the enactment of a great many laws 
that the people do not like ; and hence it is important 
to consider the character of the laws that are Radical 
voted down. The history of popular voting Sabor 
in Switzerland reveals a marked tendency to laws * 
reject measures that are in any way radical, and this is 
a very instructive fact, because it means that the people 
are really more conservative than their representatives. 
The tendency is not so manifest in the Confederation as 
in some of the cantons. 3 In Zurich, for example, a 

1 The Valais, which is partly French, has an obligatory referendum 
for appropriations of over 60,000 francs ; but it is never used, because 
care is taken not to exceed that sum in any single appropriation. In 
Vaud, where a popular vote is obligatory for large appropriations, they 
are always ratified. In the Italian canton of Ticino the optional refer- 
endum was introduced in 1883, and from that time through 1891 it had 
been used three times, one of the measures voted on being ratified and 
the other two rejected. Deploige, pp. 162-67. 

2 Id. This does not include the referendum for constitutional ques- 
tions ; nor in Vaud for large appropriations. See preceding note. From 
tables for these cantons, made for the writer by Herr Hiigli, it appears 
that another law was rejected in Geneva in March, 1896. The initiative 
has been used in both Vaud and Neuchatel. See p. 286, note 1, infra. 

3 The factory act, the liquor laws, and the constitutional amendment 
on the compulsory insurance of workmen can be cited as examples of 



266 SWITZERLAND. 

law to give daughters an equal inheritance with sons in 
the estates of their parents was passed by the legislature 
in 1878, but defeated at the polls by a vote of more 
than two to one ; and it was not until nine years later 
that this simple act of justice was sanctioned by the 
people. 

Strange as it may seem, the dislike of radical projects 
applies to labor laws and other measures designed to 
improve the condition of the working-classes, although 
laws of that kind are commonly believed to be highly 
popular with the vast majority of the people. For illus- 
trations of this we may again refer to Zurich, a canton 
largely devoted to manufacturing, and hence containing 
a great number of operatives. In 1870 the people re- 
jected there a cantonal law which limited the duration 
of labor in factories to twelve hours a day, which pro- 
tected the women who work in them, and forbade the em- 
ployment of children during the years when they were 
required to go to school. In 1877 they voted against 
a federal factory law intended for a similar purpose. 
In the following year they rejected a cantonal law to 
establish a school of weaving ; and in 1881 they voted 
down another law providing for the compulsory insur- 
ance of workmen against sickness, regulating their rela- 
tions with their employers, and making the latter liable 
for injuries to their employees caused by accidents. 

radical federal measures that have been sanctioned by the people ; while 
the law on epidemics, the act relating to education, the contract to buy 
the stock of the Central R. R. Co., and the constitutional amendments 
about trade unions and the monopoly of matches, may be considered 
cases of radical measures passed by the legislature and defeated at the 
polls. Cf. Droz, "Etatism et Liberalism," Bib. Univ., Dec, 1895, pp. 
461-64. 



CHARACTER OF LAWS REJECTED. 267 

Moreover, they have repeatedly rejected measures for 
increasing the amount of required education in the 
public schools/ and they have refused to provide free 
text-books for the children. 2 AD this does not mean 
that the people are certain to reject laws intended for 
the benefit of the working-classes ; on the contrary, 
they voted in Zurich heavily in favor of the recent 
amendment to the federal constitution giving the Con- 
federation power to enact a statute on the compulsory 
insurance of workmen. But it does mean that they 
are less ready to sanction measures of this character 
than the legislature is to pass them. 

To the statement that, as a rule, the people do not 
like radical measures, it will be objected that in several 
of the Swiss cantons progressive taxation has been rati- 
fied by popular vote. But progressive taxation in 
Switzerland is not quite so drastic a matter as it ap- 
pears, on account of the prevalence of tax-dodging. 3 
In Zurich, indeed, where the people sanctioned the laws 
for progressive taxation, they rejected at the same time 

1 April 14, 1872; July 5, 1885; Dec. 9, 1888; and Aug. 9, 1891. The 
second of these laws was proposed by the initiative, but the cantonal 
council advised its adoption. 

2 Oct. 30, 1887, and Dec. 9, 1888. The first of these was proposed by 
the initiative. Stiissi, in his Ref. und Init. im Kanton Zurich, discusses all 
these laws, and tries to show that the people have not shown themselves 
less progressive than their representatives. 

8 An illustration of avoiding progressive taxation was related to the 
writer by a prominent banker in Geneva. When such a tax was adopted 
in Vaud, a large manufacturer in that canton went through the form of 
selling his factory to his son, and took a note for the full value. He then 
moved his residence to Geneva, where taxation is not progressive, while 
the son set off the debt against the property. 



268 SWITZERLAND. 

a provision making an official inventory of the estates 
of deceased persons compulsory, for fear that the middle 
classes, who had no securities which could be easily con- 
cealed, would not escape the tax as much as the rich. 1 

Sir Henry Maine refers to the conservative nature of 
the referendum, in support of his opinion that a demo- 
cracy is unprogressive, and explains it by saying : " It 
is possible, by agitation or exhortation, to produce in 
the mind of the average citizen a vague impression that 
he desires a particular change. But, when the agita- 
tion has settled down on the dregs, when the excite- 
ment has died away, when the subject has been threshed 
out, when the law is before him in all its detail, he is 
sure to find in it much that is likely to disturb his 
habits, his ideas, his prejudices, or his interests; and 
so, in the long run, he votes i No ' to every proposal " 2 
In the case of labor laws the same truth may be stated 
in a more concrete form. Every law designed for the 
benefit of the workingman involves, or rather is liable 
to involve, a present sacrifice on his part ; but the sac- 
rifice is not evident so long as the principle of the law 
is merely stated in general terms. Any workingman, 
for example, can easily understand the wisdom of for- 
bidding the labor of children of immature years, but 

1 Stiissi, Ref. und Init. im Kanton Zurich, p. 48. This was in 1870. By 
means of the initiative the question of a compulsory inventory was again 
brought forward in Zurich in 1883, and although the cantonal council 
advised its adoption, it was rejected by a popular vote of more than two 
to one. A similar law was rejected by the people of Berne in 1890. 
The people of Zurich seem to have rejected recently a progressive inher- 
itance tax. Bib. Univ., Dec, 1895, p. 472. 

2 Popular Government, p. 97. 



CHARACTER OF LAWS REJECTED. 269 

it is not easy for him to see how he gains anything by 
losing the wages his son has been earning in the mill. 
Hence, the same man may very well vote for a candi- 
date or a party that proposes to enact a labor law, 
and yet find himself bitterly opposed to that very law 
when it is presented to him for approval. Moreover, 
the referendum places in the hands of employers a 
means of exerting a direct pressure upon their opera- 
tives which a secret ballot has not the slightest tendency 
to mitigate. The rejection of the first factory act in 
Zurich is said to have been largely due to the influence 
of the mill-owners, 1 and a little reflection will show 
how they might bring about the defeat of a labor law. 
Suppose, for example, that an act limiting the hours of 
work in factories is passed by the legislature, and that 
a demand is made for a popular vote. Then suppose 
the employers announce that if the law is ratified they 
will be obliged to cut down wages. In such a case, 
many of the operatives, not caring to run the risk of a 
decrease in wages or a strike, will be likely to vote 
against the act and kill it. 

It may also be observed that the people object to 
laws which cover a great deal of ground, 
which are complicated, or try to effect too are too com- 

Droll 6 nsivG 

much at once. To this cause Stiissi attrib- 
utes the rejection in Zurich of two important measures 
on education and on labor. 2 The symptom is a very 
healthy one, for it shows that the people want to under- 
stand the laws they are enacting, and cannot be driven 

1 Stiissi, Ref. und Init. im Kanton Zurich, pp. 48-49. 

2 Ref. und Init. im Kanton Zurich, pp. 53-55. 



270 SWITZERLAND. 

or hurried into measures whose bearing is not clear to 
them. 

A sentiment of more doubtful merit is the dislike of 
spending money, which crops up at times in 
involving a way that is almost ludicrous ; as, for exam- 
ple, when the people rejected the bill to pro- 
vide a Secretary of Legation at Washington. This 
tendency, which seems to be universal, 1 applies espe- 
cially to proposals for increasing the salaries of public 
officers, and in fact the largest number of negative 
votes ever cast on a federal law were thrown against 
the bill for pensioning officials. It may be remarked 
in this connection that two of the cantons, Berne and 
Aargau, at one time carried the theory of the referen- 
dum so far as to submit to popular vote the budget or 
general appropriation bill. The experiment was a mis- 
take, and had a not unnatural result. The budget was 
rejected more than once, until at last the government 
found it absolutely necessary to withdraw the matter 
from popular control. 2 The people might well be ex- 
pected to object to such a loss of power, and in Berne 
they were induced to ratify it by the addition of a 
clause suppressing a number of offices, which made 
the measure more palatable ; while in Aargau the same 
result was obtained by means of concessions to the 
opposition. 3 Some of the Swiss writers feel that such a 

1 It may be noticed that, of the fourteen laws rejected at the referen- 
dum in St. Gall, eight have been tax laws. 

2 In Berne, where the budget is voted for four years at a time, an 
addition to it was rejected in 1877, and in 1879 the whole budget was 
voted down. 

8 Deploige, pp. 116, 162. 



SMALLNESS OF THE VOTE CAST. 271 

tendency toward economy is a cause for reproach, and 
try to minimize it, but most Americans would prefer it 
to that inclination to squander the public moneys, which 
seems to be a besetting sin with democracies. The fact 
is that in Switzerland there are no great cities with an 
enormous proletarial class, which does not feel the 
weight of the public burdens, or realize that an increase 
of taxation affects its own comfort and prosperity ; and, 
on the other hand, the peasants are in the habit of 
dealing with small sums, and do not see the need of lib- 
eral salaries for the men who do the public work. The 
very highest Swiss officials are, indeed, paid upon a 
scale that would be considered in any other country 
ridiculously small. 

Certain criticisms upon the working of the referen- 
dum are often made in Switzerland. One of n . x . . 

Criticisms 

these relates to the small size of the vote cast. °n<w refer ~ 
It is sometimes said that the result of the bal- SmaIlness 
lot does not fairly represent popular opinion, of theYOte> 
because in most cases the opponents of a measure go 
to the polls in larger proportion than its supporters, so 
that the men who stay at home are on the whole favor- 
able to it. 1 Whether this is universally true or not, it is 
certain that the citizens stay at home a great deal more 

than could be wished. Thus in Berne only 

Berne. 
about forty-three per cent, of the voters cast 

their ballots at the referendum, although sixty-three per 

cent, of them vote at elections, 2 — a difference which 

1 Cf . Journal de Geneve, quoted by Marsauche, pp. 242-43. 

2 This includes only the valid votes. Chatelanat, Zeitschrift fur Scliweiz. 
Stat, 1877, pp. 228-32 ; Deploige, p. 160. In Soleure the average vote 



272 SWITZERLAND. 

proves either that the people take less interest in the 
former than in the latter, or that they find it easier to 
choose between the candidates for office than to form 
an opinion on the merits of a law. The proportion of 
citizens who vote at the referendum varies amazingly 
according to the character of the measure in question, 
and between 1869 and 1878 it ran in Berne all the way 
from 81.6 per cent, down to 20.2 per cent. 1 It is 
worth while to observe that the largest vote was cast on 
religious questions ; the next on political ones ; then 
Came railroad ; then school ; then financial ; then econ- 
omic ones ; while the smallest vote was polled on admin- 
istrative regulations, no doubt because the people felt 
that they did not understand them. This list of sub- 
jects shows that, cool and sensible as the Swiss are, 
they are not exempt from the popular tendency, good 
or bad, to take more interest in sensational than in 
practical matters. 

The vote cast in Zurich is larger than in Berne, 
although not to the extent that it would appear 
at first sight. It stands nominally at 74.4 
per cent, of the registered voters ; but the law allows 
the curious privilege of voting on cantonal matters by 
proxy, and hence a good many people send their ballots 
to the polls by a friend, and omit to fill out the part that 
relates to any matter in which they are not interested. 
The number of blanks reached on one occasion the 
enormous figure of 32 per cent, of the votes cast, and it 

at the referendum seems to be less than fifty per cent.; while at elections 
it is much higher. Deploige, p. 161. 
1 Chatelanat, Zeitschrift, 1877, p. 232. 



SMALLKESS OF THE VOTE CAST. 273 

has averaged nearly 16 per cent., or, in other words, 12 
per cent, of the registered voters. Deducting this from 
the total vote cast, we find that the real average vote on 
cantonal referenda is 62.6 per cent., while at elections 
it is 71.3 per cent. 1 After making the deduction the 
figures are still considerably better than those obtained 
in Berne, and the difference is no doubt owing to the 
habit of imposing a fine for a failure to vote, which has 
long been in vogue in many of the communes, 2 and was 
extended in 1890 to the whole canton. 

The half canton of Kural Basle furnishes the most 
striking example of the small attendance at 
the referendum, because until 1892 its laws 
required for the ratification of any measure not only 
that a majority of all the votes cast should be affirma- 
tive, but also that a majority of all the persons quali- 
fied should take part in the vote. 3 Now in the twenty 
years from 1864 to 1884 the people voted on one hun- 
dred and two laws, of which forty-eight were accepted 
and twenty-eight were rejected, while twenty-six were 
not ratified on account of the absence of a majority of 
the voters. The popular indifference seems, indeed, to 
have been progressive; for during the last five years 

1 These figures are taken from the results through 1885. Stiissi, Ref. 
und IniL im Kanton Zurich, pp. 39-43. Since the introduction in 1890 of 
a general fine for failure to vote, the average valid vote at cantonal ref- 
erenda has been 64.2 per cent. See the Table at the end of Stussi's Ref. 
und Init. in den SchweizerJcantonen. 

2 Stiissi, Zurich, pp. 44-47. This practice exists to a greater or less 
extent in several of the cantons, and has a tendency to spread. Deploige, 
pp. 112, 120, 122. It appears to exist in St. Gall, where the proportion 
of voters taking part at the referendum averages 65 per cent. 

3 This was changed by the Const, of 1892, § 50. 

VOL. II. 



274 SWITZERLAND. 

of this period seventeen measures were submitted to the 
people, of which only three were accepted, five were 
rejected, and nine, or more than one half, failed tlirouo-h 
lack of attendance. 1 One can iniaoine that the Wis- 
lators must have learned to look on their task as a 
thankless one. The result in Rural Basle is not due to 
any peculiar indifference on the part of the voters there. 
It would be the same in other cantons if the laws were 
similar. In Berne, for example, a majority of the citizens 
have taken part only in thirteen out of ninetv-seven 
referenda, and up to 1888 one law alone received the 
affirmative votes of half the qualified voters in the 
canton. 2 Even at national referenda, which excite a 
greater interest, the average proportion of the voters 
in the Confederation who go to the polls is less than 
sixty per cent., and no law has ever been ratified by 
a majority of the qualified voters. 3 These figures illus- 
trate the truth that under no form of government can 
the people as a whole really rule ; for they show that 
with the most democratic system ever devised, the laws 
are in fact made only by that portion of the community 
which takes a genuine interest in public affairs. 

Another criticism is often made which relates more 

particularly to the method of conducting the 

popular referendum. It is said that the people have 

discussion. . 

not sumcient means ot iorming a serious 

1 Deploige, p. 162. 

2 Deploige, p. 160, gives the figures to 1888, when a majority had 
taken part in the vote only nine times. Since he wrote a majority have 
voted four times, and the Constitution of 1S93 was ratified by nearly if 
not quite a majority of the voters. 

3 See the tables on pp. 139, 1-41, of the Nachiceiser der Ergelmlsse der 
Volksdbstimmungen im Kt. St. Gallen. 



LACK OF POPULAR DISCUSSION. 275 

opinion on the measures submitted to them, and this is 
no doubt true. The Swiss have, indeed, the wise habit 
of printing and distributing the laws to be voted upon, 
and in fact a copy is sent to every citizen some time be- 
fore the vote takes place. 1 This is done at no light cost. 
as may be judged from the fact that the expense of 
printing the federal bankruptcy law amounted to 47,696 
francs, and the total cost to the state of taking the 
popular vote was about 130.000 francs. Nor do these 
appear to be unusual figures.' 2 But an intelligent judg- 
ment of the value of a law cannot be based on a mere 
perusal of the text, and as yet no effective method has 
been discovered of giving the people any real enlighten- 
ment about the object and bearing of the measures laid 
before them. 3 In the case of federal laws, the matter 
is left entirely to the press and the platform, with the 
result that sometimes a great deal of discussion takes 
place, and sometimes very little. 

A more earnest attempt to insure the instruction of 
the public has been made in several of the cantons, 
although without much success. Wherever the refer- 
endum is compulsory, the great council is directed to 
prepare a message explaining the intent and meaning 
of the law ; but as this is commonly a mere panegyric 
of the measure. 4 the voters pay little or no attention 
to it. if. indeed, they read it at all. In a couple of 
cantons, moreover, an effort has been made to provoke 

1 Deploige, pp. 104, 117. 

2 Adams, p. 98, Loumyer's note. 

3 Cf. Deploige, pp. 117-20. 

4 Even Stiissi admits this. Zurich, p. 36. 



276 SWITZERLAND. 

discussion by providing that when the citizens meet 
at the polls a debate shall take place before the voting 
begins ; but this again has proved abortive, for when 
the presiding officer asks if any one wishes to speak, 
no one ever responds. 1 These experiments confirm the 
ancient proverb about the ease of bringing a horse to 
the water, and the impossibility of forcing him to drink. 
They show that the people cannot be compelled to dis- 
cuss seriously a measure in which they are not inter- 
ested. It does not follow, however, that because the 
people will not debate a law they vote entirely in the 
dark. On the contrary, if the question is one of 
general policy, they may have very decided and rational 
views about it ; and this points to the advisability of con- 
fining the referendum to matters on which the ordinary 
man can readily form an opinion, and not extending it 
to subjects with which an expert alone is conversant. 
But such a distinction has not been made in Switzerland. 
A third complaint one hears is that the referendum 
lowers the sense of responsibility of the rep- 
tile sense of resentatives in the legislature ; but how far 

legislative . _ . 

responsi- this charge is well founded it is not easy to 
say. The question is one of opinion which 
cannot be measured by statistics, and hence the answer 
must depend a great deal on the predisposition of the 
person who makes it. We should naturally expect a 
representative to feel less responsibility when his action, 
instead of being final, is reviewed by his constituents, 
and this would appear to be more or less the case in 
Switzerland, at least where the referendum is compul- 

1 Deploige, p. 120. 



THE VALUE OP THE REFERENDUM. 277 

sory. An eminent jurist in Berne once told the writer 
that the members of the cantonal legislature would vote 
for a measure of which they disapproved, relying on the 
people to reject it, and that he had known men to vote 
for a law in the great council and against it at the 
polls. But this gentleman belonged to a party that 
stood in a hopeless minority, and was, in fact, decidedly 
out of sympathy with current politics. That legislators 
have occasionally voted for a measure merely to get it 
out of the way, hoping that the people would refuse to 
sanction it, is altogether probable ; 1 and there can be 
no doubt that either from political motives or from 
a want of courage to face popular hostility, they have 
at times opposed the ratification of laws which they 
had helped to pass ; but these cases do not appear to 
be common. 2 The truth seems to be that the sense of 
responsibility is lessened to some extent, but not enough 
to impair substantially the efficiency and conscientious- 
ness of the representatives. 

In Switzerland the opinions both of scholars and 
statesmen on the value of the referendum 
are most divergent. 3 Some men extol it as ions of the 

.... referendum. 

the most perfect institution, in theory and 

1 It is said that the recent constitutional amendment about the monop- 
oly of matches was passed by the Assembly because it was tired of the 
subject and foresaw that the measure would be rejected by the people. 
Bib. Univ., Sept., 1895, p. 657. 

2 This happened in the case of the federal bankruptcy law. M. Droz, 
in his Etudes (p. 464), says that the referendum weakens the character of 
the legislators, who do not always dare to defend before the people the 
measures they have voted for. 

3 The best collection of contemporary Swiss opinions may be found in 
Deploige, pp. 167-79. 



278 SWITZERLAND. 

practice, ever devised ; while others decry the principle 
on the ground that the people are consulted about 
matters they cannot understand, and assert that the 
actual working of the system has been bad. But 
although opponents of the referendum are not want- 
ing, no political party would now be seriously in favor 
of giving it up ; not the Radicals, because they believe 
it to be a necessary feature of true democracy ; nor the 
Conservatives, and still less the Clericals, because both 
these groups like to see a drag on hasty legislation. 
To some extent, however, the parties have changed 
their views, for men in active public life are naturally 
prone to judge any institution by its effects on their 
immediate plans, and as the referendum results in the 
defeat of a certain number of laws passed by the legis- 
lature, it is less satisfactory to the party in power than 
to their opponents. In a number of cantons, therefore, 
the minority, whether Radical or Ultramontane, demands 
an increase of direct popular legislation, which is re- 
fused by the majority. Now, in the Confederation the 
Radicals, who are the successors of the party that in- 
troduced the referendum, have long been the ruling 
element, and hence, while they cannot propose to do 
away with it, they are by no means anxious for its 
extension. In 1884, for example, after the people had 
voted down four laws at a stroke, the Right urged the 
adoption of a compulsory referendum for all federal 
statutes, but the Radicals opposed it on the ground 
that in the hands of the Clericals it would be an instru- 
ment for impeding progress. 

The most valuable estimate of the referendum re- 



THE VALUE OF THE REFERENDUM. 279 

cently published is that of M. Droz, the distinguished 
statesman and writer, whose service of almost Views of 
a score of years on the Federal Council gives M ' Droz - 
his opinion a peculiar authority. 1 M. Droz had at first a 
strong admiration for the referendum, but after a long 
experience of its actual working he became impressed 
with its defects and the abuse of which it is susceptible, 
and modified his views to some extent. He complains 
that it furnishes a basis for demagogy, and encourages 
the growth of professional politicians, whose ideas are 
systematically negative, and who are constantly trying 
to instill among others their own spirit of discontent. 
He remarks that the voter is often influenced by his 
humor at the moment, which is good if the crops have 
been satisfactory, and bad if something disagreeable 
has taken place in public life. On the whole, however, 
he concludes that the people have made a moderate 
use of their power, and that the federal referendum 
in its present optional form has done more good than 
harm. 

If a stranger may venture to express an opinion, it 
would seem that the referendum deserves neither the 
extravagant eulogy nor the excessive condemnation 
that have been given to it. Like all human institu- 
tions, it is imperfect, but in the existing condition of 
the Swiss representative system, it seems to have sup- 
plied a real want, and so far as it has helped to soften 
the asperities of politics, to mitigate the strife of par- 
ties and of sects, it has done a very valuable service. 

1 Etudes. See the first, third, and the last two essays, written in 1882, 
1885, 1894, and 1895. 



280 SWITZERLAND. 

While it has caused the defeat of a good many laws, it 
has not prevented rational progress, and, indeed, the 
conservative influence it has exerted, though in some 
cases unfortunate, does not appear to have been, on 
the whole, any greater than is desirable. It is useless 
in such a case to engage in what has been called hypo- 
thetics, or the science of those things that might have 
happened but never did, in order to discover what the 
condition of the country would have been without direct 
popular legislation. Switzerland is one of the most 
orderly and well governed of states, and to this result, 
which it has certainly not tended to prevent, the refer- 
endum may fairly be supposed to have contributed. 

The referendum has a purely negative effect. It 
The initia- merely enables the people to reject measures 
tive ' passed by their representatives ; but the Swiss 

feel that the legislature ought not to have the exclusive 
right to originate legislation, that democracy is not 
complete unless the people have also a right to enact 
laws directly, and the initiative is intended to supply 
this deficiency. It is a device by which a certain num- 
ber of citizens can propose a law and require a popular 
vote upon it, in spite of the refusal of the legislature 
to adopt their views. And herein lies the difference 
between the initiative and the right of petition to which 
it has often been likened. A petition is merely a sug- 
gestion made to the legislature, which may act upon it 
or not as it sees fit, but the initiative takes effect with- 
out regard to the opinion of the legislature, and even 
against its wishes. 

Although the initiative is a complement of the ref- 



THE INITIATIVE. 281 

erendum, and a further extension of direct popular 
legislation, it was not always introduced subse- History of 
quently or even simultaneously. 1 Thus it was i^ t ht°c^i- n 
adopted first by Yaud in 1845, and next by tons * 
Aargau in 1852, although neither of these cantons 
then had any referendum for ordinary laws. 2 At that 
time, indeed, the new institution was treated as supple- 
mentary to the representative system, a method of pre- 
venting the legislature from neglecting the desires of 
the people, a sort of compulsory petition rather than 
a part of the machinery of direct popular legislation. 
The change in the mode of regarding it came when 
Rural Basle, in 1863, and Zurich, Thurgau, and Soleure, 
in 1869, coupled it with the obligatory referendum. 
From this time it began to spread, until now every 
canton but one 3 possesses it for revision of the consti- 
tution ; 4 and all but three for ordinary laws. 5 

1 For the history of the initiative, see Keller, Das VoUcsinitiativrecht, 
and Curti, Geschichte der Schweiz. Volksgesetzgebung. 

2 Vaud adopted at this time a provision allowing the legislature to sub- 
mit laws to the people if it saw fit. Thurgau, in 1849, and Schaffhausen, 
in 1852, adopted with the veto an initiative, but only for revision of the 
constitution. The statement in the text does not, of course, apply to the 
cantons with Lands gemeinde, or to the Grisons, the Valais, and Geneva, 
with their peculiar institutions. 

3 Geneva still retains the antiquated practice of submitting the ques- 
tion of revising the constitution to the people every fifteen years. 

4 In Schaffhausen it applies only to total revision. In the Valais the 
people decide whether the revision shall be total or partial. In all the 
rest of the cantons the petitioners can propose either one or the other 
as they choose. For a discussion of the constitutional initiative in the 
cantons, see Borgeaud, Etablissement et Revision des Constitutions, pt. iii. 
liv. iii. ch. iii. § i. 

5 These are Lucerne, Freiburg, and the Yalais. In Kural Basle, it ap- 
plies only to changes in the existing laws; while in St. Gall, on the other 



282 SWITZERLAND. 

The progress in the Confederation has been slower. 

The constitution drawn up by the Federal 

in the Con- Assembly in 1872 provided, indeed, for an 

federation. .... ,. , , „ 

initiative on ordinary laws ; but alter the re- 
fusal of the people to ratify that instrument, the pro- 
vision was dropped, and in the constitution of 1874, 
as in that of 1848, the initiative existed only for con- 
stitutional matters. The clause relating to the subject 
declared that on the demand of any fifty thousand 
voters the question whether the constitution ought to 
be revised should be submitted to the people, and that 
if the vote was affirmative the two councils should be 
reelected for the purpose of preparing the revision. 1 
This was somewhat ambiguous, and when in 1880 a 
demand was presented for an amendment giving to 
the Confederation a monopoly of the issue of bank- 
notes, the Federal Assembly decided that the provi- 
sion applied only to the revision of the constitution as 
a whole, and submitted the question in that form to 
the people, who replied in the negative by a large 
majority. 2 Now it is evident that such a proposal is 
sure to provoke too much opposition to be of any use 
in getting a special amendment passed, and after a 
good deal of discussion an article, extending the in- 
itiative to particular amendments of the constitution, 
was adopted in 1891. In the Confederation, therefore, 
the initiative does not apply to ordinary laws, but can be 

hand, it cannot be used to repeal a law which has not been in force three 
years, or in the Grisons two years. The number of signatures required 
for the demand varies in the different cantons from 800 to 12,000. 

1 Art. 120. 

2 This decision is severely criticised by Borgeaud, pp. 371-75. 



THE NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVE. 283 

used to make changes of any kind in the constitution, 
— a curious inversion of the general principle that 
the latter ought to be treated as something peculiarly 
sacred, which is carefully guarded from sudden attack. 
The provisions of the federal constitution in regard 
to the initiative, although more elaborate than 
those to be found in most of the cantons, are of opera- 
typical of the method of procedure through- 
out Switzerland, and therefore merit a description in 
detail. Any fifty thousand voters can propose an 
amendment, which may either be expressed in gen- 
eral terms, or presented in a complete and final form. 
When the proposal is couched in general terms, the 
Assembly proceeds at once to draw up the amendment 
if it approves of it ; if not, the question must first 
be submitted to the people whether such an amend- 
ment shall be made, and in case the popular vote is 
aflirmative, the duty of putting the amendment into 
form is intrusted to the existing Assembly, although that 
body has already shown itself opposed to the measure. 1 
The petitioners are not, however, obliged to rely on the 
fairness of the Assembly in carrying out their inten- 
tion. They are at liberty to present their amendment, 
drawn up in final shape, and require that it shall be 
submitted directly to the people and the cantons for 
adoption. But in that case the Assembly can advise 
the rejection of the measure, or can prepare and submit 
to vote at the same time a distinct amendment as an 
alternative. In the cantons the method of procedure 

1 After the Assembly has put the amendment into shape, it must, of 
course, be submitted to the people and the cantons for ratification. 



284 SWITZERLAND. 

is not usually regulated so minutely, but it is in general 
very much the same, except that in most of them the 
presentation of a demand in the form of a completed 
draft, if not impliedly forbidden, is at least not ex- 
pressly authorized. 1 

The new procedure has already been used in the 
The actual Confederation, but the results have not been 
th°e r K?t!a- f sucn as ^° encourage much hope of its value 
ConfTdert m the future. The required number of citi- 
tlon ' zens demanded in 1893 an amendment to the 

constitution forbidding the slaughter of animals by 
bleeding, and presented it in complete and final form. 
The chief object of the prohibition was not to prevent 
cruelty, although many of the voters were no doubt 
influenced by that consideration. The movement was 
really aimed at the Jews, whose religion prevents their 
eating meat killed in the ordinary way, and this motive 
was made evident by the fact that wherever the Jews 
had made considerable settlements, there was a majority 
in favor of the amendment. 2 The Federal Assembly 
urged the rejection of the measure, and in fact ordi- 
nances passed with the same object in a couple of the 
cantons had already been set aside by the Federal 
Council as inconsistent with the principles of religious 
liberty guaranteed by the national constitution. 3 But 
in spite of the advice of their representatives, a majority, 
both of the people and of the cantons, voted in favor of 
the amendment, thus placing Switzerland among the 

1 Keller, tit. ii. ch. vii. ; Deploige, p. 127. 

2 Bib. Univ., Sept., 1893, p. 661. Cf. Droz, Etudes, pp. 472-74. 
8 Droz, lb. 



THE NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVE. 285 

nations that oppress the Jews, and this by a method of 
petty persecution, unworthy of an enlightened commu- 
nity. What will happen when a law is passed to 
carry out this constitutional provision still remains to 
be seen. That it will interfere with the habits of the 
farmer more than he expects, and will therefore be 
voted down, is not improbable. The absurdity of 
dealing with such a matter in the constitution at all is 
no doubt quite as clear to the men who advocated the 
new initiative as to the rest of the world, and yet it is 
the natural result of applying that institution to consti- 
tutional amendments, and not to ordinary laws. 

As yet this is the only successful use of the federal 
initiative, but other attempts have been made. Em- 
boldened by the results of the first experiment, the 
opponents of the government collected the required 
signatures for two more amendments. One of them, 
declaring that every man out of employment ought to 
be furnished with work by the state, was rejected with- 
out difficulty, because the Swiss do not like socialism of 
that kind. The other, which provided for a division of 
a large part of the federal customs duties among the can- 
tons, and has been stigmatized as a miserable attack on 
the treasury, was also defeated by a large majority ; but 
only after an immense effort, in which the President of the 
Confederation and all the other magistrates took part. 1 

The initiative has not been established in the Con- 
federation a sufficient length of time to work _ 
test its real importance, but it has not been j^^ 6 ^ 
found effective, even for ordinary laws, in the Zurieh - 
1 See Vroz, Etudes, ?$. 474-76 ; Bib. Univ., Nov., 1894, pp. 431-32. 



286 SWITZERLAND. 

cantons where it has long existed. 1 This is shown 
by the experience of the great democratic canton of 
Zurich, where the referendum has certainly been no 
mere formality. 2 Here any five thousand voters can 
propose a law and require it to be submitted to the 
people, and any official or individual can do the same 
with the consent of one third of the cantonal council. 
The second form of the initiative, that is, a petition 
supported by one third of the cantonal council, can 
be neglected for our purposes, for up to 1893 no law 
had ever been enacted in that way. 3 But from 1869, 
when the initiative was established through August, 

1 In the cantons with the Landsgemeinde, one or more voters, after 
proper notice to the authorities, can, as we have seen, bring before the 
assembled people any matters they please ; but this is a case where every 
man is a member of the legislature rather than one where the people can 
make laws directly without the help of any assembly at all. The whole 
process is, in fact, so different from the initiative, that it throws no 
light on the working of that institution. 

In regard to the German cantons without the Landsgemeinde, the writer 
has not been able to get statistics of any value except in the case of 
Zurich. In Aargau, however, the initiative seems to have been little 
used. (Deploige, p. 125, note.) Berne adopted it in 1893, and has used it 
once ; St. Gall in 1890, and through 1894 had not used it all. Keuchatel 
used it with success in 1884 to cause the state to buy up a small private 
railroad, and in 1888 to forbid any cantonal official to hold at the same 
time the position of national councillor. In Yaud it has not been put in 
operation since 1883, when it was likewise successfully used to prevent 
any cantonal officer from being a member of the Federal Assembly. 
(Deploige, p. 164.) 

2 Cf. Stiissi, Zurich, pp. 58-75, and the tables at the end of both his 
pamphlets. 

3 In 1883 a bill that came before the people in this way was rejected. 
In 1871 two measures proposed by individuals were ratified by popular 
vote, but as they were adopted by a majority of the council, they are 
very properly classed by Stiissi as simple petitions. 



THE INITIATIVE IN ZUEICH. 287 

1893, twenty-one measures had been proposed by five 
thousand voters. Four of them were approved by a 
majority of the council, and of these two were ac- 
cepted by the people and two rejected ; in two other 
cases the council prepared a substitute or alternative 
which was ratified, while of the remaining fifteen pro- 
posals, which were disapproved by the council, only 
three were adopted by the people. Of these three, one 
established houses of correction for tramps, a measure 
the wisdom of which was much doubted. Another re- 
established the death penalty, which had previously been 
abolished; but the people shortly afterwards rejected 
the statute which provided for carrying it into effect, 
and the matter was thereupon dropped. The third 
abolished compulsory vaccination. 1 The net direct re- 
sult of the initiative in Zurich during twenty-four 
years has been, therefore, the enactment of only three 
laws to which the legislature was opposed, and of 
these one was of doubtful value, about another the 
people seem to have changed their minds, and in the 
opinion of most educated people the third was clearly 
bad. It is of course possible that the right on the 
part of individuals to insist on a popular vote may 
have induced the council to pass some measures 
it would otherwise have rejected ; but the large pro- 
portion of petitions which it refused to adopt makes 
it probable that such a motive has had very little 
effect. 

1 The initiative for ordinary laws was adopted in Berne in 1893, and 
the only use to which it has been put as yet is that of abolishing compul- 
sory vaccination. 



288 SWITZERLAND. 

The new federal initiative has been very severely 
criticised, although chiefly in regard to the 
the initia- right of presenting the amendment as a com- 
pleted draft. This matter was, indeed, hotly 
debated when the new procedure was adopted. 1 The 
Federal Council, in its report to the Assembly in 1890, 
recommended the extension of the initiative to par- 
ticular amendments of the constitution, but only by 
means of a demand expressed in general terms ; and 
in this form the proposal passed the National Council. 
The Council of States, however, added the provision 
allowing the petitioners to present an amendment fully 
drawn up, and require an immediate popular vote upon 
it. When this came back to the National Council the 
Radicals, who are the ruling party in Switzerland, fear- 
ing that such a procedure might be used as an instru- 
ment for passing reactionary measures, clung to the 
original project ; but the Catholic Right on one side, 
and the Democrats and Socialists on the other, glad of 
an opportunity of reaching the people over the head of 
the Assembly, were in favor of the change, and suc- 
ceeded in carrying with them enough members from the 
extreme wings of the former majority to pass the bill as 
it came from the Council of States. The position of 
the parties was the same at the popular vote. The 
Radical journals all opposed the measure, and the few 
cantons that voted against it were all noted for their 
radical tendencies, while the majorities in its favor were 
largest in the Catholic or reactionary parts of the coun- 

1 For the history of the adoption of the new federal initiative, see 
Borgeaud, pt. iii. liv. iii. ch. iv. § 4 ; and Deploige, pp. 75-78. 



CEITICISM OF THE LNITIATIVE. 289 

try. 1 In short, it was carried against the ruling party, 
which in spite of its name is moderate, by extremists 
who are more or less out of sympathy with the govern- 
ment. 

The attitude of the parties was, of course, due mainly 
to the effect which the right to present a measure 
finally drawn up was expected to have on the position 
of the Assembly. It may be noticed that this form of 
initiative is strongly advocated by the believers in 
direct popular legislation, on the ground that it em- 
bodies the most complete realization of their ideas. 
Under it the chambers play no part, except to advise 
the acceptance or rejection of a law as a whole, and if 
the system were to prove entirely successful, so as to 
replace the customary method of legislation, it might 
be possible to do away with representative chambers 
altogether. For that very reason the form of the 
completed draft is disliked by men who have confidence 
in the existing elected assemblies, and by those who 
think that every law before being enacted ought to be 
carefully prepared by responsible bodies, and publicly 
debated with an opportunity for amendment. It may 
be doubted, however, whether for constitutional amend- 
ments, which are usually short and somewhat general 
in their terms, the difference between the two methods 
of procedure is so important as is commonly supposed ; 
whether the evils that are predicted from one method 

1 The figures are given in the Bib. Univ., Aug., 1891, p. 434. The 
cantons voting Xo were Aargau, Thurgau, Vaud, Rural Basle, Appen- 
zell-Ext., and Schaffhausen. There were also heavy minorities against it 
in Zurich, Berne, and St. Gall. 
vol. n. 



290 SWITZERLAND. 

would not be realized under the other also. 1 In the 
case of the recent prohibition of the slaughter of animals 
by bleeding, for example, it is hard to see why the peti- 
tioners could not have accomplished their object equally 
well by either process, unless, indeed, the Assembly in 
drawing up the amendment should deliberately try to 
defeat their intention, which the opponents of the pro- 
cedure by completed draft assert that it can be trusted 
not to do. But however this may be, it is certain that 
the new federal initiative in its actual form has been the 
cause of great anxiety. M. Droz declares that such a 
feeling is widespread, and he points out that whereas 
a democracy ought to rest on a secure foundation, the 
present system puts the constitution in question at every 
moment. 2 He speaks of it as the beginning of a period 
of demagogy, in which self-appointed committees have 
as much importance as the regular government, and 
says that it is a continual peril to the quiet and pros- 
perity of the country, and is destined to accomplish a 
work of disintegration and destruction. These fears 
are, perhaps, a little exaggerated ; for although on 
occasions of popular excitement the initiative is liable 
to be used recklessly, and is therefore a real source of 
danger to the country, yet to judge from the experience 
of Zurich it is not likely to be put in operation with 

1 Borgeaud (pp. 341-45, 384-400) maintains that where the demand 
is presented in general terms the initiative is really exercised by the peo- 
ple as a whole, and that where it takes the form of a completed draft 
the initiative proceeds from individuals ; but this distinction seems a trifle 
artificial. The first of these methods involves, however, a second popular 
vote, which is in itself a safeguard. 

2 See the last two chapters of his Etudes. 



THE INITIATIVE REALLY INEFFECTIVE. 291 

success often enough to produce any marked influence 
on the politics of the Confederation in ordinary times. 1 
A new toy is a delight to a people as well as to a child, 
and the frequent use of the initiative during the first 
two or three years of its existence is not a sufficient 
reason for assuming that it will continue to be used to 
the same extent in the future. 

The idea of the right of everybody to take part in 
public affairs by proposing laws for the good 
of the country has something very attractive tivenot 

, . , . . . , ° J 1 likely to be 

about it, but in practice it has not proved 01 of real 
value. Whether the referendum has, on the 
whole, been a benefit to Switzerland or not, it has cer- 
tainly been a success in the sense that it has produced 
the result for which it was established. It seems, on 
the whole, to have brought out the real opinion of the 
people in regard to the laws submitted to them for 
ratification. But this cannot be said of the initia- 
tive. It would be absurd to suppose that the political 
longings of the citizens of Zurich are summed up in 
the three measures to which this institution has given 
birth in their canton ; and it would be an insult to the 
Swiss to assert that they desired above all other things 
a petty persecution of the Jews. We are forced to 
conclude, therefore, either that the wants of the people 
are, on the whole, well satisfied by the action of the 
legislature, and if so the initiative is needless ; or that 
it has not enabled them to express their real wishes, in 

1 It may be observed that in Zurich the form of the completed draft 
is allowed, and has been used about half the time. Stiissi, Zurich, pp. 
63-64. 



292 SWITZERLAND. 

which case it is a failure. The advocates of the initia- 
tive in Switzerland admit that it has not yet developed 
much efficiency, but they hope for better results here- 
after. The experience of the past, however, does not 
lead us to believe that it will play any great part 
among the institutions of the future. It applies only 
to questions which the representatives of the people, 
who are quite sensitive to public opinion, refuse to 
pass, and it leaves no room for debate, or for compro- 
mise and mutual concession, at least when used in the 
form of the completed draft. Hence the chance of en- 
acting a law by this process is very small. The concep- 
tion is bold, but it is not likely to be of any great use 
to mankind ; if, indeed, it does not prove to be merely 
a happy hunting-ground for extremists and fanatics. 

After studying any successful institution in a foreign 
land, one is always moved to ask how it 
application would work in his own country ; whether it 
endumin could be grafted into the native stock and 
made to thrive equally well there. Could 
we adopt the referendum in America? Would it 
produce the same fruits here as in Switzerland ? Is it 
consistent with our political system ? There has been 
a great deal of discussion of late upon this subject. 
More accurately stated, however, the question is not 
whether we shall adopt the referendum, but whether 
we shall adopt it in the Swiss form ; for the institution 
already exists here, and having developed spontaneously 
has probably assumed the form best suited to the 
nature of our government. 

Before discussing, therefore, an extension of the 



THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA. 293 

referendum in this country, we must know how far it 
is already in use. 1 In the first place it ap- Itg resent 
plies almost universally to changes in a con- use# 
stitution. Now there is a tendency, especially in the 
newer western states, to make the consti- 
tutions more and more elaborate and inclu- tionaiques- 
sive, so that they cover a great deal of the 
ground formerly within the province of the legislature, 
and the result is that the range of subjects controlled 
by direct popular vote has been very much enlarged. 
This tendency has, perhaps, been carried too far ; for, 
as Mr. Oberbolzer remarks in his excellent book on 
" The Eeferendum in America," " If a constitution is 
to enter into the details of government, and trespass on 
those fields of action before reserved to the legislature, 
it cannot have the character of permanence which it 
had when it was only an outline to direct the legisla- 
ture. It must change as laws change, and laws must 
change as the needs of the people change." But while 
the increasing scope of the constitutions may render 
them less immutable, it does not tend to obliterate the 
distinction between constitutional and other laws. 

The sanction of a popular vote has, in the second 
place, been required in many of the states Kindred 
for other things than constitutional amend- sub J ects - 
ments ; but if we leave out local affairs, we shall find 
that almost all the matters so treated are closely akin 
to constitutional questions, and are of such a nature 
that, except for some obvious motive of necessity or 
convenience, they would be regulated by the constitu- 

1 Cf. Oberholzer, The Referendum in America, eh. iii. and appendix. 



294: SWITZERLAND. 

tion itself. The power of the legislature to contract 
debts, for example, is often limited, with a proviso that 
any excess above the limit must be approved by the 
people. The object of this is clear. The debt limit 
cannot be absolutely rigid, because occasions when it 
must be exceeded are sure to arise, and it would be 
somewhat absurd to prescribe a limit in the constitu- 
tion, and require a formal amendment for the tempo- 
rary purpose of sanctioning an exception to the gen- 
eral rule. A similar procedure is established in some 
states for the alienation of public property; for exceed- 
ing a certain tax rate ; and even for the expenditure of 
money for a specified purpose or above a fixed amount. 
All these cases depend upon the same principle, that of 
providing a convenient way of making the necessary 
exceptions to a rule laid down in the constitution. 
Another provision, to be found in all the new states 
and in some of the old ones, declares that the capital 
shall be selected by a vote of the people, and shall not 
be changed without their consent. Now, as the seat 
of government is, naturally and properly, fixed by the 
constitution itself, such a provision merely establishes 
an informal method of completing or amending that 
instrument. 1 The same thing is even more evidently 
true of provisions authorizing the legislature to sub- 
mit to the people the question of woman suffrage, of 
the method of choosing representatives, or of the elec- 
tion of judges. 

1 In some cases this has been applied to the location of universities 
and other state institutions. A popular vote is sometimes required also 
for changing the boundaries of a state. 



THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA. 295 

These examples substantially include all the cases 
where the constitutions allow measures to be Banki ^ 
submitted to the people of the state, with acts * 
one notable exception. 1 After the banking mania of 
1848, several western states adopted a provision requir- 
ing a popular vote upon every act creating banks. This 
provision differs materially from all the others we have 
considered, and comes far nearer to the Swiss referen- 
dum. The subject is clearly not within the domain of 
constitutional law; and instead of involving a simple 
question about which the mass of people can easily form 
an opinion, it presents to them a complex piece of legis- 
lation, whose details cannot be understood without a 
great deal of study. It was a specific remedy for a par- 
ticular social disease, and has scarcely been adopted at 
all outside of the states which suffered at that time, — a 
fact which seems to prove that it is not in accord with 
our institutions. 

There remains to be considered the use of the popu- 
lar vote for local questions. This depends Local 
upon quite a different principle. The refer- matters - 
endum means an appeal from the legislature to the 
whole body of constituents who elected the represen- 
tatives ; but in the practice of leaving local affairs to 
be decided by the voters of the city, town, or county 
there is no appeal of this kind. The people of the 
state, in such a case, are not asked to ratify the act of 

1 Legislatures have occasionally submitted statutes to popular vote 
without express authority in the constitution, but the weight of opinion is 
against the constitutionality of such a proceeding, on the ground that it 
is a delegation of power. (Oberholzer, ch. v. ; and see the Opinions of 
the Justices, 160 Mass. Rep. 586.) 



296 SWITZERLAND. 

the legislature, nor can they veto it ; for although the 
vast majority may be strongly opposed to a local option 
bill, for example, they cannot prevent its becoming a 
law. The statute acquires a complete validity from the 
enactment by the legislature, and the only question on 
which a popular vote is taken is that of the local appli- 
cation of its provisions. With this the people of the 
state, as a whole, have nothing to do, for it is decided 
in each particular town solely by the voters of that 
town. Local popular voting is in reality only a method 
of local self-government, whereby additional powers are 
given to the city, town, or county, and their exercise 
is intrusted to the whole body of inhabitants. 

It may be stated, therefore, that, except for the 
anomalous case of the banking acts, the referendum in 
the United States has been almost entirely confined to 
constitutional matters, and to kindred subjects which 
are carefully specified, and are of such a nature that 
the question submitted to the people is extremely sim- 
ple. It may be observed, moreover, that the popular 
vote is always obligatory, that is, it never depends upon 
a request on the part of the citizens. Now all this is 
very important because, if the referendum ought to be 
extended, it would presumably be wise to follow the 
lines along which it has developed naturally. 

There are, indeed, a number of grave objections to 
Objections the introduction in America of a general 
refeSum referendum on all laws. Our whole political 
in America. S y S ^ em res £ s on ^he distinction between con- 
stitutional and other laws. The former are the solemn 
principles laid down by the people in its ultimate sov- 



THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA. 297 

ereignty ; the latter are regulations made by its repre- 
sentatives within the limits of their authority, Need of 
and the courts can hold unauthorized and ^fSu- 
void any act which exceeds those limits. The othTrWs 
courts can do this because they are main- tmct " 
taining against the legislature the fundamental princi- 
ples which the people themselves have determined to 
support, and they can do it only so long as the people 
feel that the constitution is something more sacred and 
enduring than ordinary laws, something that derives 
its force from a higher authority. Now, if all laws 
received their sanction from a direct popular vote, this 
distinction would disappear. There would cease to be 
any reason for considering one law more sacred than 
another, and hence our courts would soon lose their 
power to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes. 
The courts have in general no such power in Switzer- 
land, where indeed the distinction between constitu- 
tional and other laws is not so clearly marked as in 
America. With the destruction of this keystone of 
our government the checks and balances of our system 
would crumble, and the spirit of our institutions would 
be radically changed. The referendum as applied to 
ordinary statutes is, therefore, inconsistent with our 
polity, and could not be engrafted upon it without 
altering its very nature. 

Another objection to a general extension of the 
referendum here arises from our habits and 

t • -n o i i*i Alien to our 

traditions. Except for the broad and simple habits of 

questions involved in constitutional matters, 

the experience of our people has been confined to pass- 



298 SWITZERLAND. 

ing judgment on men and on general lines of policy. 
They have not been in the habit of considering the 
wisdom of particular statutes, or determining the need 
for the various appropriations. Nor would it be pos- 
sible for them to do so. In a community as complex as 
ours, legislation is a very intricate matter, and requires 
a great deal of careful study. This is far less true in 
Switzerland, where the cantons are minute compared 
with our states, and where the variety of social, com- 
mercial, and industrial interests is much smaller. Hence 
the referendum in America would impose on the voters 
a far more difficult task than it does in Switzerland. 
This consideration brings us to the practical question 

of the form in which the referendum could 
laws en- be used here. In no Swiss canton does the 

number of laws presented to the people aver- 
age ten a year, and in most places there are only half 
that number, even where the referendum exists in the 
obligatory form. But in the American states the acts 
passed in a single year are far too numerous to permit 
the people to consider them independently or vote 
intelligently upon them. They often run up into the 
hundreds, and fill a volume so large that the voter 
would hardly have time to read it through if he sacri- 
ficed all his leisure for the purpose. No doubt the 
quantity of our legislation is excessive, but even if it 
were very materially reduced, a general referendum in 
the obligatory form would still be out of the question. 
There remains the optional form ; but this the Swiss 
themselves do not like so well, because the agitation 
involved in the effort to collect the necessary signatures 



THE KEFERENDUM IN AMERICA. 299 

has a tendency to inflame political prejudices, and thus 
prevent a true expression of public opinion. In Amer- 
ica this form is open to peculiar objections, owing to 
the large size of the states, and the great development 
of political parties. It would probably be used chiefly 
in the case of laws that had aroused a good deal of 
party feeling and had been carried as party measures. 
In such cases the signatures could easily be collected by 
means of the party machinery, without which the task 
would be difficult. It is likely, therefore, that the ref- 
erendum in this form would be used mainly as a means 
of annoying the party in power by delaying legislation, 
and would become a party weapon. Viewed in this 
light, it is hardly to be desired. 

Moreover, there is not the same need of a referendum 
here that there is in Switzerland. The Swiss have no 
executive veto, as a rule no judicial process for setting 
aside unconstitutional laws, and in the cantons only a 
single legislative chamber. Hence they are much more 
exposed to the danger of hasty law-making, and have a 
greater need of a veto in the hands of the people. 

It is perhaps needless to remark that none of these 
considerations apply to the use of local pop- objections 
ular voting as a means of municipal govern- ^locafpo^ 
ment. 1 Such a system does not tend to "bating. 
obscure the distinction between constitutional and other 
laws. It brings before the people questions which, if 

1 While the power of the legislature to submit laws to a popular vote 
of the whole state, without constitutional authority, has been generally- 
denied by the courts, the weight of opinion is decidedly in favor of its 
right to make the local application of laws depend upon a local popular 
vote, at least in the case of laws that have a peculiar local interest. 



300 SWITZERLAND. 

sometimes intricate, are at least comparatively familiar, 
and it does not present such a quantity of subjects that 
they cannot be considered separately. In fact, as an 
extension of the principle of the town-meeting to larger 
communities, and as a method of educating the voters 
and increasing their interest in local government, the 
system seems to offer a possible remedy for the sad 
condition of our great cities. 1 

Even if space permitted, it would hardly seem neces- 
sary to discuss the adoption of the initiative at any 
great length. With regard to the referendum, the 
question is whether an institution that has proved of 
value in its home can be profitably introduced here ; 
but the initiative has not been a success even in Swit- 
zerland, and there is no reason to suppose it would work 
any better elsewhere. Surely we do not suffer so much 
from sterility in legislation as to make us anxious to 
add another process for manufacturing laws, without 
proof that the laws it produces are wise, just, and states- 
manlike. 

1 The theory that municipal government ought to be organized on the 
same principles that apply to the state, with a careful separation and 
balance of powers, has been a bugbear in America. The functions of a 
city are, in the main, of an executive character. Its legislative powers 
are mostly subsidiary and unimportant, and although by a confusion of 
ideas it has been allowed in many states to elect local judges, it can 
hardly be said to exercise the judicial prerogative. Hence the objections 
to a concentration of authority in the hands of the people or its represen- 
tatives, which are extremely important in the case of the state as a whole, 
do not apply to the cities. 



CHAPTER XIIL 

SWITZERLAND : PARTIES. 

The political history of the present Confederation 
begins with the overthrow of the Sonder- The history 
bund and the adoption of the constitution of °4ce a i848. 
1848. At this time power fell naturally into Theques- 
the hands of the victorious leaders in the civil refugees! 16 
war, and the first members of the Federal 1848 ~ 50; 
Council were selected from their ranks. But the con- 
stitution had no sooner been adopted than they began 
to be sharply divided among themselves on the position 
to be taken by Switzerland in regard to the revolution- 
ary movements in other lands. The larger number of 
them wanted, by~maintaining a strict neutrality, to avoid 
the danger of being drawn into a war, while the men of 
more radical views were anxious to take an active part in 
the Italian struggle for liberty. A great many of the lat- 
ter, indeed, crossed the mountains to fight as volunteers, 
and although the moderate party was strong enough to 
pass a vote forbidding the enlistment of soldiers on 
Swiss soil, it did not dare to enforce the prohibition. 
With the suppression of the insurrections in the neigh- 
boring countries, the question became even more acute, 
for refugees crowded over the frontier from Lombardy 
and Baden, and when the Federal CouDcil determined 
to expel some of the most restless of these men, a fierce 



302 SWITZERLAND. 

though fruitless effort was made in the Assembly to 
reverse its acts. 

Another matter on which the parties took opposite 
and the sides was that of the military capitulations. 
SpitSI- For centuries it had been the habit of the 
Swiss to serve as mercenaries in foreign states, 
and as late as 1848 several cantons had contracts for 
supplying troops to the King of Naples and to the 
Holy See. Now the constitution that had just been 
adopted forbade any future treaties of this kind ; but 
the Radicals, who were guided by their own sense of 
right rather than by the terms of the constitution, 
horrified at the thought of Swiss citizens serving as 
instruments to put down freedom, wanted to prevent 
all recruiting for such a purpose. The Moderates, on 
the other hand, were strict constructionists, and main- 
tained that the Confederation could not interfere with 
the existing capitulations. The Assembly in a spirit of 
compromise voted to negotiate for the abrogation of the 
treaties. The negotiations came to nothing, but with 
the ending of the revolutionary movements the interest 
both in this question and in that of the refugees began 
to wane, and thus the restoration of order in Europe 
removed the cause of political division in Switzerland. 
The parties themselves soon lost their momentum, and 
their differences finally vanished altogether at the 
time of the trouble with Prussia over Neuchatel in 
1856, when the Swiss were almost unanimous in sup- 
porting the vigorous action of the Federal Council. 
Party feeling, however, had run so high that in 1854 
Ochsenbein, one of the most prominent of the Mod- 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 303 

erates, failed of reelection to the Federal Council, and 
was replaced by Stampfli, the leader of the Radicals. 

The first issue had hardly died away when others 
arose. The former parties had been really na- 
tional; for, although the opponents of strict question, 
neutrality were particularly strong among the 
French and Italians, the members of both parties were 
scattered very generally all over the country. But 
the new issues, while in no sense based on race, were 
largely sectional, the different parts of Switzerland, 
and even the different cantons, being often found 
almost solidly on one side or the other. The divisions 
and cross-divisions were, however, exceedingly complex, 
and it is almost impossible to describe them clearly. 
They were, in fact, so indefinite that the parties did 
not even have names, and apart from the leaders it was 
not always easy to say to what group a man belonged. 1 
The primary source of division was the railroad ques- 
tion, which may be traced back as far as 1852, when a 
sharp contest took place in the Assembly between the 
advocates of state and private ownership. The latter 
prevailed, and within a few years a road, called the 
TJiallinie, ran through Switzerland from the Lake 
of Constance to the Lake of Geneva. But this was 
no sooner built than it became an apple of discord. 
An attempt was made to create rival lines, and the 

1 At all times there have been subjects about which people have not 
divided in the ordinary way, which have not, in short, been treated as 
party questions. Thus, in 1854, the proposal to create a national univer- 
sity was defeated by the opposition of the French and Italians, who 
feared an increase in German influence, and of the Ultramontanes, who 
dreaded the power of the Protestants. 



304 SWITZERLAND. 

Assembly became a field for battles between the oppo- 
nents of monopoly and the partisans of the ThaUinie ; 
the latter, with their friends the manufacturers of 
Zurich, being nicknamed railroad barons and cotton 
lords. The agitation spread from the chamber to the 
people. In 1858 a society called the Helvetia was 
formed for the purpose of curtailing the power of the 
railroad companies. It had no systematic organization, 
but exerted a great deal of influence for a number of 
years ; and in fact the enemies of the Thallinie were so 
far successful that a couple of rival lines were actually 
built. The grouping of parties was further compli- 
cated by the plans for a railroad over the Alps. The 
eastern part of the country wanted a tunnel at the Luk- 
manier or the Splugen, while the west wanted it at the 
Simplon, and the centre at the St. Gothard. In some 
mysterious manner, the interests of the Thallinie be- 
came identified with the last of these ; but the question 
remained unsettled until, by the building of a railroad 
from Lucerne to Zurich, in 1863, and the prospect of 
one to Berne, a majority was won for the St. Gothard. 
The extensive development of railroads and the defi- 
nite selection of the route over the St. Gothard, whose 
construction was finally assured by the promise of 
subventions from North Germany, Baden, and Italy, 
brought to an end the second great issue in Swiss 
politics. 

With the question of the railroads had been inter- 
The question woven another, with which it seems at first 
of Savoy. s ight to have no connection. The neutrality 
of the northern part of Savoy was guaranteed by the 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 305 

Treaty of Vienna, and in fact the provinces of Chablais 
and Fausigny had been ceded by Switzerland to Sar- 
dinia on the express condition that they should never 
be transferred to any other power. The Swiss, there- 
fore, protested loudly when they heard that Napoleon 
III. was about to take this district as a part of the fee 
for his services in driving the Austrians out of Lom- 
bardy in 1859. But protests were of no avail, and it 
was not clear what could be done. Many people wanted 
to maintain the rights of Switzerland at all hazards, 
while others dreaded the danger of a war with France. 
The Federal Council itself was divided. Strangely 
enough, the lines of cleavage on this question were 
nearly the same as on that of the railroads, for most 
of the deputies from the cantons where the railroads 
exerted great influence, such as Zurich, Thurgau, Vaud, 
and the city of Basle, belonged to the Party of Peace ; 
and, on the other hand, the Party of Action was 
supported by the anti-monopolists, and contained the 
leading men from Berne, Geneva, and Soleure. The 
struggle was bitter, and threatened to renew the an- 
cient antagonism between Berne and Zurich ; but the 
men who had not joined either side brought about a 
compromise whereby the Assembly approved of the 
previous action of the Federal Council, and requested 
it to protect the interests of the country while main- 
taining for the present the status quo. This was really 
a victory for the Party of Peace, because the retention 
of the provinces by France was not followed by a 
threat of war, the Federal Council merely appealing to 
the Great Powers, which did not care enough about 
vol. n. 



306 SWITZERLAND. 

the matter to interfere, or even to hold a conference. 
Thus Switzerland virtually acquiesced in the cession of 
Savoy, and the question disappeared from the field of 
active politics. 

Again a new issue followed close on the heels of the 

last, causing once more a different grouping 
of revision, of parties. The struggle over the railroads 

and Savoy had no sooner subsided than the 
question of revising the federal constitution came up. 
Although the powers of the Confederation undoubtedly 
needed to be enlarged, the immediate occasion for the 
change was presented almost by accident. In 1864 a 
treaty was made with France, which gave to all citizens 
of that country, without regard to creed, the privilege 
of settling in Switzerland. Now the federal constitu- 
tion guaranteed a free right of settlement only to Swiss 
Christians, and several of the cantons refused to repeal 
their laws excluding Jews. That the French Jews 
should enjoy a right denied to natives of the same 
religion was, of course, intolerable, and the Federal 
Council proposed a revision of the article of the consti- 
tution bearing on this point, and took advantage of 
the opportunity thus afforded to suggest a number 
of other amendments also. When these came before 
the people in 1866, public opinion was chaotic. The 
amendments were opposed both by men who thought 
they went too far, and by those who thought they did 
not go far enough, while the remains of the feelings 
engendered by the railroad struggle helped to confuse 
the issue. All the amendments except the one relating 
to the Jews were rejected ; but the desire for revision 



HISTORY OF PARTIES. 307 

grew stronger than ever, and parties began to form 
solely with regard to that question. A few years later 
the Assembly returned to the matter and drew up a 
constitution more centralized and more democratic than 
the one that is in force to-day. This time the issue was 
clear, and all the men of radical views urged the people 
to ratify the new constitution, their opponents consist- 
ing of the ultramontane Catholics, the believers in can- 
tonal rights, and the French and Italians, who saw in 
centralization an attempt to bring them under the con- 
trol of the Germans. For the first time in Swiss his- 
tory, party lines were determined by race, and as the 
adoption of this constitution might have perpetuated 
such a state of things, its rejection at the polls in 1872 
may be considered fortunate. The draft was then mod- 
ified, the objections of the French cantons were removed 
or overcome, and in this form it was adopted in 1874. 
The struggle over revision had raised party spirit to 
such a pitch as to cause the displacement of two fed- 
eral councillors. One of them, Jacob Dubs, resigned in 
1872 as a protest against the new constitution, which 
had been drawn up by the Assembly, 1 and of which he 
disapproved; while the other, Challet-Venel, was refused 
a reelection by the majority of the Assembly because he 
had opposed revision. 2 

Since 1874 the course of politics has been smoother, 
and the condition of the parties has been far more 
steady. The most important source of division has 
been religion, for in Switzerland, as in other countries, 

1 Muller, Pol. Geschichte der Gegenwart, 1872, p. 303. 

2 Cf. Droz, Etudes, p. 359. 



308 SWITZERLAND. 

the dogma of Papal Infallibility was followed by a con- 
flict with the Catholic church. Although by 

History of . - i ci • • 

parties since no means violent among the owiss, it was 

1874 

sharp enough to consolidate the Ultramon- 
tanes or Clericals into a united group, commonly 
known as the Right. This body, which draws its 

members mainly from the cantons where the 

The Right. ~ , ,. .. . i i • • i 

Catholic majority is overwhelming, is the 
most ardent, the most compact, and the best organized 
of the parties. It is, in fact, the only one that has 
real cohesion, and yet it is divided into two sections, 
one of which, led by the deputies from Lucerne, repre- 
sents the views of laymen and is moderate, while the 
other, whose leaders come from Freiburg, is more 
extreme. 1 

At the opposite end of the political scale have stood 
since 1874 the Radicals or Left, who look on 
the Catholic church and the Orthodox Pro- 
testant clergy as the great obstacles to progress. This 
group is held together even less firmly than the Right. 
The bulk of the party belongs to the section of the 
older Radicals, who, in spite of their name, have ceased 
to be very radical, and are, moreover, divided among 
themselves by the trend of opinion in the different 
races. The German members are at the same time 
more socialistic, and more anxious to increase the powers 
of the federal government, while the French have less 
faith in state providence, and, fearing that an extension 
of the authority of the Confederation will involve the 

1 See, on the present condition of parties, Adams, ch. vii. ; Sentupery, 
IS Europe Politique, vol. ii. pp. 1200-5. 



THE EXISTING PARTIES. 309 

supremacy of the more numerous Teutonic element, 
are inclined to uphold cantonal rights. Thus it hap- 
pens that the French, who permit in their cantons far 
less local self-government than the Germans, have a 
tendency to resist centralization in national matters. 
Of late years they are said to have acquired more 
confidence in the government at Berne, and to be less 
strenuously opposed to an increase of its powers. From 
a purely political point of view this is perhaps true, 
but on the other hand the difference of opinion be- 
tween the French and German Radicals on the subject 
of state interference seems to be more marked than 
ever. 1 Beyond this section the Radicals shade off into 
Democrats, who are more strongly in favor of socialis- 
tic legislation ; and still further to the Left are the men 
who openly call themselves Socialists, but these have 
scarcely any members in the Assembly, and are not 
very numerous in the country at large. With a growth 
in their numbers, the divisions of the Radicals have 
become more pronounced, and, in spite of great efforts 
to maintain concord, it is not improbable that the 
party will break in pieces. 2 In fact, it has already cut 
loose from the Socialists that hung on its skirts. 3 

The Centre, which stands between the Right and the 
Left, has the least cohesion of all the parties. m „ 

7 x # The Centre. 

Its members, who are also known as Liberal 
Conservatives, represent in a peculiar degree the old 

1 Cf . Droz, « Etatism et Liberalism," Bib. Univ., Dec., 1895, p. 449. 

2 Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 212; Bib. Univ., May and June, 1895, pp. 433- 
34, 662-64. 

3 Cf . Bib. Univ., April, 1894, pp. 211-12. 



310 SWITZERLAND. 

liberal traditions, and maintain the principles of per- 
sonal freedom against the tendency toward paternal 
government. They may be regarded as the successors 
of the railroad and cotton barons, and are largely 
recruited from the conservative Protestants, many of 
them being bankers, manufacturers, or other men of 
substance. They devote their attention chiefly to eco- 
nomic questions, assuming for the rest a conciliatory 
attitude; and although for a long time they have 
not held a fifth of the seats in the Assembly, yet, owing 
to the fact that until recently they still had several 
members in the Federal Council, they exerted an influ- 
ence out of proportion to their numbers. 

These three parties are the only ones that have 
Continuity existed since 1874, and they have had a con- 
^Jkepar- tinuous life, for the questions that have arisen 
1874. from time to time have not had the effect of 

creating new groups, or even causing any great changes 
in the size of the existing ones. At first none of the 
three had a majority of the Assembly, and the Centre 
held the balance of power ; but the Radicals increased 
at its expense, until after a few years they had a 
decided majority both in the National Council and in 
the Federal Assembly. Except for the gradual gain 
of seats by the Left, the strength of the three parties 
has not varied a great deal, and in fact political con- 
flicts have been decidedly less violent than formerly. 

If now we compare the periods before and after 
1874, we observe that they are alike in the absence of 
sudden party fluctuations. We do not, as in other 
democracies, see one side after the other sweep the 



ABSENCE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. 311 

country and get control of the government, but the 
relative strength of the different groups is 
constant or changes slowly. Even during the of°The arison 

n • i ,i i , on . periods be- 

iormer period the balance ot torce in anv one fore and 

„ r „ . . after 1874. 

set oi groups was pretty well maintained, 
until a new question destroyed them altogether by 
creating entirely different lines of cleavage. On the 
other hand, the second of these periods differs from 
the first by the fact that the parties have not dissolved 
to be replaced by others based on new issues. During 
the years from 1848 to 1874 this happened three times, 
but since the adoption of the present constitution each 
problem that presented itself has been dealt with by 
the existing parties without materially affecting their 
composition. The second period is also distinguished 
by a greater moderation, which has resulted in the 
reelection since 1874 of every member of the Federal 
Council who was willing to serve. To such a point, 
indeed, has this been carried that the Centre was 
allowed to retain more than half the seats in that body 
for many years after it had become a small minority in 
the Assembly. 

Although parties have never ceased to exist in Swit- 
zerland, the government of the Confederation, Relation of 
unlike that of every other democracy, is not J G thegw- 
in any true sense a government by party. 
This is eminently true of the executive ; for, as we have 
already seen, the minority is represented both in the 
Federal Council and in the executive bodies of almost 
all the cantons, and is thus enabled to exert a direct 
influence on the conduct of public affairs. A thor- 



312 SWITZERLAND. 

oughly partisan administration is therefore out of the 
question. The same absence of strict party control is 
true of the legislature also, though not quite to the 
same extent. All the groups in the Federal Assembly 
are, indeed, in the habit of holding meetings to decide 
whether the members shall act together on some ques- 
tion pending in the chamber, or be free to vote as they 
think best. This practice seems to be always followed 
by the Clericals, and it is not uncommon with the 
Radicals, who do not, however, feel bound to obey the 
decision of the majority even on the most important 
matters. But in fact party lines are rarely drawn, 
except on measures that have an immediate bearing on 
party interests or on religion ; * and on these the Con- 
servatives, although conciliatory in tone, usually vote 
with the Radicals, because the Clericals are thought to 
be unreasonable. On other matters the Centre and 
the moderate parts of the Right and Left, who enjoy 
the confidence of the Federal Council, tend to draw 
together, while the extremists of both sides, having 
little influence with the government, try to work di- 
rectly on the people. 2 The absence of a sharp division 
of the chamber into hostile factions, is reflected in the 
method of distributing the seats, for the members of 
a group do not all sit together as in other parliaments, 
but the deputies sit, as a rule, by cantons, a new 
member usually occupying the place left vacant by his 
predecessor. 

Another peculiarity of political life in Switzerland is 



1 Cf. Dupriez, vol. ii. pp. 214-15. 

2 Adams, p. 105. 



ABSENCE OF PARTY MACHINERY. 313 

the absence of party machinery. The parties are collec- 
tions of individuals who look at public matters 
from the same standpoint, rather than polit- party ma? 
ical organizations; and in fact the Swiss 
have carried out more fully than any other people 
Eohmer's theory of the strictly psychological basis of 
party division. 1 There are in the Confederation no 
national committees, no elaborate systems of primary 
caucuses and general conventions. The Clericals and 
Radicals do occasionally hold congresses, but these are 
simply intended to prevent disruption by discussing the 
questions of the day, and thus preserving a certain 
harmony of views, and they take no part in the nomi- 
nation of candidates for office. A few political asso- 
ciations exist also, of which the most famous is the 
Grutliverein, composed of workingmen, and advocating 
advanced opinions. But although these societies some- 
times exert a good deal of influence at elections, and 
more still at federal referenda, they rarely try to run 
candidates of their own and are not really party organ- 
izations. They correspond, in fact, more nearly to our 
reform clubs, temperance associations, and labor organ- 
izations, than to our political parties. The candidates 
for the National Council are, indeed, nominated by 
political meetings held in the several districts ; but an 
inspection of the results of the votes shows that the 
name of a man who is highly respected, or who has 
done valuable service, is often put on all the tickets 
irrespective of party, and that in close districts it is not 

1 Lehre von den Politischen Parteien. Cf. Bliintschli, Charakter und 
Geist der Politischen Parteien. 



be said to be no national party leaders. This 
is due in part at least to the fact that politi- 



314 SWITZERLAND. 

uncommon to agree on a ticket which includes men 
from different groups. 1 Moreover, there is among the 
Swiss very little struggle for office, and there seems to 
be no special class of politicians, no men who make a 
business of arranging nominations and managing cam- 
paigns. Nor is there much excitement about elections, 
which are not an occasion for processions, badges, and 
other devices for rallying the lukewarm and stimulat- 
ing the enthusiasm of the faithful. 2 

Not only are national conventions for the nomination 
Absence of °^ candidates unknown, but there may almost 

iation 
party 
le 

cal strife is so much hotter in cantonal than in federal 
matters that the parties are divided on local rather 
than on national issues ; or perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that the federal representatives are 
chosen by the cantonal parties. 3 Hence the influence 
of the leaders is exerted chiefly in their own cantons, 
and their power is local rather than national. 

The most remarkable peculiarity of the Swiss parties 
stability of ^ s their extreme stability. We have already 
parties. geen t ^ a t since 1874 there have been no 
sudden variations in the strength of the different 
groups, the only important change being the gain of 
seats by the Left, which has been decidedly slow and 
gradual. How far this is true may be gathered from the 

1 See, for example, the results of the election of 1887, in the Zeitschrift 
filr Schiveiz. Statistik, 1887, p. 414 et seq. 

2 Winchester, pp. 81-82. 

8 Cf . Dupriez, vol. ii. p. 214 ; Marsauche, p. 208 ; Winchester, p. 146. 



STABILITY OF PARTIES. 315 

following comparison of the returns in the last six 
general elections to the National Council : * — 

1878. 1881. 1884. 1887. 1890. 1893. 

Democrats . 6 8 

Left ... 69 83 88 87 83 86 

Centre . . 31 26 22 24 22 27 

Right ... 35 36 35 34 35 25 

In many of the districts, the certainty of the re- 
sult prevents the nomination of opposition candidates 
altogether. In 1887, for example, the election in 
twenty-three districts, choosing fifty-two deputies, was 
uncontested, and only in nine districts, with twenty- 
eight deputies, were there twice as many candidates as 
seats to be filled. The remaining districts had ninety- 
five candidates for sixty-five seats, so that the whole 
number of candidates was two hundred and three. In 
other words, only fifty-eight seats out of one hundred 
and forty-five, or just forty per cent., were contested ; 
and in five of these cases the contest was between men 
of the same party. 2 

1 As there are no systematic party organizations, and as party lines 
are not distinctly drawn, it is not easy to classify the deputies. The 
figures for 1881, 1884, and 1887, in this table, are taken from the Zeit- 
schriftfur Schweiz. Statistik, 1882, p. 70 et seq., 1887, p. 414 et seq., and for 
the first and the last two years from Sentupe'ry, UEurope Politique, 
vol. ii. p. 1200. The last column, however, does not strictly give the 
result of the election of 1893, but the condition in 1895. Sentupe'ry 
gives the composition of the Council of States during the same period as 
follows : — 





1878. 


1881. 


1884. 


1887. 


1890. 


1893. 


Left . . 


. 22 


21 


20 


18 


20 


21 


Centre 


. 5 


5 


6 


8 


6 


8 


Right . . 


. 17 


18 


18 


18 


18 


15 



2 These figures take no account of candidates who polled less than ten 
per cent, of the vote. In 1881 eighty-six seats were contested, and in 



316 SWITZERLAND. 

The same stability of parties is observable in local 
matters. For some years after the war of the Sonder- 
bund and the movements of 1848, several of the cantons 
were in a condition of great disturbance. Political 
passion ran high, and at times there were outbreaks of 
violence. 1 But this has passed away nearly everywhere, 
and in most of the cantons the proportions of the par- 
ties have varied little of late years, so that for long 
periods the majority belongs to the same party, and a 
continuous policy, liberal or conservative, is pursued. 
In Berne, for example, the Radicals have had an unin- 
terrupted supremacy for more than a quarter of a cen- 
tury, and in fact Geneva and Ticino are the only can- 
tons where power shifts at short intervals from Right 
to Left and back again. 2 

Such a condition of things naturally reduces the 
its good incentive to political organization and party 
effects. warfare to a minimum, for the majority are 
not obliged to make any great effort to retain their 
position, and the minority are rendered passive by the 
consciousness that they have no chance of getting con- 
trol of the government. This state of politics has an 
effect which is well worth consideration. In Switzer- 



1884 one hundred and three. Zeitschrift, op. cit., 1887. The large num- 
ber in the latter year was due to the fact that the Centre, thinking the 
results of the recent popular votes at the referendum indicated a general 
discontent with the Radicals, nominated many more candidates than 
usual. They did not succeed, however, in electing as many deputies as 
before. 

1 Cf. an article in Unsere Zeit, 1873, ii. p. 349. 

2 Droz, Etudes (pp. 146-47), says this is true only of Geneva, but Ticino 
may be added, although the changes there are less rapid. 



STABILITY OF PARTIES. 317 

land those cantons where the majority is large and per- 
manent are orderly and well governed, while Ticino, 
in which the parties are evenly balanced, is in a far less 
satisfactory condition ; and the same rule applies, with 
a few marked exceptions, to the northern states in the 
American Union. The fact is, that when one party 
comprises so large a part of the community and is so 
firmly established that its supremacy is virtually undis- 
puted, its members are not compelled to stand together 
and profess the same creed. They are at liberty to 
differ from one another, and follow their personal con- 
victions ; and hence the measures of the government 
are not carried by party votes, but are the result of 
a free expression of opinion. While, therefore, the 
views of all sections of the community are not taken 
into consideration precisely as they would be if no 
parties existed, still, so far as the bulk of the people 
is concerned, politics are conducted almost without 
regard to party. We have, in short, a condition that 
for practical purposes probably approaches as nearly to 
an entire absence of party as is possible in a democracy. 
Now, party government has merits as well as defects. 
Under many circumstances, it is both unavoidable and 
beneficial, and the lack of parties has its peculiar dan- 
gers. But in a community which has enough native 
honesty and intelligence to prevent personal corruption 
in its public men, and which does not require the fric- 
tion of parties to stimulate progress, it is certainly a 
great advantage to get rid of the agitation, the partisan- 
ship, and the absence of a perfectly ingenuous expression 
of opinion, which are inseparable from party government. 



318 SWITZERLAND. 

The causes of the peculiar relation of Swiss parties 
to the government, and of the condition of 
the state of the parties themselves, may be sought in 
various directions. Something must be at- 
tributed to the shortness of the sessions of the Federal 
Assembly, which usually last only four or five weeks 
apiece, and hence give very little opportunity for the 
development of a party policy, or the consolidation of 
party ties. Something is due, no doubt, to the fact 
that the national government has little patronage in 
its gift that could be used to reward partisans, for 
the eighty-three hundred employees in the postal and 
telegraphic service, and about five hundred more in 
the other departments, include almost all the federal 
officials. 1 Moreover, the abuse of the power of appoint- 
ment for political purposes is unknown in the national 
administration, and in that of most of the cantons; 
and therefore this fuel for party enthusiasm is lacking. 2 
A more important cause may be found in the method 
Method of °^ choosing the Federal Council. That the 
FedeS the Swiss realize the effect on parties of the 
present system is evident from the arguments 
brought forward in connection with the proposal to 
transfer the election of the councillors from the As- 
sembly to the people. The plan is advocated, on the 
ground that it would result in giving to the different 
groups a representation more in proportion to their 
numerical strength, that it would free the election 
from the cliques in the Assembly, and would make the 

1 Cf. Marsauche, pp. 47, 102-4. 

2 Cf. Winchester, pp. 80-81. 



CAUSES OF THE STATE OF PARTIES. 319 

councillors more independent of that body, and better 
able to resist its alleged omnipotence ; while against the 
proposal is urged the likelihood of struggles between 
the Federal Council and the Assembly, and among the 
councillors themselves. 1 In other words, the change is 
both favored and opposed, on the supposition that the 
councillors would stand for more decided opinions, in- 
stead of reflecting the somewhat amorphous condition 
of the Assembly. 

Under the existing system, the motives for party 
organization are extremely weak. The fact that the 
deputies to the federal legislature are elected on local 
rather than national issues tends to prevent the organ- 
ization of national parties ; and as the same party is 
always in a majority in most of the cantons, it helps 
also to diminish the interest in elections and the activity 
of political campaigns. But if the federal councillors 
were chosen by direct popular vote, their election would 
inevitably become a matter of absorbing interest and 
drive local issues into the background. Moreover, the 
cantons are far from large, and the electoral districts 
for the National Council are smaller still, so that in 
choosing their representatives the people vote for neigh- 
bors whom they have known long. Again the Assem- 
bly, which is a comparatively small and permanent body 
of men, 2 picks out the federal councillors from among 
its own members. In the case of all national officers, 

1 Cf . Droz, Etudes, " Le mode d'election du conseil fdderal ; " Mar- 
sauche, p. 263 et seq. 

2 A comparison of the elections of 1881 and 1887 shows that of the 
145 members of the National Council chosen at the former, 80 were 
reelected six years later. Zeitschrift, 1882, and 1887, op. cit. 



320 SWITZERLAND. 

therefore, whether legislative or executive, the Swiss 
votes for men with whom he is personally acquainted, 
and this obviates the need of party machinery for the 
selection of candidates. Now if the Confederation 
were one vast district for electing the Federal Council, 
national conventions for the nomination of candidates 
would become a necessity, and the party organizations 
thus called into being would infallibly extend their 
influence over the whole range of politics, and produce 
a radical change in the character of public life. They 
would put an end to the low development of party 
which renders the permanent, business-like, non-partisan 
character of the Federal Council possible, which makes 
it possible for the councillors to retain their places per- 
manently even when their policy does not prevail. The 
councillors would become the standard-bearers of the 
different groups, and could hardly maintain the medi- 
ating attitude that has made their position unique 
among the governments of the world. 

American history throws some light on the probable 
effect of a change in the method of choosing the 
Federal Council, for the earlier Presidents of the United 
States, although not elected by Congress, were nomi- 
nated, so far as nominations were made at all, by 
caucuses of the congressmen. Now during this period 
parties continued to exist only while there were real 
issues to keep them alive ; and when the question of 
the relations with foreign powers, which was the most 
lasting source of division, died away after the war of 
1812, the parties dissolved, and the era of good feeling 
began. But popular jealousy put an end to the habit 



MODE OF ELECTING THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. 321 

of congressional nomination, and before long the prac- 
tice of holding national conventions sprang up in its 
stead. 1 This was accompanied by the creation of an 
elaborate party machinery, and by a systematic use of 
patronage as an engine in party warfare, until at length 
the organization has become as important a factor in 
the life of a party as the issues that are supposed to 
justify its existence. On more than one occasion, in- 
deed, the perfection of its mechanism and the necessity 
of conventions for the selection of candidates has kept 
a party alive after it has ceased to represent any prin- 
ciples whatever. The modern American party without 
a principle is like a centipede without a head, which 
continues to march until destroyed by some external 
force. It may be observed, moreover, that the change 
in the method of nominating candidates has been fol- 
lowed by a loss of calibre in the men elected. During 
the earlier history of the United States every President 
was a man of great personal eminence, but since the 
nominating convention has become fully developed, very 
few of them have had at the time of their first election 
a really high reputation in national political life. 2 

1 Congressional caucuses were first held in 1800, and from that time 
through 1816 they were the regular mode of nomination. In 1820 they 
were not used, because Monroe was reelected by common consent ; and 
the attempt to revive them four years later proved a failure^. At the 
succeeding elections nominations by state legislatures were common, but 
never developed into a system. The first nominating convention was 
held in 1832, and the practice became thoroughly established in 1840. 

2 The only cases that can be considered exceptions up to this time 
are those of Polk, who had been Speaker of the House ;. Buchanan, who 
had been Secretary of State ; and Garfield, who had been one of the lead- 
ers of his party in Congress. But every one of the earlier Presidents was 

vol. n. 



322 SWITZERLAND. 

A third cause of the state of parties in Switzerland 

must be sought in the referendum. The role 

of the ref- of the political groups in the working of that 

erendum. .... „ . . 

institution is a matter of prime importance. 
Sometimes their influence is very great, sometimes in- 
significant, but speaking generally it cannot be said 
that the people obey the dictation of party ; and this 
is a point that merits particular attention. It is indeed 
essential to the success of the system, for if in a country 
where the parties are as stable as they are in Switzer- 
land the people voted as their political leaders directed, 
the laws passed by a majority of the legislature would 
almost invariably be ratified at the polls. This, how- 
ever, is very far from being the case, especially in some 
of the cantons. A marked instance of the want of 
control of the party chiefs over the popular vote oc- 
curred in 1891, when the Assembly passed well nigh 
unanimously a law for pensioning federal officials, which 
was nevertheless rejected by the people by a vote of 
nearly four to one. 

The extent to which the parties influence the ac- 

tion of the people on national laws may be 
referendum seen by examining the history of the federal 

used as a J ° J 

party referenda. 1 The men who had opposed the 

weapon at rr 

first J constitution of 1874 found in the referendum 

a new weapon, and taking advantage of the reaction 

at the time of his first election more distinguished than any of these 
three. 

1 Cf. Droz, Etudes, pp. 71-82, 460-62 ; Deploige, pp. 134-54 ; and see 
p. 255, note 1, supra. In Ticino, where the parties are evenly bal- 
anced, the referendum is usually resorted to as a party weapon. Cf. 
Deploige, pp. 166-67. 



THE REFERENDUM AND PARTIES. 323 

"which set in at that time, they demanded popular votes 
upon a number of laws during the next three years, 
usually with success. After 1877, however, this method 
of warfare was abandoned for a while, and the few 
measures which were brought before the people seem 
to have had no connection with party politics. The 
truce continued for five years, when the Radicals, who 
had obtained a large majority in the National Council, 
aroused hostility by unseating opponents, gerrymander- 
ing districts, and passing unpopular laws. Some of 
the latter would have been voted down without the 
assistance of any party, and in fact the people rejected 
one measure which appears to have had the support of 
all the groups ; but although the opposition did not 
create the popular discontent, they tried hard to draw 
profit from it. Hoping by frequent rebuffs to discredit 
the party in power, they threw their weight against 
measures to which they had no intrinsic objections, 
and in 1884 they prevailed upon the people to reject 
four laws at once. Curiously enough, the popular dis- 
content did not affect the elections which took place 
in the autumn of that year, for the different groups 
were returned in about the same proportions as before. 
The opposition had succeeded in exasperating the foe 
and in frustrating some of his plans, but had not in- 
creased their own popularity ; and it was probably for 
this reason that the use of the referendum as a party 
weapon did not continue after the elections bntno t f 
of 1884. Since that time the referendum lateyears ' 
has been put in operation a good many times, and not 
infrequently with effect, but in only one case — that 



324 SWITZERLAND. 

of the bankruptcy law — can it be said to have been 
made an instrument of party. 

During the years 1875-77 and 1882-84, therefore, 
the referendum was used mainly for party purposes, 
but apart from these two periods such a use has been 
distinctly exceptional. It may be observed, moreover, 
that the people have never voted on strict party lines, 
at least never when a law was rejected ; for even in 
The people 1884, when the opposition was strongest, and 
i°strict° te when every measure to which the referendum 
party lines. wag a pp^ ec i was voted down, the Radicals 

polled at the election a majority of the total popular 
vote. 1 The Right simply took advantage of the general 
discontent to win on certain measures the votes of 
men who were otherwise supporters of the government. 
The fact that a popular vote is not cast on party lines 
does not, however, prevent certain general tendencies 
of thought from making themselves felt. We should 
naturally expect this to be the case in a nation so 
sharply divided as Switzerland between different reli- 
gions and races ; and it is quite consistent with an 
absence of direct party influence on the vote. An 
unprogressive community is likely to take a conserva- 
tive view of any measure proposed, and follow its 
natural bias, although its members are not controlled 
by any organization, and do not obey any recognized 
political leaders. Such is the case in Switzerland, 
where the tendency of a canton to reject laws may, 
as a rule, be roughly measured by the proportion of 
Catholics in its population. The majority of the As- 

1 Zeitschrift, 1887, p. 417. 



THE REFERENDUM AND PARTIES. 325 

sembly is progressive, but the Swiss Catholics are in 
general conservative, and hence are inclined to vote 
"No," while the Protestant German cantons, like 
Zurich, the two Basles, Glarus, and Thurgau, usually 
vote " Yes." * That this is not the effect of drawing 
party lines is shown by the fact that Yaud, although 
strongly radical, has been one of the cantons most 
commonly found on the negative side. 

One naturally inquires how the demand for a popu- 
lar vote is organized, for it is evident that 
thirty thousand signatures are not collected parties P re- 
without a considerable effort. In the case of demand for 
laws that have a bearing on religion, or where 
for any reason the referendum is used as a party 
weapon, the demand is organized by the members of 
the Catholic opposition in the Assembly, who are often 
assisted by the Berner Volkspartei and the Eidgenos- 
sische Verein, both conservative societies. On other oc- 
casions, like that of the laws to be voted upon in October 
of this year, the movement takes place spontaneously, 
without any help from the political leaders. 2 Again com- 
mittees of the persons or districts specially interested are 
commonly formed for the purpose of collecting the 
necessary signatures to the petition. This was done at 
Geneva, in the case of the tariff of 1891, which bore 
severely on the trade of the city. Sometimes the 
canvass is made quietly from house to house, sometimes 
by means of public meetings and placards. In short, 

1 Cf . Chatelanat, Zeitschrift, 1879, p. 48 ; Nachweiser, St. Gotten, op. 
cit., pp. 73-74 ; Deploige, p. 138. 

2 Bib. Univ., Aug., 1896, p. 438. 



326 SWITZERLAND. 

there is no regular system of proceeding, and the 
method adopted varies with the circumstances of each 



case. 1 



Not only do the different political groups fail to 
Theref- exercise a decisive influence at the referen- 
diSnShes dum, but the institution itself tends in a 
tanc<rof° r variety of ways to lessen the importance and 
party. increase the stability of the parties. 

In purely representative democracies, election is the 
sole political act of the people, who retain 

By splitting f . 

up the no direct control over their representatives. 



Now an election under these conditions is in 
reality only a choice between two or more rival candi- 
dates or rival parties, to one of which the destinies of 
the country must be committed ; and hence the parties 
and their opinions are supremely important. But in 
Switzerland, where the people have a right to vote on 
each measure separately, there is no such necessity of 
choosing between the programmes of opposing parties, 
and of accepting some one of them in its entirety. The 
referendum, therefore, deprives political programmes 
of much of their significance, by allowing the people 
to elect a representative, and then reject any of his 
measures that they do not like. It tends, especially in 
the obligatory form, to split up political issues, and 
thus prevents the people from passing judgment on 
the whole policy of the party in power. Its effect is, 
in fact, precisely the opposite of that of a general 
election under a parliamentary system, or a plebiscite 
such as Napoleon III. used to hold in France. At a 

1 Deploige, pp. 100-2. 



THE REFERENDUM AND PARTIES. 327 

general election in England, for example, although 
some one issue may be particularly prominent, the de- 
cision of the people is not confined to that issue, but 
comprehends the broader question which of the two 
great parties had better, on the whole, be intrusted 
with the government. 1 A general election helps, there- 
fore, to consolidate and strengthen the parties. A 
French plebiscite involves the same question, except 
that the alternative, instead of being the rule of a rival 
party, is uncertainty, if not anarchy. But the ref- 
erendum entails a decision only on the special measure 
under consideration, and hence the people in Switzer- 
land are never called upon, either at an election or 
a referendum, to judge the conduct of a party as a 
whole. It is no doubt largely for this reason that 
Swiss political parties have no very definite programmes 
and little organization. 

Again, the referendum tends to draw attention to 
measures instead of men, and it is the per- 
sonal admiration or dislike of public men that attention to 

_ t 1 p i oi p n measures 

forms a great deal or the fibre of party alle- instead of 
fiance. So marked is this result in Switzer- 
land that a President of the Confederation once said 
that if any one were to question ten Swiss, all of them 
would know whether their country was well governed 
or not, but that nine of them would not be able to 
give the name of the President, and the tenth who 
might think he knew it would be mistaken. 2 After 
making all due allowance for exaggerated modesty in 

1 Cf. A. V. Dicey. Contemp. Rev. 57, pp. 492-95. 

2 Quoted by Winchester, p. 80. 



328 SWITZERLAND. 

the speaker, one feels impelled to ask how party leaders 
can be expected to thrive in such a land. 

The fact that the people retain the final power of 

rejecting all the laws has another important 

ingthemo- effect on the position of the parties, by di- 

4-ixrpQ f/")T» O 

change of minishing the political responsibility of the 

parties. , 

representatives tor the measures they enact. 
If a law is unpopular the people simply refuse to sanc- 
tion it, and this prevents an outcry against the party 
that enacted it. If, on the other hand, the people 
ratify it, there is clearly no use in trying to persuade 
them that the men in power were very wrong in passing 
it, and ought to be turned out for doing so. Nor is 
there any chance for an opposition to work on the 
popular fears by foretelling the bad laws the ruling 
party is likely to pass if continued in power, because 
the people can always reject measures they do not like. 
Hence it is not easy to find arguments for electing a 
new set of representatives drawn either from the past 
or the future ; and in short the ordinary motives for a 
change of parties are removed. 

The relation of a deputy to his constituents is, 

indeed, very peculiar and very characteristic 
ofarepre- of Swiss political ideas. The rejection by 

sentative to -, p , , , . 

his constit- tnem ot a measure he has supported is not 
regarded as reason for putting some one else 
in his place ; and throughout Switzerland, in cantonal 
as well as in federal matters, the people have an almost 
invariable habit of reelecting representatives whose 
measures they have refused to sanction. A striking 
example of this was given in 1884. During the whole 



THE REFERENDUM AND PARTIES. 329 

term of the federal assembly then sitting the referen- 
dum had been demanded with unusual frequency, 
and every law submitted to popular vote had been re- 
jected. No such general condemnation of the policy 
of the legislature had ever been known. It was 
supposed that the people were thoroughly disgusted 
with the autocratic radicalism of their representatives, 
and it was naturally expected that the next elections 
would result in a crushing defeat for the party in 
power ; but instead of this the radical majority of the 
National Council was returned in larger numbers than 
before. Such an extraordinary state of things has 
puzzled the Swiss themselves, who have suggested 
various explanations of it. 1 One is that the voter dis- 
tinguishes between the legislator and the laws, and 
recognizes that the former may do very valuable work, 
although some of his views are erroneous. Another is 
that the people, holdiug the final power in their own 
hands, are comparatively indifferent in regard to the 
men who draft the laws. A third is that the electoral 
districts are so arranged that the legislature does not 
fairly represent the majority of the people. 2 And still 

1 Deploige, pp. 149-50. 

2 That the Radicals increased their seats by this means there can be no 
doubt, but it does not help to explain the fact that they polled a larger 
popular vote than ever. The votes cast and the representatives elected 
by the three parties in the elections of 1881, 1884, and 1887, are given 
by the Zeitschrift fur Schweiz. Statistic (1887, p. 417), as follows : — 

1881. 1884. 1887. 

VOTE. SEATS. VOTE. SEATS. VOTE. SEATS. 

187,118 88 171,788 87 
81,363 22 70,962 24 
99,320 35 78,381 34 



Left . , 


, 169,058 


83 


Centre . 


77,692 


26 


Right 


97,977 


36 



330 SWITZERLAND. 

another is, that the phenomenon is inexplicable. While 
each of these theories contains, no doubt, a certain 
amount of truth, no one of them is entirely satisfactory. 
But whatever its cause may be, the habit itself is unde- 
niable and universal. 

It follows, of course, that the rejection of a law is 
not regarded as a censure upon the representatives who 
passed it. When the referendum was first introduced, 
some deputies, who had supported a bill and then saw 
it heavily voted down in their own districts, resigned ; 
but their constituents reelected them, on the ground 
that a dislike of one or more measures did not imply a 
loss of confidence. This view of the matter has now 
become a fundamental principle in Swiss politics, and 
there is only one instance in recent years of a resigna- 
tion caused by a popular disapproval of a federal law. 
In December, 1891, the people rejected a bill for the 
purchase by the national government of shares in a 
Swiss railway company, and thereupon M. Welti, the 
President of the Confederation, resigned. His col- 
leagues in the Federal Council urged him to reconsider 
his action, but in vain ; for the ownership of the rail- 
roads by the state had long been his most cherished 
project, and although the result of the vote was at- 
tributed more to an objection to the price than to dislike 
of the principle involved, yet he felt disappointed and 
withdrew. This was a very exceptional case, and M. 
Welti's motives were personal rather than political. 
His resignation, moreover, seems to have had no con- 
nection with party politics in any way. 

The habit of disassociating measures from the repre- 



THE REFERENDUM AND PARTIES. 331 

sentatives who pass them naturally gives to the latter 

and to the groups of which they are members 

great permanency of tenure ; and a study of fe^s takes 

S • i • i i • i J the place of 

Swiss history shows that since the general a change of 

parties. 

introduction of the referendum there has 
been a very marked increase in the stability of the 
political parties. The rejection of laws seems in fact 
to take the place of a change of party, for when there 
arrives one of the periods of discontent, which are re- 
current everywhere, the people, instead of putting the 
opposition into office as in other countries, reelect the 
old representatives, and give vent to then- feelings by 
voting down the measures these men have prepared. 
Such a method of rebuking the party in power is quite 
as rational as any other, and perhaps as effective, while 
it has the merit of avoiding all violent changes of 
policy. It points to a curious mental attitude on the 
part of the electorate. The fact that the relative 
strength of the different groups is nearly constant 
proves that there is no large body of voters who throw 
themselves first on one side and then on the other. In 
short, there is no considerable class of independent 
voters at elections. But, on the other hand, the fre- 
quency with which the people reject the laws passed by 
their representatives shows that the number of inde- 
pendent voters at the referendum is very great, or 
perhaps it would be fair to say that in ordinary times 
every one is an independent. Both of these results 
spring from the lack of intensity in party life, which is 
due in great measure to the habit of submitting laws 
to popular vote. 



332 SWITZERLAND. 

While the referendum has contributed to the absence 
of party government, its usefulness depends no less 
on the low development of party spirit ; for if polit- 
ical feeling ran so high, or political organizations were 
so complete, that party lines were strictly drawn on 
all occasions, the referendum would be a mere formality, 
or rather it would be used only as a means of delaying 
and harassing the government. If therefore the system 
of electing the Federal Council by popular vote were to 
be introduced, and were to result in an elaborate party 
organization, the disintegrating force of the referendum 
might very well be overcome, and the institution might 
become injurious instead of beneficial. 

After all these reasons have been suggested for the 
Effect on stability of the parties and the permanence of 
thfcharfc- official tenure, a great deal remains that must 
dttionf of a " he attributed to the traditions and the char- 
t epeope. ac ^ er £ ^e people. There is a conviction 
among the Swiss that a capable public servant ought 
to be retained, even if his views do not in all respects 
agree with those of his constituents, and an opinion of 
this sort once firmly established has a very great effect 
in moulding the history and institutions of the nation. 
The constant change of officials, and the hunt for spoils 
which results from it, could hardly maintain their hold 
in America if the bulk of the people did not have an 
underlying feeling that public office was a privilege 
rather than a trust ; and the doctrine of rotation is not 
more deeply rooted here than the opposite principle is 
in Switzerland. The Swiss, moreover, is hardheaded 
and business-like in politics, as in everything else, and 



ATHENS AND SWITZERLAND. 333 

this appears in the absence of excitement and of de- 
monstrations at elections. He is sober-minded and staid 
in all his pleasures, and Sir Henry Maine has pointed 
out that the popular interest in the battles of political 
parties is, in great measure, the interest in an unending 
cricket match between red and blue. But the Swiss 
does not seem to care for this aspect of public life. 
In short, he is not the sort of stuff that political parties 
are made of. 

It is the habit to speak of Athens and Switzerland 
as the most complete examples of democracy comparison 
in the ancient and modern world. The com- aicf Greek 
parison is instructive and worth dwelling democrac y- 
upon, because it brings into strong relief the character- 
istic features of the two systems. When the Greek 
spoke of democracy, he had in his mind the conduct of 
the administration. He meant the control by the mass 
of citizens of the question of peace and war, of the 
relations with the allies and the colonies, of the finances, 
the army, and the fleet. In Athens at the time of 
Demosthenes all these things had been placed in the 
hands of the assembly of the people, which managed 
them as far as possible directly, or by means of com- 
mittees chosen for short periods by lot. But the same 
methods were not applied to legislation. To the Greek 
mind the laws were normally permanent and unchange- 
able. Their alteration was an exceptional event, and 
in Athens they were usually made by the ancient and 
undemocratic Court of Areopagus, no attempt having 
been made to organize a system of popular legislation. 
In Athens, therefore, the administration was conducted 



334 SWITZERLAND. 

directly by the people, but the power of legislation was 
far less under their control. Now in Switzerland pre- 
cisely the reverse is true. It is hard to conceive how 
the control of legislation by the people could be ren- 
dered more absolute than it is made by the referendum 
and the initiative ; but, on the other hand, the execu- 
tive of the Confederation is removed as far from popu- 
lar influence as is possible in a community where every 
public authority is ultimately based on universal suf- 
frage. 1 The federal councillors virtually hold office for 
life, and they are chosen, not by the people, but by the 
Assembly, whose members enjoy in their turn a singu- 
larly stable tenure. It is commonly said that every form 
of government, in order to endure, must contain some 
element of a nature opposed to the general principle on 
which the government is based, and capable of pre- 
venting that principle from being carried to excess. 
Thus in a monarchy there must be something to limit 
the authority of the king, and in a democracy some- 
thing to restrain popular impulse and fickleness. In 
Switzerland this element is to be found chiefly in the 
Federal Council, while the extreme application of the 
democratic principle is seen in the referendum and the 
initiative. 

The Swiss Confederation is, on the whole, the most 
successful democracy in the world. Unlike almost every 
other state in Europe, it has no irreconcilables, — the 
only persons in its territory who could, in any sense, 

1 Formerly this was also the case in the cantons, but with the exten- 
sion of the election of the executive council by the people, it is steadily 
becoming less true. 



A FAVORED DEMOCRACY. 335 

be classed under that name being a mere handful of 
anarchists, and these, as in our own land, are 
foreigners. The people are contented. The of the Swiss 
government is patriotic, far-sighted, efficient, 
and economical, steady in its policy, not changing its 
course with party fluctuations. Corruption in public 
life is almost unknown, and appointments to office are 
not made for political purposes by the federal authori- 
ties, or by those of most of the cantons. Officials are 
selected on their merits, and retained as long as they 
can do their work ; and yet the evils of a bureaucracy 
scarcely exist. All this bears witness to the capacity of 
the Swiss for self-government, and to the integrity and 
statesmanship of their rulers. But it must be remem- 
bered that Switzerland is free from many of the diffi- 
culties that perplex other nations. The coun- 
try is small, and experience proves that the of the 

t i i • i i i • i i Problem. 

larger the population the harder is the prob- 
lem of free government. The Swiss, moreover, furnish 
in their social condition the very best material for a 
democracy. Wealth is comparatively evenly distributed. 
There are no great manufacturing centres with their 
army of operatives ; no huge cities with their seething 
proletariat, and their burden of ignorance, poverty, and 
vice. There is no long line of immigrants, unused to 
the laws and customs of the land, to be trained and 
assimilated. There are no vast territories to be subdued, 
no mines or other great natural resources to be developed, 
and hence no immense mass of eager, restless capital, 
always taking some new shape and presenting some new 
question. The people also are decidedly stationary, not 



336 SWITZERLAND. 

perpetually moving about from one part of the country 
to another, and rising and falling in the social scale. 
Bagehot once said that the men of Massachusetts could 
work any constitution, and this may be repeated of the 
Swiss. The reason in each case is the same, for Swit- 
zerland is to-day in the same state that New England 
was in formerly. The social conditions are tolerably 
equal, the minimum level of education high, and politi- 
cal experience abundant. The Swiss statesmen deserve 
the highest praise for their labors, and the greatest 
admiration for their success, but we must beware of 
thinking that their methods would produce the same 
effects under different conditions. The problem they 
have had to solve is that of self-government among a 
small, stable, and frugal people, and this is far simpler 
than self-government in a great, rich, and ambitious 
nation. 



J 



APPENDIX. 



FRANCE. 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 

25-28 f eVr. 1875. — Loi relative a V organisation des pouvoirs 

publics. 

Art. l € . r Le pouvoir le'gislatif s'exerce par deux Assemblies : la 
Chambre des de'pute's et la Sdnat. 

La Chambre des de'pute's est nomme'e par le suffrage universel 
dans les conditions de'termine'es par la loi electorate. — La composi- 
tion, le mode de nomination et les attributions du Sdnat seront regie's 
par une loi speciale. 

2. Le President de la Re'publique est elu a la majority absolue 
des suffrages par le Senat et par la Chambre des de'pute's reunis en 
Assemble'e nationale. 

II est nomine" pour sept ans ; il est re*eligible. 

3. Le President de la Re'publique a Pinitiative des lois, concur- 
remment avec les membres des deux Chambres ; il promulgue les 
lois lorsqu'elles ont 6t6 vote'es par les deux Chambres ; il en sur- 
veille et en assure l'exe'cution. 

II a le droit de faire grace ; les amnisties ne peuvent e"tre ac- 
corde'es que par une loi. 

H dispose de la force arme'e. 

II nomme a tous les emplois civils et militaires. 

H preside aux solennite's nationales ; les envoye*s et les ambas- 
sadeurs des puissances e'trangeres sont accre'dite's aupres de lui. 

Chacun des actes du President de la Re'publique doit etre contre- 
signe* par un ministre. 

4. Au fur et a mesure des vacances qui se produiront a partir 
de la promulgation de la pre*sente loi, le President de la Repub- 

vol. n. 



338 FRANCE. 

lique nomme, en conseil des ministres, les conseillers d'Etat en ser- 
vice ordinaire. 

Les conseillers d'Etat ainsi nomme's ne pourront etre r^voqu^s que 
par ddcret rendu en conseil des ministres. 

Les conseillers d'Etat nomme's en vertu de la loi du 24 mai 
1872 ne pourront, jusqu'a l'expiration de leurs pouvoirs, etre re*- 
voque's que dans la forme de'termine'e par cette loi. 

Apres la separation de l'Assemble'e nationale, la revocation ne 
pourra etre prononcee que par une resolution du Sdnat. 

5. Le President de la Republique peut, sur l'avis conforme du 
Senat, dissoudre la Chambre des deputes avant l'expiration legale 
de son mandat. 

(En ce cas, les colleges electoraux sont convoque"s pour de nou- 
velles elections, dans le deiai de trois mois.) 1 

6. Les ministres sont solidairement responsables devant les Cham- 
bres de la politique generale du Gouvernement, et individuellement 
de leurs actes personnels. 

Le President de la Republique n'est responsable que dans le cas 
de haute trahison. 

7. En cas de vacance par deces ou pour toute autre cause, les 
deux Chambres reunies procedent immediatement a 1' election d'un 
nouveau president. Dans l'intervalle, le conseil des ministres est 
investi du pouvoir executif.' 

8. Les Chambres auront le droit, par deliberations separees, prises 
dans chacune a la majorite absolue des voix, soit spontanement, soit 
sur la demande du President de la Republique, de declarer qu'il y 
a lieu de reviser les lois constitutionnelles. 

Apres que chacune des deux Chambres aura pris cette resolution, 
elles se reuniront en Assembiee nationale pour proceder a la revi- 
sion. 

Les deliberations portant revision des lois constitutionnelles, en 
tout ou en partie, devront etre prises a la majorite absolue des raem- 
bres composant 1' Assembiee nationale. 

Toutefois, pendant la duree des pouvoirs confers par la loi du 20 
nov. 1873 a M. le marechal de MacMahon, cette revision ne peut 
avoit lieu que sur la proposition du President de la Republique. 2 

1 Amended by Art. 1 of the act of Aug. 14, 1884, infra. 

3 An addition was made to this by Art. 2 of the act of Aug. 14, 1884, infra. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 339 

(9. Le Sie'ge du pouvoir exdcutif et des deux Chambres est h 
Versailles.) 1 

24-28 f eVr. 1875. — Loi relative a V organisation du Senat. 

(Art. l e . r Le Senat se compose de trois cents membres : 
Deux cent vingt-cinq elus par les departements et les colonies, et 
soixante-quinze elus par l'Assemble'e nationale.) 2 

1 Repealed by the act of June 21, 18T9, infra. 

2 The constitutional character of the first seven articles of this law was taken 
away by Art. 3, of the act of Aug. 14, 1884, and thereupon an act was passed 
on Dec. 9, 1884, of which the first seven articles are as follows : — 

9-10 dec. 1884. — Loiportant modification aux lois organiques sur Vorganisa- 
tion du Senat et les elections des senateurs. 

Art. 1" Le Senat se compose de trois cents membres elus par les departements 
et les colonies. 

Les membres actuels, sans distinction entre les senateurs elus par 1' Assembled 
nationale on le Senat et ceux qui sont elus par les departements et les colonies, 
conservent leur mandat pendant le temps pour lequel ils ont ele* nommds. 

2. Le departement de la Seine elit dix senateurs. 
Le departement du Nord elit huit secateurs. 

Les departements des Cotes-du-Nord, Finistere, Gironde, Ule-et-Vilaine, 
Loire, Loire-Inferieure, Pas-de-Calais, Rhone, Saone-et-Loire, Seine-Inf erieure, 
elisent chacun cinq senateurs. 

L'Aisne, Bouehes-du-Rhone, Charente-Inferieure, Dordogne, Haute-Garonne, 
Isere, Maine -et-Loire, Manche, Morbihan, Puy-de-D6me, Seine-et-Oise, Somme, 
elisent, chacun quatre senateurs. 

L'Ain, Allier, Ardeche, Ardennes, Aube, Aude, Aveyron, Calvados, Cha- 
rente, Cher, Correze, Corse, Cote-d'Or, Creuse, Doubs, Drome, Eure, Eure-et- 
Loir, Gard, Gers, Herault, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Jura, Landes, Loir-et-Cher, 
Haute-Loire, Loiret, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Marne, Haute-Marne, Mayenne, 
Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Nievre, Oise, Orne, Basses-Pyrenees, Haute-Saone, 
Sarthe, Savoie, Haute-Savoie, Seine-et-Marne, Deux-Sevres, Tarn, Var, Ven- 
dee, Vienne, Haute-Vienne, Vosges, Yonne, elisent chacun trois senateurs. 

Les Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes, Alpes-Maritimes, Ariege, Cantal, Lozere, 
Hautes-Pyrenees, Pyrenees-Orientales, Tarn-et-Garonne, Vaucluse, elisent cha- 
cun deux senateurs. 

Le territoire de Belfort, les trois departements de l'Algerie, les quatre colo- 
nies de la Martinique, de la Guadeloupe, de la Reunion et des Indes frangaises, 
elisent chacun un senateur. 

3. Dans les departements ou le nombre des senateurs est augmente par la 
presente loi, l'augmentation s'effectuera a mesure des vacances qui se produi- 
ront parmi les senateurs inamovibles. 

A cet effet, il sera, dans la huitaine de la vacance, proeede en seance pub- 
lique a un tirage au sort pour determiner le departement qui sera appeie a elire 
un senateur. 

Cette election aura lieu dans le deiai de trois mois h partir du tirage aa sort ; 



340 FRANCE. 

(2. Les de'partements de la Seine et du Nord eliront chacun cinq 
se'nateurs.) 

(Les de'partements de la Seine-Inf e'rieure, Pas-de-Calais, Gironde, 
Rhone, Finistere, Cotes-du-Nord, chacun quatre se'nateurs.) 

toutefois, si la vacance survient dans les six mois qui precedent le renouvelle- 
ment triennal, il n'y sera pourvu qu'au moment de ce renouvellement. 

Le mandat ainsi contere' expirera en meme temps que celui des autres seca- 
teurs appartenant au meme departement. 

4. Nul ne peut etre s^nateur s'il n'est Francais, Jige* de quarante ans au moins 
et s'il ne jouit de ses droits civils et politiques. 

Les membres des families qui ont regn^ sur la France sont ineligibles au Se*nat. 

5. Les militaires des armies de terre et de mer ne peuvent Stre elus sdnateurs. 
Sont excepted de cette disposition : 

1° Les mar^chaux de France et les amiraux ; 

2° Les officiers g£n£raux maintenus sans limite d'age dans la premiere section 
du cadre de l'e'tat-major general et non pourvus de commandement ; 

3° Les officiers g£n£raux ou assimil^s places dans la deuxieme section du 
cadre de Fe'tat-major general ; 

4° Les militaires des armies de terre et de mer qui appartiennent soit a la 
reserve de l'arme'e active, soit a l'arm^e territoriale. 

6. Les s^nateurs sont £lus au scrutin de liste quand il y a lieu, par un col- 
lege r^uni au chef -lieu du departement ou de la colonie et compose" : 

1° Des deputes ; 

2° Des conseillers g^n^raux ; 

3° Des conseillers d'arrondissement ; 

4° Des del£gu£s elus parmi les electeurs de la commune, par chaque conseil 
municipal. 

Les conseils composes de dix membres ^liront un dele*gue\ 

Les conseils composes de douze membres ^liront deux dengue's. 

Les conseils composes de seize membres ^liront trois dengue's. 

Les conseils composes de vingt et un membres ^liront six del£gu£s. 

Les conseils composes de vingt-trois membres eliront neuf del£gue"s. 

Les conseils composes de vingt-sept membres dliront douze dele'gu^s. 

Les conseils composes de trente membres eliront quinze dengue's. 

Les conseils composes de trente-deux membres dliront dix-huit dele'gue's. 

Les conseils composes de trente-quatre membres eliront vingt et un dele'gue's. 

Les conseils composes de trente-six membres et au-dessus Eliront vingt- 
quatre delegu^s. 

Le conseil municipal de Paris elira trente dele'gu^s. 

Dans Flnde franchise, les membres des conseils locaux sont substitue*s aux 
conseillers d'arrondissement. Le conseil municipal de Pondich^ry £lira cinq 
del£gu£s. Le conseil municipal de Karikal £lira trois del£gu£s. Toutes les 
autres communes Eliront cbacune deux deldguds. 

Le vote a lieu au chef -lieu de chaque elablissement. 

7. Les membres du Sdnat sont elus pour neuf anne'es. 

Le S^nat se renouvelle tous les trois ans, conforme'ment a l'ordre des series 
de d^partements et colonies actuellement existantes. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 341 

(La Loire-Infe'rieure, Saone-et-Loire, Ille-et-Vilaine, Seine-et-Oise, 
Isere, Puy-de-D6me, Somme, Bouches-du-Rhone, Aisne, Loire, 
Manche, Maine-et-Loire, Morbihan, Dordogne, Haute-Garonne, 
Charente-Infe'rieure, Calvados, Sarthe, Herault, Basses-Pyre'ne'es, 
Gard, Aveyron, Vendue, Orne, Oise, Vosges, Allier, chacun trois 
se'nateurs.) 

(Tous les autres de'partements, chacun deux se'nateurs.) 

(Le territoire de Belfort, les trois de'partements de l'Algerie, les 
quatre colonies de la Martinique, de la Gaudeloupe, de la Reunion 
et des Indes frangaises, eliront chacun un sdnateur.) 

(3. Nul ne peut etre secateur s'il n'est Francais age* de quarante 
ans au moins, et s'il ne jouit de ses droits civils et politiques.) 

(4. Les se'nateurs des de'partements et des colonies sont elus a la 
majority absolue, et, quand il y a lieu, au scrutin de liste, par un 
college reuni au chef-lieu du de'partement ou de la colonie et com- 



1°. Des deputes ; 

2°. Des conseillers ge*ne*raux ; 

3°. Des conseillers d'arrondissement ; 

4°. Des de'le'gue's elus, un par chaque conseil municipal, parmi les 
electeurs de la commune.) 

(Dans l'lnde f rancaise, les membres du conseil colonial ou des con- 
seils locaux sont substitue's aux conseillers ge'ne'raux, aux conseillers 
d'arrondissement et aux de'le'gue's des conseils municipaux.) 

(Us votent au chef -lieu de chaque 6'tablissement.) 

(5. Les se'nateurs nomme's par 1' Assemble'e sont elus au scrutin de 
liste et a la majorite' absolue des suffrages.) 

(6. Les se'nateurs des de'partements et des colonies sont elus pour 
neuf anne'es et renouvelables par tiers, tous les trois ans.) 

(Au de'but de la premiere session, les de'partements seront divise*s 
en trois series, contenant chacune un e'gal nombre de se'nateurs ; 
il sera proce'de, par la voie du tirage au sort, a la designation des 
series qui devront etre renouvele'es a l'expiration de la premiere et 
de la deuxieme p^riode triennale.) 

(7. Les se'nateurs elus par 1' Assemble'e sont inamovibles.) 

(En cas de vacance, par ddces, demission ou autre cause, il sera, 
dans les deux mois, pourvu au remplacement par le Seliat lui-meme.) 

8. Le Seliat a, concurremment avec la Chambre des ddput^s, l'ini- 
tiative et la confection des lois. 



312 FRANCE. 

Toutefois, les lois de finances doivent etre, en premier lieu, pre*- 
sent^es a la Chambre des ddputds et voters par elle. 

9. Le S£nat peut etre constitue' en cour de justice pour juger soit 
le President de la Re'publique, soit les ministres, et pour connaitre 
des attentats commis contre la surete" de l'Etat. 

10. II sera proce'de' a l'election du Se'nat un mois avant l'epoque 
flxe'e par 1' Assembled nationale pour sa separation. 

Le Sdnat entrera en fonctions et se constituera le jour meme ou 
1' Assembled nationale se sdparera. 

11. La prdsente loi ne pourra etre promulgue'e qu'apres le vote 
ddfinitif de la loi sur les pouvoirs publics. 

16-18 juill. 1875. — Loi constitutionnelle sur les rapports des 
pouvoirs publics. 

Art. l e . r Le Se'nat et la Chambre des deputes se re'unissent chaque 
anne'e le second mardi de Janvier, a moins d'une convocation an- 
te'rieure f aite par le President de la Re'publique. 

Les deux Chambres doivent etre rdunies en session cinq mois au 
moins chaque anne'e. La session de l'une commence et finit en 
meme temps que celle de l'autre. 

(Le dimanche qui suivra la rentre'e, des prieres publiques seront 
adresse'es a Dieu dans les e'glises et dans les temples pour appeler 
son secours sur les travaux des Assemblies.) 1 

2. Le President de la Re'publique prononce la cloture de la ses- 
sion. H a le droit de convoquer extraordinairement les Chambres. 
II devra les convoquer si la demande en est faite, dans l'intervalle 
des sessions, par la majority absolue des membres composant chaque 
Chambre. 

Le President peut ajourner les Chambres. Toutefois, l'ajourne- 
ment ne peut exce'der le terme d'un mois ni avoir lieu plus de deux 
fois dans la meme session. 

3. Un mois au moins avant le terme legal des pouvoirs du Presi- 
dent de la Re'publique, les Chambres devront etre rdunies en Assem- 
bled nationale pour proceder a 1' election du nouveau President. 

A defaut de convocation, cette reunion aurait lieu de plein droit 
le quinzieme jour avant 1' expiration de ces pouvoirs. 

En cas de d^ces ou de demission du President de la Re'publique, 
les deux Chambres se re'unissent imme'diatement et plein droit. 
1 Repealed by Art. 4. of the Act of Aug. 14, 1884 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 343 

Dans le cas ou par application de Tart. 5 de la loi du 25 fevr. 
1875, la Chambre des deputes se trouverait dissoute au moment ou 
la presidence de la Eepublique deviendrait yacante, les colleges 
electcraux seraient aussitot conyoques, et le Senat se reunirait de 
plein droit. 

4. Toute assemblee de l'une des deux Chambres qui serait tenue 
hors du temps de la session commune est illicit e et nulle de plein 
droit, sauf le cas preVu par l'article precedent et celui ou le Senat 
est re'uni comme cour de justice ; et, dans ce dernier cas, il ne peut 
exercer que des fonctions judiciaires. 

5. Les seances du Senat et celles de la Chambre des de'pute's sont 
publiques. 

Neanmoins, chaque Chambre peut se former en comite secret, sur la 
demande d'un certain nombre de ses membres, fixe par le reglement. 

Elle decide ensuite. a la majorite absolue, si la seance doit etre 
reprise en public sur le meme sujet. 

6. Le President de la Ee'publique communique avec les Chambres 
par des messages qui sont lus a la tribune par un ministre. 

Les ministres ont leur entree dans les deux Chambres et doivent 
etre entendus quand ils le demandent. Us peuvent se faire assister 
par des commissaires designes. pour la discussion d'un projet de loi 
determine, par decret du President de la Eepublique. 

7. Le President de la Eepublique promulgue les lois dans le mois 
qui suit la transmission au Gouyernement de la loi definitiyement 
adoptee. II doit promulguer dans les trois jours les lois dont la pro- 
mulgation, par un yote expres dans l'une et l'autre Chambre, aura 
ete de'claree urgente. 

Dans le delai fixe pour la promulgation, le President de la Eepub- 
lique peut. par un message motiye. demander aux deux Chambres 
une nouyelle deliberation, qui ne peut etre refusee. 

8. Le President de la Eepublique negocie et ratifie les traite's. 
H en donne connaissance aux Chambre aussitot que Finteret et la 
surete de l'Etat le permettent. 

Les traites de paix, de commerce., les traites qui engagent les 
finances de TEtat. ceux qui sont relatifs a l'etat des personnes et 
au droit de propriete des Francais a TetTanger, ne sont definitifs 
qu'apres ayoir e'te yotes par les deux Chambres. Nulle cession,, 
nul echange, nulle adjonction de territoire ne peut ayoir lieu qu'en 
yertu d'une loi. 



344 FRANCE. 

9. Le President de la Republique ne peut declarer la guerre sans 
l'assentiment pre'alable des deux Chambres. 

10. Chacune des Chambres est juge de Feligibilite' de ses membres 
et de la re'gularite' de leur election ; elle peut seule recevoir leur 
demission. 

11. Le bureau de chacune des deux Chambres est elu chaque an- 
ne'e pour la dure'e de la session et pour toute session extraordinaire 
qui aurait lieu avant la session ordinaire de l'anne'e suivante. 

Lorsque les deux Chambres se rdunissent en Assembled nationale, 
leur bureau se compose des president, vice-presidents et secretaires 
du Senat. 

12. Le President de la Republique ne peut §tre mis en accusation 
que par la Chambredes deputes et ne peut etre jug^queparle S^nat. 

Les ministres peuvent etre mis en accusation par la Chambre des 
deputes pour crimes commis dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions. En 
ce cas, ils sont jug^s par le S^nat. 

Le Sdnat peut etre constitue' en cour de justice par un d^cret du 
President de la Republique, rendu en conseil des ministres, pour juger 
toute personne pr e venue d' attentat commis contre la surety de l'Etat. 

Si l'instruction est commence'e par la justice ordinaire, le ddcret 
de convocation du Senat peut etre rendu jusqu'a F arret de renvoi. 

Une loi determinera le mode de procdder pour F accusation, l'in- 
struction et le jugement. 

13. Aucun membre de l'une ou de 1' autre Chambre ne peut etre 
poursuivi ou recherche* a l'occasion des opinions ou votes emis par 
lui dans l'exercise de ses fonctions. 

14. Aucun membre de l'une ou de l'autre Chambre ne peut, pen- 
dant la dure'e de la session, etre poursuivi ou arrets en matiere cri- 
minelle ou correctionnelle qu'avec Fautorisation de la Chambre dont 
il fait partie, sauf le cas de flagrant delit. 

La detention ou la poursuite d'un membre de l'une ou de l'autre 
Chambre est suspendue pendant la session, et pour toute sa dure'e, si 
la Chambre le requiert. 

21-22 juin 1879. — Loi qui revise Vart. 9 de la loi constitution- 
nelle du 25 few. 1875. 

Article unique. L'art. 9 de la loi constitutionnelle du 25 feVr. 
1875 est abroge'. 1 

1 Thereupon an act was passed of which the first four articles are as follows : 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS. 345 

14-15 aout 1884. — Loiportant revision partielle des his consti- 
tutionnelles. 

Art. l e . r Le paragraphe 2 de l'art. 5 de le loi constitutionnelle du 
25 feVr. 1875, relative a l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, est 
modine* ainsi qu'il suit : 

" En ce cas, les colleges electoraux sont reunis pour de nouvelles 
elections dans le delai de deux mois et la Chambre dans les dix 
jours qui suivront la cloture des operations electorales." 

Art. 2. — Le paragraphe 3 de l'art. 8 de la meme loi du 25 feVr. 
1875 est complete' ainsi qu'il suit : 

" La forme republicaine du Gouvernement ne peut f aire l'objet 
d'une proposition de revision. 

a Les membres des f amiles ayant re'gne' sur la France sont ineli- 
gibles a la Prdsidence de la Republique." 

Art. 3. Les art. 1 a 7 de la loi constitutionnelle du 24 feVr. 1875, 
relative a l'organisation du Sdnat, n'auront plus le caractere consti- 
tutionnel. 

Art. 4. — Le paragraphe 3 de Tart. l er de la loi constitutionnelle 
du 16 juill. 1875, sur les rapports des pouvoirs publics, est abroge*. 

22-23 juill. 1879. — Loi relative au siege du Pouvoir executif et des Chambres 

d, Paris. 

Art. l e . r Le siege du Pouvoir executif et des deux Chambres est k Paris. 

2. Le palais du Luxembourg et le Palais-Bourbon sont affected : le premier 
au service du S^nat, le second a celui de la Chambre des deputes. 

Neanmoins, cbaeune des deux Chambres demeure maitresse de designer, dans 
la ville de Paris, le palais qu'elle veut occuper. 

3. Les divers locaux du palais de Versailles, actuellement occupds par le Se*- 
nat et la Chambre des d^put^s, conservent leur affectation. 

Dans le cas ou, conformement aux art. 7 et 8 de la loi du 25 f^vr. 1875, rela- 
tive a l'organisation des pouvoirs publics, il y aura lieu a la reunion de l'Assem- 
ble"e nationale, elle si^gera a Versailles dans la salle actuelle de la Chambre des 
deputes. 

Dans le cas ou, conformement a l'art. 9 de la loi du 24 f£vr. 1875 sur. l'orga- 
nisation du S^nat et a l'art. 12 de la loi constitutionnelle du 16 juill. 1875 sur les 
rapports des pouvoirs publics, le S^nat sera appele* a se constituer en cour de 
justice, il d^signera la ville et le local ou il entend tenir ses stances. 

4. Le Senat et la Chambre des deputes siegeront h Paris a partir du 3 no- 
vembre prochain. 



ITALY. 

STATUTO DEL REGNO. 
(4 marzo 1848.) 

CARLO ALBERTO 
Per Grazia di Dio 

Re di Sardegna, di Cipro e di Gerusalemme, 
Ecc, Ecc. 

Con lealta di Re e con affetto di padre Noi veniamo oggi a com- 
piere quanto avevamo annunziato ai nostri amatissimi sudditi col 
nostro proclama dell' 8 dell' ultimo scorso febbraio, con cui abbiamo 
voluto dimostrare, in mezzo agli eventi straordinari che circondavano 
il paese, come la nostra confidenza in loro crescesse colla gravita 
delle circostanze, e come prendendo unicamente consiglio dagli im- 
pulsi del nostro cuore, fosse ferma nostra intenzione di conformare 
le loro sorti alia ragione dei tempi, agli interessi ed alia dignita 
della nazione. 

Considerando Noi le larghe e forti istituzioni rappresentative 
contenute nel presente Statuto fondamentale come un mezzo il piu 
sicuro di raddoppiare quei vincoli d'indissolubile affetto che strin- 
gono all'Italia nostra Corona un popolo che tante prove ci ha dato 
di fede, di obbedienza e d'amore, abbiamo determinato di sancirlo 
e promulgarlo nella fiducia che Iddio benedira le pure nostre inten- 
zioni, e che la nazione, libera, forte e felice, si mostrera sempre piu 
degna dell' antica fama, e sapra meritarsi un glorioso avvenire. 

Perci6, di nostra certa scienza, Regia autorita, avuto il parere del 
nostro Consiglio, abbiamo ordinato ed ordiniamo in forza di statuto 
e legge fondamentale, perpetua ed irrevocabile della monarchia 
quanto segue : 

Art. 1. La religione cattolica apostolica e romana e la sola reli- 
gione dello Stato. Gli altri culti ora esistenti sono tollerati con- 
formemente alle leggi. 

Art. 2. Lo Stato e retto da un Governo monarchico rappresenta- 
tivo. II trono e ereditario secondo la legge salica. 



TEXT OF THE STATUTO. 347 

Art. 3. II potere legislative) sara collettivamente esercitato dal Re 
e da due Camere : il Senato e quella dei Deputati. 

Art. 4. La persona del Re e sacra e inviolabile. 

Art. 5. Al Re solo appartiene il potere esecutivo. 

Egli e il capo supremo dello Stato ; comanda tutte le f orze di 
terra e di mare ; dichiara la guerra, fa i trattati di pace, d'alleanza, 
di commercio ed altri, dandone notizia alle Camere tosto che l'in- 
teresse e la sicurezza dello Stato il permetano, ed unendovi le 
comunicazioni opportune. I trattati che importassero un onere alle 
finanze, o variazioni di territorio dello Stato, non avranno effetto se 
non dopo ottenuto l'assenso delle Camere. 

Art. 6. II Re nomina a tutte le cariche dello Stato, e f a i decreti 
e regolamenti necessari per l'esecuzione delle leggi, senza sospen- 
derne l'osservanza o dispensarne. 

Art. 7. II Re solo sanziona le leggi e le promulga. 

Art. 8. II Re pub far grazia e commutare le pene. 

Art. 9. II Re convoca in ogni anno le due Camere ; pu6 .proro- 
garne le Sessioni, e disciogliere quella dei deputati; ma in quest' 
ultimo caso ne convoca un'altra nel termine di quattro mesi. 

Art. 10. La proposizione delle leggi apparterra al Re ed a 
ciascuna delle due Camere. Per5 ogni legge d'imposizione di tri- 
buti, o di approvazione dei bilanci e dei conti dello Stato, sara pre- 
sentata prima alia Camera dei deputati. 

Art. 11. II Re e maggiore all'eta di diciotto anni compiti. 

Art. 12. Durante la minorita del Re, il principe suo piu prossimo 
parente nell'ordine della successione al trono, sara reggente del 
regno, se ha compiuto gli anni ventuno. 

Art. 13. Se, per la minorita del principe chiamato alia reggenza, 
questa e devoluta ad un parente piu lontano, il reggente, che sara en- 
trato in esercizio, conservera la reggenza fino alia maggiorita del Re. 

Art. 14. In mancanza di parenti maschi, la reggenza apparterra 
alia regina madre. 

Art. 15. Se manca anche la madre, le Camere, convocate fra 
dieci giorni dai ministri, nomineranno il reggente. 

Art. 16. Le disposizioni precedenti relative alia reggenza sono 
applicabili al caso in cui il Re maggiore si trovi nella fisica impossi- 
bility di regnare. Per6 se l'erede presuntivo del trono ha compiuti 
i diciotto anni, egli sara in tal caso di pieno diritto il reggente. 

Art. 17. La regina madre e tutrice del Re finche egli abbia compi- 
uta l'eta di sette anni ; da questo punto la tutela passa al reggente. 



348 ITALY. 

Art. 18. I diritti spettanti alia potesta civile in materia benefi- 
ciaria, o concernenti all'esecuzione delle provvisioni d'ogni natura 
provenienti dall'estero, saranno esercitati dal Re. 

Art. 19. La dotazione della Corona e conservata durante il regno 
attuale quale risultera dalla media degli ultimi dieci anni. 

II Re continuera ad avere l'uso dei reali palazzi, ville, giardini e 
dipendenze, nonche di tutti indistintamente i beni mobili spettanti 
alia Corona di cui sara fatto inventario a diligenza di un ministro 
responsabile. 

Per l'awenire la dotazione predetta verra stabilita per la durata 
d'ogni regno dalla prima Legislatura dopo l'avvenimento del Re al 
trono. 

Art. 20. Oltre i beni, che il Re attualmente possiede in proprio, 
formeranno il suo privato patrimonio ancora quelli che potesse in 
seguito acquistare a titolo oneroso o gratuito durante il suo regno. 

II Re puo disporre del suo patrimonio privato, sia per atti fra 
vivi, sia per testamento, senza essere tenuto alle regole delle leggi 
civili, che limitano la quantita disponibile. Nel rimanente il patri- 
monio del Re e soggetto alle leggi che reggono le altre proprieta. 

Art. 21. Sara provveduto per legge ad un assegnamento annuo 
pel principe ereditario giunto alia maggiorita, od anche prima in 
occasione di matrimonio ; all' appannaggio dei principi della fami- 
glia e del sangue reale nelle condizioni predette; alle doti delle 
principesse, ed al dovario delle regine. 

Art. 22. II Re, salendo al Trono, presta in presenza delle Camere 
riunite il giuramento di osservare lealmente il presente Statuto. 

Art. 23. II reggente prima di entrare in funzioni presta il giura- 
mento di essere f edele al Re, di osservare lealmente lo Statuto e le 
leggi dello Stato. 

DEI DIRITTI E DEI DOVERI DEI CITTADINI. 

Art. 24. Tutti i regnicoli, qualunque sia il loro titolo o grado, 
sono eguali dinanzi alia legge. 

Tutti godono egualmente i diritti civili e politici, e sono ammessi- 
bili alle cariche civili e militari, salve le eccezioni determinate dalle 
leggi. 

Art. 25. Essi contribuiscono indistintamente, nella proporzione 
dei loro averi, ai carichi dello Stato. 

Art. 26. La liberta individuale e guarentita. 



TEXT OF THE STATUTO. 349 

Niuno puo essere arrestato o tradotto in giudizio, se non nei casi 
previsti dalla legge, e nelle forme che essa prescrive. 

Art. 27. H domicilio e inviolabile. Niuna visita domiciliare pu6 
aver luogo se non in f orza d'una legge, e nelle forme che essa pre- 
scrive. 

Art. 28. La stampa sara libera, ma una legge ne reprime gli abusi. 

Tuttavia le bibbie, i catechismi, i libri liturgici e di preghiera non 
potranno essere stampati senza il preventivo permesso del vescovo. 

Art. 29. Tutte le proprieta, senza alcuna eccezione, sono invio- 
labili. 

Tuttavia, quando l'interesse pubblico legalmente accertato lo esiga, 
si pu6 essere tenuti a cederle in tutto od in parte, mediante una 
giusta indennita conformemente alle leggi. 

Art. 30. Nessun tributo puo essere imposto o riscosso se non e 
stato consentito dalle Camere e sanzionato dal Re» 

Art. 31. H debito pubblico e guarentito. 

Ogni impegno dello Stato verso i suoi creditori e inviolabile. 

Art. 32. E riconosciuto il diritto di adunarsi pacificamente e senz' 
armi, uniformandosi alle leggi che possono regolarne l'esercizio nelT 
interesse della cosa pubblica. 

Questa disposizione non e applicabile alle adunanze in luoghi pub- 
blici, od aperti al pubblico, i quali rimangono intieramente soggetti 
alle leggi di polizia. 

DEL SENATO. 

Art. 33. II Senato e composto di membri nominati a vita dal Re, 
in numero non limitato, aventi l'eta di quarant'anni compiuti, e 
scelti nelle categorie seguenti : 

1° Gli arcivescovi e vescovi dello Stato ; 

2° II presidente della Camera dei deputati ; 

3° I deputati dopo tre Legislature o sei anni d'esercizio ; 

4° I ministri di Stato ; 

5° I ministri segretari di Stato ; 

6° Gli ambasciatori ; 

7° Gl'inviati straordinari, dopo tre anni di tali funzioni ; 

8° I primi presidenti e presidenti del Magistrato di Cassazione e 
della Camera dei conti ; 

9° I primi presidenti dei Magistrati d'appello ; 

10° L'awocato generale presso il Magistrato di Cassazione ed il 
procuratore generale, dopo cinque anni di funzioni ; 



350 ITALY. 

11° I president! di classe dei Magistrati di appello, dopo tre 
anni di funzione ; 

12° I consiglieri del Magistrate) di Cassazione e della Camera de 
conti, dopo cinque anni di f unzioni ; 

13° Gli avvocati generali o fiscali generali presso i Magistrati 
d'appello, dopo cinque anni di funzioni ; 
. 14° Gli uffiziali generali di terra e di mare ; 

Tuttavia i maggiori generali e i contrammiragli dovranno avere 
da cinque anni quel grado in attivita ; 

15° I consiglieri di Stato dopo cinque anni di funzioni ; 

16° I membri dei Consigli di divisione, dopo tre elezioni alia loro 
Presidenza ; 

17° Gl'intendenti generali dopo sette anni di esercizio ; 

18° I membri della regia Accademia delle scienze, dopo sette 
anni di nomina ; 

19° I membri ordinari del Consiglio superiore d'istruzione pub- 
blica, dopo sette anni d' esercizio ; 

20° Coloro che con servizi o meriti eminenti avranno illustrata la 
patria ; 

21° Le persone che da tre anni pagano tre mila lire d'imposizione 
diretta in ragione dei loro beni o della loro industria. 

Art. 34. I Principi della f amiglia reale f anno di pien diritto parte 
del Senato. Essi seggono immediatamente dopo il presidente. En- 
trano in Senato a ventun anno, ed hanno voto a venticinque. 

Art. 35. H presidente e i vice-presidenti del Senato sono nomi- 
nati dal Re. 

II Senato nomina nel proprio seno i suoi segretari. 

Art. 36. II Senato e costituito in alta Corte di giustizia con de- 
creto del Re per giudicare dei crimini di alto tradimento e di atten- 
tato alia sicurezza dello Stato, e per giudicare i ministri accusati 
della Camera dei deputati. 

In questi casi il Senato non e corpo politico. Esso non pu6 oc- 
cuparsi se non degli affari giudiziari, per cui f u convocato, sotto pena 
di nullita. 

Art. 37. Fuori del caso di flagrante delitto, niun senatore pu6 
essere arrestato se non in f orza di un ordine del Senato. Esso e solo 
competente per giudicare dei reati imputati ai suoi membri. 

Art. 38. Gli atti coi quali si accertano legalmente le nascite, i 
matrimoni e le morti dei membri della famiglia reale, sono presen- 
tati al Senato, che ne ordina il deposito ne'suoi archivi. 



TEXT OF THE STATUTO. 351 



DELLA CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI. 

Art. 39. La Camera elettiva e composta di deputati scelti dai 
collegi elettorali conformemente alia legge. 

Art. 40. Nessun deputato pu6 essere ammesso alia Camera se 
non e suddito del Re, non ha compiuta l'eta di trent' anni, non gode 
i diritti civili e politici, e non riunisce in se gli altri requisiti voluti 
dalla legge. 

Art. 41. I deputati rappresentano la nazione in generale e non 
le sole provincie in cui furono eletti. 

Nessun mandato imperative pub loro darsi dagli elettori. 

Art. 42. I deputati sono eletti per cinque anni ; il loro mandato 
cessa di pien diritto alia spirazione di questo termine. 

Art. 43. II presidente, i vice-presidenti e i segretari della Camera 
dei deputati sono da essa stessa nominati nelproprio seno alprincipio 
d'ogni Sessione per tutta la sua durata. 

Art. 44. Se un deputato cessa per qualunque motivo dalle sue 
funzioni, il collegio che l'aveva eletto sara tosto convocato per fare 
una nuova elezione. 

Art. 45. Nessun deputato pu6 essere arrestato fuori del caso di 
flagrante delitto nel tempo della Sessione, ne tradotto in giudizio in 
materia criminale senza il previo consenso della Camere. 

Art. 46. Non pu6 eseguirsi alcun mandato di cattura per debiti 
contro un deputato durante la Sessione della Camera, come neppure 
nelle tre settimane precedenti e susseguenti alia medesima. 

Art. 47. La Camera dei deputati ha il diritto di accusare i minis- 
tri del Re, e di tradurli dinanzi all' alta Corte di giustizia. 

DISPOSIZIONT COMUNT ALLE DUE CAMERE. 

Art. 48. Le Sessioni del Senato e della Camera dei deputati co- 
minciano e finiscono nello stesso tempo. 

Ogni riunione di una Camera fuori del tempo della Sessione dell' 
altra e illegale, e gli atti ne sono interamente nulli. 

Art. 49. I senatori e i deputati prima di essere ammessi all' eserci- 
zio delle loro funzioni prestano il giuramento di essere f edeli al Re, 
di osservare lealmente lo Statuto e le leggi dello Stato, e di eserci- 
tare le loro funzioni col solo scopo del bene inseparable del Re e 
della patria. 

Art. 50. Le funzioni di senatore e di deputato non danno luogo ad 
alcuna retribuzione od indennita. 



352 ITALY. 

Art. 51. I senatori e i deputati non sono sindacabili per ragione 
delle opinioni da loro einesse e dei voti dati nelle Camere. 

Art. 52. Le sedute delle Camere sono pubbliche. 

Ma quando dieci membri ne facciano per iscritto la domanda, esse 
possono deliberare in segreto. 

Art. 53. Le sedute e le deliberazioni delle Camere non sono legali 
ne valide, se la maggiorita assoluta dei loro membri non e presente. 

Art. 54. Le deliberazioni non possono essere prese se non alia 
maggiorita dei voti. 

Art. 55. Ogni proposta di legge debb' essere dapprima esaminata 
dalle Giunte che saranno da ciascuna Camera nominate per i lavori 
preparatori. Discussa ed approvata da una Camera, la proposta 
sara trasmessa all' altra per la discussione ed approvazione ; e poi 
presentata alia sanzione del Re. 

Le discussioni si faranno articolo per articolo. 

Art. 56. Se un progetto di legge e stato rigettato da uno dei tre po- 
teri legislativi, non potra essere piu riprodotto nella stessa Sessione. 

Art. 57. Ognuno che sia maggiore d'eta ha il diritto di mandare 
petizioni alle Camere, le quali debbono farle esaminare da una 
Giunta, e, dopo la relazione della medesima, deliberare se debbono 
essere prese in considerazione, ed in caso aifermativo mandarsi 
al ministro competente, o depositarsi negli uffici per gli opportuni 
riguardi. 

Art. 58. Nessuna petizione pu6 essere presentata personalmente 
alle Camere. 

Le autorita costituite hanno sole il diritto di indirizzare petizioni 
in nome collettivo. 

Art. 59. Le Camere non possono ricevere alcuna deputazione, ne 
sentire altri, fuori dei propri membri, dei ministri e dei commissari 
del Governo. 

Art. 60. Ognuna delle Camere e sola competente per giudicare 
della validita dei titoli di ammissione dei propri membri. 

Art. 61. Cosi il Senato, come la Camera dei deputati, determina, 
per mezzo d'un suo regolamento interno, il modo secondo il quale 
abbia da esercitare le proprie attribuzioni. 

Art. 62. La lingua italiana e la lingua officiale delle Camere. 

E pero facoltativo di servirsi della francese ai membri che appar- 
tengono ai paesi in cui questa e in uso, od in risposta ai medesimi. 

Art. 63. Le votazioni si fanno per alzata e seduta, per divisione 



TEXT OF THE STATUTO. 353 

e per squittinio segreto. Quest' ultimo mezzo sara sempre impie- 
gato per la votazione del complesso di una legge, e per cio che con- 
cerne il personale. 

Art. 64. Nessuno pu6 essere ad un tempo senatore e deputato. 

DEI MINISTRI. 

Art. 65. II Re nomina e revoca i suoi ministri. 

Art. 66. I ministri non haimo voto deliberative nelT una o nelT 
altra Camera se non quando ne sono membri. 

Essi vi hanno sempre l'ingresso, e debbono essere sentiti sempre 
che lo richieggano. 

Art. 67. I ministri sono risponsabili. 

Le leggi e gli atti del Governo non hanno vigore se non sono mu- 
niti della firma d'un ministro. 

dell' ordine gdjdiziario. 

Art. 68. La giustizia emana dal Re, ed e amministrata in suo 
nome dai giudici che egli istituisce. 

Art. 69. I giudici nominati dal Re, ad eccezione di quelli di man- 
damento, sono inamovibili dopo tre anni di esercizio. 

Art. 70. I magistrati, tribunali e giudici attualmente esistenti sono 
conservati. Non si potra derogare all' organizzazione giudiziaria se 
non in f orza di una legge. 

Art. 71. Niuno pu6 essere distolto dai suoi giudici natural!. 

Non potranno perci6 essere creati tribunali o Commissioni straor- 
dinarie. 

Art. 72. Le udienze dei tribunali in materia civile e i dibatti- 
menti in materia criminale saranno pubblici conformemente alle 
leggi. 

Art. 73. L'interpretazione delle leggi, in modo per tutti obbliga- 
torio, spetta esclusivamente al potere legislativo. 

DISPOSIZIONL GENERALI. 

Art. 74. Le istituzioni comunali e provinciali e la circosciizione 
dei comuni e delle provincie sono regolate dalla legge. 

Art. 75. La leva militare e regolata dalla legge. 

Art. 76. E istituita una milizia comunale sovra basi fissate dalla 
legge. 

vol. n. 



354 ITALY. 

Art. 77. Lo Stato conserva la sua bandiera ; e la coccarda az- 
zurra e la sola nazionale. 

Art. 78. Gli ordini cavallereschi ora esistenti sono mantenuti con 
le loro dotazioni. Queste non possono essere impiegate in altro uso 
fuorche in quello prefisso dalla propria istituzione. 

II Re pu6 creare altri ordini, e prescriverne gli statuti. 

Art. 79. I titoli di nobilta sono mantenuti a coloro che vi hanno 
diritto. H Re pu5 conferirne dei nuovi. 

Art. 80. Niuno pu6 ricevere decorazioni, titoli o pensioni da una 
potenza estera senza l'autorizzazione del Re. 

Art. 81. Ogni legge contraria al presente Statuto e abrogata. 

DISPOSIZIONI TRANSITORIE. 

Art. 82. II presente Statuto avra il pieno suo effetto dal giorno 
della prima riunione delle due Camere, la quale avra luogo appena 
compiute le elezioni. Fino a quel punto sara provveduto al pubblico 
servizio d'urgenza con sovrane disposizioni secondo i modi e le 
forme sin qui seguite, omesse tuttavia le interinazioni e registrazioni 
dei magistrati, che sono fin d'ora abolite. 

Art. 83. Per l'esecuzione del presente Statuto, il Re si riserva 
di fare le leggi sulla stampa, sulle elezioni, sulla milizia comunale, 
sul riordinamento del Consiglio di Stato. 

Sino alia pubblicazione della legge sulla stampa rimarranno in 
vigore gli ordini vigenti a quella relativi. 

Art. 84. I ministri sono incaricati e responsabili della esecuzione 
e della piena osservanza delle presenti disposizioni transitorie. 

Dato a Torino, addi quattro del mese di marzo l'anno del Sig- 
nore mille ottocento quarant'otto e del regno nostro il decimo ot- 
tavo. 



GERMANY. 

VEEFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN EEICHS. 

Seine Majestat der Konig von Preussen im Namen des Norddeut- 
schen Bundes, Seine Majestat der Konig von Bayern, Seine Majestat 
der Konig von Wurttemberg, Seine Konigliche Hoheit der Grossher- 
zog von Baden und Seine Konigliche Hoheit der Grossherzog von 
Hessen und bei Rhein fur die sudlich vom Main belegenen Theile 
des Grossherzogthums Hessen, schliessen einen ewigen Bund zum 
Schutze des Bundesgebietes und des innerhalb desselben gultigen 
Rechtes, sowie zur Pflege der Wohlfahrt des Deutschen Volkes. 
Dieser Bund wird den Namen Deutsches Reich f iihren und wird 
nachstehende Verf assung haben. 

I. BlJNDESGEBIET. 

Aktikel 1. Das Bundesgebiet besteht aus den Staaten Preussen 
mit Lauenburg, Bayern, Sachsen, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hessen, 
Mecklenburg - Schwerin, Sachsen - Weimar, Mecklenburg - Strelitz, 
Oldenburg, Braunschweig, Sachsen-Meiningen, Sachsen-Altenburg, 
Sachsen-Koburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarz- 
burg-Sondershausen, Waldeck, Reuss alterer Linie, Reuss jiingerer 
Linie, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Liibeck, Bremen, Hamburg. 1 

II. Reichsgesetzgebung. 
Artikel 2. Innerhalb dieses Bundesgebietes ubt das Reich das 
Recht der Gesetzgebung nach Massgabe des Inhalts dieser Verfas- 
sung und mit der Wirkung aus, dass die Reichsgesetze den Landes- 
gesetzen vorgehen. Die Reichsgesetze erhalten ihre verbindliche 
Kraft durch ihre Verkiindigung von Reichswegen, welche vermittelst 
eines Reichsgesetzblattes geschieht. Sof ern nicht in dem publizirten 
Gesetze ein anderer Anfangstermin seiner verbindlichen Kraft 
bestimmt ist, beginnt die letztere mit dem vierzehnten Tage nach 

1 Since the adoption of this constitution, Alsace-Lorraine and Heligoland 
have heen annexed to the Empire. 



356 GERMANY. 

dem Ablauf desjenigen Tages, an welchem das betreffende Stuck 
des Reichsgesetzblattes in Berlin ausgegeben worden ist. 

Artikel 3. Fur ganz Deutschland besteht ein gemeinsames In- 
digenat mit der Wirkung, dass der Angehorige (Unterthan, Staats- 
blirger) eines jeden Bundesstaates in jedem anderen Bundesstaate 
als Inlander zu behandeln und Demgemass zum festen Wohnsitz, 
zum Gewerbebetriebe, zu offentlichen Aemtern, zur Erwerbung von 
Grundstucken, zur Erlangung des Staatsbiirgerrechtes und zum 
Genusse aller sonstigen burgerlichen Rechte unter denselben Voraus- 
setzungen wie der Einheimische zuzulassen, auch in Betreff der 
Rechtsverfolgung und des Rechtsschutzes demselben gleich zu be- 
handeln ist. 

Kein Deutscher darf in der Ausiibung dieser Befugniss durch 
die Obrigkeit seiner Heimath, oder durch die Obrigkeit eines anderen 
Bundesstaates beschrankt werden. 

Diejenigen Bestimmungen, welche die Armenversorgung und die 
Aufnahme in den lokalen Gemeindeverband betreffen, werden durch 
den im ersten Absatz ausgesprochenen Grundsatz nicht beruhrt. 

Ebenso bleiben bis auf Weiteres die Vertrage in Kraft, welche 
zwischen den einzelnen Bundesstaaten in Beziehung auf die Ueber- 
nahme von Auszuweisenden, die Verpflegung erkrankter und die 
Beerdigung verstorbener Staatsangehorigen bestehen. 

Hinsichtlich der Erfiillung der Militairpflicht im Verhaltniss zu 
dem Heimathslande wird im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung das 
Notbige geordnet werden. 

Dem Auslande gegenuber haben alle Deutschen gleichmassig 
Anspruch auf den Schutz des Reichs. 

Artikel 4. Der Beaufsichtigung Seitens des Reichs und der 
Gesetzgebung desselben unterliegen die nachstehenden Angelegen- 
heiten : — 

1. die Bestimmungen liber Freiziigigkeit, Heimaths- und Nieder- 
lassungs-Verhaltnisse, Staatsburgerrecht, Passwesen und Fremden- 
polizei und iiber den Gewerbebetrieb, einschliesslich des Versicher- 
ungswesens, soweit diese Gegenstande nicht schon durch den Artikel 
3 dieser Verfassung erledigt sind, in Bayern jedoch mit Ausschluss 
der Heimaths- und Niederlassungs-Verhaltnisse, desgleichen iiber 
die Kolonisation und die Auswanderung nach ausserdeutschen 
Landern ; 

2. die Zoll- und Handelsgesetzgebung und die fur die Zwecke 
des Reichs zu verwendenden Steuern ; 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 357 

3. die Ordnung des Maass-, Miinz- und Gewichtssystems, nebst 
Feststellung der Grundsatze liber die Emission von fundirtem und 
unf undirtem Papiergelde ; 

4. die Allgemeinen Bestimmungen iiber das Bankwesen ; 

5. die Erfindungspatente ; 

6. der Schutz des geistigen Eigenthums ; 

7. Organisation eines gemeinsamen Schutzes des Deutschen Han- 
dels im Auslande, der Deutschen Schifffahrt und ihrer Flagge zur 
See und Anordnung gemeinsamer konsularischer Vertretung, welche 
vom Reiche ausgestattet wird ; 

8. das Eisenbahnwesen, in Bayern vorbehaltlich der Bestimmung 
im Artikel 46, und die Herstellung von Land- und Wasserstrassen 
im Interesse der Landesvertheidigung und des allgemeinen Verkehrs ; 

9. der Flosserei- und Sckiffahrtsbetrieb auf den mehreren Staaten 
gemeinsamen Wasserstrassen und der Zustand der letzteren, sowie 
die Fluss- und sonstigen Wasserzolle ; desgleichen die Seeschiff- 
fahrtszeichen (Leuchtfeuer, Tonnen, Baken und sonstige Tages- 
marken) ; * 

10. das Post- und Telegraphenwesen, jedoch in Bayern und Wurt- 
temberg nur nach Massgabe der Bestimmung im Artikel 52 ; 

11. Bestimmungen uber die wechselseitige Vollstreckung von 
Erkenntnissen in Civilsachen und Erledigung von Requisitionen 
iiberhaupt ; 

12. sowie liber die Beglaubigung von offentlichen Urkunden ; 

13. die gemeinsame Gesetzgebung uber das gesammte burgerliche 
Recht, das Straf recht und das gerichtliche Verfahren : 2 

14. das Militairwezen des Reichs und die Kriegsmarine ; 

15. Massregeln der Medizinal- und Veterinairpolizei ; 

16. die Bestimmungen iiber die Presse und das Vereinswesen. 
Artikel 5. Die Reichsgesetzgebung wird ausgeiibt durch den 

Bundesrath und den Reichstag. Die Uebereinstimmung der Mehr- 
heitsbeschltisse beider Yersammlungen ist zu einem Reichsgesetze 
erf orderlich und ausreichend. 

Bei Gesetzesvorschlagen iiber das Militairwesen, die Kriegsmarine 
und die im Artikel 35. bezeichneten Abgaben giebt, wenn im Bundes- 

1 The last nine words were added by the amendment of March 3, 1873. 

2 This is the form of the clause, as amended on December 20, 1873. In the 
original form it read as follows : " Die gemeinsame Gesetzgebung iiber das 
Obligationsrecht, Strafrecht, Handels- und Wechselrecht und das gerichtliche 
Verfaren." 



358 



GERMANY. 



rathe eine Meinungsverschiedenheit stattfindet, die Stimme des 
Presidiums den Ausschlag, wenn sie sich fur die Aufrechthaltung 
der bestehenden Einrichtungen ausspricht. 

III. BlTNDESRATH. 

Arttkel 6. Der Bundesrath besteht aus den Vertretern der 
Mitglieder des Bundes, unter welchen die Stimmf uhrung sich in der 
Weise vertheilt, dass Preussen mit den ehemaligen Stimmen von 
Hannover, Kurhessen, Holstein, Nassau 
und Frankfurt 
fuhrt, Bayern 



Sachsen 

Wilrttemberg 

Baden 

Hessen 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin 

Sachsen-Weimar 

Mecklenburg-Strelitz 

Oldenburg . 

Braunschweig . 

Sachsen-Meiningen 

Sachsen-Altenburg . 

Sachsen-Koburg-Gotha 

Anhalt .... 

Schwarzburg-B-udolstadt 

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 

Waldeck . 

Reuss alterer Linie . 

Reuss jiingerer Linie . 

Schaumburg-Lippe . 

Lippe 

Ltibeck .... 

Bremen 

Hamburg 

Zusammen . » 



Jedes Mitglied des Bundes kann so viel Bevollmachtigte zum 
Bundesrathe ernennen, wie es Stimmen hat, doch kann die Gesammt- 
heit der zustandigen Stimmen nur einheitlich abgegeben werden. 



17 Stimmen. 


6 


u 


4 


a 


4 


a 


3 


a 


3 


a 


2 


a 


1 


a 


1 


u 


1 


u 


2 


tt 


1 


(6 


1 


(i 


1 


it 


1 


a 


1 


a 


1 


tt 


1 


tt 


1 


tt 


1 


tt 


1 


tt 


1 


it 


1 


tt 


1 


it 


1 


a 


58 Stimmen. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 359 

Artikel 7. Der Bundesrath beschliesst : — 

1. liber die dem Keichstage zu machenden Vorlagen und die von 
demselben gefassten Beschltisse ; 

2. tiber die zur Ausfiihrung der Reichsgesetze erforderlichen 
allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften und Einrichtungen, sofern 
nicht dnrcb Reichsgesetz etwas Anderes bestimmt ist ; 

3. iiber Mangel, welche bei der Ausfiihrung der Reichsgesetze 
oder der vorstehend erwahnten Yorschriften oder Einrichtungen 
hervortreten. 

Jedes Bundesglied ist befugt, Vorschlage zu machen und in 
Vortrag zu bringen, und das Prasidium ist verpflichtet, dieselben der 
Beratbung zu iibergeben. 

Die Beschlussfassung erfolgt, vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen in 
den Artikeln 5, 37, und 78, mit einfacher Mehrheit. Nicht vertre- 
tene oder nicht instruirte Stimmen werden nicht gezahlt. Bei 
Stimmengleichheit giebt die Prasidialstimme den Ausschlag. 

Bei der Beschlussfassung liber eine Angelegenheit, welche nach 
den Bestimmungen dieser Verfassung nicht dem ganzen Reiche 
gemeinschaftlich ist, werden die Stimmen nur derjenigen Bundes- 
staaten gezahlt, welehen die Angelegenheit gemeinschaftlich ist. 

Artikel 8. Der Bundesrath bildet aus seiner Mitte dauernde 
Ausschiisse. 

1. fur das Landheer und die Festungen ; 

2. fur das Seewesen ; 

3. fur Zoll- und Steuerwesen ; 

4. fur Handel und Verkehr ; 

5. flir Eisenbahnen, Post und Telegraphen ; 

6. flir Justizwesen ; 

7. fur Rechnungswesen. 

In jedem dieser Ausschiisse werden ausser dem Prasidium min- 
destens vier Bundesstaaten vertreten sein, und fiihrt innerhalb dersel- 
ben jeder Staat nur Eine Stimme. In dem Ausschuss fur das Land- 
heer und die Festungen hat Bayern einen standigen Sitz, die iibrigen 
Mitglieder desselben, sowie die Mitglieder des Ausschusses fur das 
Seewesen werden vom Kaiser ernannt ; die Mitglieder der anderen 
Ausschiisse werden von dem Bundesrathe gewahlt. Die Zusam- 
mensetzung dieser Ausschiisse ist flir jede Session des Bundesrathes 
resp. mit jedem Jahre zu erneuern, wobei die ausscheidenden Mit- 
glieder wieder wahlbar sind. 



360 GERMANY. 

Ausserdem wird im Bundesrathe aus den Bevollmachtigten der 
Konigreiche Bayern, Sachsen, und Wiirttemberg und zwei, vom 
Bundesrathe alljahrlich zu wahlenden Bevollmachtigten anderer 
Bundesstaaten ein Ausschuss fiir die auswartigen Angelegenheiten 
gebildet, in welchem Bayern den Vorsitz fiihrt. 

Den Aussclmssen werden die zu ihren Arbeiten nothigen Beamten 
zur Verfiigung gestellt. 

Artikel 9. Jedes Mitglied des Bundesrathes hat das Recht, im 
Reichstage zu erscheinen und muss daselbst auf Verlangen jederzeit 
gehort werden, urn die Ansichten seiner Regierung zu vertreten, auch 
dann, wenn dieselben von der Majoritat des Bundesrathes nicht 
adoptirt worden sind. Niemand kann gleichzeitig Mitglied des 
Bundesrathes und des Reichstages sein. 

Artikel 10. Dem Kaiser liegt es ob, den Mitgliedern des Bundes- 
rathes den iiblichen diplomatisehen Schutz zu gewahren. 

IV. Prasidium. 

Artikel 11. Das Prasidium des Bundes steht dem Konige von 
Preussen zu, welcher den Namen Deutscher Kaiser fiihrt. Der 
Kaiser hat das Reich volkerrechtlich zu vertreten, im Namen des 
Reichs Krieg zu erklaren und Frieden zu schliessen, Bundnisse 
und andere Vertrage mit fremden Staaten einzugehen, Gesandte zu 
beglaubigen und zu empf angen. 

Zur Erklarung des Krieges im Namen des Reichs ist die Zustim- 
mung des Bundesrathes erf orderlich, es sei denn, dass ein Angriff 
auf das Bundesgebiet oder dessen Kiisten erfolgt. 

Insoweit die Vertrage mit fremden Staaten sich auf solche Gegen- 
stande beziehen, welche nach Artikel 4, in den Bereich der Reichs- 
gesetzgebung gehoren, ist zu ihrem Abschluss die Zustimmung des 
Bundesrathes und zu ihrer Gultigkeit die Genehmigung des Reich- 
stages erforderlich. 

Artikel 12. Dem Kaiser steht es zu, den Bundesrath und den 
Reichstag zu beruf en, zu eroffnen, zu vertagen und zu schliessen. 

Artikel 13. Die Beruf ung des Bundesrathes und des Reichstages 
findet alljahrlich statt und kann der Bundesrath zur Vorbereitung 
der Arbeiten ohne den Reichstag, letzterer aber nicht ohne den 
Bundesrath berufen werden. 

Artikel 14. Die Berufung des Bundesrathes muss erfolgen, so- 
bald sie von einem Drittel der Stimmenzahl verlangt wird. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 361 

Artikel 15. Der Vorsitz im Bundesrathe und die Leitung der 
Geschafte steht dem Reichskanzler zu, welcher vom Kaiser zu ernen- 
nen ist. 

Der Reichskanzler kann sich durch jedes andere Mitglied des 
Bundesrathes vermoge schriftlicher Substitution vertreten lassen. 

Artikel 16. Die erf orderlichen Yorlagen werden nach Massgabe 
der Beschliisse des Bundesrathes im Namen des Kaisers an den 
Reichstag gebracht, wo sie durch Mitglieder des Bundesrathes oder 
durch besondere von letzterem zu ernennende Kommissarien vertre- 
ten werden. 

Artikel 17. Dem Kaiser steht die Ausfertigung und Verkiindi- 
gung der Reichsgesetze und die Ueberwachung der Ausfuhrung 
derselben zu. Die Anordnungen und Verftigungen des Kaisers 
werden im Namen des Reichs erlassen und bediirf en zu ihrer Gultig- 
keit der Gegenzeichnung des Reichskanzlers, welcher dadurch die 
Verantwortlichkeit tibernimmt. 

Artikel 18. Der Kaiser ernennt die Reichsbeamten, lasst diesel- 
ben fur das Reich vereidigen und verf Iigt erf orderlichen Falles deren 
Entlassung. 

Den zu einem Reichsamte berufenen Beamten eines Bundesstaates 
stehen, sof ern nicht vor ihrem Eintritt in den Reichsdienst im Wege 
der Reichsgesetzgebung etwas Anderes bestimmt ist, dem Reiche 
gegentiber diejenigen Rechte zu, welche ihnen in ihrem Heimaths- 
lande aus ihrer dienstlichen Stellung zugestanden hatten. 

Artikel 19. Wenn Bundesglieder ihre verfassungsmassigen 
Bundespflichten nicht erfullen, konnen sie dazu im Wege der Exe- 
kution angehalten werden. Diese Exekution ist vom Bundesrathe 
zu beschliessen und vom Kaiser zu vollstrecken. 

V. Reichstag. 

Artikel 20. Der Reichstag geht aus allgemeinen und direkten 
Wahlen mit geheimer Abstimmung hervor. 

Bis zu der gesetzlichen Regelung, welche im § 5, des Wahlge- 
setzes vom 31. Mai 1869 (Bundesgesetzbl. 1869, S. 145), vorbehal- 
ten ist, werden in Bayern 48, in Wtirttemberg 17, in Baden 14, in 
Hessen stidlich des Main 6, in Elsass-Lothringen 15 Abgeordnete 
gewahlt, und betragt demnach die Gesammtzahl der Abgeordneten 
397. 1 

1 In the original constitution nothing was said abont representatives from 



362 GERMANY. 

Artikel 21. Beamte bediirfen keines Urlaubs zum Eintritt in 
den Reichstag. 

Wenn ein Mitglied des Reichstages ein besoldetes Reichsamt oder 
in einem Bundesstaat ein besoldetes Staatsamt annimmt oder im 
Reichs- oder Staatsdienste in ein Amt eintritt, mit welchem ein 
hoherer Rang oder ein hoheres Gehalt verbunden ist, so verliert 
es Sitz und Stimme in dem Reichstag und kann seine Stelle in 
demselben nur durch neue Wahl wieder erlangen. 

Artikel 22. Die Verhandlungen des Reichstages sind offentlich. 

Wahrheitsgetreue Berichte iiber Verhandlungen in den offent- 
lichen Sitzungen des Reichstages bleiben von jeder Verantwortlich- 
keit frei. 

Artikel 23. Der Reichstag hat das Recht, innerhalb der Kom- 
petenz des Reichs Gesetze vorzuschlagen und an ihn gerichtete 
Petitionen dem Bundesrathe resp. Reichskanzler zu uberweisen. 

Artikel 24. Die Legislaturperiode des Reichstages dauert filnf 
Jahre. 1 Zur Auflosung des Reichstages wahrend derselben ist ein 
Beschluss des Bundesrathes unter Zustimmung des Kaisers erf order- 
lich. 

Artikel 25. Im Falle der Auflosung des Reichstages mussen 
innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von 60 Tagen nach derselben die Wahler 
und innerhalb eines Zeitraumes von 90 Tagen nach der Auflosung 
der Reichstag versammelt werden. 

Artikel 26. Ohne Zustimmung des Reichstages darf die Ver- 
tagung desselben die Frist von 30 Tagen nicht ubersteigen und 
wahrend derselben Session nicht wiederholt werden. 

Artikel 27. Der Reichstag priift die Legitimation seiner Mit- 
glieder und entscheidet dariiber. Er regelt seinen Geschaftsgang 
und seine Disziplin durch eine Geschafts-Ordnung und erwahlt 
seinen Prasidenten, seine Vizeprasidenten und Schriftfuhrer. 

Artikel 28. Der Reichstag beschliesst nach absoluter Stimmen- 
mehrheit. Zur Giiltigkeit der Beschlussfassung ist die Anwesen- 
heit der Mehrheit der gesetzlichen Anzahl der Mitglied er erforder- 
lich. 2 

Alsace-Lorraine, and the total number was fixed at 382. The change was made 
by the act of June 25, 1873, concerning the application of the constitution to 
Alsace-Lorraine. 

1 The original period was three years, the change to five being made by the 
amendment of March 19, 1888. 

2 To this article was originally added the following clause, which was 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 363 

A rttttfx 29. Die Mitglieder des Reichstages sind Vertreter 
des gesammten Volkes und an Auftrage und Instruktionen nicht 
gebunden. 

Artlkel 30. Kein Mitglied des Reichstages darf zu irgend einer 
Zeit wegen seiner Abstimmung oder wegen der in Auslibung seines 
Beruf es gethanen Aeusserungen gerichtlich oder disziplinarisch ver- 
folgt oder sonst ausserhalb der Versammlung zur Verantwortung 
gezogen werden. 

Artikel 31. Ohne Genehmigung des Reichstages kann kein Mit- 
glied desselben wahrend der Sitzungsperiode wegen einer mit Strafe 
bedrohten Handlung zur Untersuchung gezogen oder verhaftet wer- 
den, ausser wenn es bei Ausiibung der That oder im Laufe des 
nachstfolgenden Tages ergriffen wird. 

Gleiche Genehmigung ist bei einer Verhaftung wegen Schulden 
erforderlich. 

Auf Verlangen des Reichstages wird jedes Strafrerfahren gegen 
ein Mitglied desselben und jede Untersuchungs- oder Civilhaft ftir 
die Dauer der Sitsungsperiode aufgehoben. 

Artikel 32. Die Mitglieder des Reichstages dtirfen als solche 
keine Besoldung oder Entschadigung beziehen. 

VI. Zoll- uxd ELlndelswesen. 

Artikel 33. Deutschland bildet ein Zoll- und Handelsgebiet, 
umgeben von gemeinschaftlicher Zollgrenze. Ausgeschlossen bleiben 
die wegen ihrer Lage zur Einschliessung in die Zollgrenze nicht 
geeigneten einzelnen Gebietstheile. 

Alle Gegenstande, welche im freien Verkehr eines Bundesstaates 
befindlich sind, konnen in jeden anderen Bundesstaat eingefuhrt und 
diirfen in letzterem einer Abgabe nur insoweit unterworfen werden, 
als daselbst gleichartige inlandische Erzeugnisse einer inneren Steuer 
unterliegen. 

Artikel 34. Die Hansestadte Bremen und Hamburg mit einem 
dem Zweck entsprechenden Bezirke ihres oder des umliegenden 
Gebietes bleiben als Freihafen ausserhalb der gemeinschaftlichen 
Zollgrenze, bis sie ihren Einschluss in dieselbe beantragen. 

repealed by the amendment of Feb. 24, 1873 : " Bei der Bescblnssfassung iiber 
eine Angelegenbeit, welcbe nach den Bestimmnngen dieser Verfassung 1 nicht 
dem ganzen Reiche gemeinschaftlich ist, werden die Stimmen nnr derjenigen 
Mitglieder gezahlt, die in Bnndesstaaten gewahlt sind, welchen die Angelegen- 
heit gemeinschaftlich ist." 



364 GERMANY. 

Artikel 35. Das Reich ausschliesslich hat die Gesetzgebung 
liber das gesammte Zollwesen, iiber die Besteuerung des im Bundes- 
gebiete gewonnenen Salzes und Tabacks, bereiteten Branntweins 
und Bieres und aus Ruben oder anderen inlandischen Erzeugnissen 
dargestellten Zuckers und Syrups, liber den gegenseitigen Schutz 
der in den einzelnen Bundesstaaten erhobenen Verbrauchsabgaben 
gegen Hinterziehungen, sowie iiber die Massregeln, welche in den 
Zollausschlussen zur Sicherung der gemeinsamen Zollgrenze erfor- 
derlich sind. 

In Bayern, Wiirttemberg und Baden bleibt die Besteuerung des 
inlandischen Branntweins und Bieres der Landesgesetzgebung vor- 
behalten. Die Bundesstaaten werden jedoch ihr Bestreben darauf 
richten, eine Uebereinstimmung der Gesetzgebung liber die Besteu- 
erung auch dieser Gegenstande herbeizuflihren. 

Artikel 36. Die Erhebung und Verwaltung der Zolle und Ver- 
brauchssteuern (Art. 35) bleibt jedem Bundesstaate, soweit derselbe 
sie bisher ausgelibt hat, innerhalb seines Gebietes liberlassen. 

Der Kaiser liberwacht die Einhaltung des gesetzlichen Verfahr- 
ens durch Reichsbeamte, welche er den Zoll- oder Steueramtern 
und den Direktivbehorden der einzelnen Staaten, nach Vernehmung 
des Ausschusses des Bundesrathes fur Zoll- und Steuerwesen, beiord- 
net. 

Die von diesen Beamten liber Mangel bei der Ausflihrung der 
gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebung (Art. 35) gemachten Anzeigen 
werden dem Bundesrathe zur Beschlussnahme vorgelegt. 

Artikel 37. Bei der Beschlussnahme liber die zur Ausfuhrung 
der gemeinschaftlichen Gesetzgebung (Art. 35) dienenden Verwalt- 
ungsvorschriften und Einrichtungen giebt die Stimme des Presi- 
diums alsdann den Ausschlag, wenn sie sich fur Auf rechthaltung der 
bestehenden Vorschrift oder Einrichtung ausspricht. 

Artikel 38. Der Ertrag der Zolle und der anderen in Artikel 
35, bezeichneten Abgaben, letzterer soweit sie der Reichsgesetzge- 
bung unterliegen, fliesst in die Reichskasse. 

Dieser Ertrag besteht aus der gesammten von den Zollen und den 
iibrigen Abgaben aufgekommenen Einnahme nach Abzug : 

1. der auf Gesetzen oder allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften 
beruhenden Steuerverglitungen und Ermassigungen, 

2. der Rlickerstattungen fur unrichtige Erhebungen, 

3. der Erhebungs- und Verwaltungskosten, und zwar : 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 365 

a. bei den Zollen der Kosten, welche an den gegen das Aus- 
land gelegenen Grenzen und in dem Grenzbezirke fiir den 
Schutz und die Erhebung der Zolle erforderlich sind, 

b. bei der Salzsteuer der Kosten, welche zur Besoldung der 
mit Erhebung und Kontrolirung dieser Steuer auf den Salz- 
werken beauftragten Beamten aufgewendet werden, 

c. bei der Rtibenzuckersteuer und Tabacksteuer der Vergti- 
tung, welche nach den jeweiligen Beschliissen des Bundesrathes 
den einzelnen Bundesregierungen fur die Kosten der Verwal- 
tung dieser Sleuern zu gewahren ist, 

d. bei den ubrigen Steuern mit funfzehn Prozent der Ge- 
sammteinnahme. 

Die ausserhalb der gemeinschaftlichen Zollgrenze liegenden 
Gebiete tragen zu den Ausgaben des Eeichs durch Zahlung eines 
Aversums bei. 

Bayern, Wurttemberg und Baden haben an dem in die Reichs- 
kasse fliessenden Ertrage der Steuern von Branntwein und Bier 
und an dem diesem Ertrage entsprechenden Theile des vorstehend 
erwahnten Aversums keinen Theil. 

Artikel 39. Die von den Erhebungsbehorden der Bundesstaaten 
nach Ablauf eines jeden Vierteljahres aufzustellenden Quartal- 
Extrakte und die nach dem Jahres- und Bticherschlusse aufzustellen- 
den Finalabschlusse tiber die im Laufe des Vierteljahres bezie- 
hungsweise wahrend des Rechnungsjahres fallig gewordenen Ein- 
nahmen an Zollen und nach Artikel 38. zur Reichskasse fliessenden 
Verbrauchsabgaben werden von den Direktivbehorden der Bundes- 
staaten, nach vorangegangener Priifung, in Hauptiibersichten zusam- 
mengestellt, in welchen jede Abgabe gesondert nachzuweisen ist, 
und es werden diese Uebersichten an den Ausschuss des Bundes- 
rathes fiir das Rechnungswesen eingesandt. 

Der letztere stellt auf Grund dieser Uebersichten von drei zu 
drei Monaten den von der Kasse jedes Bundesstaates der Reichs- 
kasse schuldigen Betrag vorlaufig fest und setzt von dieser Feststel- 
lung den Bundesrath und die Bundesstaaten in Kenntniss, legt auch 
alljahrlich die schliessliche Feststellung jener Betrage mit seinen 
Bemerkungen dem Bundesrathe vor. Der Bundesrath beschliesst 
uber diese Feststellung. 

Artikel 40. Die Bestimmungen in dem Zollvereinigungsvertrage 
vom 8. Juli 1867, bleiben in Kraft, soweit sie nicht durch die 



366 GERMANY. 

Vorschriften dieser Verfassung abgeandert sind und so lange sie 
nicht auf dem im Artikel 7., beziehungsweise 78. bezeichneten 
Wege abgeandert werden. 

VII. ElSENBAHNWESEN. 

Artikel 41. Eisenbahnen, welche im Interesse der Vertheidi- 
gung Deutschlands oder im Interesse des gemeinsamen Verkehrs f ur 
nothwendig erachtet werden, konnen kraft eines Reichsgesetzes 
auch gegen den Widerspruch der Bundesglieder, deren Gebiet die 
Eisenbahnen durchschneiden, unbeschadet der Landeshoheitsrechte, 
fiir Rechnung des Reichs angelegt oder an Privatunternehmer zur 
Ausftihrung konzessionirt und mit dem Expropriationsrechte aus- 
gestattet werden. 

Jede bestehende Eisenbabnverwaltung ist verpflicbtet, sich den 
Anschluss neu angelegter Eisenbahnen auf Kosten der letzteren 
gefallen zu lassen. 

Die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen, welche bestehenden Eisenbahn- 
Unternehmungen ein Widerspruchsrecht gegen die Anlegung von 
Parallel- oder Konkurrenzbahnen einraumen, werden, unbeschadet 
bereits erworbener Rechte, fiir das ganze Reich hierdurch aufgeho- 
ben. Ein solches Widerspruchsrecht kann auch in den kiinftig zu 
ertheilenden Konzessionen nicht weiter verliehen werden. 

Artikel 42. Die Bundesregierungen verpflichten sich, die 
Deutschen Einsenbahnen im Interesse des allgemeinen Verkehrs wie 
ein einheitliches Netz verwalten und zu diesem Behuf auch die neu 
herzustellenden Bahnen nach einheitlichen Normen anlegen und 
ausriisten zu lassen. 

Artikel 43. Es sollen demgemass in thunlichster Beschleuni- 
gung ubereinstimmende Betriebseinrichtungen getroffen, insbesondere 
gleiche Bahnpolizei-Reglements eingefuhrt werden. Das Reich hat 
dafiir Sorge zu tragen, dass die Eisenbahnverwaltungen die Bahnen 
jederzeit in einem die nothige Sicherheit gewahrenden baulichen 
Zustande erhalten und dieselben mit Betriebsmaterial so ausrusten, 
wie das Verkehrsbediirfniss es erheischt. 

Artikel 44. Die Eisenbahnverwaltungen sind verpflichtet, die 
fiir den durchgehenden Verkehr und zur Herstellung ineinander 
greifender Fahrplane nothigen Personenziige mit entsprechender 
Fahrgeschwindigkeit, desgleichen die zur Bewaltigung des Giiter- 
verkehrs nothigen Gtiterziige einzuf iihren, auch direkte Expeditionen 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 367 

im Personen- und Giiterverkehr, unter Gestattung des Ueberganges 
der Transportmittel von einer Bahn auf die andere, gegen die 
tibliche Vergiitung einzurichten. 

Artikel 45. Dem Reiche stent die Kontrole iiber das Tarif- 
wesen zu. Dasselbe wird namentlich dahin -wirken : 

1. dass baldigst auf alien Deutschen Eisenbahnen iibereinstim- 
mende Betriebsreglements eingefiihrt werden ; 

2. dass die moglichste Gleichmassigkeit und Herabsetzung der 
Tarife erzielt, insbesondere, dass bei grosseren Entfernungen fur 
den Transport von Kohlen, Koaks, Holz, Erzen, Steinen, Salz, 
Roheisen, Dtingungsmitteln und ahnlichen Gegenstanden ein dem 
Bediirfniss der Landwirthschaft und Industrie entspechender er- 
massigter Tarif , und zwar zunachst thunlichst der Einpf ennig-Tarif 
eingefiihrt werde. 

Artikel 46. Bei eintretenden Nothstanden, insbesondere bei 
ungewbhnlicher Theuerung der Lebensmittel, sind die Eisenbahn- 
verwaltungen verpflichtet, fiir den Transport, namentlich von Ge- 
treide, Mehl, Hulsenfriichten und Kartoffeln, zeitweise einen dem 
Bediirfniss entsprechenden, von dem Kaiser auf Vorschlag des betref- 
fenden Bundesraths-Ausschusses festzustellenden, niedrigen Spezial- 
tarif einzufiihren, welcher jedoch nicht unter den niedrigsten auf 
der betreffenden Bahn fiir Rohprodukte geltenden Satz herabgehen 
darf. 

Die vorstehend, sowie die in den Artikeln 42, bis 45, getrof- 
fenen Bestimmungen sind auf Bayern nicht anwendbar. 

Dem Reiche steht jedoch auch Bayern gegeniiber das Recht zu, 
im Wege der Gesetzgebung einheitliche Normen fiir die Konstruk- 
tion und Ausriistung der fiir die Landesvertheidigung wichtigen 
Eisenbahnen aufzustellen. 

Artikel 47. Den Anforderungen der Behorden des Reichs in 
Betreff der Benutzung der Eisenbahnen sum Zweck der Vertheidi- 
gung Deutschlands haben sammtliche Eisenbahnverwaltungen un- 
weigerlich Folge zu leisten. Insbesondere ist das Militair und alles 
Kriegsmaterial zu gleichen ermassigten Satzen zu befordern. 

VIII. Post- und Telegraphenwesen. 

Artikel 48. Das Postwesen und das Telegraphenwesen werden 
fiir das gesammte Gebiet des Deutschen Reichs als einheitliche Staats- 
verkehrs-Anstalten eingerichtet und verwaltet. 



368 GERMANY. 

Die im Artikel 4. vorgesehene Gesetzgebung des Keichs in Post- 
und Telegraphen-Angelegenheiten erstreckt sich nicht auf diejenigen 
Gegenstande, deren Regelung nach den in der Norddeutschen Post- 
und Telegraphen-Verwaltung massgebend gewesenen Grundsatzen 
der reglementarischen Festsetzung oder administrativen Anordnung 
iiberlassen ist. 

Artikel 49. Die Einnahmen des Post- und Telegraphenwesens 
sind fur das ganze Reich gemeinschaftlich. Die Ausgaben werden 
aus den gemeinschaftlichen Einnahmen bestritten. Die Ueber- 
schiisse fliessen in die Reichskasse (Abschnitt XII.). 

Artikel 50. Dem Kaiser gehort die obere Leitung der Post- und 
Telegraphenverwaltung an. Die von ihm bestellten Behorden haben 
die Pflicht und das Recht, dafur zu sorgen, dass Einheit in der 
Organisation der Verwaltung und im Betriebe des Dienstes, sowie 
in der Qualifikation der Beamten hergestellt und erhalten wird. 

Dem Kaiser steht der Erlass der reglementarischen Festsetzungen 
und allgemeinen administrativen Anordnungen, sowie die aus- 
schliessliche Wahrnehmung der Beziehungen zu anderen Post- und 
Telegraphenverwaltungen zu. 

Sammtliche Beamte der Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung sind 
verpflichtet, den Kaiserlichen Anordnungen Folge zu leisten. Diese 
Verpnichtung ist in den Diensteid aufzunehmen. 

Die Anstellung der bei den Verwaltungsbehorden der Post und 
Telegraphie in den verschiedenen Bezirken erforderlichen oberen 
Beamten (z. B. der Direktoren, Rathe, Ober-Inspektoren), ferner 
die Anstellung der zur Wahrnehmung des Aufsichts- u. s. w. Dien- 
stes in den einzelnen Bezirken als Organe der erwahnten Behorden 
fungirenden Post- und Telegraphenbeamten (z. B. Inspektoren, 
Kontroleure) geht fur das ganze Gebiet des Deutschen Reichs vom 
Kaiser aus, welchem diese Beamten den Diensteid Leisten. Den 
einzelnen Landesregierungen wird von den in Rede stehenden 
Ernennungen, soweit dieselben ihre Gebiete betreffen, Behufs der 
landesherrlichen Bestatigung und Publikation rechtzeitig Mittheilung 
gemacht werden. 

Die anderen bei den Verwaltungsbehorden der Post und Tele- 
graphie erforderlichen Beamten, sowie alle fur den lokalen und 
technischen Betrieb bestimmten, mithin bei den eigentlichen Be- 
triebsstellen fungirenden Beamten u. s. w. werden von den betref- 
fenden Landesregierungen angestellt. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 369 

Wo eine selbststandige Landespost- resp. Telegraphenverwaltung 
nicht besteht, entscheiden die Bestimmungen der besonderen Ver- 
trage. 

Artikel 51. Bei Ueberweisung des Ueberschusses der Postver- 
waltung fiir allgemeine Reichszwecke (Art. 49.) soil, in Betracht 
der bisherigen Verschiedenbeit der von den Landes-Postverwaltungen 
der einzelnen Gebiete erzielten Reineinnahmen, zum Zwecke einer 
entsprechenden Ausgleichung wahrend der unten f estgesetzten Ueber- 
gangszeit folgendes Verfabren beobachtet werden. 

Aus den Postiiberschiissen, welcbe in den einzelnen Postbezirken 
wabrend der fiinf Jabre 1861. bis 1865. aufgekommen sind, wird 
ein durcbscbnittlicber Jabresiiberscbuss berechnet, und der Antbeil, 
welchen jeder einzelne Postbezirk an dem fiir das gesammte Gebiet 
des Reicbs sicb darnacb berausstellenden Posttiberscbusse gebabt 
hat, nach Prozenten festgestellt. 

Nach Massgabe des auf diese Weise festgestellten Verhaltnisses 
werden den einzelnen Staaten wahrend der auf ibren Eintritt in die 
Reichs-Postverwaltung f olgenden acht Jahre die sicb fiir sie aus den 
im Reicbe aufkommenden Posttiberschtissen ergebenden Quoten auf 
ihre sonstigen Beitrage zu Reicbszwecken zu Gute gerechnet. 

Nach Ablauf der acbt Jahre hort jene Unterscheidung auf, und 
fliessen die Postiiberschiisse in ungetheilter Aufrechnung nach dem 
im Artikel 49. enthaltenen Grundsatz der Reichskasse zu. 

Von der wahrend der vorgedachten acht Jahre fiir die Hanse- 
stadte sich herausstellenden Quote des Postuberschusses wird all- 
jahrlich vorweg die Halfte dem Kaiser zur Disposition gestellt zu 
dem Zwecke, daraus zunachst die Kosten fiir die Herstellung nor- 
maler Posteinrichtungen in den Hansestadten zu bestreiten. 

Artikel 52. Die Bestimmungen in den vorstehenden Artikeln 48. 
bis 51. finden auf Bayern und Wurttemberg keine Anwendung. An 
ihrer Stelle gelten fiir beide Bundesstaaten folgende Bestimmungen. 

Dem Reiche ausschliesslich steht die Gesetzgebung iiber die Vor- 
rechte der Post und Telegraphie, iiber die rechtlichen Verhaltnisse 
beider Anstalten zum Publikum, iiber die Portofreiheiten und das 
Posttaxwesen, jedoch ausschliesslich der reglementarischen und 
Tarif-Bestimmungen fiir den internen verkehr innerhalb Bayerns, 
beziehungsweise Wiirttembergs, sowie, unter gleicher Beschrankung, 
die Feststellung der Gebiihren fiir die telegraphische Korrespond- 
enz zu. 

vol. n. 



370 GERMANY. 

Ebenso steht dem Reiche die Regelung des Post- und Telegraphen- 
verkekrs mit dem Auslande zu, ausgenommen den eigenen unmittel- 
baren Verkehr Bayerns, beziehungsweise Wiirtteinbergs mit seinen 
dem Reiche nicht angehorenden Nachbarstaaten, wegen dessen 
Regelung es bei der Bestimmung im Artikel 49. des Postvertrages 
vom 23. November 1867. bewendet. 

An den zur Reichskasse fliessenden Einnahmen des Post- und 
Telegraphenwesens haben Bayern und Wiirtteinberg keinen Theil. 

IX. Marine und Schiffahrt. 

AlRTTkel 53. Die Kriegsmarine des Reichs ist eine einheitliche 
unter dem Oberbefehl des Kaisers. Die Organisation und Zusam- 
mensetzung derselben liegt dem Kaiser ob, welcher die Offiziere 
und Beamten der Marine ernennt, und ftir welchen dieselben nebst 
den Mannschaf ten eidlich in Pflicht zu nehmen sind. 

Der Kieler Hafen und der Jadehafen sind Reichskriegshafen. 

Der zur Grundung und Erbaltung der Kriegsflotte und der damit 
zusammenhangenden Anstalten erforderliche Auf wand wird aus der 
Reichskasse bestritten. 

Die gesammte seemannische Bevolkerung des Reichs, einschliess- 
lich des Maschinenpersonals und der Schiffshandwerker, ist vom 
Dienste im Landheere befreit, dagegen zum Dienste in der Kaiser- 
lichen Marine verpflichtet. 

Artikel 54. Die Kauffahrteischiffe aller Bundesstaaten bilden 
eine einheitliche Handelsmarine. 

Das Reich hat das Verfahren zur Ermittelung der Ladungsfahig- 
keit der Seeschiffe zu bestimmen, die Ausstellung der Messbriefe, 
sowie der Schiffscertifikate zu regeln und die Bedingungen festzu- 
stellen, von welchen die Erlaubniss zur Fuhrung eines Seeschiffes 
abhangig ist. 

In den Seehafen und auf alien naturlichen und kiinstlichen Was- 
serstrassen der einzelnen Bundesstaaten werden die Kauffahrtei- 
schiffe sammtlicher Bundesstaaten gleichmassig zugelassen und 
behandelt. Die Abgaben, welche in den Seehafen von den See- 
schiffen oder deren Ladungen fiir die Benutzung der Schiffahrtsan- 
stalten erhoben werden, diirfen die zur Unterhaltung und gewohn- 
lichen Herstellung dieser Anstalten erforderlichen Kosten nicht 
ubersteigen. 

Auf alien naturlichen Wasserstrassen diirfen Abgaben nur fiir die 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 371 

Benutzung besonderer Anstalten, die zur Erleichterung des Verkehrs 
bestimmt sind, erhoben werden. Diese Abgaben, sowie die Abgaben 
fiir die Bef ahrung solcher kiinstlichen Wasserstrassen, welche Staat- 
seigenthum sind, dtirfen die zur Unterhaltung und gewbhnlichen 
Herstellung der Anstalten und Anlagen erforderlicben Kosten nicht 
ttbersteigen. Auf die Flosserei finden diese Bestimmungen inso- 
weit Anwendung, als dieselbe auf schiffbaren Wasserstrassen betrie- 
ben wird. 

Auf fremde Schiffe oder deren Ladungen andere oder hbhere 
Abgaben zu legen, als von den Schiffen der Bundesstaaten oder 
deren Ladungen zu entrichten sind, stebt keinem Einzelstaate, son- 
dern nur dem Reiche zu. 

Artikel 55. Die Flagge der Kriegs- und Handelsmarine ist 
scbwarzweissroth. 

X. KONSULATWESEN. 

Artikel 56. Das gesammte Konsulatwesen des Deutschen Reichs 
stebt unter der Aufsicbt des Kaisers, welcber die Konsuln, nach 
Vernehmung des Ausschusses des Bundesratbes fiir Handel und 
Verkehr, anstellt. 

In dem Amtsbezirk der Deutschen Konsuln dtirfen neue Landes- 
konsulate nicht errichtet werden. Die Deutschen Konsuln tiben 
ftir die in ihrem Bezirk nicht vertretenen Bundesstaaten die Funk- 
tionen eines Landeskonsuls aus. Die sammtlichen bestehenden 
Landeskonsulate werden aufgehoben, sobald die Organisation der 
Deutschen Konsulate dergestalt vollendet ist, dass die Vertretung 
der Einzelinteressen aller Bundesstaaten als durch die Deutschen 
Konsulate gesichert von dem Bundesrathe anerkannt wird. 

XI. Reichskriegswesen. 

Artikel 57. Jeder Deutsche ist wehrpflichtig und kann sich in 
Austibung dieser Pflicht nicht vertreten lassen. 

Artikel 58. Die Kosten und Lasten des gesammten Kriegswesens 
des Reichs sind von alien Bundesstaaten und ihren Angehorigen 
gleichmassig zu tragen, so dass weder Bevorzugungen, noch Pragra- 
vationen einzelner Staaten oder Klassen grundsatzlich zulassig sind. 
Wo die gleiche Vertheilung der lasten sich in natura nicht herstellen 
lasst, ohne die Gffentliche Wohlfahrt zu schadigen, ist die Ausglei- 
chung nach den Grundsatzen, der Gerechtigkeit im Wege der 
Gesetzgebung f estzustellen. 



372 GERMANY. 

Artikel 59. Jeder wehrfahige Deutsche gehort sieben Jahre 
lang, in der Kegel vom vollendeten zwanzigsten bis zum beginnenden 
achtundzwanzigsten Lebensjahre, dem stehenden Heere — und zwar 
die ersten drei Jahre bei den Fahnen, die letzten vier Jahre in der 
Reserve — die folgenden ftinf Lebensjahre der Landwehr ersten 
Aufgebots und sodann bis zum 31. Marz desjenigen Kalender- 
jahres, in welchem das neununddreissigste Lebensjahr vollendet 
wird, der Landwehr zweiten Aufgebots an. In denjenigen Bundes- 
staaten, in denen bisher eine langere als zwolfjahrige Gesammt- 
dienstzeit gesetzlich war, findet die allmahlige Herabsetzung der 
Verpflichtung nur in dem Maasse statt, als dies die Riicksicht auf 
die Kriegsbereitschaft des Reichsheeres zulasst. 

In Bezug auf die Auswanderung der Reservisten sollen lediglich 
Diejenigen Bestimmungen massgebend sein, welche fur die Aus- 
wanderung der Landwehrmanner gelten. 

Artikel 60. Die Friedens-Prasenzstarke des Deutschen Heeres 
wird bis zum 31. Dezember 1871. auf Ein Prozent der Bevolkerung 
von 1867. normirt, und wird fro rata derselben von den einzelnen 
Bundesstaaten gestellt. Flir die spatere Zeit wird die Friedens- 
Prasenzstarke des Heeres im Wege der Reichsgesetzgebung fest- 
gestellt. 

Artikel 61. Nach Publikation dieser Verfassung ist in dem 
ganzen Reiche die gesammte Preussische Militairgesetzgebung un- 
gesaumt einzufuhren, sowohl die Gesetze selbst, als die zu ihrer 
Ausfuhrung, Erlauterung, oder Erganzung erlassenen Reglements, 
Instruktionen und Reskripte, namentlich also das Militair-Strafge- 
setzbuch vom 3. April 1845., die Militair-Strafgerichstordnung 
vom 3. April 1845., die Verordung iiber die Ehrengerichte vom 20. 
Juli 1843., die Bestimmungen iiber Aushebung, Dienstzeit, Servis- und 
Verpflegungswesen, Einquartierung, Ersatz von Flurbeschadigungen, 
Mobilmachung u. s. w. fur Krieg und Frieden. Die Militair-Kirch- 
enordnung ist jedoch ausgeschlossen. 

Nach gleichmassiger Durchfiihrung der Kriegsorganisation des 
Deutschen Heeres wird ein umfassendes Reichs-Militairgesetz dem 
Reichstage und dem Bundesrathe zur verf assungsmassigen Beschluss- 
fassung vorgelegt werden. 

Artikel 62. Zur Bestreitung des Aufwandes ftir das gesammte 
Deutsche Heer und die zu demselben gehorigen Einrichtungen sind 
bis zum 31. Dezember 1871. dem Kaiser jahrlich sovielmal 225 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 373 

Thaler, in Worten zweihundert funf und zwanzig Thaler, als die 
Kopfzahl der Friedensstarke des Heeres nach Artikel 60. betragt, 
zur Verfiigung zu stellen. Vergl. Abschnitt XII. 

Nach dem 31. Dezember 1871. mussen diese Beitrage von den 
einzelnen Staaten des Bundes zur Reichskasse fortgezahlt werden. 
Zur Berechnung derselben wird die im Artikel 60. interimistisch 
festgestellte Friedens-Prasenzstarke so lange festgehalten, bis sie 
durch ein Reichsgesetz abgeandert ist. 

Die Verausgabung dieser Summe fur das gesammte Reichsheer 
und dessen Einrichtungen wird durch das Etatsgesetz festgestellt. 

Bei der Feststellung des Militair-Ausgabe-Etats wird die auf 
Grundlage dieser Verfassung gesetzlich feststehende Organisation 
des Reichsheeres zu Grunde gelegt. 

Artikel 63. Die gesammte Landmacht des Reichs wird ein ein- 
heitliches Heer bilden, welches in Krieg und Frieden unter dem 
Befehle des Kaisers steht. 

Die Regimenter &c. fuhren f ortlauf ende Nummern durch das ganze 
Deutsche Heer. Fur die Bekleidung sind die Grundfarben und 
der Schnitt der Koniglich Preussischen Armee massgebend. Dem 
Betreffenden Kontingentsherrn bleibt es iiberlassen, die ausseren 
Abzeichen (Kokarden &c.) zu bestimmen. 

Der Kaiser hat die Pflicht und das Recht, dafiir Sorge zu tragen, 
dass innerhalb des Deutschen Heeres alle Truppentheile vollzahlig 
und kriegstiichtig vorhanden sind und dass Einheit in der Organi- 
sation und Formation, in Berwaffnung und Kommando, in der Aus- 
bildung der Mannschaften, sowie in der Qualifikation der Offiziere 
hergestellt und erhalten wird. Zu diesem Behufe ist der Kaiser 
berechtigt, sich jederzeit durch Inspektionen von der Verfassung der 
einzelnen Kontingente zu iiberzeugen und die Abstellung der dabei 
vorgefundenen Mangel anzuordnen. 

Der Kaiser bestimmt den Prasenzstand, die Gliederung und Ein- 
theilung der Kontingente des Reichsheeres, sowie die Organisation 
der Landwehr, und hat das Recht, innerhalb des Bundesgebietes die 
Garnisonen zu bestimmen, sowie die kriegsbereite Aufstellung eines 
jeden Theils des Reichsheeres anzuordnen. 

Behuf s Erhaltung der unentbehrlichen Einheit in der Administra- 
tion, Verpflegung, Bewaffnung und Ausriistung aller Truppentheile 
des Deutschen Heeres sind die beziiglichen kunftig ergehenden 
Anordnungen fur die Preussische Armee den Kommandeuren der 



374 GERMANY. 

ubrigen Kontingente, durch den Artikel 8. Nr. 1. bezeichneten Auss- 
chuss fiir das Landheer und die Festungen, zur Nachachtung in 
geeigneter Weise mitzutheilen. 

Artikel 64. Alle Deutsche Truppen sind verpflichet, den Be- 
f ehlen des Kaisers unbedingte Folge zu leisten. Diese Verpflichtung 
ist in den Fahneneid aufzunehmen. 

Der Hochstkommandirende eines Kontingents, sowie alle Offiziere, 
welche Truppen mehr als eines Kontingents befehligen, und alle 
Festungskommandanten werden von dem Kaiser ernannt. Die von 
Demselben ernannten Offiziere leisten Ihm den Fahneneid. Bei 
Generalen und den Generalstellungen versehenden Offizieren in- 
nerhalb des Kontingents ist die Ernennung von der jedesmaligen 
Zustimmung des Kaisers abhangig zu machen. 

Der Kaiser ist berechtigt, Behufs Versetzung mit oder ohne Be- 
forderung fiir die von Ihm im Reichsdienste, sei es im Preussischen 
Heere, oder in anderen Kontingenten zu besetzenden Stellen aus den 
Offizieren aller Kontingente des Reichsheeres zu wahlen. 

Artikel 65. Das Recht, Festungen innerhalb des Bundesgebietes 
anzulegen, steht dem Kaiser zu, welcher die Bewilligung der dazu 
erf orderlichen Mittel, soweit das Ordinarium sie nicht gewahrt, nach 
Abschnitt XII. beantragt. 

Artikel 66. Wo nicht besondere Konventionen ein Anderes 
bestimmen, ernennen die Bundesfiirsten, beziehentlich die Senate die 
Offiziere ihrer Kontingente, mit der Einschrankung des Artikels 64. 
Sie sind Chefs aller ihren Gebieten angehorenden Truppentheile 
und geniessen die damit verbundenen Ehren. Sie haben nament- 
lich das Recht der Inspizirung zu jeder Zeit und erhalten, ausser 
den regelmassigen Rapporten und Meldungen iiber vorkommende 
Veranderungen, Behufs der nothigen landesherrlichen Publikation, 
rechtzeitige Mittheilung von den die betreffenden Truppentheile 
beriihrenden Avancements und Ernennungen. 

Auch steht ihnen das Recht zu, zu polizeilichen Zwecken nicht 
bios ihre eigenen Truppen zu verwenden, sondern auch alle anderen 
Truppentheile des Reichsheeres, welche in ihren Landergebieten 
dislocirt sind, zu requiriren. 

Artikel 67. Ersparnisse an dem Militair-Etat fallen unter keinen 
Umstanden einer einzelnen Regierung, sondern jederzeit der Reichs- 
kasse zu. 

Artikel 68. Der Kaiser kann, wenn die offentliche Sicherheit in 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 375 

dem Bundesgebiete bedroht ist, einen jeden Theil desselben in 
Kriegszustand erklaren. Bis zum Erlass eines die Voraussetzungen, 
die Form der Verkiindigung und die Wirkungen einer solchen Er- 
klarung regelnden Reichsgesetzes gelten dafiir die Vorschriften des 
Preussischen Gesetzes vom 4. Juni 1851. (Gesetz-Samml. fiir 1851. 
S. 451 ff.). 

SCHLUSSBESTIMMUNG ZUM XI. ABSCHNITT. 

Die in diesem Abschnitt enthaltenen Vorschriften kommen in 
Bayern nach naherer Bestimmung des Bundnissvertrages vom 23. 
November 1870. (Bundesgesetzbl. 1871. S. 9.) unter III. § 5., in 
Wiirttemberg nach naherer Bestimmung der Militairkonvention 
vom. 21. /25. November 1870. (Bundesgesetzbl. 1870. S. 658.) zur 
Anwendung. 

XII. Reichsfinanzen. 

Artikel 69. Alle Einnahmen und Ausgaben des Reichs miissen 
fiir jedes Jahr veranschlagt und auf den Reichshaushalts-Etat 
gebracht werden. Letzterer wird vor Beginn des Etatsjahres nach 
folgenden Grundsatzen durch ein Gesetz f estgestellt. 

Artikel 70. Zur Bestreitung aller gemeinschaftlichen Ausgaben 
dienen zunachst die etwaigen Ueberschtisse der Vorjahre, sowie die 
aus den Zollen, den gemeinschaftlichen Verbrauchssteuern und aus 
dem Post- und Telegraphenwesen fliessenden gemeinschaftlichen 
Einnahmen. Insoweit dieselben durch diese Einnahmen nicht ge- 
deckt werden, sind sie, so lange Reichssteuern nicht eingfuhrt sind, 
durch Beitrage der einzelnen Bundesstaaten nach Massgabe ihrer 
Bevolkerung aufzubringen, welche bis zur Hohe des budgetmassigen 
Betrages durch den Reichskanzler ausgeschrieben werden. 

Artikel 71. Die gemeinschaftlichen Ausgaben werden in der 
Regel fiir ein Jahr bewilligt, konnen jedoch in besonderen Fallen 
auch fiir eine langere Dauer bewilligt werden. 

Wahrend der im Artikel 60. normirten Uebergangszeit ist der 
nach Titeln geordnete Etat iiber die Ausgaben fur das Heer dem 
Bundesrathe und dem Reichstage nur zur Kenntnissnahme und zur 
Erinnerung vorzulegen. 

Artikel 72. Ueber die Verwendung aller Einnahmen des Reichs 
ist durch den Reichskanzler dem Bundesrathe und dem Reichstage 
zur Entlastung jahrlich Rechnung zu legen. 

Artikel 73. In Fallen eines ausserordentlichen Bediirfnisses 



376 GERMANY. 

kann im Wege der E-eichsgesetzgebung die Aufnahme einer An- 
leihe, sowie die Uebernahme einer Garantie zu Lasten des Reichs 
erfolgen. 

SCHLUSSBESTIMMUNG ZUM XIII. ABSCHNITT. 

Auf die Ausgaben fiir das Bayerische Heer finden die Artikel 69. 
und 71. nur nach Massgabe der in der Schlussbestimmung zum XI. 
Abschnitt erwahnten Bestimmungen des Vertrages vom 23. Novem- 
ber 1870. und der Artikel 72. nur insoweit Anwendung, als dem 
Bundesratbe und dem Reichstage die Ueberweisung der fur das 
Bayerische Heer erf orderlichen Summe an Bayern nachzuweisen ist. 

XTTT. Schlichtung von Stkeitigkeiten und Straebesttm- 

MUNGEN. 

Artikel 74. Jedes Unternehmen gegen die Existenz, die Integ- 
ritat, die Sicherheit oder die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, 
endlich die Beliedigung des Bundesrathes, des Reichstages, eines 
Mitgliedes des Bundesrathes oder des Reichstages, einer Behorde 
oder eines bfrentlichen Beamten des Reichs, wahrend dieselben in 
der Austibung ihres Berufes begriffen sind oder in Beziehung auf 
ihren Beruf, durch Wort, Schrift, Druck, Zeichen, bildliche oder 
andere Darstellung, werden in den einzelnen Bundesstaaten beurtheilt 
und bestraft nach Massgabe der in den letzteren bestehenden oder 
kiinf tig in Wirksamkeit tretenden Gesetze, nach welchen eine gleiche 
gegen den einzelnen Bundesstaat, seine Verfassung, seine Kammern 
oder Stande, seine Kammer- oder Standemitglieder, seine Behbrden 
und Beamten begangene Handlung zu richten ware. 

Artikel 75. Fur diejenigen in Artikel 74. bezeichneten Unter- 
nehmungen gegen das Deutsche Reich, welche, wenn gegen einen 
der einzelnen Bundesstaaten gerichtet, als Hochverrath oder Landes- 
verrath zu qualifiziren waren, ist das gemeinschaftliche Ober-Appella- 
tionsgericht der drei f reien und Hansestadte in Ltibeck die zustandige 
Spruchbehorde in erster und letzter Instanz. 

Die naheren Bestimmungen tiber die Zustandigkeit und das Ver- 
f ahren des Ober-Appellationsgerichts erfolgen im TTege der Reichsge- 
setzgebung. Bis zum Erlasse eines Reichsgesetzes bewendet es bei 
der seitherigen Zustandigkeit der Gerichte in den einzelnen Bundes- 
staaten und den auf das Verfahren dieser Gerichte sich beziehenden 
Bestimmungen. 

Artikel 76. Streitigkeiten zwischen verschiedenen Bundes- 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 377 

staaten, sofern dieselben nicht privatrechtlicher Natur und daher 
von den Kompetenten Gerichtsbehorden zu entscheiden sind, werden 
auf Anruf en des einen Theils von dem Bundesrathe erledigt. 

Verfassungsstreitigkeiten in solchen Bundesstaaten, in deren Ver- 
fassnng nicht eine Behorde zur Entscheidung solcher Streitigkeiten 
bestimmt ist, hat auf Anrufen eines Theiles der Bundesrath giitlich 
auszugleichen oder, wenn das nicht gelingt, im Wege der Reichsge- 
setzgebung zur Erledigung zu bringen. 

Artikel 77. Wenn in einem Bundesstaate der Fall einer Justiz- 
verweigerung eintritt, und auf gesetzlichen Wegen ausreichende 
Hulfe nicht erlangt werden kann, so hegt dem Bundesrathe ob, 
erwiesene, nach der Verfassung und den bestehenden Gesetzen des 
betreflienden Bundesstaates zu beurtheilende Beschwerden iiber ver- 
weigerte oder geheminte Rechtspflege anzunehmen, und darauf die 
gerichtliche Hulfe bei der Bundesregierung, die zu der Beschwerde 
Anlass gegeben hat, zu bewirken. 

XIV. Allgemeine Bestimmungen. 

Artikel 78. Veranderungen der Verfassung erfolgen im Wege 
der Gesetzgebung. Sie gelten als abgelehnt, wenn sie im Bundes- 
rathe 14 Stimmen gegen sich haben. 

Diejenigen Vorschriften der Reichsverfassung, durch welche be- 
stimmte Rechte einzelner Bundesstaaten in deren Verhaltniss zur 
Gesammtheit festgestellt sind, konnen nur mit Zustimmung des 
berechtigten Bundesstaates abgeandert werden. 



AUSTRIA. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 

Staatsgrundgesetz iiber Gemeinsame Angelegenheiten und Art 
ihrer Behandlung. 

21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 146). 

Mit Zustimmung der beiden Hauser des Reichsrathes finde Ich 
in Erganzung des Staatsgrundgesetzes liber die Reichsvertretung 
nachstehendes Gesetz zu erlassen ; 

§ 1. Nachfolgende Angelegenheiten werden als den im Reichs- 
rathe vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern und den Landern der 
ungarisclien Krone gemeinsam erklart : 

a. Die auswartigen Angelegenheiten mit Einschluss der diplo- 
matischen und commerziellen Vertretung dem Auslande gegentiber, 
sowie die in Betreff der intern ationalen Vertrage etwa nothwen- 
digen Verfiigungen, wobei jedoch die Genehmigung der internation- 
alen Vertrage, insoweit eine solche verfassungsmassig nothwendig 
ist, den Vertretungskorpern der beiden Reichshalften (dem Reichs- 
rathe und dem ungarischen Reichstage) vorbehalten bleibt ; 

b. das Kriegswesen mit Inbegriff der Kriegsmarine, jedoch mit 
Ausschluss der Recrutenbewilligung und der Gesetzgebung liber die 
Art und Weise der Erfullung der TVehrpflicht, der Verfiigungen 
hinsichtlich der Dislocirung und Verpflegung des Heeres, ferner der 
Regelung der btirgerlichen Verhaltnisse und der sich nicht auf den 
Militardienst beziehenden Rechte und Verpflichtungen der Mit- 
glieder des Heeres ; 

c. das Finanzwesen rucksichtlich der gemeinschaftlich zu be- 
streitenden Auslagen, insbesondere die Festsetzung des diessfalligen 
Budgets und die Priifung der darauf beztiglichen Rechnungen. 

§ 2. Ausserdem sollen nachfolgende Angelegenheiten zwar nicht 
gemeinsam verwaltet, jedoch nach gleichen von Zeit zu Zeit za 
vereinbarenden Grundsatzen behandelt werden : 

1. Die commerziellen Angelegenheiten, speciell die Zollgesetz- 
gebung ; 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 379 

2. die Gesetzgebung liber die mit der industriellen Production in 
enger Verbindung stehenden indirecten Abgaben ; 

3. die Feststellung des Mtinzwesens und des Geldf usses ; 

4. Verftigungen beziiglich jener Eisenbahnlinien, welche das 
Interesse beider Reichshalften beruhren ; 

5. die Feststellung des Wehrsystems. 

§ 3. Die Kosten der gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten (§ 1) sind 
von beiden Reichstheilen nach einem Verhaltnisse zu tragen, welches 
durch ein vom Kaiser zu sanctionirendes Uebereinkommen der 
beiderseitigen Vertretungskorper (Reichsrath und Reichstag) von 
Zeit zu Zeit festgesetzt werden wird. Sollte zwischen beiden Ver- 
tretungen kein Uebereinkommen erzielt werden, so bestimmt der 
Kaiser dieses Verhaltniss, jedoch ntjr ftjr die Datjer Eines 
Jahres. Die Aufbringung der auf jede der beiden Reichstheile 
hiernach entfallenden Leistungen ist jedoch ausschliesslich Sache 
eines jeden Theiles. 

Es kann jedoch auch zur Bestreitung der Kosten der gemein- 
samen Angelegenheiten ein gemeinsames Anlehen aufgenommen 
werden, wo dann auch Alles, was den Abschluss des Anlehens und 
die Modalitaten der Verwendung und Rttckzahlung betrifft, gemein- 
sam zu behandeln ist. 

Die Entscheidung iiber die Frage, ob ein gemeinsames Anlehen 
aufzunehmen ist, bleibt jedoch der Gesetzgebung jeder der beiden 
Reichshalften vorbehalten. 

§ 4. Die Beitragsleistung zu den Lasten der gegenwartigen Staats- 
schuld wird durch ein zwischen beiden Reichshalften zu treffendes 
Uebereinkommen geregelt. 

§ 5. Die Verwaltung der gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten wird 
durch ein gemeinsames verantwortliches Ministerium besorgt, 
welchem jedoch nicht gestattet ist, nebst den gemeinsamen Angele- 
genheiten auch die besonderen Regierungsgeschafte eines der beiden 
Reichstheile zu fuhren. 

Die Anordnungen in Betreff der Leitung, Fuhrung und inneren 
Organisation der gesammten Armee stehen ausschliesslich dem 
Kaiser zu. 

§ 6. Das den Vertretungskorpern beider Reichshalften (dem 
Reichsrathe und dem ungarischen Reichstage) zustehende Gesetzge- 
bungsrecht wird von denselben, insoweit es sich um die gemeinsa- 
men Angelegenheiten handelt, mittelst zu entsendender Delega- 
tionen ausgetibt. 



380 



AUSTRIA. 



§ 7. Die Delegation des Reichsrathes zahlt sechzig Mitglieder, 
wovon ein Drittheil dem Herrenhause und zwei Drittheile dem 
Hause der Abgeordneten entnommen werden. 

§ 8. Das Herrenhaus hat die auf dasselbe entfallenden zwanzig 
Mitglieder der Delegation mittelst absoluter Stimmenmehrheit aus 
seiner Mitte zu wahlen. 

Die auf das Haus der Abgeordneten entfallenden vierzig Mit- 
glieder werden in der Weise gewahlt, dass die Abgeordneten der 
einzelnen Landtage * nach dem nachstehenden Vertheilungsmodus 
die Delegirten entsenden, wobei ihnen freisteht, dieselben aus ihrer 
Mitte oder aus dem Plenum des Hauses zu wahlen. 

Es haben mittelst absoluter Stimmenmehrheit zu wahlen die 
Abgeordneten aus 

dem Konigreiche Bohmen 10 

dem Konigreiche Dalmatien .... 1 
dem Konigreiche Galizien und Lodomerien mit dem 

Grossherzogthume Krakau .... 7 

dem Erzherzogthume Oesterreich unter der Enns 3 

dem Erzherzogthume Oesterreich ob der Enns . 2 

dem Herzogthume Salzburg .... 1 

dem Herzogthume Steiermark .... 2 

dem Herzogthume Karnten .... 1 

dem Herzogthume Krain ..... 1 

dem Herzogthume Bukowina .... 1 

der Markgrafschaft Mahren ..... 4 

dem Herzogthume Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien . 1 

der gefiirsteten Grafschaft Tirol .... 2 

dem Lande Vorarlberg 1 

der Markgrafschaft Istrien 1 

der gefiirsteten Grafschaft Gorz und Gradiska . 1 

der Stadt Triest mit ihrem Gebiete ... 1 



40 



1 The Law of April 2, 1873, which established direct elections to the Reichs- 
rath, provided in Art. II. as follows : " Von demselben Zeitpunkte an ist in 
die Delegation des Reichsraths die nach § 8, Alinea 2 u. 3 und § 9 des Gesetzes 
vom 21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 146) auf jedes Land entfallende Zahl von 
Delegirten und Ersatzmannern durch die in dem betreffenden Lande gewahlten 
Mitglieder des Abgeordnetenhauses zu wahlen. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 381 

§ 9. In gleicher Weise hat jedes der beiden Hauser cles Reichs- 
rathes Ersatzmanner der Delegirten zu wahlen, deren Anzahl fur 
das Herrenhaus zehn und fiir das Abgeordnetenhaus zwanzig 

betragt. 

Die Zahl der aus dem Abgeordnetenhause zu wahlenden Ersatz- 
manner wird auf die aus demselben zu entsendenden Delegirten 
derart vertheilt, dass auf Einen bis drei Delegirte je Ein Ersatz- 
mann, auf vier und mebr Delegirte je zwei Ersatzmanner entf alien. 
Die Wahl jedes Ersatzmannes ist gesondert vorzunehmen. 

§ 10. Die Wahl der Delegirten und ihrer Ersatzmanner wird 
von deD beiden Hausern des Reichsrathes alljahrlich erneuert. 

Bis dahin verbleiben die Delegirten und Ersatzmanner in ihrer 
Function. 

Die abgetretenen Mitglieder der Delegation konnen in dieselbe 
wieder gewahlt werden. 

§ 11. Die Delegationen werden alljahrlich vom Kaiser einberu- 
fen ; der Versammlungsort wird vom Kaiser bestimmt. 

§ 12. Die Delegation des Reichsrathes wahlt aus ihren Mitglie- 
dern den Prasidenten und Viceprasidenten, sowie auch die Schrift- 
fiihrer und ubrigen Functionare. 

§ 13. Der Wirkungskreis der Delegationen umfasst alle Gegen- 
stande, welche die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten betreffen. 

Andere Gegenstande sind von der Wirksamkeit der Delegationen 



§ 14. Regierungsvorlagen gelangen durch das gemeinsame Minis- 
terium an jede der beiden Delegationen abgesondert. 

Auch steht jeder Delegation das Recht zu, in Gegenstanden ihres 
Wirkungskreises Vorschlage zu machen. 

§ 15. Zu alien Gesetzen in Angelegenheiten des Wirkungskreises 
der Delegationen ist die Uebereinstimmung beider Delegationen 
oder bei mangelnder Uebereinstimmung der in einer gemeinschaft- 
lichen Plenarsitzung beider Delegationen gefasste zustimmende 
Beschluss und in jedem Falle die Sanction des Kaisers erforderlich. 

§ 16. Das Recht, das gemeinsame Ministerium zur Verantwort- 
ung zu ziehen, wird von den Delegationen geiibt. 

Bei Verletzung eines fiir die gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten be- 
stehenden verfassungsmassigen Gesetzes kann jede Delegation einen 
der anderen Delegation mitzutheilenden Antrag auf Anklage des 
gemeinsamen Ministeriums oder eines einselnen Mitgliedes desselben 
stellen. 



382 AUSTRIA. 

Die Anklage 1st rechtskraftig, wenn sie von jeder Delegation 
abgesondert oder in einer gemeinschaftlichen Plenarsitzung beider 
Delegatiotien beschlossen wird. 

§ 17. Jede Delegation schlagt aus den unabhangigen und gegetz- 
kundigen Staatsburgern jener Lander, welche sie vertritt, jedoch 
nicht aus ihrer Mitte, vierundzwanzig Richter vor, wovon die andere 
Delegation zwolf verwerfen kann. Auch der Angeklagte, oder 
wenn der Angeklagten mehrere sind, alle gemeinschaftlich haben 
das Recht zwolf der Vorgeschlagenen abzulehnen, so, dass jene 
derart durch den von der einen und anderen Delegation Vorge- 
schlagenen gleich viele abgelehnt werden. 

Die hiernach tibrig bleibenden Richter bilden den Gerichtshof f iir 
den vorliegenden Process. 

§ 18. Ein eigenes Gesetz liber die Verantwortlichkeit des gemein- 
samen Ministeriums wird die naheren Bestimmungen iiber die 
Anklage, das Verfahren und das Erkenntniss f eststellen. 

§ 19. Jede der beiden Delegationen verhandelt, berathet und be- 
schliesst ftir sich in abgesonderten Sitzungen. 

Den Ausnahmsfall enthalt der § 31. 

§ 20. Zur Beschlussfahigkeit der Delegation des Reichsrathes ist 
ausser dem Vorsitzenden die Anwesenheit von wenigstens dreissig 
Mitgliedern und zur Giltigkeit eines Beschlusses die absolute Stim- 
menmehrheit der Anwesenden erforderlich. 

§ 21. Die reichsrathlichen Delegirten und Ersatzmanner haben 
von ihren Wahlern keine Instructionen anzunehmen. 

§ 22. Die Delegirten des Reichsrathes haben ihr Stimmrecht per- 
sOnlich auszuiiben ; wann ein ersatzmann einzutreten hat, bestimmt 
der § 25. 

§ 23. Die Delegirten des Reichsrathes geniessen in dieser Eigen- 
schaft die namliche Unverletzlichkeit und Un verantwortlichkeit, 
welche ihnen als Mitglieder des Reichsrathes kraft des § 16 des 
Grundgesetzes iiber die Reichsvertretung zusteht. 

Die in diesem Paragraphe dem betreffenden Hause eingeraumten 
Befugnisse kommen, insoferne nicht der Reichsrath gleichzeitig 
versammelt ist, riicksichtlich der Delegirten der Delegation zu. 

§ 24. Der Austritt aus dem Reichsrathe hat auch den Austritt 
aus der Delegation zur Folge. 

§ 25. Kommt ein Mitglied der Delegation oder ein Ersatzmann 
in Abgang, so ist eine neue Wahl vorzunehmen. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 383 

1st der Reichsrath nicht versammelt, so hat an die Stelle des 
abgangigen Delegirten dessen Ersatzmann einzutreten. 

§ 26. Wird das Abgeordnetenhaus aufgelbst, so erlischt auch die 
Wirksamkeit der Delegation des Reichsrathes. 

Der neu zusammentretende Reichsrath wahlt eine neue Delega- 
tion. 

§ 27. Die Session der Delegation wird durch den Prasidenten 
derselben nach Beendigung der Geschafte mit kaiserlicher Geneh- 
migung oder iiber Auftrag des Kaisers geschlossen. 

§ 28. Die Mitglieder des gemeinsamen Ministeriums sind be- 
rechtigt, an alien Berathungen der Delegation Theil zu nehmen 
nnd ihre Vorlagen personlich oder durch einen Abgeordneten zu 
vertreten. 

Sie mltssen auf Verlangen jedesmal gehort werden. 

Die Delegation hat das Recht, an das gemeinsame Ministerium 
oder an ein einselnes Mitglied desselben Fragen zu richten und von 
demselben Antwort und Aufklarung zu verlangen, ferner Commis- 
sionen zu ernennen, welchen von Seite der Ministerien die erforder- 
liche Information zu geben ist. 

§ 29. Die Sitzungen der Delegation sind in der Regel ofrentlich. 

Ausnahmsweise kann die Oeffentlichkeit ausgeschlossen werden, 
wenn es vom Prasidenten oder wenigstens von ftinf Mitgliedern 
verlangt und von der Yersammlung nach Entf ernung der Zuhorer 
beschlossen wird. 

Ein Beschluss kann jedoch nur in offentlicher Sitzung gefasst 
werden. 

§ 30. Beide Delegationen theilen sich ihre Beschlusse, sowie 
erforderlichen Falles deren Motive gegenseitig mit. 

Dieser Verkehr findet schriftlich statt auf Seite der Delegation 
des Reichsrathes in deutscher, auf Seite der Delegation des Reichs- 
tages in ungarischer Sprache und beiderseits unter Anschluss einer 
beglaubigten Uebersetzung in der Sprache der anderen Delegation. 

§ 31. Jecle Delegation ist berechtight zu beantragen, dass die 
Frage durch gemeinschaftliche Abstimmung entschieden werde, und 
kann dieser Antrag, sobald ein dreimaliger Schriftenwechsel erfolg- 
los geblieben ist, von der anderen Delegation nicht abgelehnt 
werden. 

Die beiderseitigen Prasidenten vereinbaren Ort und Zeit einer 
Plenarsitzung beider Delegationen zum Zwecke der gemeinschaft- 
lichen Abstimmung. 



384 AUSTRIA. 

§ 32. In den Plenarsitzungen prasidiren die Prasidenten der 
Delegation abwechselnd. 

Durch das Los wird entschieden, welcher der beiden Prasidenten 
das erste Mai zu prasidiren hat. In alien folgenden Sessionen 
prasidirt der ersten Plenarversammlung der Prasident jener Dele- 
gation deren Prasident der unmittelbar vorhergegangenen nicht vor- 
gesessen hat. 

§ 33. Zur Beschlussfahigkeit der Plenarversammlung ist die 
Anwesenheit von mindestens zwei Drittheilen der Mitglieder jeder 
Delegation erfordeiiieh. 

Der Beschluss wird mit absoluter Mehrheit der Stimmen gefasst. 

Sind auf Seite der einen Delegation mehr Mitglieder anwesend 
als auf Seite der anderen, so haben sich auf Seite der in der Mehr- 
zahl anwesenden Delegation so viele Mitglieder der Abstimmung zu 
enthalten, als zur Herstellung der Gleichheit der Zahl der beiderseits 
Stimmenden entfallen mussen. 

Wer sich der Abstimmung zu enthalten hat, wird durch das Los 
bestimmt. 

§ 34. Die Plenarsitzungen der beiden Delegationen sind 6ffent- 
lich. 

Das Protokoll wird in beiden Sprachen durch die beiderseitigen 
Schrif tftihrer gefuhrt und gemeinsam beglaubigt. 

§ 35. Die naheren Bestimmungen iiber den Geschaftsgang der 
Delegation des Reichsrathes werden durch die Geschaftsordnung 
geregelt, deren Feststellung durch die Delegation zu erfolgen hat. 

§ 36. Die Vereinbarung in Betreff jener Gegenstande, welche 
zwar nicht als gemeinsame behandelt, jedoch nach gemeinsamen 
Grundsatzen geregelt werden sollen, erf olgt entweder dadurch, dass 
die verantwortlichen Ministerien im gemeinschaftlichen Einverneh- 
men einen Gesetzentwurf ausarbeiten und den betreffenden Vertre- 
tungskorpern beider Theile zur Beschlussfassung vorlegen und die 
ubereinstimmenden Bestimmungen beider Vertretungen dem Kaiser 
zur Sanction vorgelegt werden, oder dass die beiden Vertretungs- 
kbrper jeder aus seiner Mitte eine gleich grosse Deputation wahlen, 
welche unter Einnussnahme der betreffenden Ministerien einen 
Vorschlag ausarbeiten, welcher Vorschlag dann durch die Minis- 
terien jedem Vertretungskorper mitgetheilt, von denselben ord- 
nungsmassig behandelt und die ubereinstimmenden Beschliisse 
beider Vertretungen dem Kaiser zur Sanction unterbreitet werden. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 385 

Der zweite Vorgang ist speciell bei der Yereinbarung iiber das 
Beitragsverhaltniss zu den Kosten der gemeinsamen Angelegen- 
heiten einzuhalten. 

§ 37. Dieses Gesetz tritt mit dem Gesetze, betreffend die Aband- 
erung des Grundgesetzes iiber die Reichsvertretung vom 26. Feb- 
ruar 1861, dann mit den Staatsgrundgesetzen liber die allgemeinen 
Rechte der Staatsbiirger, liber die Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt, 
liber die richterlicbe Gewalt und liber die Einsetzung eines Reichs- 
gericbtes zugleich in Wirksamkeit. 

Staatsgrundgesetz iiber die Reichsvertretung. 
21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 141). 
(As amended by the Laws of April 2, 1873, and November 12, 1886.) 

Mit Zustimmung der beiden Hauser des Reicbsrathes finde Ich 
das Grundgesetz liber die Reichsvertretung vom 26. Februar, 1861, 
abzuandern und dasselbe hat zu lauten, wie f olgt : — 

§ 1. Zur gemeinsamen Vertretung der Kbnigreiche Bohmen, 
Dalmatien, Galizien und Lodomerien mit dem Grossherzogthume 
Krakau, des Erzherzogthumes Oesterreich unter und ob der Enns, 
der Herzogthlimer Salzburg, Steiermark, Karnthen, Krain und 
Bukowina, der Markgrafschaft Mahren, des Herzogthumes Ober- 
und Nieder-Schlesien, der geflirsteten Grafschaft Tirol und des 
Landes Vorarlberg, der Markgrafschaft Istrien, der geflirsteten 
Grafschaft Gbrz und Gradiska und der Stadt Triest mit ihrem 
Gebiete ist der Reichsrath berufen. Der Reichsrath besteht aus 
dem Herrenhause und dem Hause der Abgeordneten. 

Niemand kann gleichzeitig Mitglied beider Hauser sein. 

§ 2. Mitglieder des Herrenhauses sind durch Geburt die gross- 
jahrigen Prinzen des kaiserlichen Hauses. 

§ 3. Erbliche Mitglieder des Herrenhauses sind die gross jahrigen 
Haupter jener inlandischen Adelsgeschlechter, welche in den durch 
den Reichsrath vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern durch aus- 
gedehnten Grundbesitz hervorragen und welchen der Kaiser die 
erbliche Reichsrathswlirde verleiht. 

§ 4. Mitglieder des Herrenhauses vermoge ihrer hohen Kirchen- 
wiirde in den durch den Reichsrath vertretenen Konigreichen und 
Landern sind alle Erbzischofe und jene Bischbfe, welchen fiirst- 
licher Rang zukommt. 



386 



AUSTRIA. 



§ 5. Dem Kaiser bleibt vorbehalten, aus den im Reichsrathe 
vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern ausgezeichnete Manner, 
welche sich urn den Staat oder Kirche, Wissenschaft oder Kunst 
verdient gemacht haben, als Mitglieder auf Lebensdauer in das 
Herrenhaus zu berufen. 

§ 6. 1 In das Haus der Abgeordneten kommen durch Wahl 353 
Mitglieder, und zwar in der fur die einselnen Konigreiche und 
Lander auf f olgende Art f estgesetzten Zahl : — 

fur das Konigreich Bohmen . . . . .92 
fur das Konigreich Dalmatien .... 9 

fur das Konigreich Galizien u. Lodomerien mit dem 

Grossherzogthume Krakau. . . . .63 
fur das Erzherzogthum Oesterreich unter der Enns 37 
fur das Erzherzogthum Oesterreich ob der Enns . 17 
fur das Herzogthum Salzburg .... 5 

fiir das Herzogthum Steiermark . . . .23 
fur das Herzogthum Karnthen .... 9 

fiir das Herzogthum Krain . . . . .10 
fiir das Herzogthum Bukowina .... 9 

fiir die Markgrafschaft Mahren . . . .36 
fiir das Herzogthum Ober- u. Nieder-Schlesien . 10 
fiir die gefurstete Graf schaf t Tirol . . . .18 
fiir das Land Vorarlberg ..... 3 

fiir die Markgraf shaft Istrien .... 4 

fiir die gefurstete Grafschaft Gorz und Gradiska . 4 

fiir die Stadt Triest mit ihrem Gebiete ... 4 
§ 7. 2 A. Die fiir jedes Land festgesetzte Zahl der Mitglieder wird 
unter die in den Landesordnungen enthaltenen Wahlerclassen 

a. des grossen (landtaflichen, lehentaflichen) Grundbesitzes, der 
Hochstbesteuerten in Dalmatien, des adeligen grossen Grundbesitzes 
sammt den im. § 3 I der Landesordnung bezeichneten Personen in 
Tirol ; 

b. der Stadte (Stadte — Markte — Industrialorte — Orte) ; 

c. der Handels- und Gewerbekammern und 

d. der Landgemeinden 
vertheilt und es sind zu wahlen : 

1 §§ 6, 7, 15, and 18 were amended by the Law of April 2, 1873, and are 
printed here in their new form. By the original statute there were two hun- 
dred and three members elected by the provincial diets. 

2 See note to § 6. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 



387 



Im Konigreiche Bohmen 

23 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... a 

32 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . b 

7 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse c 
30 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . d. 

Im Konigreiche Dalmatien 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse .... a 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . b u. c 
6 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . d. 

Im Konigreiche Galizien und Lodomerien mit 
dem Gross-Herzogthume Krakau 

20 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... a 

13 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse ... . b 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse c 
27 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . d. 

Im Erzherzogthume Oesterreich unter der Enns 1 

8 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... a 
19 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . b 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . c 
8 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . d. 

Im Erzherzogthume Oesterreich ob der Enns 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... a 

6 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . b 
1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse c 

7 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . d. 

Im Herzogthume Salzburg 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse .... a 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . b u. c 
2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse d. 

Im Herzogthume Steiermark 

4 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . .a 

8 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse b 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . c 

, 9 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse d. 

Im Herzogthume Karnthen 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse . . . . .a 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . . . . b 

1 The seats for this province were thus distributed by the Law of 
1886 (R. G. B. 162). Class (b) had previously had 17 seats, and class 



Nov. 12, 
(d) 10. 



388 



AUSTRIA. 



Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse 



4 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

Im Herzogthume Krain 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

5 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

Im Herzogthume Bukowina 
3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 
1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

In der Markgrafschaft Mahren 

9 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

13 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

11 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

Im Herzogthume Ober- und Nieder-Schlesien 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . 

4 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 
3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . 

In der gerfursteten Grafschaft Tirol 

5 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 
5 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . 
8 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse 

Im Lande Vorarlberg 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse b 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... 

In der Markgrafschaft Istrien 
1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse .... 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse b 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... 

In der gefiirsteten Grafschaft Gorz und Gradiska 
1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse .... 

1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse ... b 

2 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse . 

In der Stadt Triest mit ihrem Gebiete 

3 Mitglieder von der Wahlerclasse .... 
1 Mitglied von der Wahlerclasse .... 



. c 
d. 

. a 
u. c 
. d. 

a 
. b 

c 
, d. 

a 
. b 

c 
, d. 

a 

u. c 
d. 

a 

u. c 

d. 

u. c 

. d. 



u. c 

d. 

a 

u. c 

d. 

b 
c. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 389 

B. Die Vertheilung der in jeder Wahlerclasse zu wahlenden 
Mitglieder des Abgeordnetenhauses auf die einzelnen Wahlbezirke 
und Wahlkorper wird durch die Reichsraths Wahlordnung bestimmt. 

C. 1 Die Abgeordneten werden in der Wahlerclasse der Landge- 
meinden durch von den Wahlberechtigten gewahlte Wahlmanner und 
in den anderen Wahlerclassen durch die Wahlberechtigten unmittel- 
bar gewahlt. 

Die Wahl der Wahlmanner und der Abgeordneten hat durch 
absolute Stimmenmehrheit zu geschehen. 

Wird diese Stimmenmehrheit bei einer oder, insoferne noch 
mehrere Abgeordnete zu wahlen sind, auch bei fortgesetzter engerer 
Wahl nicht erzielt, so entscheidet schliesslich bei gleichgetheilten 
Stimmen das Los. 

D. 1 Wahlberechtigt ist jeder osterreichische Staatsbiirger, der das 
24. Lebensjahr zurtickgelegt hat, eigenberechtigt ist und den son- 
stigen durch die Reichsraths- Wahlordnung festgestellten Erforder- 
nissen entspricht. 

E. Wahlbar in jedem der im § 6 aufgefuhrten Lander sind 
alle Personen mannlichen Geschlechtes, welche das osterreichische 
Staatsbiirgerrecht seit mindestens drei Jahren besitzen, das 30. 
Lebensjahr zurtickgelegt haben und in einem dieser Lander nach 
der Bestimmung des Absatzes D wahlberechtigt oder in den Land- 
tag wahlbar sind. 

§ 8. Die in das Haus der Abgeordneten gewahlten bffentlichen 
Beamten und Functionare bedurfen zur Ausubung ihres Mandates 
keines Urlaubes. 

§ 9. Der Kaiser ernennt den Prasidenten und den Viceprasidenten 
des Herrenhauses aus dessen Mitgliedern fur die Dauer der Session. 
Das Abgeordnetenhaus wahlt aus seiner Mitte den Prasidenten und 
die Viceprasidenten. Die iibrigen Functionare hat jedes Haus 
selbst zu wahlen. 

§ 10. Der Reichsrath wird vom Kaiser alljahrlich, womoglich in 
den Wintermonaten, einberufen. 

§ 11. Der Wirkungskreis des Reichsrathes umf asst alle Angelegen- 
heiten, welche sich auf Rechte, Pflichten und Interressen beziehen, 
die alien im Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern 
gemeinschaftlich sind, insoferne dieselben nicht in Folge der Verein- 
barung mit den Landern der ungarischen Krone zwischen diesen 

1 See Law of May 27, 1896, Art. H. 



390 AUSTRIA. 

und den iibrigen Landern der Monarchie gemeinsam zu behandeln 
sein werden. 

Es gehoren daher zum Wirkungskreise des Reichsrathes : 

a. die Priifung und Genehmigung der Handelsvertrage und jener 
Staatsvertrage, die das Reich oder Theile desselben belasten, oder 
einzelne Burger verpflichten, oder eine Gebietsanderung der im 
Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander zur Folge haben ; 

b. alle Angelegenheiten, welche sich auf die Art und Weise, 
sowie auf die Ordnung und Dauer der Militarpflicht beziehen, und 
insbesondere die jahrliche Bewilligung der Anzahl der auszuheben- 
den Mannschaft und die allgemeinen Bestimmungen in Bezug auf 
Vorspannsleistung, Verpflegung und Einquartierung des Heeres ; 

c. die Feststellung der Voranschlage des Staatshaushaltes, und 
insbesondere die jahrliche Bewilligung der einzuhebenden Steuern, 
Abgaben und Gefalle ; die Priifung der Staatsrechnungsabschliisse 
und Resultate der Finanzgebarung, die Ertheilung des Absolutori- 
ums ; die Aufnahme neuer Anlehen, Convertirung der bestehenden 
Staatsschulden, die Verausserung, Urnwandlung und Belastung des 
unbeweglichen Staatsvermogens, die Gesetzgebung iiber Monopole 
und Regalien und iiberhaupt alle Finanzangelegenheiten, welche den 
im Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreichen und Landern gemeinsam 
sind ; 

d. die Regelung des Geld-, Miinz- und Zettelbankwesens, der 
Zoll- und Handelsangelegenheiten, sowie des Telegraphen-, Post-, 
Eisenbahn-, Schiffahrts- und sonstigen Reichs - Communications- 
wesens ; 

e. die Credit-, Bank-, Privilegien-, und Gewerbsgesetzgebung, 
mit Ausschluss der Gesetzgebung iiber die Propinationsrechte, dann 
die Gesetzgebung iiber Mass und Gewicht, iiber Marken- und Mus- 
terschutz ; 

/. die Medicinalgesetzgebung, sowie die Gesetzgebung zum 
Schutze gegen Epidemien und Viehseuchen ; 

g. die Gesetzgebung iiber Staatsbiirger- und Heimatsrecht, iiber 
Fremdenpolizei und Passwesen, sowie iiber Volkszahlung ; 

h. iiber die confessionellen Verhiiltnisse, iiber Vereins- und 
Versammlungsrecht, iiber die Presse und den Schutz des geistigen 
Eigenthumes ; 

i. die Feststellung der Grundsatze des Unterrichtswesens be- 
zuglich der Yolksschulen und Gymnasien, dann die Gesetzgebung 
tiber die Universitaten ; 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 391 

Tc. die Straf justiz- und Polizeistraf-, sowie die Civilrechtsgesetz- 
gebung, mit Ausschluss der Gesetzgebung iiber die innere Ein- 
richtung der offentlichen Bticher und iiber solche Gegenstande, 
welche auf Grund der Landesordnungen und dieses Grundgesetzes in 
den Wirkungskreis der Landtage gehoren, ferner die Gesetzgebung 
iiber Handels- und Wechselrecht, See-, Berg- und Lehenrecht ; 

I. die Gesetzgebung liber die Grundziige der Organisirung der 
Gerichts- und Verwaltungsbehorden ; 

m. die zur Durchftihrung der Staatsgrundgesetze tiber die allge- 
meinen Rechte der Staatsbiirger, iiber das Reichsgericht, iiber die 
richterliche, Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt zu erlassenden und 
dort beruf enen Gesetze ; 

n. die Gesetzgebung iiber jene Gegenstande, welche sich auf 
Pflichten und Verhaltnisse der einzelnen Lander unter einander 
beziehen ; 

o. die Gesetzgebung, betreffend die Form der Behandlung der 
durch die Vereinbarung mit den zur ungarischen Krone gehorigen 
Landern als gemeinsam festgestellten Angelegenheiten. 

§ 12. Alle iibrigen Gegenstande der Gesetzgebung, welche in die- 
sem Gesetze dem Reichsrathe nicht ausdriicklich vorbehalten sind, 
gehoren in den Wirkungskreis der Landtage der im Reichsrathe 
vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander und werden in und mit diesen 
Landtagen verf assungsmassig erledigt. 

Sollte jedoch irgend ein Landtag beschliessen, dass ein oder der 
andere ihm iiberlassene Gegenstand der Gesetzgebung im Reichs- 
rathe behandelt und erledigt werde, so tibergeht ein solcher Gegen- 
stand fiir diesen Fall und riicksichtlich des betreffenden Landtages 
in den Wirkungskreis des Reichsrathes. 

§ 13. Gesetzesvorschlage gelangen als Regierungsvorlagen an 
den Reichsrath. Auch diesem steht das Recht zu, in Gegenstanden 
seines Wirkungskreises Gesetze vorzuschlagen. 

Zu jedem Gesetze ist die Ubereinstimmung beider Hauser und die 
Sanction des Kaisers erforderlich. 

Kann in einem Finanzgesetze liber einzelne Posten desselben 
oder im Recrutengesetze iiber die Hohe des auszuhebenden Contin- 
gentes trotz wiederholter Berathung keine Uebereinstimmung 
zwischen beiden Hausern erzielt werden, so gilt die kleinere Zifrer 
als bewilligt. 

§ 14. Wenn sich die dringende Nothwendigkeit solcher Anord- 



392 AUSTRIA. 

nungen, zu welchen verfassungsmassig die Zustiramung des Reichs- 
rathes erforderlich ist, zu einer Zeit herausstellt, wo dieser nicht 
versammelt ist, so konnen dieselben unter Verantwortung des Ge- 
sammtministeriums durch kaiserliche Verordnung erlassen werden, 
insoferne solche keine Abanderung des Staatsgrundgesetzes be 
zwecken, keine dauernde Belastung des Staatsschatzes und keine 
Verausserung von Staatsgut betreffen. Solche Verordnungen haben 
provisorische Gesetzeskraft, wenn sie von sammtlichen Ministern 
unterzeichnet sind und mit ausdriicklicher Beziehung auf diese 
Bestimmung des Staatsgrundgesetzes kundgemacht werden. 

Die Gesetzeskraft dieser Verordnungen erlischt, wenn die Re- 
gierung unterlassen hat, dieselben dem nachsten nach deren Kund- 
machung zusammentretenden Reichsrathe, und zwar zuvorderst 
dem Hause der Abgeordneten binnen vier Wochen nach diesem 
Zusammentritte zur Genehmigung vorzulegen, oder wenn dieselben 
die Genehmigung eines der beiden Hauser des Reichsrathes nicht 
erhalten. 

Das Gesammtministerium ist dafur verantwortlich, dass solche 
Verordnungen, sobald sie ihre provisorische Gesetzeskraft verloren 
haben, sofort ausser Wirksamkeit gesetzt werden. 

§ 15. 1 Zu einem giltigen Beschlusse des Reichsrathes ist in dem 
Hause der Abgeordneten die Anwesenheit von hundert, im Her- 
renhause von vierzig Mitgliedern und in beiden die absolute Stim- 
menmehrheit der Anwesenden nothwendig. 

Aenderungen in diesen Grundgesetze, sowie in den Staatsgrund- 
gesetzen liber die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsburger fur die im 
Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander, iiber die Einsetz- 
ung eines Reichsgerichtes, liber die richterliche, sowie iiber die 
Ausiibung der Regierungs- und der Vollzugsgewalt konnen nur 
mit einer Mehrheit von wenigstens zwei Dritteln der Stimmen der 
Anwesenden, und im Abgeordnetenhause nur bei Anwesenheit von 
mindestens der Halfte der Mitglieder giltig beschlossen werden. 

§ 16. Die Mitglieder des Hauses der Abgeordneten haben von 
ihren Wahlern keine Instructionen anzunehmen. 

Die Mitglieder des Reichsrathes konnen wegen der in Ausiibung 
ihres Berufes geschehenen Abstimmungen niemals, wegen der in die- 
sem Berufe gemachten Aeusserungen aber nur von dem Hause, dem 
sie angehbren, zur Verantwortung gezogen werden. 

1 See note to § 6. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 393 

Kein Mitglied des Reichsrathes darf wahrend der Dauer der 
Session wegen einer straf baren Handlung — den Fall der Ergreifung 
auf frischer That ausgenommen — ohne Zustimmung des Hauses 
verhaftet oder gerichtlich verfolgt werden. 

Selbst in dem Falle der Ergreifung auf frischer That hat das 
Gericht dem Prasidenten des Hauses sogleich die geschehene Ver- 
haftung bekannt zu geben. 

Wenn es das Haus verlangt, muss der Verhaft aufgehoben oder 
die Verf olgung fur die ganze Sitzungsperiode aufgeschoben werden. 
Dasselbe Recht hat das Haus in Betreff einer Verhaftung oder Un- 
tersuchung, welche liber ein Mitglied desselben ausserhalb der 
Sitzungsperiode verhangt worden ist. 

§ 17. Alle Mitglieder des Reichsrathes haben ihr Stimmrecht 
personlich auszutiben. 

§ 18. 1 Die Mitglieder des Hauses der Abgeordneten werden auf 
die Dauer von sechs Jahren gewahlt. 

Nach Ablauf dieser Wahlperiode, sowie im Falle der Auflosung 
des Abgeordnetenhauses erfolgen allgemeine Neuwahlen. 

Gewesene Abgeordnete konnen wiedergewahlt werden. 

Wahrend der Dauer der Wahlperiode sind Erganzungswahlen 
vorzunehmen, wenn ein Mitglied die Wahlbarkeit verliert, mit Tod 
abgeht, das Mandat niederlegt, oder aus sonst einem gesetzlichen 
Grunde aufhort Mitglied des Reichsrathes zu sein. 

§ 19. Die Vertagung des Reichsrathes, sowie die Auflosung des 
Hauses der Abgeordneten erfolgt uber Verfiigung des Kaisers. 
Im Falle der Auflosung wird im Sinne des § 7 neu gewahlt. 

§ 20. Die Minister und Chefs der Centralstellen sind berechtigt, 
an alien Berathungen Theil zu nehmen und ihre Vorlagen person- 
lich oder durch einen Abgeordneten zu vertreten. Jedes Haus kann 
die Anwesenheit der Minister verlangen. Sie mussen auf Ver- 
langen jedesmal gehort werden. Das Recht, an der Abstimmung 
Theil zu nehmen, haben sie, insoferne sie Mitglieder eines Hauses 
sind. 

§ 21. Jedes der beiden Hauser des Reichsrathes ist berechtigt, 
die Minister zu interpelliren, in Allem, was sein Wirkungskreis 
erfordert, die Verwaltungsacte der Regierung der Prtifung zu un- 
terziehen, von derselben iiber eingehende Petitionen Auskunft zu 
verlangen, Commissionen zu ernennen welchen von Seiten der Min- 
1 See note to § 6. 



394 AUSTRIA. 

isterien die erforderliche Information zu geben ist, und seinen 
Ansichten in Form von Adressen oder Resolutionen Ausdruck zu 
geben. 

§ 22. Die Ausiibung der Controle der Staatsschuld durch die 
Vertretungskorper wird durch ein besonderes Gesetz bestimmt. 

§ 23. Die Sitzungen beider Hauser des Reichsrathes sind offent- 
lich. 

Jedem Hause steht das Recht zu, ausnahmsweise die Oeffentlich- 
keit auszuschliessen, wenn es vom Prasidenten oder wenigsteds zehn 
Mitgliedern verlangt und vom Hause nach Entfernung der Zuhorer 
beschlossen wird. 

§ 24. Die naheren Bestimmungen tiber den wechselseitigen und 
den Aussenverkehr beider Hauser enthalt das Gesetz in Betreff der 
Geschaftsordnung des Reichsrathes. 

Gesetz. 

vom 14. Juni 1896 (R. G. B. 168). 

wodurch das 

Grundgesetz liber die Reichsvertretung vom 21. Dezember 1867, 

R. G. B. 141, beziehungsweise die Gesetze vom 2. April 1873, R. 

G. B. 40 und vom. 12. November 1886, R. G. B. 162, abgeandert 

und erganzt werden. 

Mit Zustimmung der beiden Hauser des Reichsrathes finde Ich 
anzuordnen, wie f olgt : 

Artikel 1. Zu den 353 Mitgliedern, welche im Grunde der §§6 
und 7 des Grundgesetzes liber die Reichsvertretung (Gesetze vom 2. 
April 1873, R. G. B. 40, beziehungsweise vom 12. November 1886, 
R. G. B. 162) in das Haus der Abgeordneten von den in den 
Landesordnungen enthaltenen Wahlerclassen zu wahlen sind, kom- 
men weitere 72 Mitglieder, welche von einer mit e zu bezeichnenden 
allgemeinen Wahlerclasse gewahlt werden. 

Die fur diese Wahlerclasse f estgesetzte Zahl von Mitgliedern wird 
auf die einzelnen Konigreiche und Lander aufgetheilt, und es sind 
von dieser Wahlerclasse zu wahlen : 

Im Konigreiche Bohmen . . . . . .18 

im Konigreiche Dalmatien ..... 2 

im Konigreiche Galizien und Lodomerien mit dem 

Grossherzogthume Krakau 15 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS 



395 



im Erzherzogthume Oesterreich unter der Enns . 9 

im Erzherzogthume Oesterreich ob der Enns . . 3 
im Herzogthume Salzburg . . . . .1 

im Herzogthume Steiermark ..... 4 

im Herzogthume Karnten . . . . .1 

im Herzogthume Krain ...... 1 

im Herzogthume Bukowina . . . . .2 

in der Markgrafschaft Mahren .... 7 

im Herzogthume Ober- und Niederschlesien . . 2 
in der geftirsteten Grafschaft Tirol ... 3 

im Lande Vorarlberg ...... 1 

in der Markgrafschaft Istrien . . . . 1 

in der geftirsteten Grafschaft Gorz und Gradiska . 1 

in der Stadt Triest mit ihrem Gebiete ... 1 

Die Vertheilung der hiernach zu wahlen den Mitglieder des Ab- 
geordnetenhauses auf die einzelnen Wahlbezirke wird durch ein 
besoncleres Gesetz bestimmt. 

Artikel 2. Die Absatze C und D des § 7 des Grundgesetzes 
iiber die Eeichsvertretung (Gesetz vom 2. April, 1873, R. G. B. 40) 
treten in ihrer gegenwartigen Fassung ausser Wirksamkeit und 
haben zu lauten wie f olgt : 

C. Die Abgeordneten werden in der Wahlerclasse der Landge- 
meinden, dann in den ausschliesslich aus Gerichtsbezirken gebildeten 
Wahlbezirken der allgemeinen Wahlerclasse durch von den Wahl- 
berechtigten gewahlte Wahlmanner, in den anderen Wahlerclassen, 
dann in den iibrigen Wahlbezirken der allgemeinen Wahlerclasse 
durch die Wahlberechtigten unmittelbar gewahlt. 

In Landern jedoch, in welchen durch landesgesetzliche Bestim- 
mungen die unmittelbare Wahl der Landtagsabgeordneten in der 
Wahlerclasse der Landgemeinden f estgesetzt wird, sind audi die Mit- 
glieder des Abgeordinetenhauses in der Wahlerclasse der Landge- 
meinden, sowie in sammtlichen Wahlbezirken der allgemeinen 
Wahlerclasse unmittelbar durch die Wahlberechtigten zu wahlen. 

Die Wahl der Wahlmanner und der Abgeordneten hat durch 
absolute Stimmenmehrheit zu geschehen. 

Wird diese Stimmenmehrheit bei einer oder, insoferne noch 
mehrere Abgeordnete zu wahlen sind, auch bei fortgesetzter en- 
gerer Wahl nicht erzielt, so entscheidet schliesslich bei gleichgetheil- 
ten Stimmen das Los. 



396 AUSTRIA. 

D. Wahlberechtigt ist jeder osterreichische Staatsbiirger, der das 
24. Lebensjahr zuriickgelegt hat, eigenberechtigt ist und den son- 
stigen durch die Reichsrathswahlordnung, beziehungsweise durch das 
Gesetz vom 14 Juni 1896 (R. G. B. 169) festgestellten Erf order- 
nissen entspricht. 

Artikel 3. Dieses Gesetz tritt gleichzeitig mit dem Gesetze 
vom 14. Juni 1896, betreffend die Abanderung und Erganzung der 
Reichsrathswahlordnung, in Wirksamkeit. 

JStaatsgrundgesetz uber die allgemeinen Rechte Der 
Staatsbiirger. 

21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 142). 

Mit Zustimmung beider Hauser des Reichsrathes finde Ich das 
nachstehende Staatsgrundgesetz iiber die allgemeinen Rechte der 
Staatsbiirger zu erlassen und anzuordnen, wie folgt : 

Art. 1. Fur alle Angehorigen der im Reichsrathe vertretenen 
Konigreiche und Lander besteht ein allgemeines osterreichisches 
Staatsblirgerrecht. 

Das Gesetz bestimmt, unter welchen Bedingungen das osterreich- 
ische Staatsblirgerrecht erworben, ausgetibt und verloren wird. 

2. Vor dem Gesetze sind alle Staatsbiirger gleich. 

3. Die offentlichen Aemter sind fiir alle Staatsbiirger gleich zu- 
ganglich. 

Fiir Auslander wird der Eintritt in dieselben von der Erwerbung 
der osterreichischen Staatsbiirgerschaft abhangig gemacht. 

4. Die Freiziigigkeit der Person und des Vermogens innerhalb 
des Staatsgebietes unterliegt keiner Beschrankung. 

Allen Staatsbiirgern, welche in einer Gemeinde wohnen und da- 
selbst von ihrem Realbesitze, Erwerbe oder Einkommen Steuer 
entrichten, gebiihrt das active und passive Wahlrecht zur Gemeinde- 
vertretung unter denselben Bedingungen wie den Gemeindeange- 
horigen. 

Die Freiheit der Auswanderung ist von Staatswegen nur durch 
die Wehrpflicht beschrankt. 

Abfahrtsgelder diirfen nur in Anwendung der Reciprocitat er- 
hoben werden. 

5. Das Eigenthum ist unverletzlich. Eine Enteignung gegen den 
Willen des Eigenthiimers kann nur in den Fallen und in der Art 
eintrpten, welche das Gesetz bestimmt. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 397 

6. Jeder Staatsbiirger kann an jedem Orte des Staatsgebietes 
seinen Aufenthalt und Wohnsitz nehmen, Liegenschaften jeder Art 
erwerben und liber dieselben frei verftigen, sowie unter den gesetz- 
lichen Bedingungen jeden Erwerbszweig ausliben. 

Fiir die todte Hand sind Beschrankungen des Rechtes, Liegen- 
schaften zu erwerben und liber sie zu verfiigen, in Wege des Gesetzes 
aus Grtinden des offentlichen Wohles zulassig. 

7. Jeder Unterthanigkeits- und Horigkeitsverband ist fiir immer 
aufgehoben. Jede aus dem Titel des getheilten Eigenthums auf 
Liegenschaften haftende Schuldigkeit oder Leistung ist ablosbar, 
und es darf in Zukunft keine Liegenschaft mit einer derartigen 
unablosbaren Leistung belastet werden. 

8. Die Freiheit der Person ist gewahrleistet. 

Das bestehende Gesetz vom 27. October 1862 (R. G. B. 87) 
zum Schutze der personlichen Freiheit wird hiemit als Bestandtheil 
dieses Staatsgrundgesetzes erklart. 

Jede gesetzwidrig verfiigte oder verlangerte Verhaftung ver- 
pflichtet den Staat zum Schadenersatze an den Verletzten. 

9. Das Hausrecht ist unverletzlich. 

Das bestehende Gesetz vom 27. October 1862 (R. G. B. 88) zum 
Schutze des Hausrechtes wird hiemit als Bestandtheil dieses Staats- 
grundgesetzes erklart. 

10. Das Briefgeheimniss darf nicht verletzt und die Beschlag- 
nahme von Brief en, ausser dem Falle einer gesetzlichen Verhaftung 
oder Haussuchung, nur in Kriegsfallen oder auf Grund eines richt- 
erlichen Befehles in Gemassheit bestehender Gesetze vorgenommen 
werden. 

11. Das Petitionsrecht steht jedermann zu. 

Petitionen unter einem Gesammtnamen diirf en nur von gesetzlich 
anerkannten Korperschaften oder Vereinen ausgehen. 

12. Die osterreichischen Staatsbiirger haben das Recht, sich zu 
versammeln und Vereine zu bilden. Die Ausiibung dieser Rechte 
wird durch besondere Gesetze geregelt. 

13. Jedermann hat das Recht, durch Wort, Schrift, Druck oder 
durch bildliche Darstellung seine Meinung innerhalb der gesetzlichen 
Schranken frei zu aussern. 

Die Presse darf weder unter Censur gestellt, noch durch das 
Concessionssystem beschrankt werden. Administrative Postverbote 
finden auf inlandische Druckschriften keine Anwendung. 



398 AUSTRIA. 

14. Die voile Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit ist jedermann 
gewahrleistet. Der Genuss der biirgerlichen und politischen Rechte 
ist von dem Religionsbekenntnisse unabhangig; doch darf den 
staatsblirgerliclien Pflichten durch das Religionsbekenntniss kein 
Abbruch geschehen. Niemand kann zu einer kirclilichen Hand- 
lung oder zur Theilnahme an einer kirchlichen Feierlichkeit ge- 
zwungen werden, insofern er nicht der nach dem Gesetze liierzu 
berechtigten Gewalt eines Anderen untersteht. 

15. Jede gesetzlich anerkannte Kirche und Religionsgesellscliaft 
hat das Recht der gemeinsamen offentlichen Religionsubung, ordnet 
und verwaltet ihre inneren Angelegenheiten selbstandig, bleibt im 
Besitze und Genusse ihrer fur Cultus-, Unterrichts- und Wohl- 
thatigkeitszwecke bestimmten Anstalten, Stiftungen und Fonde, 
ist aber wie jede Gesellschaft den allgemeinen Staatsgesetzen 
unterworfen. 

16. Den Anhangern eines gesetzlich nicht anerkannten Religions- 
bekenntnisses ist die hausliche Religionsubung gestattet, insoferne 
dieselbe weder rechtswidrig, noch sittenverletzend ist. 

17. Die Wissenschaft und ihre Lehre ist frei. 

Unterrichts- und Erziehungsanstalten zu griinden und an solchen 
Unterricht zu ertheilen, ist jeder Staatsbttrger berechtigt, der seine 
Befahigung hiezu in gesetzlicher Weise nachgewiesen hat. 

Der hausliche Unterricht unterliegt keiner solchen Beschrankung. 

Fiir den Religionsunterricht in den Schulen ist von der betreffen- 
den Kirche oder Religionsgesellscliaft Sorge zu tragen. 

Dem Staate steht riicksichtlich des Gesammten Unterrichts- und 
Erziehungswesens das Recht der obersten Leitung und Aufsicht zu. 

18. Es steht jedermann frei, seinen Beruf zu walilen und sich 
fiir denselben auszubilden, wie und wo er will. 

19. Alle Volksstamme des Staates sind gleichberechtigt, und jeder 
Volksstamm hat ein unverletzliches Recht auf Wahrung und Pflege 
seiner Nationalist und Sprache. 

Die Gleichberechtigung aller landestiblichen Sprachen in Schule, 
Amt und offentlichem Leben wird vom Staate anerkannt. 

In den Landern, in welchen mehrere Volksstamme wohnen, sollen 
die offentlichen Unterrichtsanstalten derart eingerichtet sein, dass 
ohne Anwendung eines Zwanges zur Erlernung einer zweiten Land- 
essprache jeder dieser Volksstamme die erforderlichen Mittel zur 
Ausbildung in seiner Sprache erhalt. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 399 

20. Ueber die Zulassigkeit der zeitweiligen und orlichen Suspen- 
sion der in den Art. 8, 9, 10, 12 und 13 enthaltenen Bechte durch 
die verantwortliche Regierungsgewalt wird ein besonderes Gesetz 
bestimmen. 



Staatsgrundgesetz ilher das Reichsgericht. 
21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 143). 

Mit Zustimmung beider Hauser des Reichsrathes finde Ich nach- 
stehendes Staatsgrundgesetz zu erlassen und anzuorclnen, wie f olgt : 

Art. 1. Zur Entscheidung bei Competenzconflicten und in 
streitigen Angelegenheiten offentlichen Rechtes wird ftir die im 
Reichsratbe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander ein Reichsgericht 
eingesetzt. 

2. Das Reichsgericht hat endgiltig zu entscheiden bei Competenz- 
conflicten ; 

a. zwischen Gerichts- und Verwaltungsbehorden tiber die Frage, 
ob eine Angelegenheit irn Rechts- oder Verwaltungswege auszutragen 
ist, in den durch das Gesetz bestimmten Fallen ; 

b. zwischen einer Landesvertretung und den obersten Regierungs- 
behorden, wenn jede derselben das Verfugungs- oder Entscheidungs- 
recht in einer administrativen Angelegenheit beansprucht ; 

c. zwischen den autonomen Landesorganen verschiedener Lander 
in den ihrer Besorgung und Yerwaltung zugewiesenen Angelegen- 
heiten. 

3. Dem Reichsgerichte steht ferners die endgiltige Entscheidung 
zu; 

a. tiber Ansprtiche einzelner der im Reichsrathe vertretenen 
Konigreiche und Lander an die Gesammtheit derselben und umsre- 
kehrt, dann iiber Ansprtiche eines dieser Konigreiche und Lander 
an ein anderes derselben, endlich iiber Ansprtiche, welche von 
Gememden, Korperschaften oder einzelnen Personen an eines der 
genannten Konigreiche und Lander oder an die Gesammtheit der- 
selben gestellt werden, wenn solche Ansprtiche zur Austragung im 
ordentlichen Rechtswege nicht geeignet sind, 

b. iiber Beschwerden der Staatsbiirger wegen Yerletzung der 
ihnen durch die Verfassung gewahrleisteten politischen Rechte, 
nachden die Angelegenheit im gesetzlich vorgeschriebenen adminis- 
trativen Wege ausgetragen worden ist. 



400 AUSTRIA. 

4. Ueber die Frage, ob die Entscheidung eines Falles dem 
Reichsgerichte zusteht, erkennt einzig und allein das Reichsgericht 
selbst; dessen Entscheidungen schliessen jede weitere Berufung, 
sowie die Betretung des Rechtsweges aus. 

Wird eine Angelegenheit vom Reichsgerichte vor den ordentlichen 
Richter oder vor eine Verwaltungsbehbrde gewiesen, so kann die 
Entscheidung von denselben wegen Incompetenz nicht abgelehnt 
werden. 

5. Das Reichsgericht hat seinen Sitz in Wien und besteht aus dem 
Prasidenten und seinem Stellvertreter, welche vom Kaiser auf 
Lebensdauer ernannt werden, dann aus zwblf Mitgliedern und vier 
Ersatzmannern, welche der Kaiser iiber Vorschlag des Reichsrathes, 
und zwar sechs Mitglieder und zwei Ersatzmanner aus den durch 
das Abgeordnetenhaus, dann sechs Mitglieder und zwei Ersatzman- 
ner aus den von dem Herrenhause vorgeschlagenen Personen eben- 
falls auf Lebensdauer ernennt. 

Der Vorschlag wird in der Weise erstattet, dass fiir jede der zu 
besetzenden Stellen drei sachkundige Manner bezeichnet werden. 

6. Ein besonderes Gesetz wird die naheren Bestimmungen iiber 
die Organisation des Reichsgerichtes, iiber das Verfahren vor dem- 
selben und iiber die Vollziehung seiner Entscheidungen und Verfii- 
gungen feststellen. 

Staatsgrundgesetz, iiber die richterliche gewalt. 
21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 144). 

Mit Zustimmung der beiden Hauser des Reichsrathes finde Ich 
nachstehendes Staatsgrundgesetz iiber die richterliche Gewalt zu 
erlassen und anzuordnen, wie f olgt : — 

Art. 1. Alle Gerichtsbarkeit im Staate wird im Namen des 
Kaisers ausgeiibt. 

Die Urtheile und Erkenntnisse werden im Namen des Kaisers 
ausgefertigt. 

2. Die Organisation und Competenz der Gerichte wird durch 
Gesetze festgestellt. 

Ausnahmsgerichte sind nur in den von den Gesetzen im voraus 
bestimmten Fallen zulassig. 

3. Der Wirkungskreis der Militargerichte wird durch besondere 
Gesetze bestimmt. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 401 

4. Die Gerichtsbarkeit beziiglich der Uebertretungen der Polizei- 
und der Gefallsstrafgesetze wird durch Gesetze geregelt. 

5. Die Richter werden vom Kaiser oder in dessen Namen defini- 
tiv und auf Lebensdauer ernnant. 

6. Die Richter sind in Austibung ihres richterlichen Amtes selb- 
Standig und unabhangig. 

Sie dtirfen nur in den vom Gesetze vorgeschriebenen Fallen und 
nur auf Grund eines formlichen richterlichen Erkenntnisses ihres 
Amtes entsetzt werden ; die zeitweise Enthebung derselben vom 
Amte darf nur durch Yerfiigung des Gerichtsvorstandes oder der 
hoheren Gerichtsbehorde unter gleichzeitiger Verweisung der Sache 
an das zustandige Gericht ; die Versetzung an eine andere Stelle 
oder in den Ruhestand wider Willen nur durch gerichtlichen Be- 
schluss in den durch das Gesetz bestimmten Fallen und Formen 
erfolgen. 

Diese Bestimmungen finden jedoch auf Uebersetzungen und Ver- 
setzungen in den Ruhestand keine Anwendung, welche durch Ver- 
anderungen in der Organisation der Gerichte nothig werden. 

7. Die Priifung der Giltigkeit gehorig kundgemachter Gesetze 
steht den Gerichten nicht zu. Dagegen haben die Gerichte iiber 
die Giltigkeit von Verordnungen im gesetzlichen Instanzenzuge zu 
entscheiden. 

8. Alle richterlichen Beamten haben in ihrem Diensteide auch 
die unverbrtichliche Beobachtung der Staatsgrundgesetze zu be- 
schworen. 

9. Der Staat oder dessen richterliche Beamten konnen wegen der 
von den letzteren in Austibung ihrer amtlichen Wirksamkeit verur- 
sachten Rechtsverletzungen ausser den im gerichtlichen Verfahren 
vorgezeichneten Rechtsmitteln mittelst Klage belangt werden. 
Dieses Klagerecht wird durch ein besonderes Gesetz geregelt. 

10. Die Verhandlungen vor dem erkennenden Richter sind in 
Civil- und Strafrechts-Angelegenheiten mundlieh und oflentlich. 

Die Ausnahmen bestimmt das Gesetz. Im Strafverfahren gilt 
der Anklageprocess. 

11. Bei den mit schweren Strafen bedrohten Verbrechen, welche 
das Gesetz zu bezeichnen hat, sowie bei alien politischen oder durch 
den Inhalt einer Druckschrift veriibten Verbrechen und Vergehen 
entscheiden Geschworne iiber die Schuld des Angeklagten. 

VOL. II. 



402 AUSTRIA. 

12. Fiir die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander 
besteht der oberste Gerichts- und Cassationshof in Wien. 

13. Der Kaiser hat das Recht, Amnestie zu ertheilen und die 
Strafen, welche von den Gericbten ausgesprocben wurden, zu er- 
lassen ocler zu inildern, sowie die Recbtsfolgen von Verurtheilungen 
nachzusehen, mit Vorbehalt der im Gesetze iiber die Verantwort- 
licbkeit der Minister enthaltenen Beschrankungen. 

Die Regelung des Recbtes anzuordnen, dass wegen einer straf- 
baren Handlung ein strafgericbtliches Verfahren nicbt eingeleitet 
oder das eingeleitete Strafverf abren wieder eingestellt werde, bleibt 
den Vorscbrif ten der Strafprocess-Ordnung yorbebalten. 

14. Die RechtspfLege wird von der Yerwaltung in alien Instan- 
zen getrennt. 

15. In alien Fallen, wo eine Verwaltungsbehorde nacb den 
bestebenden oder kunftig zu erlassenden Gesetzen iiber einander 
widerstreitende Anspriicbe von Privatpersonen zu entscbeiden bat, 
steht es dem durcb diese Entscbeidung in seinen Privatrecbten 
Benacbtbeiligten frei, Abbilfe gegen die andere Partei im ordent- 
licben Rechtswege zu sucben. 

Wenn ausserdem jemand bebauptet, durcb eine Entscbeidung 
oder Yerfiigung einer Verwaltungsbeborde in seinen Recbten ver- 
letzt zu sein, so stebt ibm frei, seine Anspriicbe vor dem Verwalt- 
ungsgericbtsbofe im orfentlichen miindlicben Yerf abren wide reinen 
Yertreter der Verwaltungsbehorde geltend zu macben. 

Die Falle, in welcben der Verwaltungsgerichtshof zu entscbeiden 
hat, dessen Zusammensetzung, sowie das Yerfabren vor demselben 
werden durcb ein besonderes Gesetz bestimmt. 

Staatsgrundgesetz fiber die Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt. 
21. December 1867 (R. G. B. 145). 

Mit Zustimmung der beiden Hauser des Reicbsratbes finde Ich 
nacbstebendes Staatsgrundgesetz iiber die Ausiibung der Regier- 
ungs- und Yollzugsgewalt zu erlassen und anzuordnen wie f olgt : — 

Art. 1. Der Kaiser ist gebeiligt, unverletzlich und unverantwort- 
Hch. 

2. Der Kaiser iibt die Regierungsgewalt durcb verantwortliche 
Minister und die denselben untergeordneten Beamten und Bestell- 
ten aus. 



TEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS. 403 

3. Der Kaiser ernennt und entlasst die Minister und besetzt 
fiber Antrag der betreffenden Minister alle Aemter in alien Zweigen 
des Staatsdienstes, insof erne nicht das Gesetz ein Anderes verordnet. 

4. Der Kaiser verleiht Titel, Orden und sonstige staatliche Aus- 
zeichnungen. 

5. Der Kaiser ftihrt den Oberbefehl fiber die bewaffnete Macht, 
erklart Krieg und schliesst Frieden. 

6. Der Kaiser schliesst die Staatsvertrage ab. 

Zur Giltigkeit der Handelsvertrage und jener Staatsvertrage, die 
das Reich oder Theile desselben belasten oder einzelne Burger ver- 
pflichten, ist die Zustimmung des Reichsrathes erforderlich. 

7. Das Munzrecht wird im Namen des Kaisers ausgefibt. 

8. Der Kaiser leistet beim Antritte der Regierung in Gegenwart 
beider Hauser des Reichsrathes das eidliche Gelobniss : — 

" Die Grundgesetze der im Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche 
und Lander unverbruchlich zu halten und in Uebereinstimmung mit 
denselben und den allgemeinen Gesetnen zu regieren." 

9. Die Minister sind fur die Verfassungs- und Gesetzmassigkeit 
der in die Sphare ihrer Amtswirksamkeit fallenden Regierungsacte 
verantwortlich. 

Diese Verantwortlichkeit, die Zusammensetzung des fiber die 
Ministeranklage erkennenden Gerichtshof es und das Verfahren vor 
demselben sind durch ein besonderes Gesetz geregelt. 1 

10. Die Kundmachung der Gesetze erf olgt im Namen des Kaisers 
mit Berufung auf die Zustimmung der verfassungsmassigen Ver- 
tretungskorper und unter Mitfertigung eines verantwortlichen 
Ministers. 

11. Die Staatsbehorden sind innerhalb ihres amtlichen Wirk- 
ungskreises befugt, auf Grund der Gesetze Verordnungen zu erlas- 
sen und Befehle zu ertheilen, und sowohl die Beobachtung dieser 
letzteren als der gesetzlichen Anordnungen selbst gegenfiber den 
hiezu Verpflichteten zu erzwingen. 

Besondere Gesetze regeln das Execution srecht der Verwaltungs- 
beh orden, sowie die Befugnisse der bewaffneten Macht, die zur 
Erhaltung der offentlichen Sicherheit, Ruhe und Ordnung dauernd 
organisirt ist oder in besonderen Fallen aufgeboten wird. 

1 The first clause of the law on the responsibility of the ministers (25. July 
1867, R. G. B. 101) is as follows : " § 1. Jeder Regierungsact des Kaisers bedorf 
zu seiner Giltigkeit der Gegenzeichnung eines verantwortlichen Ministers." 



404 AUSTRIA. 

12. Sammtliche Staatsdiener sind innerhalb ihres amtlichen 
Wirkungskreises fur die Beobachtung der Staatsgrundgesetze, sowie 
fiir die den Reichs- und Landesgesetzen entsprechende Gescbafts- 
fiihrung verantwortlich. 

Diese Verantwortlicbkeit geltend zu machen sind diejenigen 
Organe der Executivgewalt verpflichtet, deren Disciplinargewalt 
die betreffenden Staatsdiener untersteben. 

Die civilrecbtlicbe Haftung derselben fur die durcb pflichtwidrige 
Verfiigungen verursacbten Recbtsverletzungen wird durcb ein 
Gesetz normirt. 

13. Alle Organe der Staatsverwaltung baben in ibrem Dienst- 
eide aucb die unverbrucblicbe Beobacbtung der Staatsgrundgesetze 
zu bescbworen. 



SWITZERLAND. 

AU NOM DE DIEU TOUT PUISSANT ! 
LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE. 

Voulant affermir l'alliance des Confeder^s, maintenir et accroitre 
l'unite, la force et l'honneur de la Nation Suisse, a adopts la consti- 
tution f e'de'rale suivante : 

CONSTITUTION FED^RALE 

DE LA 

CONFEDERATION SUISSE. 



CHAPITRE PREMIER. 

DISPOSITIONS GENERALES. 

Article 1. Les peuples des vingt-deux cantons souverains de la 
Suisse, unis par la pre'sente alliance, savoir : Zurich, Berne, Lu- 
cerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (le haut et la bas), Glaris, Zoug, 
Fribourg, Soleure, Bale (ville et campagne), Schaff house, Appenzell 
(les deux Rhodes), St-Gall, Grisons, Argovie, Tessin, Vaud, Valais, 
Neuchdtel et Geneve, f orment dans leur ensemble la Confederation 

SUISSE. 

Article 2. La Confederation a pour but d'assurer l'inde'pendance 
de la patrie contre l'etranger, de maintenir la tranquillite et l'ordre 
a l'inte'rieur, de protdger la liberty et les droits des confedere's et 
d'accroitre leur prosperity commune. 

Article 3. Les cantons sont souverains en tant que leur sou- 
verainete n'est pas limitee par la constitution federale, et, comme 
tels, ils exercent tous les droits qui ne sont pas delegues au pouvoir 
federal. 

Article 4. Tous les Suisses sont egaux devant la loi. II n'y a en 



406 SWITZERLAND. 

Suisse ni sujets, ni privileges de lieu, de naissance, de personnes ou 
de families. 

Article 5. La Confederation garantit aux cantons leur territoire, 
leur souverainete dans les limites fix^es par l'article 3, leurs consti- 
tutions, la liberty et les droits du peuple, les droits constitutionnels 
des citoyens, ainsi que les droits et les attributions que le peuple a 
conf eres aux autorites. 

Article 6. Les cantons sont tenus de demander a la Confedera- 
tion la garantie de leurs constitutions. 

Cette garantie est accordee, pourvu : 

a. que ces constitutions ne renferment rien de contraire aux 

dispositions de la constitution f ederale ; 

b. qu'elles assurent l'exercice des droits politiques d'apres des 

formes republicaines, — representatives ou democratiques ; 
c. qu'elles aient ete acceptees par le peuj)le et qu'elles puissent 
etre revisees lorsque la majorite absolue des citoyens le 
demande. 

Article 7. Toute alliance particuliere et tout traite d'une nature 
politique entre cantons sont iuterdits. 

En revanche, les cantons ont le droit de conclure entre eux des 
conventions sur des objets de legislation, d' administration ou de 
justice ; toutef ois ils doivent les porter a la connaissance de l'autorite 
federale, laquelle, si ces conventions renferment quelque chose de 
contraire a la Confederation ou aux droits des autres cantons, est 
autorisee a en empecher l'execution. Dans le cas contraire, les 
cantons contractants sont autorises a redamer pour l'execution la 
cooperation des autorites federales. 

Article 8. La Confederation a seule le droit de declarer la guerre 
et de conclure la paix, ainsi que de faire avec les etats etrangers des 
alliances et des traites, notamment des traites de peage (douanes) et 
de commerce. 

Article 9. Exceptionnellement, les cantons conservent le droit de 
conclure avec les etats etrangers des traites sur des objets concern- 
ant l'economie publique, les rapports de voisinage et de police ; 
neanmoins ces traites ne doivent rien contenir de contraire k la 
Confederation ou aux droits d' autres cantons. 

Article 10. Les rapports officiels entre les cantons et les gou- 
vernements etrangers ou leurs representants ont lieu par rinterme*- 
diaire du conseil federal. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 407 

Toutefois, les cantons peuvent correspondre directement avec les 
autorites inferieures et les employe's d'un etat Stranger, lorsqu'il 
s'agit des objets mentionnds a l'article precedent. 

Article 11. II ne peut etre conclu de capitulations militaires. 

Article 12. Les membres des autorites fe'derales, les function- 
naires civils et militaires de la Confederation, et les repre'sentants ou 
les commissaires fede'raux ne peuvent recevoir d'un gouvernement 
Stranger ni pensions ou traitements, ni titres, presents ou decora- 
tions. 

S'ils sont deja en possession de pensions, de titres ou de decora- 
tions, ils devront renoncer a jouir de leurs pensions et a porter leurs 
titres et leurs decorations pendant la durde de leurs fonctions. 

Toutefois les employes inferieurs peuvent etre autorisds par Ie 
conseil federal a recevoir leurs pensions. 

On ne peut, dans l'armee federale, porter ni decoration ni titre 
accordes par un gouvernement etranger. 

II est interdit a tout officier, sous-officier ou soldat d'accepter des 
distinctions de ce genre. 

Article 13. La Confederation n'a pas le droit d'entretenir des 
troupes permanentes. 

Nul canton ou demi-canton ne peut avoir plus de 300 hommes 
de troupes permanentes, sans l'autorisation du pouvoir federal ; la 
gendarmerie n'est pas comprise dans ce nombre. 

Article 14. Des differends venant a s'eiever entre cantons, les 
etats s'abstiendront de toute voie de fait et de tout armement. lis 
se soumettront a la decision qui sera prise sur ces differends con- 
formement aux prescriptions federales. 

Article 15. Dans le cas d'un danger subit provenant du dehors, 
le gouvernement du canton menace doit requerir le secours des 
etats conf ederes et en aviser immediatement l'autorite federale, le 
tout sans prejudice des dispositions qu'elle pourra prendre. Les 
cantons requis sont tenus de preter secours. Les frais sont sup- 
portes par la Confederation. 

Article 16. En cas de troubles a l'interieur, ou lorsque le danger 
provient d'un autre canton, le gouvernement du canton menace 
doit en aviser immediatement le conseil federal, afin qu'il puisse 
prendre les mesures necessaires dans les limites de sa competence 
(article 102, chiffres 3, 10 et 11) ou convoquer l'assembiee federale. 
Lorsqu'il y a urgence, le gouvernement est autorise, en avertissant 



408 SWITZERLAND. 

immddiatement le conseil federal, a requ^rir le secours d'autres 
etats confdddrds, qui sont tenus de le preter. 

Lorsque le gouvernement est hors d'etat d'invoquer le secours, 
l'autorite f e'de'rale competente peut intervenir sans requisition ; elle 
est tenue de le faire lorsque les troubles compromettent la surete* de 
la Suisse. 

En cas d'intervention, les autorite's f eMerales veillent a l'observa- 
tion des dispositions prescrites a Particle 5. 

Les frais sont supports par le canton qui a requis l'assistance ou 
occasionnd l'intervention, a moins que l'assemblee federale n'en 
decide autrement, en consideration de circonstances particulieres. 

Article 17. Dans les cas mentionnes aux deux articles precedents, 
chaque canton est tenu d'accorder libre passage aux troupes. Celles- 
ci sont immediatement placdes sous le commandement federal. 

Article 18. Tout Suisse est tenu au service militaire. 

Les militaires qui, par le fait du service federal, perdent la vie ou 
voient leur sante altdr^e d'une maniere permanente, ont droit a des 
secours de la Confederation, pour eux ou pour leur f amille, s'ils sont 
dans le besoin. 

Chaque soldat regoit gratuitement ses premiers effets d'armement, 
d'equipement et d'habillement. L'arme reste en mains du soldat aux 
conditions qui seront fixees par la legislation federale. 

La Confederation edictera des prescriptions uniformes sur la taxe 
d' exemption du service militaire. 

Article 19. L'armee federale est composee : 

a. des corps de troupes des cantons ; 

b. de tous les Suisses qui, n'appartenant pas a ces corps, sont 

neanmoins astreints au service militaire. 

Le droit de disposer de l'armee ainsi que du materiel de guerre 
prevu par la loi, appartient a la Confederation. 

En cas de danger, la Confederation a aussi le droit de disposer 
exclusivement et directement des hommes non incorpores dans 
l'armee federale et de toutes les autres resources militaires des 
cantons. 

Les cantons disposent des forces militaires de leur territoire, pour 
autant que ce droit n'est pas liniite par la constitution ou les lois 
federales. 

Article 20. Les lois sur l'organisation de l'armee emanent de la 
Confederation. L'execution des lois militaires dans les cantons a 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 409 

lieu par les autorite's cantonales, dans les limites qui seront fixe'es par 
la legislation federale et sous la surveillance de la Confederation. 

L'instruction militaire dans son ensemble apjmrtient a la Con- 
federation ; il en est de meme de l'armenient. 

La fourniture et l'entretien de Thabillement et de l'equipement 
restent dans la competence cantonale ; toutefois, les depenses qui en 
resultent sont bonifiees aux cantons par la Confederation, d'apres 
une regie a etablir par la legislation federale. 

Article 21. A moins que des considerations militaires ne s'y op- 
posent, les corps doivent etre formes de troupes d'un meme canton. 

La composition de ces corps de troupes, le soin du maintien de 
leur effectif, la nomination et la promotion des officiers de ces corps 
appartiennent aux cantons sous reserve des prescriptions generales 
qui leur seront transmises par la Confederation. 

Article 22. Moyennant une indemnite equitable, la Confedera- 
tion a le droit de se servir ou de devenir proprietaire des places 
d'armes et des batiments ayant une destination militaire qui existent 
dans les cantons, ainsi que de leurs accessoires. 

Les conditions de l'indemnite seront regies par la legislation 
federale. 

Article 23. La Confederation peut ordonner a ses frais ou en- 
courager par des subsides les travaux publics qui interessent la Suisse 
ou une partie considerable du pays. 

Dans ce but, elle peut ordonner l'expropriation moyennant une 
juste indemnite. La legislation federale statuera les dispositions 
ulterieures sur cette matiere. 

L'asembiee federale peut interdire les constructions publiques qui 
porteraient atteinte aux interets militaires de la Confederation. 

Article 24. La Confederation a le droit de haute surveillance sur 
la police des endiguements et des forets dans les regions elevees. 

Elle concourra a la correction et a l'endiguement des torrents, 
ainsi qu'au reboisement des regions ou ils prennent leur source. 
Elle decretera les mesures necessaires pour assurer l'entretien de ces 
ouvrages et la conservation des forets existantes. 

Article 25. La Confederation a le droit de statuer des disposi- 
tions legislatives pour regler l'exercice de la peche et de la chasse, 
principalement en vue de la conservation du gros gibier dans les 
montagnes, ainsi que pour proteger les oiseaux utiles a l'agriculture 
et a la sylviculture. 



410 SWITZERLAND. 

Article 25 b . i8 1 H est expresse'ment interdit de seigner les animaux 
de boucherie sans les avoir e'tourdis prealablement ; cette disposition 
s'applique a tout mode d'abatage et a toute espece de betail. 

Article 26. La legislation sur la construction et l'exploitation des 
chemins de fer est du domaine de la Confederation. 

Article 27. La Confederation a le droit de crder outre Pe'cole 
polytechnique federale existante, une university fe'de'rale et d'autres 
dtablissements d'instruction superieure ou de subventionner des eta- 
blissements de ce genre. 

Les cantons pourvoient a l'instruction primaire, qui doit etre suf- 
fisante et placee exclusivement sous la direction de l'autorite civile. 
Elle est obligatoire et, dans les ecoles publiques, gratuite. 

Les ecoles publiques doivent pouvoir etre frequentees par les 
adherents de toutes les confessions, sans qu'ils aient a souffrir d'au- 
cune faQon dans leur liberte de conscience ou de croyance. 

La Confederation prendra les mesures necessaires contre les can- 
tons qui ne satisf eraient pas a ces obligations. 

Article 28. Ce qui concerne les peages releve de la Confedera- 
tion. Celle-ci peut percevoir des droits d'entree et des droits de 
sortie. 

Article 29. La perception des peages federaux sera rdglee con- 
formement aux principes suivants : 

1. Droits sur l'importation : 

a. Les matieres necessaires a l'industrie et a Tagriculture du pays 
seront taxees aussi bas que possible. 

b. II en sera de meine des objets necessaires a la vie. 

c. Les objets de luxe seront soumis aux taxes les plus elevees. 

A moins d'obstacles majeurs, ces principes devront aussi etre ob- 
serves lors de la conclusion de traites de commerce avec 1' Stranger. 

2. Les droits sur l'exportation seront aussi moderes que pos- 
sible. 

3. La legislation des peages contiendra des dispositions propres a 
assurer le commerce frontiere et sur les marches. 

Les dispositions ci-dessus n'empechent point la Confederation de 
prendre temporairement des mesures exceptionnelles dans les circon- 
stances extraordinaires. 

Article 30. Le produit des peages appartient h la Confedera- 
tion. 

i Adopted Aug. 20, 1893. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 411 

Les indemnites payees jusqu'a present aux cantons pour le rachat 
des peages, des droits de chaussee et de pontonnage, des droits de 
douane et d'autres emoluments semblables, sont supprimees. 

Les cantons d'Uri, des Grisons, du Tessin et du Valais recoivent, 
par exception et a raison de leurs routes alpestres internationales, 
une indemnite annuelle dont, en tenant compte de toutes les circon- 
stances, le chiffre est fixe comme suit : 

Uri, fr. 80,000 

Grisons, fr. 200,000 

Tessin, fr. 200,000 

Valais, fr. 50,000 

Les cantons d'Uri et du Tessin recevront en outre, pour le de- 
blaiement des neiges sur la route du St-Gothard, une indemnite 
annuelle totale de fr. 40,000 francs, aussi longtemps que cette route 
ne sera pas remplacee par un chemin de fer. 

Article 31. La liberty de commerce et de l'industrie est garantie 
dans toute l'etendue de la Confederation. 

Sont reserves : 

a. La regale du sel et de la poudre de guerre, les peages f^de- 
raux, les droits d'entree sur les vins et les autres boissons spiritu- 
euses, ainsi que les autres droits de consommation formellement 
reconnus par la Confederation, a teneur de l'article 32. 

b. 1 La fabrication et la vente des boissons distillees, en conformity 
de Particle 32 bis - 

c. 1 Tout ce qui concerne les auberges et la commerce au detail des 
boissons spiritueuses, en ce sens que les cantons ont le droit de sou- 
mettre par voie legislative, aux restrictions exige'es par le bien-etre 
public, l'exercice du me'tier d'aubergiste et le commerce au detail 
des boissons spiritueuses. 

d. Les mesures de police sanitaire contre les e'pide'mies et les 
epizooties. 

e. Les dispositions touchant l'exercice des professions commer- 
ciales et industrielles, les impots qui s'y rattachent et la police des 
routes. Ces dispositions ne peuvent rien renfermer de contraire au 
principe de la liberty de commerce et d'industrie. 

Article 32. Les cantons sont autorise's a percevoir les droits d'en- 
trde sur les vins et les autres boissons spiritueuses prevus a l'article 
31, lettre a, toutefois sous les restrictions suivantes : 

1 Adopted Oct. 25, 1885. 



412 SWITZERLAND. 

a. La perception de ces droits d'entre'e ne doit nullement grever le 
transit ; elle doit gener le moins possible le commerce, qui ne peut 
£tre frappe* d'aucune autre taxe. 

b. Si les objets imported pour la consommation sont re'exporte's du 
canton, les droits paye's pour l'entre'e sont restitue's sans qu'il en 
requite d'autres charges. 

c. Les produits d'origine Suisse seront moins imposes que ceux de 
1' Stranger. 

d. Les droits actuels d'entre'e sur les vins et les autres boissons 
spiritueuses d'origine Suisse ne pourront etre hausse's par les cantons 
oii il en existe. II n'en pourra e'tre ^tabli sur ces produits par les 
cantons qui n'en percoivent pas actuellement. 

e. Les lois et les arreted des cantons sur la perception des droits 
d'entre'e sont, avant leur mise a execution, soumis a l'approbation de 
l'autorite* fe'de'rale, afin qu'elle puisse, au besoin, faire observer les 
dispositions qui precedent. 

Tout les droits d'entre'e percus actuellement par les cantons, ainsi 
que les droits analogues percus par les communes, doivent disparaitre 
sans indemnite a l'expiration de l'anne'e 1890. 

Article 32 b * sl La Confe'de'ration a le droit de de'cre'ter, par voie 
legislative, des prescriptions sur la fabrication et la vente des bois- 
sons distille'es. Toutefois, ces prescriptions ne doivent pas imposer 
les produits qui sont exported ou qui ont subi une preparation les 
rendant impropres a servir de boissons. La distillation du vin, des 
fruits a noyaux ou a pepins et de leurs de'chets, des racines de gen- 
tiane, des baies de genievre et d'autres matieres analogues est excep- 
ted des prescriptions f^d^rales concernant la fabrication et l'impot. 

Apres l'abolition des droits d'entre'e sur les boissons spiritueuses 
mentionne'es a l'article 32 de la constitution fe'de'rale, le commerce 
des boissons alcooliques non distille'es ne pourra plus etre soumis par 
les cantons a aucun impot special, ni a d'autres restrictions que 
celles qui sont necessaires pour proteger le consommateur contre 
les boissons falsifiees ou nuisibles a la sant^. Restent toutefois 
reservees, en ce qui concerne 1' exploitation des auberges et la vente 
en detail de quantites inferieures a deux litres, les competences 
attributes aux cantons par l'article 31. 

Les recettes nettes provenant des droits sur la vente des boissons 
distillees restent acquises aux cantons dans lesquels ces droits sont 
pei'9us. 

1 Adopted Oct. 25, 1885. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 413 

Les recettes nettes de la Confederation resultant de la distillation 
indigene et de l'elevation correspondante des droits d'entrde sur les 
boissons distilles etrangeres seront reparties entre tous les cantons 
proportionnellement a leur population de fait etablie par le recense- 
ment federal le plus recent. Les cantons sont tenus d'employer au 
moins 10% des recettes pour combattre l'alcoolisme dans ses causes 
et dans ses effets. 

Article 33. Les cantons peuvent exiger des preuves de capacite 
de ceux qui veulent exercer des professions liberales. 

La legislation federale pourvoit a ce que ces derniers puissent 
obtenir a cet eff et des actes de capacite valables dans toute la Con- 
federation. 

Article 34. La Confederation a le droit de statuer des prescrip- 
tions uniformes sur le travail des enfants dans les fabriques, sur la 
duree du travail qui pourra y etre impose aux adultes, ainsi que sur 
la protection a accorder aux ouvriers contre l'exercice des industries 
insalubres et dangereuses. 

Les operations des agences d' emigration et des entreprises d'as- 
surance non institutes par Fe'tat sont soumises a la surveillance et a 
la legislation federates. 

Article 34. 1 La Confederation introduira, par voie legislative, 
l'assurance en cas d'accident et de maladie, en tenant compte des 
caisses de secours existantes. 

Elle peut declarer la participation a ces assurances obligatoire en 
general ou pour certaines categories determinees de citoyens. 

Article 35. II est interdit d'ouvrir des maisons de jeu. Celles qui 
existent actuellement seront fermees le 31 decembre 1877. 

Les concessions qui auraient ete accordees ou renouvelees depuis 
le commencement de l'annee 1871 sont declarees nulles. 

La Confederation peut aussi prendre les mesures necessaires con- 
cernant les loteries. 

Article 36. Dans toute la Suisse, les postes et les telegraphes sont 
du domaine federal. 

Le produit des postes et des telegraphes appartient a la caisse 
federale. 

Les tarifs seront fixes d'apres les memes principes et aussi equi- 
tablement que possible dans toutes les parties de la Suisse. 

L'inviolabilite" du secret des lettres et des telegrammes est ga- 
rantie. 

1 Adopted Oct. 26, 1890. 



414 SWITZERLAND. 

Article 37. La Confederation exerce la haute surveillance sur 
les routes et les ponts dont le maintien l'inte'resse. 

Les sommes dues aux cantons designed a l'article 30, a raison de 
leurs routes alpestres internationales, seront retenues par l'autorite 
federale si ces routes ne sont pas convenablement entretenues par 
eux. 

Article 38. La Confederation exerce tous les droits compris dans 
la regale des monnaies. 

Elle a seule le droit de battre monnaie. 

Ello fixe le systeme mone'taire et peut e'dicter, s'il y a lieu, des 
prescriptions sur la tarification de monnaies e'trangeres. 

Article 39. 1 Le droit d'e'mettre des billets de banque et toute autre 
monnaie fiduciaire appartient exclusivement a la Confederation. 

La Confederation peut exercer le monopole des billets de banque 
au moyen d'une banque d'etat placee sous une administration spe- 
ciale, ou en conceder l'exercice, sous reserve du droit de rachat, a 
une banque centrale par actions a creer qui serait administree avec 
le concours et sous le controle de la Confederation. 

La banque investie du monopole aura pour tache principale de 
servir en Suisse de regulateur du marche de l'argent et de faciliter 
les operations de paiement. 

Le benefice net de la banque, deduction faite d'un interet ou d'un 
dividende equitable a servir au capital de dotation ou au capital- 
actions et apres prelevement des versements a operer au fonds de 
reserve, revient au moins pour les deux tiers aux cantons. 

La banque et ses succursales seront exemptes de tout impot dans 
les cantons. 

L'acceptation obligatoire des billets de banque et de toute autre 
monnaie fiduciaire ne pourra etre decretee par la Confederation 
qu'en cas de necessite en temps de guerre. 

La legislation federale edictera les disposition relatives au siege 
de la banque, a ses bases, a son organisation et a l'exe'cution de cet 
article en general. 

1 On October 18, 1891, this article was substituted for the original one, which 
read as follows : — 

Article 39. La Confederation a le droit de deleter par voie legislative des 
descriptions g^n^rales sur remission et le remboursement des billets de banque. 

Elle ne peut cependant creer aucun monopole pour remission des billets de 
banque, ni deleter l'acceptation obligatoire de ces billets. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 415 

Article 40. La Confederation determine le systeme des poids et 
mesures. 

Les cantons executent, sous la surveillance de la Confederation, 
les lois concernant cette matiere. 

Article 41. La fabrication et la vente de la poudre de guerre 
dans toute la Suisse appartiennent exclusivement a la Confedera- 
tion. 

Les compositions minieres impropres au tir ne sont point com- 
prises dans la regale des poudres. 

Article 42. Les depenses de la Confederation sont couvertes : 

a. par le produit de la fortune federale ; 

b. par le produit des peages f eddraux percus a la f rontiere Suisse ; 

c. par le produit des postes et des telegraphes ; 

d. par le produit de la regale des poudres ; 

e. par la moitie du produit brut de la taxe sur les exemptions 

militaires percue par les cantons ; 

/. par les contributions des cantons, que reglera la legislation 
f e'de'rale, en tenant compte surtout de leur richesse et de leurs 
ressources imposables. 

Article 43. Tout citoyen d'un canton est citoyen Suisse. 

II peut, a ce titre, prendre part, au lieu de son domicile, a toutes 
les elections et votations en matiere federale, apres avoir dument 
justing de sa qualite d'electeur. 

Nul ne peut exercer des droits politiques dans plus d'un canton. 

Le Suisse etabli jouit, au lieu de son domicile, de tous les droits 
des citoyens du canton et, avec ceux-ci, de tous les droits des 
bourgeois dela commune. La participation aux biens des bourgeoisies 
et des corporations et le droit de vote dans les affaires purement 
bourgeoisiales sont except^s de ces droits, k moins que la legislation 
canton ale n'en decide autrement. 

En matiere canton ale et communale il devient eiecteur apres un 
e'tablissement de trois mois. 

Les lois cantonales sur l'etablissement et sur les droits electoraux 
que possedent en matiere communale les citoyens etablis sont sou- 
mises a la sanction du conseil federal. 

Article 44. Aucun canton ne peut renvoyer de son territoire un 
de ses ressortissants, ni le priver du droit d'origine ou de cite. 

La legislation federale determinera les conditions auxquelles les 
etrangers peuvent etre naturalises, ainsi que celles auxquelles un 



416 SWITZERLAND. 

Suisse peut renoncer a sa nationality pour obtenir la naturalisation 
dans un pays Stranger. 

Article 45. Tout citoyen Suisse a le droit de s'e'tablir sur un point 
quelconque du territoire Suisse, moyennant la production d'un acte 
d'origine ou d'une autre piece analogue. 

Exceptionnellement, l'e'tablissement peut etre refuse ou retire a 
ceux qui, par suite d'un jugement pe'nal, ne jouissent pas de leurs 
droits civiques. 

L'&ablissement peut etre de plus retire a ceux qui ont e'te a 
r^itdrdes fois punis pour des delits graves, comme aussi a ceux qui 
tombent d'une maniere permanente a la charge de la bienfaisance 
publique et auxquels leur commune, soit leur canton d'origine, refuse 
une assistance suffisante apres avoir e'te' invitee officiellement a 
l'accorder. 

Dans les cantons ou existe l'assistance au domicile, l'autorisation 
de s'e'tablir peut etre subordonne'e, s'il s'agit de ressortissants du 
canton, a la condition qu'ils soient en etat de travailler et qu'ils ne 
soient pas tombds, a leur ancien domicile dans le canton d'origine, 
d'une maniere permanente a la charge de la bienfaisance publique. 

Tout renvoi pour cause d'indigence droit etre ratine' par le gou- 
vernement du canton du domicile et communique' prealablement au 
gouvernement du canton d'origine. 

Le canton dans lequel un Suisse etablit son domicile ne peut 
exiger de lui un cautionnement, ni lui imposer aucune charge particu- 
liere pour cet e'tablissement. De meme, les communes ne peuvent 
imposer aux Suisses domicilii sur leur territoire d'autres contribu- 
tions que celles qu'elles imposent a leurs propres ressortissants. 

Une loi f eddrale fixera le maximum de l'dmolument de chancellerie 
a payer pour obtenir un permis d'etablissement. 

Article 46. Les personnes e'tablies en Suisse sont soumises, dans 
la regie, a la jurisdiction et a la legislation du lieu de leur domicile 
en ce qui concerne les rapports de droit civil. 

La legislation f e'de'rale statuera les dispositions ndcessaires en vue 
de l'application de ce principe, et pour empecher qu'un citoyen ne 
soit impose a double. 

Article 47. Une loi federale determinera la difference entre l'e'ta- 
blissement et le s^jour et fixera en meme temps les regies auxquelles 
seront soumis les Suisses en sejour quant a leurs droits politiques et 
a leurs droits civils. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 417 

Article 48. Une loi f ederale statuera les dispositions necessaires 
pour regler ce qui concerne les frais de maladie et de sepulture des 
ressortissants pauvres d'un canton tombe'a malades ou decedes dans 
un autre canton. 

Article 49. La liberte* de conscience et de croyance est inviolable. 

Nul ne peut etre contraint de faire partie d'une association re- 
ligieuse, de suivre un enseignement religieux, d'accomplir un acte 
religieux, ni encourir des peines, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, 
pour cause d' opinion religieuse. 

La personne qui exerce l'autorite' paternelle ou tuteiaire a le droit 
de disposer, conformement aux principes ci-dessus, de l'education 
religieuse des enfants jusqu'a l'age de 16 ans reVolus. 

L'exercice des droits civils ou politiques ne peut etre restreint par 
des prescriptions ou des conditions de nature eccle'siastique ou reli- 
gieuse, quelles qu'elles soient. 

Nul ne peut, pour cause d'opinion religieuse, s'affranchir de 
raccomplissement d'un devoir civique. 

Nul n'est tenu de payer des impots dont le produit est spdciale- 
ment affecte* aux frais proprement dits du culte d'une communaute 
religieuse a laquelle il n'appartient pas. L'exe'cution ultdrieure de 
ce principe reste re'serve'e a la legislation f e'derale. 

Article 50. Le libre exercice des cultes est garanti dans les limites 
compatibles avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mceurs. 

Les cantons et la Confederation peuvent prendre les mesures 
necessaires pour le maintien de l'ordre public et de la paix entre 
les membres des diverses communautes religieuses, ainsi que contre 
les empietements des autorites ecciesiastiques sur les droits des 
citoyens et de l'etat. 

Les contestations de droit public ou de droit prive auxquelles 
donne lieu la creation de communautes, religieuses ou une scission de 
communautes religieuses existantes, peuvent etre portees par voie de 
recours devant les autorites f ederales competentes. 

H ne peut etre erige d'eveches sur le territoire Suisse sans l'appro- 
bation de la Confederation. 

Article 51. L'ordre des Jesuites et les societes qui lui sont affiliees 
ne peuvent etre recus dans aucune partie de la Suisse, et toute action 
dans l'eglise et dans l'ecole est interdite a leurs membres. 

Cette interdiction peut s'etendre aussi, par voie d'arrete federal, a 

VOL. II. 



418 SWITZERLAND. 

d'autres ordres religieux dont Taction est dangereuse pour l'e'tat ou 
trouble la paix entre les confessions. 

Article 52. II est interdit de fonder de nouveaux cou vents ou 
ordres religieux et de re'tablir ceux qui ont 6t6 suppriine's. 

Article 53. L'e'tat civil et la tenue des registres qui s'y rapportent 
est du ressort des autorite's civiles. La legislation federale statuera 
a ce sujet les dispositions ulte'rieures. 

Le droit de disposer des lieux de sepulture appartient a l'autorite 
civile. Elle doit pourvoir a ce que toute personne dece'de'e puisse 
etre enterre'e ddcemment. 

Article 54. Le droit au mariage est place' sous la protection de la 
Confederation. 

Aucun empechement au mariage ne peut etre fonde* sur des motifs 
confessionnels, sur l'indigence de l'un ou de l'autre des epoux, sur 
leur conduite ou sur quelque autre motif de police que ce soit. 

Sera reconnu comme valable dans toute la Confederation le mariage 
conclu dans un canton ou a l'etranger, conform ement a la legislation 
qui y est en vigueur. 

La femme acquiert par le mariage le droit de cite et de bourgeoisie 
de son mari. 

Les enfants nes avant le mariage sont legitimes par le mariage 
subsequent de leurs parents. 

II ne peut etre pergu aucune finance d' admission ni aucune taxe 
semblable de l'un ou de l'autre epoux. 

Article 55. La liberte de la presse est garantie. 

Toutefois, les lois cantonales statuent les mesures necessaires a la 
repression des abus ; ces lois sont soumises a l'approbation du conseil 
federal. 

La Confederation peut aussi statuer des peines pour reprimer les 
abus diriges contre elle ou ses autorites. 

Article 56. Les citoyens ont le droit de former des associations, 
pourvu qu'il n'y ait dans le but de ces associations ou dans les moyens 
qu'elles emploient rien d'iliicite ou de dangereux pour l'etat. Les 
lois cantonales statuent les mesures necessaires a la repression des 
abus. 

Article 57. Le droit de petition est garanti. 

Article 58. Nul ne peut etre distraint de son juge naturel. En 
consequence, il ne pourra etre etabli de tribunaux extraordinaires. 

La juridiction ecciesiastique est abolie. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 419 

Article 59. Pour reclamations personnelles, le debit eur solvable 
ayant domicile en Suisse doit etre recherche devant le juge de son 
domicile ; ses biens ne peuvent en consequence etre saisis ou seques- 
trds hors clu canton ou il est domicilii, en yertu de reclamations 
personnelles. 

Demeurent reservees, en ce qui concerne les etrangers, les dispo- 
sitions des traites internationaux. 
La contrainte par corps est abolie. 

Article 60. Tous les cantons sont obliges de traiter les citoyens 
des autres etats confecleres comme ceux de leur etat en matiere de 
legislation et pour tout ce qui concerne les voies juridiques. 

Article 61. Les jugements civils definitifs rendus dans un can- 
ton sont executoires clans toute la Suisse. 

Article 62. La traite foraine est abolie dans l'interieur de la 
Suisse, ainsi que le droit de retrait des citoyens d'un canton contre 
ceux d' autres etats confecleres. 

Article 63. La traite foraine a Tegard des pays Strangers est abolie 
sous reserve de reciprocite*. 
Article 64. La legislation 
sur la capacity civile, 

sur toutes les matieres du droit se rapportant au commerce et 
aux transactions mobilieres (droit des obligations, y compris 
le droit commercial et le droit de change), 
sur la propriete litteraire et artistique. 

(sur la protection des dessins et modeles nouveaux, ainsi que des 
inventions representees par des modeles et applicables a l'in- 
dustrie,) 1 
sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite, 
est du res sort de la Confederation. 

L'administration de la justice reste aux cantons sous reserve des 
attributions clu tribunal federal. 

Article 65. II ne pourra etre prononce de condamnation a mort 
pour cause cle delit politique. 

Les peines corporelles sont inter dites. 2 

Article 66. La legislation fed^rale fixe les limites dans lesquelles 
un citoyen Suisse peut etre prive de ses droits politiques. 

i Adopted July 10, 1887. 

2 On May 18, 1879, this clause was substituted for the original one -which 
forbade capital as well as corporal punishment. 



420 SWITZERLAND. 

Article 67. La legislation fe'de'rale statue sur l'extradition des 
accuses d'un canton a l'autre ; toutefois, l'extradition ne peut etre 
rendue obligatoire pour les delits politiques et ceux de la presse. 

Article 68. Les mesures a prendre pour incorporer les gens sans 
patrie (Heimatlosen) et pour empecher de nouveaux cas de ce genre 
sont re'gle'es par la loi f e'de'rale. 

Article 69. La legislation concernant les mesure de police sani- 
taire contre les e'pide'mies et les e'pizooties qui off rent un danger 
general est du domaine de la Conf e'de'ration. 

Article 70. La Confederation a le droit de renvoyer de son terri- 
toire les Strangers qui compromettent la surete interieure ou exte*- 
rieure de la Suisse. 



CHAPITRE II. 

AUTORITE FEDiERALES. 

I. ASSEMBLE FE'DE'RALE. 

Article 71. Sous reserve des droits du peuple et des cantons 
(articles 89 et 121), l'autorite' supreme de la Confederation est ex- 
ercee par l'assembiee federale, qui se compose de deux sections ou 
conseils, savoir: 

A. le conseil national ; 

B. le conseil des etats. 

A. Conseil national. 

Article 72. Le conseil national se compose des deputes du peuple 
Suisse, eius a raison d'un membre par 20,000 ames de la population 
totale. Des fractions en sus de 10,000 ames sont comptees pour 
20,000. 

Chaque canton et, dans les cantons partages, chaque demi-can- 
ton elit un depute au moins. 

Article 73. Les elections pour le conseil national sont directes. 
Elles ont lieu dans des colleges eiectoraux f ederaux, qui ne peuvent 
toutefois etre formes de parties de differents cantons. 

Article 74. A droit de prendre part aux elections et aux votations 
tout Suisse age de vingt ans revolus et qui n'est du reste point exclu 
du droit de citoyen actif par la legislation du canton dans lequel il 
a son domicile. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 421 

Toutefois, la legislation federale pourra rdgler d'une maniere 
uniforme l'exercice de ce droit. 

Article 75. Est eligible comme membre du conseil national tout 
citoyen Suisse laique et ayant droit de voter. 

Article 76. Le conseil national est elu pour trois ans et renouvele* 
integralement chaque fois. 

Article 77. Les deputes au conseil des etats, les membres du 
conseil federal et les functionnaires nomme's par ce conseil ne 
peuvent etre simultan^m^nt membres du conseil national. 

Article 78. Le conseil national choisit dans son sein, pour chaque 
session ordinaire ou extraordinaire, un president et un vice-presi- 
dent, 

Le membre qui a 6t6 president pendant une session ordinaire ne 
peut, a la session ordinaire suivante, revetir cette charge ni celle de 
vice-president. 

Le meme membre ne peut §tre vice-president pendant deux ses- 
sions ordinaires consecutives. 

Lorsque les avis sont egalement partages, le president decide; 
dans les elections, il vote comme les autres membres. 

Article 79. Les membres du conseil national sont indemnises par 
la caisse federale. 

B. Conseil des etats. 

Article 80. Le conseil des etats se compose de quarante-quatre 
deputes des cantons. Chaque canton nomme deux deputes ; dans 
les cantons partages, chaque demi-etat en eiit un. 

Article 81. Les membres du conseil national et ceux du conseil 
federal ne peuvent etre deputes au conseil des etats. 

Article 82. Le conseil des etats choisit dans son sein, pour chaque 
session ordinaire ou extraordinaire, un president et un vice-presi- 
dent. 

Le president ni le vice-president ne peuvent etre elus parmi les 
deputes du canton dans lequel a ete choisi le president pour la 
session ordinaire qui a immediatement precede. 

Les deputes du meme canton ne peuvent revetir la charge de 
vice-president pendant deux sessions ordinaires consecutives. 

Lorsque les avis sont egalement partages, le president decide; 
dans les elections, il vote comme les autres membres. 

Article 83. Les deputes au conseil des etats sont indemnises par 
les cantons. 



422 SWITZERLAND. 

C. Attributions de V assembled federate. 

Article 84. Le conseil national et le conseil des etats deliberent 
sur tous les objets que la pre*sente constitution place dans le ressort 
de la Confederation et qui ne sont pas attributes a une autre autorite* 
federate. 

Article 85. Les affaires de la competence des deux conseils sont 
notamment les suivantes : 

1. Les lois sur Torganisation et le mode d'election des autorit^s 
federates. 

2. Les lois et arreted sur les matieres que la Constitution place 
dans la competence federate. 

3. Le traitement et les indemnity des membres des autorite*s de la 
Confederation et de la chancellerie f ederale ; la creation de f onctions 
federates permanentes et la fixation des traitements. 

4. L' election du conseil federal, du tribunal federal et du chance- 
lier, ainsi que du general en chef de l'armee federate. 

La legislation federate pourra attribuer a Tassembtee federate 
d'autres droits d'election ou de confirmation. 

5. Les alliances et les traites avec les etats etrangers, ainsi que 
l'approbation des traites des cantons entre eux ou avec les etats 
etrangers ; toutefois les traites des cantons ne sont portes a l'assem- 
blee federate que lorsque le conseil federal ou un autre canton eieve 
des reclamations. 

6. Les mesures pour la surete exterieure ainsi que pour le main- 
tien de l'independance et de la neutralite de la Suisse ; les declara- 
tions de guerre et la conclusion de la paix. 

7. La garantie des constitutions et du territoire des cantons ; 
l'intervention par suite de cette garantie ; les mesures pour la surete* 
interieure de la Suisse, pour le maintien de la tranquillite et de 
l'ordre ; l'amnistie et le droit de grace. 

8. Les mesures pour faire respecter la constitution federate et 
assurer la garantie des constitutions cantonales, ainsi que celles qui 
ont pour but d'obtenir l'accomplissement des devoirs federaux. 

9. Le droit de disposer de l'armee federate. 

10. L'etablissement du budget annuel, l'approbation des comptes 
de l'etat et les arretes autorisant des emprunts. 

11. La haute surveillance de l'administration et de la justice 
federates. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 423 

12. Les reclamations contre les decisions du conseil federal rela- 
tives a des contestations adrainistratives (art. 113). 

13. Les conflits de competence entre autorites f e'derales. 

14. La revision de la constitution f ederale. 

Article 86. Les deux conseils s'assemblent, chaque ann^e une f ois, 
en session ordinaire, le jour fixe' par le reglement. 

lis sont extraordinairement convoque's par le conseil federal, ou sur 
la demande du quart des membres du conseil national ou sur celle 
de cinq cantons. 

Art. 87. Un conseil ne peut deliberer qu'autant que les deputes 
presents forment la majorite* absolue du nombre total de ses membres. 

Article 88. Dans le conseil national et dans le conseil des dtats, 
les decisions sont prises a la majorite' absolue des votants. 

Article 89. Les lois federates, les d^crets et les arretes fede'raux 
ne peuvent etre rendus«qu'avec l'accord des deux conseils. 

Les lois fe'de'rales sont soumises a l'adoption ou au rejet du peuple, 
si la demande en est faite par 30,000 citoyens actifs ou par huit 
cantons. H en est de meme des arreted f dderaux qui sont d'une 
portde generate et qui n'ont pas un caractere d'urgence. 

Article 90. La legislation f^derale determinera les formes et les 
delais a observer pour les votations populaires. 

Article 91. Les membres des deux conseils votent sans instruc- 
tions. 

Article 92. Chaque conseil delibere separe'ment. Toutefois, lors- 
qu'il s'agit des elections mentionne'es a l'article 85, chiffre 4, d'exercer 
le droit de grace ou de prononcer sur un conflit de competence (article 
85, chiffre 13), les deux conseils se reunissent pour delibe'rer en 
commun sous la. direction du president du conseil national, et c'est 
la majority des membres votants des deux conseils qui decide. 

Article 93. L'initiative appartient a chacun des deux conseils et 
a chacun de leurs membres. 

Les cantons peuvent exercer le meme droit par correspondance. 

Article 94. Dans la regie, les stances des conseils sont publiques. 

n. conseil fe'de'ral. 

Article 95. L'autorite' directoriale et executive supeVieure de la 
Confe'de'ration est exerce'e par un conseil federal compose* de sept 
membres. 

Article 96. Les membres du conseil fe'de'ral sont nomme's pour 
trois ans, par les conseils reunis, et choisis parmi tous les citoyens 



424 SWITZERLAND. 

suisses eligibles au conseil national. On ne pourra toutefois choisir 
plus d'un membre du conseil federal dans le meme canton. 

Le conseil federal est renouveie intdgralement apres chaque re- 
nouvellement du conseil national. 

Les membres qui font vacance dans l'intervalle des trois ans sont 
remplace's, a la premiere session de l'assembiee f ederale, pour le reste 
de la dure'e de leurs f onctions. 

Article 97. Les membres du conseil federal ne peuvent, pendant 
la durde de leurs f onctions, revetir aucun autre emploi, soit au service 
de la Confederation, soit dans un canton, ni suivre d' autre carriere 
ou exercer de profession. 

Article 98. Le conseil fe'de'ral est preside par le president de la 
Confederation. II a un vice-president. 

Le president de la Confederation et le vice-president du conseil 
federal sont nommes pour une annee, par l'assembiee f ederale, entre 
les membres du conseil. 

Le president sortant de charge ne peut etre elu president ou vice- 
president pour 1' annee qui suit. Le meme membre ne peut revetir 
la charge de vice-president pendant deux annees de suite. 

Article 99. Le president de la Confederation et les autres 
membres du conseil federal regoivent un traitement annuel de la 
caisse f ederale. 

Article 100. Le conseil federal ne peut deliberer que lorsqu'il y a 
au moins quatre membres presents. 

Article 101. Les membres du conseil federal ont voix consultative 
dans les deux sections de l'assembiee federale, ainsi que le droit d'y 
faire des propositions sur les objets en deliberation. 

Article 102. Les attributions et les obligations du conseil federal, 
dans les limites de la presente constitution, sont notamment les 
suivantes : 

1. II dirige les affaires f ederales, conformement aux lois et arretes 
de la Confederation. 

2. H veille a l'observation de la constitution, des lois et des 
arretes de la Confederation, ainsi que des prescriptions des con- 
cordats f ederaux ; il prend, de son chef ou sur plainte, les mesures 
necessaires pour les faire observer, lorsque le recours n'est pas du 
nombre de ceux qui doivent etre portes devant le tribunal federal a 
teneur de 1' article 113. 

3. H veille a la garantie des constitutions cantonales. 

4. II presente des projets de lois ou d'arretes a l'assembiee 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 425 

federale et donne son pr^avis sur les propositions qui lui sont ad- 
dressees par les conseils ou par les cantons. 

5. II pourvoit a l'exe'cution des lois et des arreted de la Confe'de'- 
ration et a celle des jugements du tribunal federal, ainsi que des 
transactions ou des sentences arbitrales sur des diff^rends entre 
cantons. 

6. H fait les nominations qui ne sont pas attribue's a l'assem- 
b\6e federale ou au tribunal f e'de'ral ou a une autre autorite. 

7. H examine les trait^s des cantons entre eux ou avec 1' Stranger, 
et il les approuve, s'il y a lieu (art. 85, chiffre 5). 

8. II veille aux interets de la Confederation au dehors, notam- 
ment a l'observation de ses rapports internationaux, et il est, en 
general, charge des relations exterieures. 

9. II veille a la surety exterieure de la Suisse, au maintien de son 
ind^pendance et de sa neutrality. 

10. II veille a la surete intdrieure de la Confederation, au main- 
tien de la tranquillity et de l'ordre. 

11. En cas d'urgence et lorsque l'assembiee federale n'est pas 
r^unie, le conseil federal est autorise a lever les troupes ndcessaires 
et a en disposer, sous reserve de convoquer immediatement les con- 
seils, si le nombre des troupes levies depasse deux mille hommes ou 
si elles restent sur pied au dela de trois semaines. 

12. H est charge de ce qui a rapport au militaire federal, ainsi 
que de toutes les autres branches de l'administration qui appar- 
tiennent a la Confederation. 

13. II examine les lois et les ordonnances des cantons qui doivent 
etre soumises a son approbation ; il exerce la surveillance sur les 
branches de l'administration cantonale qui sont placees sous son 
controle. 

14. H administre les finances de la Confederation, propose le 
budget et rend les comptes des recettes et des depenses. 

15. II surveille la gestion de tous les fonctionnaires et employes 
de l'administration f ederale. 

16. II rend compte de sa gestion a l'assembiee federale, a 
chaque session ordinaire, lui presente un rapport sur la situation de 
la Confederation tant a l'interieur qu'au dehors, et recommande a 
son attention les mesures qu'il croit utiles a l'accroissement de la 
prosperite commune. 

II fait aussi des rapports speciaux lorsque l'assembiee federale 
ou une de ses sections le demande. 



426 SWITZERLAND. 

Article 103. Les affaires du conseil federal sont re'parties par 
d^partements entre ses membres. Cette repartition a uniquement 
pour but de faciliter l'examen et l'expe'dition des affaires ; les de*- 
cisions einanent du conseil f ederal comme autorite. 

Article 104. Le conseil fe'de'ral et ses ddpartements sont autorise's 
a appeler des experts pour des objets spe'ciaux. 

HI. CHANCELLERIE FE'DE'RALE. 

Article 105. Une chancellerie federale, a la tete de laquelle se 
trouve le chancelier de la Confederation, est charg^e du secretariat 
de l'assembiee f ederale et de celui du conseil federal. 

Le chancelier est eiu par l'assembiee federale pour le terme de 
trois ans, en meme temps que le conseil federal. 

La chancellerie est sous la surveillance speciale du conseil fede- 
ral. 

Une loi federale determine ce qui a rapport a l'organisation de la 
chancellerie. 

IV. TRIBUNAL F]fDE*RAL. 

Article 106. II y a un tribunal federal pour l'administration de 
la justice en matiere federale. 

II y a de plus un jury pour les affaires penales (article 112). 

Article 107. Les membres et les supplants du tribunal federal 
sont nommes par l'assembiee federale, qui aura egard a ce que les 
trois langues nationales y soient representees. 

La loi determine l'organisation du tribunal federal et de ses 
sections, le nombre de ses membres et des supplants, la duree de 
leurs f onctions et leur traitement. 

Article 108. Peut etre nomme au tribunal federal tout citoyen 
Suisse eligible au conseil national. 

Les membres de l'assembiee federale et du conseil federal et les 
fonctionnaires nommes par ses autorites, ne peuvent en meme temps 
faire partie du tribunal federal. 

Les membres du tribunal federal ne peuvent, pendant la duree 
de leurs fonctions, revetir aucun autre emploi, soit au service de la 
Confederation, soit dans un canton, ni suivre d'autre carriere ou ex- 
ercer de profession. 

Article 109. La tribunal federal organise sa chancellerie et en 
nomme le personnel. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 427 

Article 110. Le tribunal federal connait des differends de droit 
civil : 

1. entre la Confederation et les cantons ; 

2. entre la Confederation d'une part et des corporations ou des 
particuliers d'autre part, quand ces corporations ou ces particuliers 
sont demandeurs et quand le litige atteint le degre d'importance 
que determinera la legislation f ederale ; 

3. entre cantons ; 

4. entre des cantons d'une part et des corporations ou des par- 
ticuliers d'autre part, quand une des parties le requiert et que le 
litige atteint le degre d'importance que determinera la legislation 
federale. 

II connait de plus des differends concernant le heimatlosat, ainsi 
que des contestations qui surgissent entre communes de differents 
cantons touchant le droit de cite. 

Article 111. Le tribunal federal est tenu de juger d'autres 
causes, lorsque les parties s'accordent a le nantir et que l'objet en 
litige atteint le degre d'importance que determinera la legislation 
federale. 

Article 112. Le tribunal federal assiste du jury, lequel statue 
sur les faits, connait en matiere penale : 

1. des cas de haute trahison envers la Confederation, de revolte 
ou de violence contre les autorites federales ; 

2. des crimes et des deiits contre le droit des gens ; 

3. des crimes et des deiits politiques qui sont la cause ou la suite 
de troubles par lesquels une intervention federale armee est occa- 
sionnee ; 

4. des faits releves a la charge de fonctionnaires nommes par 
une autorite federale, quand cette autorite en saisit le tribunal 
federal. 

Article 113. Le tribunal federal connait, en outre : 

1. des conflits de competence entre les autorites federales, d'une 
part, et les autorites cantonales, d'autre part ; 

2. des differends entre cantons, lorsque ces differends sont du 
domaine du droit public ; 

3. des reclamations pour violation de droits constitutionnels des 
citoyens, ainsi que des reclamations de particuliers pour violation de 
concordats ou de traites. 

Sont reservees les contestations administratives, a determiner par 
la legislation federale. 



428 SWITZERLAND. 

Dans tous les cas pr£mentionn£s, le tribunal federal appliquera 
les lois votdes par l'assemblde federale et les arretes de cette assem- 
bled qui ont une porte'e gdndrale. II se conformera egalement aux 
traites que l'assemble'e federale aura ratifies. 

Article 114. Outre les cas mentionne's aux articles 110, 112 et 
113, la legislation federale peut placer d'autres affaires dans la com- 
petence du tribunal federal ; elle peut, en particulier, donner a ce 
tribunal des attributions ayant pour but d'assurer l'application uni- 
forme des lois pr^vues a l'article 64. 

V. DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES. 

Article 115. Tout ce qui concerne le siege des autorit^s de la 
Confederation est l'objet de la legislation f^derale. 

Article 116. Les trois principales langues parses en Suisse, 
l'allemand, le francais et l'italien, sont langues nationales de la 
Confederation. 

Article 117. Les fonctionnaires de la Confederation sont respon- 
sables de leur gestion. Une loi federale determine ce qui tient a 
cette responsabilite. 

CHAPITRE III. 1 

REVISION DE LA CONSTITUTION FEDERALE. 

Article 118. La constitution federale peut etre revisee en tout 
temps, (totalement ou partiellement.) 

Article 119. La revision (totale) a lieu dans les formes statues 
pour la legislation federale. 

Article 120. Lorsqu'une section de l'assembiee federale decrete 
la revision (totale) de la constitution federale et que l'autre section 
n'y consent pas, ou bien lorsque cinquante mille citoyens suisses 
ayant droit de voter demandent la revision (totale), la question de 
savoir si la constitution federale droit etre revisee est, dans l'un 
comme dans l'autre cas, soumise a la votation du peuple Suisse, par 
oui ou par non. 

Si, dans l'un ou dans l'autre de ces cas, la majorite des citoyens 
suisses prenant part a la votation se prononce pour l'affirmative, les 
deux conseils seront renouveies, pour travailler a la revision. 

1 The parts of this chapter inclosed in brackets were added by the amend- 
ment of July 5, 1891. 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 429 

(Article 121. La revision partielle peut avoir lieu, soit par la voie 
de l'initiative populaire, soit dans les formes statuses pour la legis- 
lation federale. 

L'initiative populaire consiste en une demande presentee par 
50,000 citoyens suisses ayant le droit de vote et rdclamant 1' adoption 
d'un nouvel article constitutionnel ou l'abrogation ou la modification 
d'articles determines de la constitution en vigueur. 

Si, par la voie de l'initiative populaire, plusieurs dispositions dif- 
f ^rentes sont presentees pour etre revisees ou pour etre introduces 
dans la constitution federale, chacune d'elles doit former l'objet 
d'une demande d'initiative distincte. 

La demande d'initiative peut revetir la forme d'une proposition 
concue en termes generaux ou celle d'un pro jet redige de toutes 
pieces. 

Lorsque la demande d'initiative est congue en termes generaux 
les chambres federales, si elles l'approuvent, procederont a la re- 
vision partielle dans le sens indique et en soumettront le pro jet a 
l'adoption ou au re jet du peuple et des cantons. Si, au contraire, 
elles ne l'approuvent pas, la question de la revision partielle sera 
soumise a la votation du peuple ; si la majorite des citoyens suisses 
prenant part a la votation se prononce pour l'aflirmative, l'assembiee 
federale procedera a la revision en se conformant a la decision 
populaire. 

Lorsque la demande revet la forme d'un projet redige de toutes 
pieces et que l'assembiee federale lui donne son approbation, le pro- 
jet sera soumis a l'adoption ou au rejet du peuple et des cantons. 
Si l'assembiee federale n'est pas d'accord, elle peut eiaborer un 
projet distinct ou recommander au peuple le rejet du projet propose 
et soumettre a la votation son contre-projet ou sa proposition*de rejet 
en meme temps que le projet emane de l'initiative populaire.) 

(Article 122. Une loi federale determinera les formalites a ob- 
server pour les demandes d'initiative populaire et les votations rela- 
tives a la revision de la constitution federale.) 

Article 123. La constitution federale revisee (ou la partie revisee 
de la constitution) entre en vigueur lorsqu'elle a ete acceptee par la 
majorite des citoyens suisses prenant part a la votation et par la 
majorite des etats. 

Pour etablir la majorite des etats, le vote d'un demi-canton est 
compte pour une demi-voix. 



4cO SWITZERLAND. 

Le resultat de 1* rotation populaire dans chaque canton est con- 
sider^ comme le Tote de F&at. 

-POSITIONS TRANSITOIRE& 

Article 1. Le produit des postes et des peages sera reparti 
sdt les bases aetnelles jusqu'a Fepoque ou la Confederation prendra 
effectiTement a sa charge les depenses militaires supporters jusqu'a 
ce joint par les can: :■::$. 

La legislation f ederale pourvoira en outre a ce qne la perte que 
ponrraient entrainer <l»ns lenr ensemble les modifications resultant 
des articles 20, 30, 36, 2™* alinea, et 42 e, pour la fisc de certains 
cantons, ne frappe ceux-ei qne gradnellement et n'atteigne son 
ehiffre total qu'apres une periode transitoire de qnelqnes annees. 

Les cantons qui n auraient pas rempli. an moment oil Farticle 20 
de la constitution entrera en Tiguenr, les obligations militaires qui 
lenr soot imposees par Fancienne constitution et les lois f ederales 
seront tenus de les executer a leurs propres frais. 

Article 2. Les dispositions des lois f ederales, des concordats et des 
constitutions ou des lois cantonales contraires a la presente constitu- 
tion cessent d'etre en Tiguenr par le fait de 1'adoption de celle-ci, ou 
de la promulgation des lois qu'elle preroit. 

Article 3. Les nourelles dispositions concernant Forganisation et 
la competence du tribunal federal n'entrent en Tiguenr qu'apres la 
promulgation des lois f e*derales j relatives. 

Article 4. Tin delai de cinq ans est accorde" aux cantons pour 
introduire la gratuite* de Fenseignement public prhnaire (article 27). 

Article 5. Les personnes qui exercent une profession liberale et 
qui, arant la promulgation de la loi f ederale preVue a Farticle 33, 
ont obtenu un certificat de capacite d'nn canton on d'une antorite' 
eoncordataire representant plusieurs cantons, peuvent exercer cette 
profession sur tout le territoire de la Confederation. 

Article 6. 1 Si la loi federate preVue par Farticle 32*" est mise 
en Tiguenr arant Fexpiration de Fannee 1890, les droits d'entree 
percus par les cantons sur les boissons spiritueuses, en conformity 
de Farticle 32, seront abolis a partir de Fentree en Tiguenr de 
cette loi. 

Si, dans ce eas, les parts revenant a ees cantons ou communes sur 
la sonune a repartir ne suffisaient pas a compenser les droits abolis 



TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 431 

calculus d'apres la moyenne annuelle da produit net de ces droits 
pendant les annees 1880 a 1884 inclusivement, le deficit des cantons 
ou communes constitue's en perte sera convert, jusqu'a la fin de 1890, 
sur la somme qui reviendrait aux autres cantons d'apres le chiffre de 
leur population, et ce n'est qu'apres ce prelevement que le reste sera 
reparti a ceux-ci au prorata de leur population. 

La legislation f ederale pourvoira en outre a ce que la perte que 
pourrait entrainer 1' application du present arrete pour le fisc des 
cantons ou des communes interesses ne les frappe que graduellement 
et n'atteigne son chinre total qu'apres une periode transitoire jusqu'a 
1895, les sommes a allouer dans ce but devant etre preleve'es sur les 
recettes nettes mentionnees a l'article 32 bis , 4 me alinea. 

REMARQUE. 

En conformite* du premier aline'a de cet article 6 et de l'arrete' du con- 
seil fe'de'ral du 15 juillet 1887 concernant l'exe'cution successive des 
diffe'rentes parties de la loi fe'de'rale sur les spiritueux, du 23 ddcembre 
1886 (recueil officiel, nouv. se'rie, tome X, pages 60 et 143), les droits 
d'entre'e pergus par les cantons et par les communes sur les vins et les 
autres boissons spiritueuses en application de l'article 32 de la constitution 
fe'de'rale sont abolis depuis le l er septembre 1887. En consequence, les 
articles 31, lettre a, et 32 de cette constitution sont abroge's en tant qu'ils 
se rapportent aux droits d'entre'e sur les vins et les autres boissons 
spiritueuses. 



INDEX. 



(This index does not cover the text of the constitutions in the Appendix.) 



Admimstkation ; difficulties of, in 
parliamentary government, i. 227; 
decentralized in England, 50, 66 ; de- 
velopment of, in France, 53 ; char- 
acter of, in France, 33 et seq. ; in 
Italy, 161 et seq. ; in the German 
Empire, 244 ; in Prussia, 293 ; in 
Austria, ii. 78-84, 93-94 ; in Hun- 
gary, 129-30, 143 ; in the joint gov- 
ernment of Austria and Hungary, 
169, 170 et seq. ; in the Swiss Con- 
federation, 185 - 93 ; and in the 
cantons, 225, 226-27, 235. See, also, 
Local government in the different 
countries. 

Administrative courts ; in France, i. 57- 
63; in Italy, 173-76; in Germany, 
281, n. 2 ; in Prussia, 294-297 ; in 
the smaller German States, 138, n. 
2, 345, 348, 349, 351, 357 ; in Austria, 
ii. 83 ; in Switzerland, 195-96, 217, 
220, n. 1. 

Alsace-Lorraine ; government of, i. 372 ; 
its share in the imperial government, 
259, 375 ; its present condition, 375- 
76. 

America. See United States. 

Andrassy, ii. 153. 

Anhalt, government of, i. 351. 

Aristotle, his views on democracy, ii. 
66, n. 1. 

Aspromonte, i. 190. 

Association, Meeting and the Press; 
restraints upon, in France, i. 34 ; in 
Italy, 151, 164; in Germany, ii. 31, 
32, 45, 48-50 ; in Prussia, i. 286-87 ; 
in Austria, ii. 80-82. 

Auersperg. See Austria. 

Augusta, Empress ; opposes Bismarck, 
ii. 17. 

Austria. See, also, Austria-Hungary. 

— Administrative Courts, ii. 83. 

— Association and Meeting; restraint 

of, ii. 80. 



Austria : — 

— Auersperg, Adolph ; his cahinet, ii. 

107-11. 

— Auersperg, Charles ; his cabinet, ii. 

102. 

— Badeni; his cabinet in Austria, ii. 

118 ; carries electoral reform, 118. 

— Beust ; his reorganization of Aus- 

tria-Hungary, ii. 71, 136 ; his alli- 
ance with the German Liberal 
party, 100 ; his enactment of Fun- 
damental Laws, 101 ; retains the 
administration of foreign affairs, 
101. 

— Bill of Rights, ii. 74 ; its inefficiency, 

79-84. 

— Bohemians. See Czechs. 

— Bureaucracy, ii. 78 ; its non-partisan 

character, 78 ; its corruption, 78 ; 
its enormous power, 79 ; its control 
by the Reichsgericht, 83. 

— Catholic. See Church. 

— Centralization ; extent of, ii. 90-91, 

93-94; problem of, 119-20. 

— Chambers of Commerce ; electoral 

rights of, ii. 87-88, 92. 

— Church ; the question of the, ii. 94, 

102, 108. 

— Cities ; electoral rights of, ii. 87-88, 

92. 

— Committees in the Reichsrath, ii. 89, 

n. 4, 5. 

— Classes of voters, ii. 87-89, 92. 

— Clericals. See Conservatives. 

— Clubs in the Reichsrath, ii. 110. 

— Communes ; electoral rights of, ii. 

87-88, 92. 

— Consensus ; lack of, ii. 120. 

— Conservatives ; oppose the Liberal 

cabinet, ii. 102 ; in power under 
Hohenwart, 106 ; support Taafe, 
112 ; and Windischgratz, 117. 

— Constitution. See Fundamental 

Laws. 



434 



INDEX. 



Austria : — 

— Corruption, ii. 78. 

— Crown. See Emperor. 

— Czechs ; their number and distribu- 

tion, ii. 73 ; attitude of, 96-97, 103, 
107 ; division into Old Czechs and 
Young Czechs, 96, 108; their op- 
position and refusal to sit in the 
Reichsrath from 1868 to 1879, 101, 
105, 108, 111 ; Old Czechs support 
Taafe, 112-13 ; quarrel between 
the Old and Young Czechs over 
the compromise of 1890, 115-16 ; 
defeat of the Old Czechs, 116. 

— Dalmatia ; insurrection in, ii. 103. 

— Diets, provincial ; their former power 

to elect the house of representa- 
tives, ii. 85-86, 108 ; their func- 
tions, 90 ; organization of, 92 ; con- 
trol of, by the crown, 93-94. 

— " Doctors," ministry of, ii. 102. 

— Electoral reform ; question of, ii. 

117 ; bill carried, 118. See, also, 
87, 88. 

— Emperor ; rules of succession, ii. 75 ; 

powers of, 76 ; his actual influence, 
77 ; future of country depends on, 
122. See, also, Francis Joseph. 

— Feudal party. See Conservatives. 

— Finances ; prosperity of, ii. 122. 

— Francis Joseph; attachment of the 

people to, ii. 100; vacillations in 
his policy, 100, 121. 

— Fundamental Laws, ii. 74 ; their 

failure to protect private rights, 
79 et seq. (For the text of these 
Laws, see ii. 378.) 

— Galicia. See Poles. 

— General class of voters, ii. 87. 

— Geography of, ii. 72. 

— Germans ; their number and distri- 

bution, ii. 73 ; their attitude, 95 ; 
weakened by divisions, 95, 119-20. 
See German Liberals. 

— German Liberals ; support Beust and 

the Fundamental Laws, ii. 100-1 ; 
the "Ministry of Doctors," 120; 
they become divided and the cabi- 
net breaks up, 103 ; their opposi- 
tion to Hohenwart, 106 ; their re- 
turn to power under Adolph Auers- 
perg, 107 ; they quarrel and upset 
the cabinet in 1879, 109 ; go into 
opposition, 112 ; form a precarious 
alliance with Taafe in 1890, 115 ; 
support "Windischgratz at first and 
then upset him, 117 ; support the 
constitution, 121. 



Austria : — 

— Herrenhaus, ii. 85. 

— History, 1848 to 1867, ii. 70-71, 100, 

132-36 ; and see i. 237, 240-41. 

— Hohenwart ; his cabinet, ii. 106 ; his 

fall, 107. 

— House of Lords, ii. 85. 

— House of Representatives ; method 

of election, ii. 85 ; the five classes 
of voters, 87. 

— Italians ; attitude of ii. 97-98 ; their 

opposition from 1868 to 1879, 102. 

— Irreconcilables, ii. 120-21. 

— Kielmansegg ; his cabinet, ii. 118. 

— Languages, number of, ii. 72 ; con- 

flict over, 98. 

— Landowners ; electoral rights of, ii. 

87, 88, 92. 

— Metternich ; his resignation, ii. 133. 

— Ministers ; nominally but not really 

responsible to parliament, ii. 76- 
78. 

— Moravia. See Czechs. 

— Parliament. See Reichsrath. 

— Parties, history of ; state of, in 

Reichsrath of 1867, ii. 100; the 
German Liberals support Beust 
and the treaty with Hungary, 
100 ; other races in opposition, 
101 ; "Ministry of Doctors " under 
Charles Auersperg, 1868, 102 ; its 
difficulties in the provinces, 102 ; 
German Liberals become divided 
in 1869, 103 ; and cabinet breaks 
up, 104 ; Taafe's attempt at con- 
ciliation, 104-5 ; Hohenwart's re- 
actionary ministry, 106 ; his fall, 
107 ; German Liberal ministry of 
Adolph Auersperg, 107 ; adoption 
of direct elections to the Reichs- 
rath, 108 ; German Liberals offend 
the crown, quarrel with the cabi- 
net and among themselves, 109 ; 
Auersperg's cabinet breaks up and 
Taafe forms a ministry, 110-11 ; 
German Liberals go into opposi- 
tion, 112 ; the other races support 
the government, 112 ; though with- 
out much influence on its policy, 
113 ; defeat of the Bohemian com- 
promise of 1890, 115-16 ; Taafe's 
attempt to get support of Moder- 
ates, 116 ; his electoral reform bill, 
117 ; his fall, 117 ; cabinets of 
Windischgratz, Kielmansegg, and 
Badeni, 117-18 ; the latter carries 
electoral reform, 118 ; effect of 
Taafe's policy, 118. 



INDEX. 



435 



Austria : — 

— Patronage ; not used for party pur- 

poses, ii. 78. 

— Plener ; leader of the German Lib- 

erals, ii. 117. 

— Poles ; their number and distribu- 

tion, ii. 78 ; attitude of, 96 ; their 
policy, 1868-79, 101, n. 1, 102, 104, 
105, 107, 108 ; they support Taafe, 
1879-93, 112-15; support Win- 
dischgratz, 117 ; their willingness 
to support any cabinet, 97. 

— Political issues ; the church ques- 

tion, ii. 94 ; the race question, 95 ; 
failure to solve it, 99 ; the question 
of electoral reform, 117-18. 

— Potocki ; minister, ii. 102, n. 1, 104. 

— Pragmatic sanction, the, ii. 75. 

— Press ; restraints upon, ii. 81. 

— Prospects of ; difficulty of forecast- 

ing, ii. 122. 

— Provinces ; administration of, ii. 93. 

See, also, Diets. 

— Races, ii. 72-73 ; their aspirations, 

95-98 ; the conflict of tongues, 98 ; 
difficulty of the problem, 119. 

— Reichsgericht, ii. 83-84. 

— Reichsrath ; its organization, ii. 85 ; 

its powers, 89 ; limited by that of 
Diets, 90. 

— Slavs ; their number and distribu- 

tion, ii. 73 ; attitude of, 97 ; their 
opposition, 1868-79, 102, 104. 107, 
108 ; they support Taafe, 1879- 
93, 112-114. 

— Slowenians ; their number and dis- 

tribution, ii. 73 ; attitude of, 97 ; 
in the matter of language, 99 ; 
their opposition, 1868-79, 102, 104, 
107, 108; they support Taafe, 
1879-93, 112, 114. 

— Staatsgrundgesetze. See Fundamen- 

tal Laws. 

— Suffrage ; in the five classes of voters, 

ii. 88. 

— Taafe, Count ; head of the ministry 

in 1869, ii. 102, n. 1 ; disagrees 
with his colleagues and resigns, 
104 ; forms a new cabinet in 1870, 
104; resigns in November, 105; 
forms another cabinet in 1879, 
110-11 ; professes to stand above 
parties, but really relies on the 
support of the anti-German ele- 
ments, 112-13 ; his concessions to 
the races small, 113 ; his policy 
increases the influence of the 
crown, 114; failure of his Bohe- 



Austria : — 

mian compromise of 1890, 115-16 ; 
attempts to reorganize his ma- 
jority, 116; his electoral reform 
bill, 117 ; his fall, 117 ; effect of 
his policy, 118. 

— Tyrol. See Italians. 

— Voters ; classes of, ii. 87-89, 92. 

— Wenceslaus, Saint; crown of, ii. 

96. 

— Windischgratz ; his cabinet, ii. 117. 
Austria-Hungary. See, also, Austria 

and Hungary. 

— Army ; organization of, ii. 171. 

— Bank ; the joint national, ii. 175. 

— Bosnia, ii. 175. 

— Centralization ; absence of, in legisla- 

tion, ii. 168-69. 

— Compact of 1867, ii. 136, 162; na- 

ture of union established, 168-69, 
177-79 ; necessity of, 177 ; clumsi- 
ness of, 178. (For the text, see ii. 
378.) 

— Constitution. See Compact of 1867. 

— Customs and trade union, ii. 174. 

— Delegations ; their organizations and 

procedure, ii. 165 ; this favors 
Hungary, 166 ; their powers, 168 ; 
their relation to the ministers, 170. 

— Diploma of Oct. 30, 1860, ii. 135. 

— Emperor ; his relation to the two 

countries, ii. 163 ; his powers, 164. 

— Federal union. See Compact. 

— Finance ; administration of, ii. 172 ; 

the common debt and expenses, 
173 ; the customs union, 174 ; min- 
ister of finance governs Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 175-76. 

— Foreign Affairs ; minister of, ii. 170. 

— Herzegovina, ii. 175. 

— Hungary ; has 70 per cent, of the 

power for 30 per cent, of the cost, 
ii. 166-68, 173. 

— Kalnoky ; forced to resign by Banff y, 

ii. 168. 

— King. See Emperor. 

— Languages ; in the Delegations, ii. 

165. 

— Legislation ; in the hands of the sep- 

arate parliaments, ii. 168-69. 

— Ministers, ii. 164, 170 ; their rela.- 

tion to the Delegations, 170 ; 
Foreign Affairs, 170 ; War, 171 ; 
Finance, 172. 

— Patent ; of March 5, 1860, ii. 135 ; 

of Feb. 26, 1861, 136. 

Baden ; its relation to the North Ger- 



436 



INDEX. 



man Confederation, i. 241 ; its privi- 
leges in the Empire, 250; govern- 
ment of, 344 ; parties in, 345. 

Badeni. See Austria. 

Bagehot ; his remarks on the govern- 
ment of Massachusetts, ii. 336. 

Ballotage. See Plurality. 

Bamberger, ii. 27. 

Banffy. See Hungary. 

Bavaria ; its relation to the North Ger- 
man Confederation, i. 241 ; its privi- 
leges in the Empire, 240, 266 ; its 
imperial policy, 340 ; government 
of, 337 ; parties in, 338. 

Bennigsen. See Germany. 

Beust. See Austria. 

Bismarck. See Germany. 

Bitto. See Hungary. 

Blankenburg. See Germany. 

Bohemia. See Austria. 

Boulanger, General ; i. 85-86 ; his at- 
tempt to hold a plebiscite, 16-17. 

Bourgeois ; his cabinet, i. 98-99 ; its 
overthrow, 23, n. 1. 

Bremen ; right to remain a free port, 
i. 249 ; government of, 368. 

Broglie, Due de ; his cabinet, i. 79. 

Brunswick ; government of, i. 350. 

Buckle ; his views on class conflicts 
during the Commonwealth, ii. 58. 

Budget ; bad arrangement of, in 
France, i. 143 ; limited control of the 
Landtag over, in Prussia, 239, 298 ; 
in other German States, 344, n. 2, 
351, n. 1, 360, n. 2, 364, 367 ; proce- 
dure on, in England, 116 ; committee 
on, in France, 116 ; in Italy, 208 ; 
subject to referendum in Berne and 
Aargau, ii. 270. 

Bundesrath. See Germany. 

Bureaucracy ; in Prussia, i. 293 ; in 
Austria, ii. 78. See, also, Adminis- 
tration. 

Bureaux. See Sections. 

Cabinets ; need of cohesion in parlia- 
mentary system, i. 70, 212 ; lack of 
this in France, 129 ; in Italy, 213 ; 
in Prussia, 290 ; instability of, in 
France, 128 ; in Italy, 211 ; small 
importance of cabinet crises in 
France, 127-28; effect of parlia- 
mentary procedure upon, in France, 
111-24 ; in Italy, 207-11 ; meetings 
of, cannot be public in parliamentary 
system, 212. See, also, Ministers ; 
and see Germany, Chancellor ; Swit- 
zerland, Federal Council. 



Cairoli ; first cabinet of, i. 164, 195 ; 
second cabinet of, 197. 

Caprivi. See Germany. 

Carnot ; his election, i. 84, n. 1 ; bia 
assassination, 95. 

Casimir-Perier ; his ministry, i. 94; 
elected President and resigns, 95-96. 

Catholic. See, also, Church. 

Cavour; his plan for Italian federa- 
tion, i. 149 ; his doctrine of a free 
church in free state, 179 ; his rela- 
tion to the parties, 189. 

Centralization ; came early in England 
and took a judicial form, i. 48, 51 ; 
came later in France and was ad- 
ministrative, 53 ; extent of, in France, 
35 ; in Germany, 243-45 ; in Austria, 
ii. 90-91, 93-94 ; in Hungary, 143 ; 
in the joint government of Austria- 
Hungary, 169, 177 ; in Switzerland, 
185, 235. 

Chamber of Deputies. See France. 

Chambers ; method of avoiding dead- 
locks between, in the smaller Ger- 
man States, i. 336, n. 2, 342, n. 2, 
344, n. 2, 347-48, 371, n. 1 ; in Aus- 
tria, ii. 89-90 ; in the Joint Monarchy, 
165-66. See Committees, Ministers, 
Parliamentary system ; Representa- 
tion, Representatives ; and see the 
different countries. 

Chambord, Comte de ; refuses to ac- 
cept the tricolor, i. 10. 

Chancellor. See Germany. 

Charles Albert ; grants the Statuto, i. 
148. 

Church; its relation to the State in 
France, i. 87 ; its attitude towards 
the French Republic, 87-89 ; its po- 
sition in Italy, 178 et seq. ; attitude 
of its partisans, 205-6 ; conflicts 
with, in Germany, ii. 12, 14, 26-27, 
29-30 ; in Austria, 94-95 ; in Hun- 
gary, 157 ; in Switzerland, 308. 

Civil Service ; examinations for ap- 
pointment to, in Prussia, i. 293. See, 
also, Patronage. 

Classes ; representation of, in Prussia, 
i. 303-7, 324-26, 328 ; in Austria, ii. 
87-89, 92; absence of conflicts be- 
tween, in England, i. QQ, 67 ; ii. 57 ; 
their mutual hostility in France, i. 
67 ; in Germany, ii. 59-64. 

Clemenceau ; his defeat in 1893, i. 93. 

Cliques and Clientage in Italy. See 
Italy. 

Coburg-Gotha, i. 358. 

Committees ; in the French Chambers, 



INDEX. 



437 



i. 111-17 ; in the Italian parliament, 
207-10; in the Reichstag, 255; in 
the Bundesrath, 265-67 ; in the 
Prussian Landtag, 300-1 ; in the 
Austrian Reichsrath, ii. 89, n. 4, 5 ; 
in Hungary, 142, n. 3. 

Common Law, the ; its development in 
England, i. 50. 

Conflicts of jurisdiction ; decision of, 
in France, i. 60 ; in Italy, 173-74 ; in 
Austria, ii. 83 ; in Switzerland, 220. 

Consensus, political ; necessity of, i. 
101 ; lack of, in France, 104 ; in 
Austria, ii. 120. 

Constitution ; of France, i. 7-14 ; of 
Italy, 148, 150-51; of Germany, 
242, 246, 250-51 ; of Prussia, 286- 
87; of Austria, ii. 74, 79; of Hun- 
gary, 128, 136 ; of the joint mon- 
archy, 162 ; of Switzerland, 184, 190, 
306-7 ; of the Swiss cantons, 221 ; 
interpretation of, decided by a spe- 
cial tribunal in Saxony, 335. For 
effect of laws violating, see Courts 
of Law. For a fuller index, see each 
of these countries, and see, also, 
the smaller German States. For the 
text of the various constitutions, see 
the Appendix at the end of vol. ii. 

Corruption in France ; i. 93, 97-98, 137 ; 
in Italy, 202-3, 217-18 ; in Austria, 
ii. 78, 79 ; in Hungary, 142-54. 

Countersignature of ministers. See 
Ministers. 

Courts of Law ; their power developed 
early in England, i. 48 ; late in 
France, 51-53 ; their power over 
administrative questions in France, 
56-57 ; organization and powers of, 
in Italy, 170-78, 228 ; in Germany, 
281 ; in the Swiss Confederation, ii. 
214 ; their authority in relation to 
laws violating the constitution, in 
France, i. 13 ; in Italy, 151, n. 1, 
175; in Germany, 282; in Austria, 
ii. 79, n. 2, 84 ; in Switzerland, 219 ; 
their advantages in maintaining 
order in a democracy, i. 228 ; con- 
dition of South American Repub- 
lics due to want of strong courts, 
229. See, also, Law, Administrative 
courts, and Conflicts. 

Crispi. See Italy. 

Croatia. See Hungary. 

Crown. See the different countries. 

Deadlocks, between the Chambers; 
methods of avoiding in the smaller 



German States, i. 336, n. 2, 342, n. 
2, 344, n. 2, 347, 348, 371, n. 1 ; in 
Austria, ii. 89-90 ; in the Joint 
Monarchy, 165-66. 

Deak. See Hungary. 

Democracy ; characteristic defect of, 
i. 65 ; comparison of, in Athens and 
Switzerland, ii. 333 ; does not gain 
ground in Germany, i. 376, ii. 56 et 
seq. ; Freeman's views on true demo- 
cracy, ii. 65 ; importance of parties 
in, i. 69 ; and of their lines of divi- 
sion, ii. 65-66 ; importance of a 
strong judiciary in, i. 228. 

Depretis. See Italy. 

Deputies. See Chambers. 

Diet ; of the Germanic Confederation, 
i. 234 ; of the old Swiss Confedera- 
tion, ii. 239 ; provincial diets in 
Austria, 90 ; diet of Croatia, 149. 

Discontent ; political, in Germany, i. 
333, 372 ; ii. 55. 

Droz. See Switzerland. 

Dupriez ; his remarks on committees, 
i. 115, 209 ; on interpellations, 211, 
n. 1. ; on Swiss federal supervision of 
the cantons, ii. 188. 

Election ; by majority vote ; its effect 
in subdividing parties, i. 108-11 ; 
formerly required in America, 110 ; 
still required in France, 108-11 ; in 
Italy, 207, n. 1 ; in Germany, 253 ; 
ii. 51 ; in Prussia, 304 ; in Austria, 
ii. 89, n. 1 ; in Hungary, 141, n. 3 ; 
in Switzerland, ii. 211 ; indirect elec- 
tions in Prussia, i. 303-4; their 
working, 308 ; indirect elections in 
Saxe-Weimar, i. 356 ; in Austria, ii. 
88-89 ; in Hungary, 141, n. 3. See, 
also, the smaller German States, and 
see Representation. 

Electoral districts in France, i. 16; 
in Italy, 157 ; in Germany, 252 ; in 
Prussia, 303 ; in Austria, ii. 87 ; in 
Hungary, 131, n. 3 ; in Switzerland, 
212-13. 

Emperor. See Germany, Austria, and 
Austria-Hungary. 

England ; political continuity in, i. 47 ; 
development of royal power in, 48, 
66 ; judicial system centralized early, 
48 ; administration did not, 50 ; 
Gneist's views on self-government 
in, Q6 ; fusion of public and private 
law in, 55, 68 ; precision of statutes 
in, 44; development of parliament- 
ary system, 2 ; procedure on the 



438 



INDEX. 



budget, 116 ; questions in the House 
of Commons, 118; normally only 
two parties in, 70 ; parties in the 
parliament of 1892, 71-72, 126 ; ab- 
sence of conflicts between the classes, 
66, 67 ; ii. 57 ; parties not based on 
class distinctions, ii. 59. 
Eulenburg; quarrels with Caprivi, ii. 
6,44. 

Fallieres; resignation of, i. 22, n. 1. 

Faure, Felix ; President of the French 
Republic, i. 96. 

Federal government ; nature of, in the 
United States, i. 243, 245, 285; in 
Germany, 243 et seq., 285 ; in Aus- 
tria-Hungary, ii. 169, 177 ; in Swit- 
zerland, 184 et seq. ; Austria's re- 
semblance to a confederation, 90, 
93-94. 

Ferdinand of Austria, ii. 132-33. 

Ferry, Jules ; his cabinet, i. 83. 

Forckenbeck, ii. 22, 27. 

France : — 

— Administration ; its development, i. 

53 et seq.; its centralization, 35 
* et seq.; legislative and judicial 
powers in, 43 et seq. 

— Administrative Law ; separated from 

private law, i. 54-56 ; not codified, 
59 ; exemption of officials from 
suit and prosecution, 55, 57 ; le- 
gality of official acts still reserved 
for the administrative courts, 57; 
their efficiency in protecting pri- 
vate rights, 58, 59 ; their jurisdic- 
tion, 62 ; the Court of Conflicts, 
60. See Judicial system. 

— Arreted, i. 46. 

— Arrondissements, i. 40. 

— Bonapartists ; belong to the Right, 

i. 74 ; are irreconcilable, 104 ; fol- 
lowed Boulanger, 86. 

— Boulanger, i. 85-86 ; his attempt to 

hold a plebiscite, 16-17. 

— Bourgeois ; his cabinet, i. 98-99 ; its 

overthrow, 23, n. 1. 

— Broglie, Due de ; his cabinet, i. 79. 

— Budget ; bad arrangement of, i. 143 ; 

committee on, 116. 

— Bureaux ; in the Chambers, i. 111. 

— Cabinets ; lack of harmony in, i. 

129; weakness of, 92, 129; in- 
stability of, 128 ; change of, does 
not involve change of party, 128 ; 
effect of parliamentary procedure 
upon, 111-26. See, also, Minis- 



France : — 

— Cantons, the, i. 40. 

— Carnot ; his election, i. 84, n. 1 ; his 

assassination, 95. 

— Cas royaux, i. 52. 

— Casimir-Perier ; his ministry, i. 94 ; 

elected President and resigns, 95- 
96. 

— Centralization ; developed late and 

took administrative form, i. 51- 
53, 67 ; present state of, 35. 

— Chamber of Deputies ; suffrage for, 

i. 14; qualifications of members, 
15 ; terms, 15 ; distribution of 
seats, 15 ; method of election, 
Scrutin de liste and Scrutin de 
arrondissement, 16 ; majority vote, 
108-11 ; multiple candidatures 
forbidden, 17, n. 1 ; a tumultuous 
body, 18 ; power to dissolve, 27 ; 
its control over the ministers, 33 ; 
its jealousy of them, 124. See, 
also, Deputies, Bureaux, Commit- 
tees, Interpellations. 

— Chambers ; powers of, i. 12, 26-28 ; 

omnipotence of, 13. 

— Chambord, Comte de ; refuses to 

accept the tricolor, i. 10. 

— Church and State ; relation of, i. 

87. 

— Church ; attitude towards the Re- 

public, i. 87-91. 

— Classes ; hostility of, i. 67. 

— Cl^menceau ; his defeat in 1893, i. 93. 

— Committees ; system of, in the 

Chambers, i. 111-17 ; weakens the 
cabinet, 114-17 ; committee on 
the budget, 113, 116 ; and see Elec- 
toral committees. 

— Communes, the, i. 40. 

— Consensus, lack of, i. 101 et seq. 

— Concordat, i. 87. 

— Conflicts, courts of, i. 60. 

— Congress. See National Assembly. 

— Constitutional Laws, i. 7 ; adoption 

of, 8, 77 ; barely establish the 
framework of the government, 
8 ; contain no bill of rights, 8 ; 
essentially a compromise, 11 ; not 
intended to be lasting, 11 ; amend- 
ments, 12 ; act violating is valid, 
13 ; moral force of, 14 ; ratifica- 
tion of earlier constitutions by 
popular vote, ii. 245. For the text 
of these laws, see ii. 337. 

— Contentieux, i. 63. 

— Council of State, i. 30 ; administra- 

tive section of, 63. 



INDEX. 



439 



France : — 

— Councils, General, i. 38. 

— Courts. See Judicial System. 

— Decrees and ordinances, i. 44. 

— Departments. See Local govern- 

ment. 

— Deputies ; qualifications and elec- 

tion of, i. 15 ; effect of election 
by majority vote,- 108; their 
control of patronage, 130 ; they 
meddle with the administration, 
132 ; nomination of candidates, 
133 ; their programmes, 105-7 ; 
their campaign, 134 ; their rela- 
tion to their constituents, 136. See, 
also, Chamber of Deputies. 

— Election, method of. See Chamber 

of Deputies. 

— Electoral campaigns, i. 134. 

— Electoral committees, i. 133 ; their 

powers, 135. 

— Executive, legislative, and judicial 

powers, i. 43, 47, 54 ; power of 
executive over appropriations, 47 ; 
effect of its enormous power, 64. 

— Fallieres, resignation of, i. 22, n. 1. 

— Faure, Felix ; President of the Re- 

public, i. 96. 

— Ferry, Jules ; his cabinet, i. 83. 

— Finances ; danger to, i. 142. 

— Freicinet ; cabinet of, i. 92. 

— Gambetta ; his victory over Mac- 

Mahon, i. 80 ; his ministry, 82 ; 
his death, 83 ; his attack on the 
Church, 88. 
■■ — Gre'vy, Jules ; President of the Re- 
public, i. 81, 84, n. 1. 

— Groups. See Parties. 

— Instability of cabinets. See Cabi- 

net. 

— Institutions, constant change of, i. 

47. 

— Interpellations, i. 117 ; form of, 119; 

orders of the day thereon, 119- 
21 ; weaken the cabinet, 120-24. 

— Irreconcilables, i. 101-5. 

— Judges ; protection of, i. 58 ; remov- 

als of, 58, n. 2. 

— Judicial system ; centralized late, i. 

51 ; parliament of Paris, 52 ; sep- 
aration of powers, 54 ; exemption 
of officials from suit and prosecu- 
tion, 55, 57 ; separation of public 
and private law, 55 ; protection of 
judges, 58 ; removals of judges, 
58, n. 2 ; protection of private 
rights, 58-62 ; Court of Conflicts, 
60; administrative courts, 57; L 



France : — 

their jurisdiction, 62-63 ; the con- 
tentieux, 63 ; section of the Coun- 
cil of State, 63. 

— Lavigerie, Cardinal ; his acceptance 

of the Republic, i. 89. 

— Left ; meaning of the term, i. 74, 

n. 2. 

— Legitimists ; follow the Comte de 

Chambord, i. 10. 

— Local government, i. 35-43 ; the de- 

partments, 36 ; the prefects, 36 
the general councils, 38 ; the ar- 
rondlssements, 40 ; the cantons, 40 
the communes, 40; the mayors 
40 ; the communal councils, 41 
Paris, 42 ; the Prefect of the Seine 
43; the Prefect of Police, 43: 
Lyons, 43, n. 1. 

— Lyons; local government of, i. 43, 

n. 1. 

— MacMahon, Marshal ; elected Pres- 

ident, i. 10, 77 ; appoints respon- 
sible ministries, 10, 77-79 ; his 
struggle with the Republicans, 79, 
139 ; his resignation, 81. 

— Majority; election by, subdivides 

the parties, i. 108-11. 

— Mayor, the, i. 40. 

— Meline, his cabinet, i. 99. 

— Ministers ; exercise the powers of 

the President, i. 28 ; their num- 
ber and duties, 32 ; their enor- 
mous power, 33 ; they must be 
very strong or very weak, 64; 
they can speak in either Chamber, 
33 ; rarely resign on vote of Sen- 
ate, 22 ; their responsibility to the 
Chamber, 24, 33, 65 ; jealousy of, 
124. See, also, Cabinets. 

— Moderates ; their influence at first, 

i. 76 et seq. ; withdraw from ac- 
tive politics, 84-85 ; their return 
to power, 94 ; their weakness, 
96-97, 126-27. 

— Monarchists ; belong to the Right, i. 

74 ; a majority in the National 
Assembly, 10 ; help to create the 
Republic, 10 ; their struggle 
against the Republic with Mac- 
Mahon, 79; part of them follow 
Boulanger, 86 ; the Church their 
basis of strength. 87 ; they begin 
to accept the Republic, 89. 

— Monastic orders ; suppression of, i. 

61. 

— Napoleonic administrative system, i. 

35. 



440 



INDEX. 



France : — 

— National Assembly, or Congress ; 

has power to amend the constitu- 
tion, i. 12 ; elects the President, 26. 

— Offices ; political use of, i. 130. 

— Officials ; integrity of, i. 132 ; suit 

and prosecution of, 55, 57. 

— Opportunists ; origin of, i. 78 ; prom- 

inence of, 81. 

— Orders of Day. See Interpella- 

tions. 

— Ordinances, i. 44. 

— Orleanists ; follow the Comte de 

Paris, i. 10. 

— Panama Canal scandals, i. 89, 93, 

137. 

— Paris, made the capital, i. 13 ; local 

government of, 42. 

— Parliament of Paris, i. 52. See, also, 

Chambers, Chamber of Deputies, 
Senate. 

— Paternal nature of government, i. 34. 

— Parties ; causes of subdivision of, i. 

101 et seq. ; lack of a consensus, 
101 ; theoretical nature of opin- 
ions, 105 ; lack of power of organ- 
ization, 106 ; effect of election by 
majority vote, 108-11 ; of the 
system of committees, 111 ; of in- 
terpellations, 117 ; absence of na- 
tional party organizations, 107 ; 
lack of cohesion, 126 ; need of dis- 
cipline, 145 ; no change of party 
without a revolution, 138. 

— Parties, history of, i. 75-101 ; the 

Right a majority in the National 
Assembly, 75 ; other parties there, 
76 ; Thiers supported by the Left 
Centre, 76 ; upset by the Right, 
77 ; MacMahon's early cabinets 
conservative, 77-79 ; the groups in 
the first Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies, 77-78 ; MacMahon ap- 
points a cabinet of Monarchists in 
1877, 79 ; the Republicans protest 
and the Chamber is dissolved, 79 ; 
victory of the Republicans, 80; 
the President appoints a Republi- 
can cabinet, 80 ; bis resignation, 
81 ; Opportunists dominant, but 
Radicals more and more influen- 
tial, 81 ; ministries constantly 
overthrown, 82-83; Ferry's cabi- 
net, 83 ; growth of personal poli- 
tics, S3 ; breaking up of the 
groups and political confusion, 
84 ; the Chamber Radical and 
the country Conservative, 85 ; the 



France : — 

career of Boulanger, 85 ; his de- 
feat, 86 ; the Church accepts the 
Republic, 87-89 ; followed by a 
portion of the Right, 89-90; the 
policy of Republican concentra- 
tion, 91 ; the Conservative Re- 
publican majority in 1893, 93 ; 
cabinet of Casimir-Perier, 94 ; 
murder of Carnot, 95 ; election of 
Casimir-Perier as President, 95 ; 
his resignation, election of Felix 
Faure, 96 ; the Conservative Re- 
publican majority breaks down, 
96, 126 ; Bourgeois' Radical cabi- 
net, 98 ; its overthrow by the Sen- 
ate, 99 ; the Conservative Repub- 
lican cabinet of Meiine, 99. 

— Patronage, i. 130; control of, by 

deputies, i. 130-32. 

— Personal politics, growth of, i. 83. 

— Plurality. See Majority. 

— Prefects of departments, i. 36 ; of 

the Seine, 43 ; of Police, 43. 

— President ; qualifications of, i. 26 ; 

his functions, 27 ; his powers 
really exercised by the ministers, 
28 ; his freedom in selecting 
them, 29 ; cannot safely be inde- 
pendent of the Chambers, 144. 

— Princes ; excluded from the Cham- 

ber of Deputies, i. 15 ; ineligible 
to Presidency, 26. 

— Private rights, protection of, i. 58- 

62. 

— Programmes of candidates, i. 105-7. 

— Public and private law ; distinct, i. 

55. 

— Questions in the Chambers, i. 118- 

19. See Interpellations. 

— Radicals ; growth of their influence, 

i. 81 ; dissatisfaction of, 86 ; loss 
of power by, 91 ; regain influence, 
98 ; their dislike of the Senate, 25 ; 
their ideal an omnipotent conven- 
tion, 125. 

— Reactionaries, i. 74 ; their irrecon- 

cilable attitude prevents the for- 
mation of two parties, 101-5. 

— Republic ; proclamation of, i. 9 ; pro- 

visional at first, 10-11 ; acceptance 
of, by the Church, 89 ; prospects of, 
137. 

— Republican concentration ; policy of, 

i. 91-93 ; its abandonment, 93. 

— Right in the Chambers, i. 74 ; mean- 

ing of the term, 74, n. 2. 

— Royal power ; developed late, i. 51, 



INDEX. 



441 



France : — 

67 ; and took administrative form, 
53. 

— Scrutin d'arrondissement and Scru- 

tin de liste, i. 16. 

— Senate ; composition of, i. 19 ; elec- 

tion and qualifications of members, 
20 ; its functions, 21 ; its actual 
influence, 21-26 ; resignation of 
the ministry on adverse vote of, 
exceptional, 22; disliked by the 
Radicals, 25. 

— Separation of powers, i. 54. 

— Siege ; state of, i. 63. 

— Simon, Jules ; his cabinet, i. 79. 

— Suffrage ; for the Chamber of Depu- 

ties, i. 14; for the local bodies, 
38, 41. 

— Thiers ; President of the Republic, 

i. 9 ; refuses to appoint a respon- 
sible ministry, 9 ; his relation to 
the parties, 76 ; his resignation, 
77. 

— Treaties ; require consent of Cham- 

bers, i. 27. 

Franchise. See Suffrage. 

Francis Joseph. See Austria and Hun- 
gary. 

Frankfort ; parliament of, i. 237 ; city 
annexed by Prussia, 240. 

Frederick III. ; his short reign, ii. 30. 

Freeman ; his views on the English 
nobility, ii. 59 ; on democracy, 65. 

Freicinet ; cabinet of, i. 92. 

Gambetta. See France. 

Garibaldi, i. 14S, 150, 190. _ 

Germanic Confederation, i. 234 ; Diet 

of, 234 ; its procedure, 235. 
Germany. See, also, the several Ger- 
man States. 

— Alsace-Lorraine ; government of, i. 

372 ; its share in the imperial gov- 
ernment, 259, 375 ; its present con- 
dition, 375. 

— Alsatian party, i. 376, ii. 10. 

— Anti-Socialist Bills, ii. 19, 26, 32, 

44-45. 

— Army ; organization of, i. 247—48 

laws fixing its size, 256, n. 4 
struggles over them in 1880, ii. 26 
in 1887, 29 ; in 1890, 35 ; in 1893, 
38. 

— Arnim, Count Harry von ; his in- 

trigue against Bismarck, ii. 17. 

— Augusta, Empress ; opposes Bis- 

marck, ii. 17. 

— Austria; her influence in the old 



Germany : — 

Diet, i. 236-37 ; her exclusion from 
the Zollverein, 238; the war of 
1866, 240; her exclusion from 
Germany, 241. 

— Bamberger, ii. 27. 

— Bennigsen ; insists that acts of the 

Emperor must be countersigned, i. 
278; offered a portfolio by Bis- 
marck, ii. 21 ; his efforts to keep 
the National Liberals together, 25, 
29 ; continues to follow Bismarck 
when the party breaks up, 27. 

— Bismarck ; his views on the union of 

Germany, i. 238 ; appointed Presi- 
dent of the Council, and governs 
without a budget, 239 ; his mo- 
tives for annexing Hanover, etc., 
240 ; his plan for the federal ad- 
ministration, 277 ; his alliance with 
the moderate parties in 1867, ii. 
11 ; his war with the Church, 12 
et seq. ; his quarrel with the Con- 
servatives, 16-18; his troubles 
with the Bundesrath about rail- 
roads, 18 ; and with the Reichstag 
about the anti-socialist bill, 19 
and about financial questions, 20 
offers a portfolio to Bennigsen, 21 
his change of base, 22 ; breaks up 
the National Liberals and trans- 
fers his support to the Conser- 
vatives, 25, 27 ; his protective 
tariff, 24; his reconciliation with 
the Pope, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30 ; his 
attempt to suppress the Socialists, 
19, 26, 31 ; his compulsory insur- 
ance laws, 31 ; his struggle with 
the Reichstag over the septennate, 
29 ; over the anti-socialist law, 32 ; 
his quarrel with William IL., 33 ; 
his fall, 34 ; his dislike of parties, 
48 ; his treatment of the press, 48 ; 
his criticism of the government 
after his resignation, 45, n. 1. 

— Blankenburg ; offered a portfolio by 

Bismarck, ii. 17. 

— Budget ; limited control of the 

Reichstag over, i. 256. 

— Bundesrath ; the successor of the old 

Diet, i. 252, 264 ; its composition, 

259 ; representation of States in, 

260 ; only States interested vote, 
267 ; members of, are diplomats, 
261 ; members from a State must 
vote alike, 262 ; and according to 
instructions from their govern- 
ments, 262 ; usually officers of the 



442 



INDEX. 



Germany : — 

State, 263 ; their responsibility to 
the State Landtags, 263 ; substitu- 
tion of members, 263 ; committees 
in, 265-67 ; special privileges of, 
270 ; privacy of meetings, 270 ; 
true conception of the body, 264 ; 
its resemblance to a cabinet, 258, 
269 ; its relation to the Reichstag, 
269 ; its legislative powers, 268 ; 
its executive powers, 268 ; power 
to issue ordinances, 268 ; judicial 
powers, 269 ; it decides controver- 
sies about public law, 245, 269 ; 
its actual influence, 272 ; some- 
times votes against Prussia, 261 ; 
Prussia's veto in. 246-47 ; position 
of the Chancellor in, 265, 279, 
ii. 2. 

— Caprivi, General von ; appointed 

Chancellor, ii. 4, 34 ; his relation to 
the parties, 35 ; his resignation, 
44. 

— Cartell parties, ii. 33, 41. 

— Catholics. See Centre. 

— Centralization ; legislative, but not 

executive, i. 243. 

— Centre, the ; its origin, ii. 13 ; its 

growth during the Kulturkampf , 
15 ; its solidity, 16, 42 ; supports 
the tariff, 25 ; in spite of religious 
concessions generally opposes the 
government, 26, 27, 29, 32, 35, 36, 
37, 38. See, also, Parties. 

— Chancellor ; the sole federal minis- 

ter, i. 276 ; his functions, 279 ; his 
substitutes, 279 ; he is not respon- 
sible to the Reichstag, 278 ; an- 
swers interpellations, 258 ; his po- 
sition in the Bundesrath, 265. 279 ; 
ii. 2 ; his relations to the Emperor, 
ii. 1-7 ; his double position as an 
Imperial and Prussian official, i. 
279 ; importance of his holding 
the office of Prussian Premier, i. 
279 ; ii. 1-6 ; sniallness of his direct 
authority, ii. 2 ; greatness of his 
indirect influence, i. 279 ; ii. 3, 7 ; 
possible changes in his position, ii. 
67. 

— Character of the people ; lack of 

homogeneousness, ii. 46 ; intense 
individualism, 47. 

— Classes ; conflicts between, ii. 59-64 ; 

an obstacle to democracy, 63. 

— Confederation ; the Germanic, i. 234 ; 

North German, 240. See, also, 
Empire. 



Germany t — 

— Conservatives, origin of, ii. 8 ; en- 

tirely Prussian, 9 ; alienated from 
Bismarck by the Kulturkampf, 
etc., 16 ; support him after 1879, 
22, 24, 27, 29, 33 ; failure of Wil- 
liam II. to insure fidelity of, 36, 37, 
41, 43, 45 ; their control of the 
Prussian House of Peers, i. 302. 
See, also, Parties. 

— Constitution ; of the Empire, charac- 

ter of, i. 242 ; amendments of, 242, 
n. 1 ; method of amending, 246, 
250-51. (For the text of the con- 
stitution see ii. 355.) 

— Courts of Law ; belong mostly to 

the States, i. 281 ; only one "fed- 
eral tribunal, the Reichsgericht, 
281 ; power to hold statutes un- 
constitutional, 282. 

— Danes ; party of, origin, ii. 10. 

— Democracy ; not likely to gain 

ground, ii. 56 et seq. ; probable 
effect of, 67. 

— Deutsch Freisinnige, party ; opposes 

the government, ii. 29, 32, 35 ; 
breaks in pieces, 40. 

— Diet; of the Germanic Confedera- 

tion, i. 234 ; takes Austria's side 
in 1866, 239 ; the model for the 
Bundesrath, 252, 264. 

— Discontent ; growth of, ii. 55 ; i. 333, 

372. 

— Elsass. See Alsace-Lorraine. 

— Emperor ; is King of Prussia, i. 246, 

273 ; smallness of his powers as 
Emperor, 274; but as King of 
Prussia very great, 275 ; confusion 
of the two sets of functions, 275 ; 
true position of. 276 ; his relations 
to the Chancellor, ii. 1-7 ; his at- 
tempt to rule in person, 4-6. 

— Empire ; formation of, i. 241 ; 

character of, 243 ; legislative cen- 
tralization and executive decen- 
tralization. 243 ; inequality of the 
States, 246, 284 ; privileges of 
Prussia, 246, 266 ; privileges of 
other States, 249, 266 ; sovereignty 
in, 251, n. 2 ; possible changes in 
organization of, ii. 67. 

— Eulenburg ; quarrels with Caprivi, 

ii. 6, 44. 

— Execution ; federal, i. 245. 

— Finances ; sources of revenue, i. 244, 

n.3. 

— Forckenbeck, ii. 22, 27. 

— Free Conservatives ; origin of , LL 8 ; 



INDEX. 



443 



Germany : — 

mostly Prussians, 9 ; support the 
government, 18, 24, 27, 29, 33, 36, 
38 ; held most of the important 
offices under Bismarck, 50. 

— Frederick III. ; his short reign, ii. 30. 

— Fortschritt ; origin of, ii. 8 ; a part 

separate and form National Lib- 
eral party, 9; the rest entirely 
Prussian, 9 ; at first hostile to Bis- 
marck, 11 ; become more friendly 
during the Kulturkampf , 18 ; but 
entirely hostile after 1876, 20, 24 ; 
unite with the dissident National 
Liberals to form the Deutsch 
Freisinnige party, 29. 

— Guelphs, party of, ii. 10. 

— Germanic Confederation, i. 234. 

— Hohenlohe - Schillingsf iirst ; Statt- 

halter of Alsace-Lorraine, i. 376 ; 
appointed Chancellor, ii. 6. 

— Homogeneousness ; lack of, ii. 46. 

— Individualism ; intensity of, ii. 47. 

— Irreconcilables, ii. 120. 

— Judicial system. See Courts of Law. 

— Kulturkampf, ii. 12 ; the May Laws, 

14 ; the reconciliation with Rome, 
23, 26, 27, 29-30. 

— Lasker, ii. 27, n. 1. 

— Legislative centralization and execu- 

tive decentralization, i. 243. 

— Leo XIII. ; his reconciliation with 

Bismarck, ii. 23, 26, 27, 29-30. 

— Liberal Vereinigung ; formation of, 

ii. 27 ; unites with the Fortschritt, 
29. 

— Liberals ; their failure to unite Ger- 

many in 1848, i. 236. See National 
Liberals, Fortschritt, etc. 

— Lorraine. See Alsace-Lorraine. 

— May Laws, ii. 14 ; repeal of, 26, 27. 

— Monarchy ; German theory of, ii. 54, 

— National Liberals ; origin of, ii. 9 ; 

the only national party, 10 ; sup- 
port Bismarck after 1866, 11, 18 ; 
begin to disagree with Bismarck, 
19-20; offered a portfolio, 21; 
Bismarck becomes hostile to, 22 ; 
divide on the protective tariff, 24, 
25 ; and break up, 25-27 ; remnant 
continue to support Bismarck, 27, 
29 ; oppose the anti-socialist law 
in 1890, 32 ; support the army bill 
in 1893, 38 ; their party club, 51. 

— Newspapers ; local circulation of, ii. 

47 ; their relation to the parties, 
48. 

— North German Confederation, i. 240. 



Germany : — 

— Officials ; small number of federal, 

i. 244. 

— Parties ; causes of their subdivision ; 

lack of homogeneousness of the 
people, ii. 46 ; intense individual- 
ism, 47 ; Bismarck's dislike of 
parties, 48 ; his treatment of the 
press, 48 ; lack of responsibility of 
parties, 50 ; the party clubs, 51 ; 
parties based on social distinctions, 
63. 

— Parties ; history of, origin and charac- 

ter of the Conservatives, the Fort- 
schritt, Free Conservatives, and the 
National Liberals, ii. 8 ; National 
Liberals the only national party, 
10 ; the irreconcilable parties, 
Poles, Guelphs, Danes, Alsatians, 
Social Democrats, 10 ; parties in 
Empire and States similar, 11 ; 
after 1866 moderate parties sup- 
port Bismarck, 11 ; the Centre, 
13 ; effect of the Kulturkampf on 
parties, 15-18 ; first disagreements 
between Bismarck and National 
Liberals (1875), 19; portfolio 
offered to Bennigsen (1877), 21 ; 
Bismarck's change of base, 22 ; 
the Reichstag rejects the anti- 
socialist bill and is dissolved, 22 ; 
the protective tariff " (1879), 24; 
confusion of parties, 24; reconcili- 
ation with the Church, 23, 26, 27, 
29-30 ; breaking up of the Na- 
tional Liberals (1880), 25, 27 ; the 
Conservatives support the govern- 
ment, 27 ; weakening of the middle 
parties, 28 ; the Reichstag rejects 
the septennate and is dissolved 
(1887), 29 ; growth of the Social 
Democrats, 31 ; anti-socialist bill 
rejected, 32 ; fall of Bismarck 
(1890), 34; Caprivi's relations to 
the parties, 35 et seq.; the com- 
mercial treaties (1891), 36 ; the 
Prussian Education Bill (1892), 
37 ; the Reichstag rejects the 
army bill (1893), and is dissolved, 
38 ; results of the election, 39 ; 
hostility of the south, 40 ; the dis- 
integration of parties, 41 ; decrease 
of the moderate elements, 43-44 ; 
failure of the government to con- 
trol the Conservatives, 43 ; dissen- 
sions among the ministers (1894), 
44; defeat of anti-revolutionary 
bill, 45. 



444 



INDEX. 



Germany : — 

— People; lack of homogeneousness of, 

ii. 46 ; intense individualism of, 47. 

— Poles ; party of, origin, ii. 10 ; sup- 

port William II., 35, 39. 

— Press ; Bismarck's treatment of, ii. 

48. 

— Prussia ; her influence in the Diet, i. 

236 ; declines the imperial crown 
in 1849, 237 ; war with Austria in 
1866, 240 ; reorganizes Germany, 
240—41 ; her privileged position in 
the Empire, 246-49, 266; some- 
times outvoted in the Bundesrath, 
261 ; Prussian and imperial 
powers interwoven, 275, 279; ii. 
2-3. 

— Reichstag ; its term, i. 252 ; suffrage 

for, 252 ; electoral districts, 252- 
53 ; majority vote required, 253 ; 
non-payment of members, 253-54 ; 
committees in, 255 ; its powers, 
256 ; dissolution of, 257 ; Chancel- 
lor not responsible to, 257-59 ; its 
power of interpellation, 258 ; its 
influence negative rather than 
positive, 256-57 ; its division into 
groups, ii. 7 ; supremacy of, un- 
likely, while conflict of classes 
continues, 64. 

— Richter, Eugene; the Radical leader, 
ii. 29. 

— Roon, General von; at the head of 
the Prussian cabinet, ii. 17. 

— Schleswig-Holstein ; quarrel over, i. 

239 ; annexation of, by Prussia, 
240. 

— Septennate; struggles over, ii. 26, 29, 

38 ; and see i. 256, n. 4. 

— Social-Democrats ; origin of, ii. 10 ; 

their growth, 31, 44, 55 ; war of 
Bismarck with, 31-33 ; of William 
n. with, 44, 45. 

— States ; former subdivision of, i. 232 ; 

representation in the Diet of the 
Germanic Confederation, 234-36 ; 
their inequality of rights in the 
Empire, 246 et seq., 284-85 ; their 
conventions with Prussia, 247. 

— Stauffenberg, ii. 29. 

— Vice-Chancellor, i. 280. 

— Vienna ; treaty of, i. 234. 

— William I. ; his conflict with the 

Prussian parliament, i. 239 ; his 
sympathy with the Conservatives, 
ii. 17 ; his adherence to Bismarck, 
4, 17 ; his death, 30. 

— William II. ; his accession, ii. 30 ; 



Germany : — 

his quarrel with Bismarck, 33; 
attempts to rule in person, 4-6; 
becomes the centre of political in- 
terest, 34 ; his commercial treaties, 
36 ; education bill, 37 ; army bill, 
38; anti-revolutionary bill, 44; 
unpopularity of his course in the 
south, 40 ; his failure to make 
alliances with any party and its 
effects, 41 et seq. ; his character, 
52 ; his desire for personal promi- 
nence, 53 ; his theory of the mon- 
archy, 54 ; its dangers, 54. 
— Zollverein; in the Germanic Con- 
federation, i. 238 ; in the North 
German Confederation, 241. 
Giolitti ; his cabinet, i. 202-3. 
Gneist ; his views on political history 
of England, France, and Germany, i. 
65, n. 2; on parliamentary gov- 
ernment, 309; plan of local gov- 
ernment in Prussia, 309 ; his satis- 
faction with the results, 332. 
Goodnow, F. J. ; his views on French 

administrative law, i. 59, n. 3. 
Gotha, Saxe-Coburg; government of, 

i. 358. 
Gr^vy, Jules ; President of the French 

Republic, i. 81, 84, n. 1. 
Groups. See Parties. 

Hamburg ; government of, i. 368 ; 
right to remain a free port, 249. 

Hanover ; annexed by Prussia, i. 240. 

Hanse Cities ; government of, i. 368 ; 
Senates of, 369; Biirgerschaft in, 
370. 

Hesse-Cassel ; annexed by Prussia, i. 
240. 

Hesse-Darmstadt; its relation to the 
North German Confederation, i. 241 ; 
government of, 347. 

History ; comparison of English and 
French, i. 47 et seq. ; of English and 
German, ii. 57 et seq. See, also, the 
different countries. 

Hohenlohe - Schillingsfurst. See Ger- 
many. 

Hohenwart, Count. See Austria. 

Horizontal and vertical parties, ii. 65. 

House of Commons ; origin of, i. 2-3 ; 
acquires control over the ministers, 
3 ; normally two parties in, 70-72, 
126; treatment of budget by, 116; 
questions in, 118. 

House of Lords ; origin of, i. 2 ; its loss 
of power, 4; can virtually demand 



INDEX. 



445 



a referendum, 5. See, also, Prussia, 

Austria, Hungary. 
Houses of Parliament. See Chambers ; 

and see the different countries. 
Hungary. See, also, Austria-Hungary. 

— Andrassy ; his cabinet, ii. 153. 

— Banffy ; his cabinet, ii. 158 ; his 

quarrel with Kalnoky, 168. 

— Bitto ; his cabinet, ii. 154. 

— Cabinet. See Ministers. 

— Catholics, ii. 125, 128, 138, 139. 

— Chancery, at Vienna, ii. 137. 

— Churches ; Catholic, ii. 125, 128, 138, 

139; Protestant, 128, 138, 139; 
Orthodox Greek, 125, 138, 139; 
United Greek, 125, 138, 139. 

— Compact of 1867. See Austria-Hun- 

gary. 

— Congregations, of the counties, ii. 

129, 143. 

— Constitution ; the ancient, ii. 128 ; 

laws of 1848, 132 ; the compact of 
1867, 136. 

— Counties ; old organization of, ii. 129- 

30 ; present government of, 143. 

— Croatia ; its history, ii. 125, 133, 146 ; 

its representation in the Parlia- 
ment, 139, 140-41 ; its connection 
with Hungary, 148 ; its diet, 149 ; 
the Ban, 150. 

— Deak, Francis ; forced into the back- 

ground in 1848, ii. 133 ; carries the 
compact of 1867, 136 ; his tale of 
the eels, 142 ; leads the Parlia- 
ment, 153 ; retires from public 
life, 154. 

— Deputies. See Table of Deputies. 

— Ferdinand ; his struggle and abdica- 

tion, ii. 132-33. 

— Francis Joseph ; ascends the throne, 

ii. 133 ; his policy after 1848, 134 ; 
makes the compact of 1867, 136. 

— Free Cities, ii. 129-30. 

— Germans, ii. 126. See, also, Transyl- 

vania. 

— Golden Bull, ii. 128, 137. 

— Greek Church. See Churches. 

— Habsburgs; the struggle with, ii. 

131. 

— History ; the struggle with the Habs- 

burgs, ii. 131 ; the revolt of 1848, 
132; the struggle of 1849-66, 
134-36 ; the compromise of 1867, 
136. See History of parties. 

— Insurrection ; right of, ii. 129, 137. 

— Jelacic ; Ban of Croatia, ii. 133. 

— Joseph H. ; his struggle with the 

Magyars, ii. 131. 



Hungary : — 

— King, the ; his powers, ii. 137-38. 

— Kossuth; his career in 1848-49, ii. 

134 ; oppose the compromise of 
1867, 136, 155. 

— Language ; laws concerning, ii. 145, 

149, 151, 165. 

— Local government. See Counties. 

— Lonyay, ii. 154. 

— Magnates. See Table of Magnates. 

— Magyars, ii. 126 ; their struggle for 

liberty, 131 et seq. ; their treat- 
ment of the other races, 144-52, 
161. 

— Ministers ; their powers, ii. 138 ; 

their responsibility to Parliament, 
137-39, 157-58 ; never forced to 
resign by change of party in Par- 
liament, 158-59. 

— Nobility, ii. 127, 130. 

— Orthodox Greeks, ii. 125, 138, 139. 

— Parliament ; its composition of old, 

ii. 129 ; at present, 139-42. 

— Parties ; absence of two great par- 

ties and reasons therefor, ii. 159- 
61. 

— Parties, history of ; Andrassy's min- 

istry, 1867, supported by the Deak 
Club, ii. 153 ; his successors Lon- 
yay, Sclavy, Bitto, 154 ; Deak's 
party falls to pieces, 154 ; the Left 
accepts the compact, 1875, and 
Tisza comes to power supported 
by the union of Deak's party and 
the Left, 154-55 ; Tisza's govern- 
ment, 1875-90, 155-56 ; cabinets 
of Szapary, Wekerle, and Banffy, 
the religious bills, 156-58. 

— Protestants, ii. 128, 138, 139. 

— Races, ii. 124; Roumanians, 125-26; 

Slavs, 125 ; Germans, 126 ; Mag- 
yars, 126 ; Saxons, 126 ; Szeklers, 
126 ; race conflicts in 1848, 132-34 ; 
treatment of other races by the 
Magyars, 144-45, 151 ; its results, 
152, 161 ; danger from the Slavs, 
160. 

— Roumanians, ii. 125-26, 153. 

— Saxons, ii. 126. See, also, Transyl- 

vania. 

— Sclavy ; his cabinet, ii. 154. 

— Slavs, ii. 125, 153, 160. See, also, 

Croatia. 

— Suffrage ; for Table of Deputies, ii. 

141 ; for the Croatian Diet, 150. 

— Szeklers, ii. 126. 

— Table of Deputies ; old organization, 

ii. 129-30 ; present organization, 



446 



INDEX. 



Hungary : — 

140 ; suffrage for, 141 ; disqualifi- 
cations, 142 ; term, 142 ; proce- 
dure, 142, n. 3. 

— Table of Magnates, ii. 129, 139, 140 ; 

opposes the religious bills, 157-58. 

— Tisza ; accepts the compact of 1867 

and comes to power 1875, 155 ; 
his rule until 1890, 155-56; his 
reforms of local government, 143, 
155. 

— Transylvania ; its history, ii. 127, 

145 ; government of, 146. 

— United Greek Church, ii. 125, 138, 

139. 

Initiative; by popular action. See 
Switzerland. 

Interpellations in France, i. 117-26; 
in Italy, 210 ; in Germany, 258 ; in 
Prussia, 300 ; in Austria, ii. 89 ; in 
Hungary, 159; in Switzerland, 200, 
n. 3. 

Irreconcilables ; in France, i. 102-5 
in Italy, 205-6 ; in Germany, ii. 120 
in Austria, 121 ; in Hungary, 161 
absence of, in Switzerland, 334-35. 

Italy : — 

— Accounts ; Court of, i. 167, n. 4. 

— Administrative Courts, i. 173-76. 

— Administrative system ; its centrali- 

zation, i. 162 ; contrast between 
theory and practice, 163 ; difficul- 
ties caused by interference of depu- 
ties, 227. 

— Arbitrary power, i. 162-164, 173-78. 

— Aspromonte, i. 190. 

— Bank scandals, i. 202-3. 

— Brigandage, i. 162, 194, 195, 229. 

— Budget ; committee on, i. 207-9. 

— Cabinets ; lack of harmony in, i. 212, 

213 ; duration of, 211 ; relation to 
the chambers, 152, 153-54 ; not 
hampered as much as in France by 
committees, 207-210 ; or by inter- 
pellations, 210 ; control of legisla- 
tion by, 225. 

— Cairoli ; first cabinet of, i. 164, 195 ; 

second cabinet of, 197 ; a member 
of the Pentarchy, 199, n. 1. 

— Camorra, the, i. 194, 216. 

— Cassation. See Courts. 

— Catholic. See Church. 

— Cavour ; his plan for Italian federa- 

tion, i. 149 ; his doctrine of a free 
church in a free state, 179 ; his 
relation to the parties, 189. 

— Centre party, i. 189. 



Italy : — 

— Cities; government of , i. 169 : debts 

of, 170. 

— Chamber of Deputies, i. 156; suf- 

frage for, 157 ; electoral districts, 
157-59 ; qualification of members, 

159 ; term, 159 ; sessions, 160 ; 
dissolution, 153; President, 160; 
attempt to copy English procedure, 

160 ; Uffici, or sections, 207 ; Com- 
mittees, 207-9 ; process of three 
readings, 210 ; Interpellations, 
210 ; control over administration, 
219, 225 ; relation of ministers to, 
153-54. 

— Charles Albert ; grants the Statuto, 

i. 148. 

— Church, the, i. 178 et seq. ; doctrine 

of free church in a free state, 179 ; 
how far carried out, 180 ; suppres- 
sion of monastic orders, 181 ; con- 
version and taxation of property, 
182 ; annexation of the Papal 
States, 183 ; law of the Papal 
Guarantees, 183 ; the Pope's re- 
fusal to acquiesce, 185; question 
of the Temporal Power, 186. 

— Clericals ; their attitude, i. 205. 

— Clientage ; its origin, i. 193, 215 et 

seq. 

— Cliques ; political, i. 215 ; growth of, 

216 ; their political influence, 217- 
19. 

— Coalitions ; between Right and Left, 

i. 198, 201. 

— Communes ; government of, i. 169. 

— Committees ; in parliament, i. 207- 

210. 

— Conflicts of jurisdiction, i. 173-174. 

— Constitution. See Statuto. 

— Courts of Law. See Judicial system. 

— Council of State, i. 167, n. 4 ; acted 

formerly as a court of conflicts, 
173-74 ; now as an administrative 
court, 174-75. 

— Criminal Law ; state of, i. 163. 

— Crispi ; a minister in 1877-78, i. 194- 

95 ; a member of the Pentarchy, 
199, n. 1 ; a minister in 1887, 199 ; 
his first cabinet, 200; his last 
cabinet, 203 ; his remark on pa- 
tronage, 219. 

— Depretis ; his first two cabinets, i. 

193-95 ; his third cabinet (1878), 
197 ; his later cabinets, 198 ; his 
unparliamentary tactics, 199, 213. 

— Deputies ; qualification of, i. 159 ; 

their relation to the cliques, 218 ; 



Dtt)EX. 



447 



Italy: — 

their control of patronage, 219, 
227. 

— Electoral districts, i. 157-59. 

— Finances ; control of deputies over, 

i. 208-9 ; bad condition of, 230. 

— Franchise. See Suffrage. 

— Garibaldi, i. 148, 150, 190. 

— Gioletti ; his cabinet, i. 202-3. 

— Groups. See Parties. 

— Interpellations, i. 210. 

— Jesuits. See Church. 

— Judicial system ; decentralization of 

i. 170 ; the five Courts of Cassation 
170 ; jurisdiction over official acts 
171-76 ; administrative law, 173 
administrative courts, 174; con 
flicts of jurisdiction, 173-74 
■weakness of precedent, 175 ; weak 
ness of the judicial system, 176 
protection of judges, 177 ; need of 
more powerful courts, 228 ; courts 
have no power to hold statutes un- 
constitutional, 151, n. 1, 175. 

— King, the, i. 152 ; his power and 

influence, 152-153. 

— Left ; formation of, i. 190 ; minis- 

tries of, in 1862 and 1867, 190; 
comes to power in 1876, 191 ; its 
policy, 191 et seq. 

— Leo XIII. ; his refusal to abandon 

the Temporal Power, i. 185. 

— Liberation ; struggle for, i. 146-50 ; 

its dramatic character, 148. 

— Local government, i. 168-70 ; prov- 

inces, 169 ; prefects, 169 ; com- 
munes, 169 ; syndics, 169 ; elected 
councils, 169. 

— Mafia, i. 194,216. 

— Mazzini, i. 148,194,215. 

— Mentana, i. 190. 

— Minghetti ; leaderof the Right, i. 192. 

— Ministers, i. 153 ; their relation to 

the King, i. 152-53 ; to the Cham- 
bers, 153-54. See Cabinet. 

— Monastic Orders. See Church. 

— Naples ; disorganization in, i. 215 ; 

cliques in, 217-1S. 

— Nicotera ; his policy in 1S76, i. 194 ; 

a member of the Pentarchy, 199, 
n. 1 ; becomes minister again in 
1891, 201. 

— Offices ; appointment to, i. 166. 

— Officials ; exemption from suit and 

prosecution, i. 172. 

— Ordinances ; power to make, i. 165 ; 

legislation by, 165-66. 

— Papal States ; annexation of, i. 183. 



Italy : — 

— Parliament. See Senate and Cham- 

ber of Deputies. 

— Parliamentary government ; inver- 

sion of, i. 225. 

— Parties ; their condition, i. 204 ; 

causes of subdivision of, 205 et 
seq. ; national parties depend on 
local issues, 224 ; their tendency 
to degenerate into cliques, 214- 
19 ; prominence of personal poli- 
tics in, 193, 199, 214. 

— Parties ; history of ; Cavour sup- 

ported by great central party, i. 
189, which breaks up at his death, 
190 ; the Right, with short inter- 
missions, governs until 1876, 190- 
91 ; but is not solidly united, 192 ; 
the Left comes to power, 191 ; 
effects of the change, 191-93 ; 
first cabinets of Depretis, 194-95 ; 
the Cairoli - Zanardelli cabinet, 
195 ; difference in the policies of 
these ministries, 196 ; the third 
cabinet of Depretis, 197 ; the sec- 
ond cabinet of Cairoli, 197 ; the 
Cairoli - Depretis cabinet, 197 ; 
Depretis' long tenure of office, 
198 ; his alliance with the Right 
or Transformismo, 198 ; the Pen- 
tarchy, 199 ; his unparliamentary 
tactics, 199 ; Crispi's first cabinet, 
200 ; his fall, 201 ; first ministry 
of Rudini, 201 ; of Giolitti, 201-2 ; 
Crispi's restoration and fall, 203-4 ; 
second cabinet of Rudini, 204. 

— Patron and client. See Clientage. 

— Patronage, i. 167 ; abuse of, 167 ; 

controlled by deputies, 219, 227. 
See, also, Cliques. 

— Pentarchy, the, i. 199. 

— Personal politics ; prominence of, i. 

193, 199, 214. 

— Pius IX., i. 149 ; his refusal to aban- 

don the Temporal Power, 185. 

— Pope. See Church. 

— Prefect, i. 169. 

— Provinces ; government of, i. 169. 

— Rattazzi ; his ministries, i. 190. 

— Republicans ; accept the monarchy, 

i. 194. 

— Right ; formation of, i. 190 ; in 

power, 190 ; its faU, 191 ; its lack 
of harmony, 192 ; coalition with 
Depretis, 198 ; with the Left in 
1891 ? 201. 

— Rudini; his first cabinet, i. 201; 

second, cabinet, 204. 



448 



INDEX. 



Italy : — < 

— Scrutinio di lista, i. 158. 

— Secret societies, i. 216. 

— Sella ; leader of the Eight, i. 192. 
— Senate, i. 154; its composition, 154— 

55 ; its powers, 155-56. 

— Sicily ; condition of, i. 164, 215-16 ; 

riots in, 178, 202 ; cliques in, 218. 

— Social disorganization, in the south, 

i. 215. 

— Statutes ; character of, i. 166, n. 1. 

— Statuto ; grant of, i. 148 ; never for- 

mally amended, 150 ; its contents, 
151. (For the text of the Statuto, 
see ii. 346.) 

— Spagnolismo. See Cliques. 

— Suffrage ; for the Chamber of Depu- 

ties, i. 157 ; for the local councils, 
169. 

— Syndic,!. 169. 

— Temporal Power. See Church. 

— Three readings ; process of, i. 210. 

— Transf ormismo, i. 198. 

— Uffici, or Sections; in the Cham- 

bers, i. 207. 

— Victor Emmanuel ; H Re Galan- 

tuomo, i. 148. 

— Zanardelli ; his belief in liberty and 

overthrow, i. 164, 195-96 ; a mem- 
ber of the Pentarchy, 199, n. 1 ; 
in office again, 1887, 199 ; supports 
Gioletti, 202 ; opposes Crispi, 203. 

Joseph II. ; his struggle with the Mag- 
yars, ii. 131. 

Judges ; ordinary and administrative, 
tenure of, in France, i. 58-59 ; in 
Italy, 174-75, 177 ; in Prussia, 296 ; 
in Austria, ii. 84 ; in Switzerland, 
214. See, also, Administrative courts, 
Conflicts of jurisdiction, Courts of 
Law. 

Justice of the Peace ; in England, i. 
51, 66 ; adoption of, in Prussia, 322. 

Kalnoky ; Austro-Hungarian minister, 
forced to resign by Banffy, ii. 168. 

King ; power of, developed early in 
England, i. 48, 66 ; late in France, 
51, 67. For the actual powers of the 
monarch, see the various countries. 

Kielmansegg ; his cabinet in Austria, 
ii. 118. 

Kossuth. See Hungary. 

Kulturkampf . See Germany. 

Labor laws ; their rejection at the 
referendum, ii. 265. 



Landschaft ; in Mecklenburg, i. 365. 

Landtag. See Prussia. 

Lasker, ii. 27, n. 1. 

Lavigerie, Cardinal ; his acceptance of 
the French Republic, i. 89. 

Law, public and private ; fusion of, in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, i. 55, 68 ; 
separate in France, 56 ; in Italy, 171 ; 
in Prussia, 296-97 ; in Austria, ii. 
83 ; in Switzerland, 216. 

Left and Right ; meaning of, i. 74, n. 2. 

Legislature. See Chambers, Parlia- 
mentary system ; and see the differ- 
ent countries. 

Leo XIII. ; his attitude towards the 
Republic in France, i. 89 ; his refusal 
to abandon the Temporal Power, 
185 ; his negotiations with Bismarck, 
i. 186 ; ii. 23, 26, 29-30. 

Liberty, of Association, Meeting, and 
the Press. See Association ; see, also, 
Private rights. 

Lippe-Detmold ; government of, i. 354. 

Local government. See the different 
countries. 

Lorraine. See Alsace-Lorraine. 

Lubeck ; government of, i. 368. 

MacMahon, Marshal. See France. 

Magnates. See Hungary. 

Maine, Sir Henry ; his remarks on the 
position of the French President, i. 
29 ; his explanation of the conserva- 
tive tendency of the referendum, ii. 
268 ; his remarks on the interest in 
the battles of parties, 333. 

Majority. See Election, Parliamentary 
government. 

Mazzini, i. 148, 194, 215. 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, government of, 
i. 364. 

Mecklenburg-Strelitz, government of, 
i. 364. 

Meeting, freedom of. See Association. 

Meline ; his cabinet, i. 99. 

Mentana ; battle of, i. 190. 

Metternich ; his resignation, ii. 133. 

Meyer, Professor ; his views on the 
electoral system of Saxe-Weimar, i. 
356. 

Minghetti ; leader of the Right in 
Italy, i. 192. 

Ministers ; in France, i. 32 ; in Italy, 
154 ; in Prussia, 292 ; in Austria, ii. 
77-78; in Hungary, 137-3S; in the 
Joint Monarchy, 170 et seq. (for 
the smaller German States, see those 
States) ; their enormous power in 



INDEX. 



449 



France, i. 33 et seq.; responsibility 
to Parliament, origin of, 3 ; enables 
majority of House of Commons to 
control the crown, 4 ; their counter- 
signature, and their relation to the 
President in France, 28-30 ; to the 
crown in Italy, 152-54 ; in Prussia, 
289-91 ; in Austria, ii. 76-77 ; in 
Hungary, 137 ; their relation to the 
Upper Chamber in France, i. 22- 
26 ; in Italy, 156 ; in Hungary, ii. 
157-58 ; their relation to the Lower 
Chamber in France, i. 24, 33, 65, 
124; in Italy, 153-54, 211-13; in 
Prussia, 289 ; in the other German 
States, 334 ; in Austria, ii. 76-78 ; in 
Hungary, 137-38, 157-58; in the 
Joint Monarchy, 170. See, also, 
Cabinet ; Germany, Chancellor ; and 
Switzerland, Federal Council. 

Minority. See Representation. 

Monarchists ; in France. See France. 

Monarchy; vitality of, in Germany, i. 
334, 376 ; merits and defects of, ii. 
64. 

Montesquieu ; his doctrine of the sep- 
aration of powers, i. 54. 

Napoleon ; his administrative system 
in France, i. 35 ; his influence on 
German unity, 234. 

Nassau ; annexed by Prussia, i. 240. 

Newspapers ; in France, i. 106 ; in 
Germany, ii. 47-50. 

Nicotera. See Italy. 

North German Confederation, i. 240. 

Officials ; protection of, from suit and 
prosecution in France, i. 55-57 ; in 
Italy, 171-72 ; in Belgium, 171, n. 
3 ; in Prussia, 294 ; in Austria, ii. 
80 ; in Switzerland, 220. See, also, 
Administrative Courts, Patronage. 

Oldenburg, government of, i. 348. 

Opportunists. See France. 

Orders of the Day. See Interpella- 
tions. 

Ordinances ; in England and America, 
i. 45 ; in France, 44-46 ; in Italy, 
165 ; in the German Empire, 268 ; 
in Prussia, 290 ; in Saxony, 335 ; in 
Wurtemberg, 341 ; in Baden, 345 ; 
in Austria, ii. 76 ; in Hungary, 138 ; 
in the Joint Monarchy, 164; in 
Switzerland, 195, n. 2. 

Panama scandal ; in France, i. 93, 137. 
Parliament ; of Paris, i. 52, 54 ; "in 



and out " in Hungary, ii. 141. See, 
also, Chambers. 

Parliamentary government ; origin of, 
i. 3 ; enables majority of popular 
chamber to control the executive, 4; 
its effect on the other chamber, 4-5, 
22, 25, n. 1 ; requires harmony and 
joint responsibility in the cabinet, 
70-71, 212-13 ; importance of secrecy 
of meetings, 212 ; need of mutual 
confidence between cabinet and ma- 
jority of chamber, 126 ; imperfectly 
copied on the continent, 6 ; bad ef- 
fect of election by majority vote, 
108-11 ; of committees, 114-17, 207- 
10 ; of interpellations, 117-23 ; nor- 
mally produces two parties, 70, 212 ; 
cannot work well otherwise, 72 ; 
danger of autocratic power in, 226- 
27 ; parliamentary system exists in 
France, 28, 33 ; in Italy, 152-54 ; in 
Hungary, ii. 137-39, 157-58 ; exists 
in form in Austria, 76-78 ; does not 
exist in Germanv, i. 278 ; in Prussia, 
289, 291; in any of the German 
States, 334 ; or in Switzerland, ii. 
198-200. 

Parties ; importance of studying them 
as a fact, i. Preface ; their influence 
on popular government, 69 ; only 
two in Anglo-Saxon countries, 69, 
71 ; many on the Continent, 70 ; nor- 
mally two in parliamentary system, 
70, 212 ; it cannot work well other- 
wise, 72 ; election by majority vote 
tends to subdivide, 108-11 ; so do 
committees in parliamentary system, 
114-17, 207-10 ; and interpellations, 
117-23 ; relation of national and 
local parties, 39, 220-24; ii. 11, 91-92, 
314, 319 ; divisions of, vertical and 
horizontal, or by classes, 65 ; effect of 
great stability of parties, 316 ; Bight 
and Left, meaning of, i. 74, n. 2 ; 
Parties in Bavaria, 338 ; in Wurtem- 
berg, 343 ; in Baden, 345 ; in Olden- 
burg-, 349. For the larger countries, 
see under the name of the country. 

Patronage ; abuse of, in France, i. 130 ; 
in Italy, 166, 216 et seq. ; in Hun- 
gary, ii. 156 ; absence of, in Prussia, 
i. 293 ; in Austria, ii. 78 ; in Swit- 
zerland, 318, 335 ; influence of dep- 
uties on use of, in France, i. 130; in 
Italy, 167, 216 et seq.; its dangers 
in a democracy, 225. 

Payment, of representatives. See Rep- 
resentatives. 



450 



INDEX. 



Pius IX., i. 149 ; his refusal to aban- 
don Temporal Power, i. 185. 

Plener ; leader of the German Liberals 
in Austria, ii. 117. 

Plurality. See Election. 

Political parties. See Parties. 

Pope ; his position in Italy, i. 183. 
See, also, Pius IX. and Leo XIII. 

Popular government ; influence of par- 
ties on, i. 69. 

Potocki ; Austrian minister, ii. 102, n. 
1, 104. 

Press ; freedom of. See Association. 

Private rights ; protection of, in France, 
i. 59 ; in Italy, 173-78 ; in Prussia, 
286-87 ; in Austria, ii. 79 et seq. ; 
in Switzerland, 186, 195-96, 216- 
18. 

Property ; as a basis of representation. 
See Representation. 

Prussia. For its relation to the Empire, 
see Germany. 

— Abgeordnetenhaus. See House of 

Representatives. 

— Administrative justice, history of, i. 

294 ; the administrative courts, 
296, 319-22 ; their possible devel- 
opment, 296. 

— Amtsvorsteher, i. 322. 

— Annexations, in 1866, i. 240. 

— Austria ; war with, i. 240. 

— Berlin ; government of, i. 318 ; city 

elections in, 328-29. 

— Eezirksaussehuss, i. 319. 

— Brunswick ; ruled by a Prussian 

prince, i. 350. 

— Budget ; control of the Landtag 

over, i. 239, 298. 

— Bureaucracy, i. 293. 

— Cabinet. See Ministers. 

— Cities ; government of, i. 327 ; the 

Stadtverordnete, 328 ; the Stadt- 
rath, 330 ; the burgomaster, 330 ; 
the results, 332-33. 

— Classes ; system of election by, i. 

303, 324-26, 328 ; its effect on 
parties, 306 ; its effect on admin- 
istration, 305, 332 ; produces dis- 
content, 333. 

— Communes, rural ; government of, 

i. 325 ; the Schulze, 326 ; manors, 
327. 

— Constitio Achillea, i. 233. 

— Constitution, of 1850, i. 286 ; imper- 

fection of, 286; amendment of, 
287. 

— Constitutional conflict, 1862-66, i. 

239. 



Prussia : — 

— Conventions with other States, i. 

247. 

— Discontent ; growth of, i. 233. 

— Herrenhaus. See House of Peers. 

— House of Peers ; composition of, i. 

301 ; controlled by the landed 
gentry, 302 ; its powers, 302. 

— House of Representatives, i. 303; 

the three-class system of election, 
303-5; its results, 305; its ef- 
fect on parties, 306, 307 ; effect 
of indirect elections, 308. See, also, 
Landtag. 

— King, the ; rules of succession, i. 288 ; 

his powers, 288 ; the ministers 
countersign his acts, 288 ; but are 
really under his control, 289 ; his 
position as Emperor, 274-76. 

— Kreis ; local government of, i. 321. 

— Kreisausschuss, i. 321. 

— " Kreis-Ordnung," i. 309. 

— Kreistag, i. 323. 

— Landesdirector, i. 317. 

— Landeshauptmann, i. 317. 

— Landowners ; control the House of 

Peers, i. 302 ; their characteristics, 
302, ii. 46-47 ; their former abuse 
of power, i. 308-9 ; their influence 
in local government, 222-23, 324- 
25, 327. 

— Landrath, i. 321. 

— Landtag, i. 297 ; its dissolution, 298 ; 

its functions, 298 ; its control over 
appropriations, 239, 298 ; its right 
of initiative, 299 ; its control over 
the administration, 299 ; its rela- 
tion to the ministers, 289, 291, 
300 ; committees and sections in, 
300-1. See, also, House of Peers 
and House of Representatives. 

— Local government ; the late reforms, 

i. 308-10 ; their objects, 310-11 ; 
separation of general and local 
administration, 312 ; of profes- 
sional and lay officials, 312; the 
province, 313; its government, 
314-18 ; Berlin, 318 ; the Regie- 
rungsbezirk, 318; complexity of 
its government, 320 ; the Kreis, 
321 ; the Justice of the Peace, 
322 ; the Kreistag, 323 ; election 
of, 324-25 ; the rural commune, 
325 ; the manor, 327 ; the city, 
327-31 ; actual working of the 
system in the rural districts, 331 ; 
in the cities, 332-33. 

— Ministers ; their number, i. 292 ; re- 



INDEX. 



451 



Prussia : — 

sponsible only to the King, 289; 
their independence of each other, 
290; the ministry of state, 290; 
their relation to the Chambers, 
289, 291, 300 ; the Oberrechnungs- 
kamnier, 290; the Volkswirth- 
schaftrath and Staatsrath, 292, 
n. 2. 

— Oberrechmmgskammer, i. 290. 

— Oberprasident, i. 315. 

— Oberverwaltungsgericht, i. 296. 

— Officials ; appointment of, i. 293 ; 

how far subject to the courts, 
294. 

— Personal liberty ; imperfectly pro- 

tected by the constitution, i. 286- 
87. 

— Provinzialausschuss, i. 317. 

— Provinziallandtag, i. 316. 

— Provinzialrath, i. 315. 

— Regierung, i. 318 ; Regierungsbe- 

zii'k, 318 ; Regierungsprasident. 
139. 

— Staatsrath, 292, n. 2. 

— Waldeck ; conventions with, i. 24S, 

353. 
Public Law. See Law. 
Public Officials. See Officials. 

Questions ; in the House of Commons, 
i. 118 ; in the French Chambers, 119. 
See Interpellations. 

Rattazzi ; his ministries, i. 190. 

Referendum ; rejection of a bill by the 
House of Lords is virtually a, i. 5. 
See Switzerland and United States. 

Reichsgericht ; in Germany, i. 2S1 ; in 
Austria, ii. 83. 

Reichsrath. S?e Austria and Bavaria. 

Reichstag. See Germany. 

Representation ; based partly on prop- 
erty in Prussia, i. 303, 324-1:6, 328 ; 
in Austria, ii. 87, 88, n. 1 ; in Hun- 
gary, 141, n. 3, 143, n. 2. See, also, 
the smaller German States ; propor- 
tional representation in the Italian 
parliament, i. 158-59; in Switzerland, 
ii. 213, 232 ; in America, 233, 334, n. 
1 ; objections to the system, 234. 

Representatives ; are not required to 
be residents of their districts in 
France, i. 15, 17, n. 1 ; in Italy, 159 ; 
in Germany. 252. n. 2 ; in Austria, 
ii. 89, 92 ; but they are required to, 
in the Prussian local government, 
L 324, n. 1 ; and in Alsace-Lorraine, 



374 ; they are not paid in Italy, i. 
159 ; in Germany, 253 ; in the Hanse 
Cities, 370 ; but they are in many 
of the smaller German States, i. 336, 
n. 1, 337, n. 3, 341, n. 1, 349, n. 1, 
354, n. 3. 

Responsibility, of Ministers. See Min- 
isters. 

Reuss-Greiz ; government of, i. 363. 

Reuss-Schleiz ; government of, i. 362. 

Richter, Eugene, ii. 29. 

Right and Left ; meaning of, i. 74, n. 2. 

Ritterschaft ; in Mecklenburg, i. 365. 

Rb'hmer ; his theory of parties, ii. 9, 
313. 

Roon, General von ; at the head of the 
Prussian cabinet, ii. 17. 

Rousseau ; his views on parties, i. 69 ; 
his influence in creating the referen- 
dum, ii. 243. 

Royal power ; its development in Eng- 
land, i. 48, 66 ; in France, 51, 67. 

Rudini. See Italy. 

Sardinia ; takes the lead in the struggle 

for Italian unity, i. 147. 
Saxe-Altenburg ; government of, i. 359. 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha ; government of, i. 

358. 
Saxe - Meiningen ; government of, i. 

357. 
Saxe-Weimar ; government of, i. 356. 
Saxon duchies ; government of, i. 355. 
Saxony ; government of. i. 334. 
Schaumburg-Lippi ; government of, i. 

355. 
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt ; government 

of, i. 361. 
Sehwarzburg-Sondershausen ; govern- 
ment of, i. 361. 
Scrutin de Airondissement and Serutin 

de Liste. See France and Italy. 
Sections, or Bureaux; in the French 

Chambers, i. Ill ; in Italy, 207 ; in 

the Reichstag, 255 ; in the Prussian 

Landtag, 300 ; in Austria, ii. 89, n. 

3 ; in Hungary, 142, n. 3. 
Self-government ; in England, Gneist's 

views on, i. G6. 
Sella ; leader of the Italian Right, i. 

192. 
Senate. See France, Italy, Hanse 

Cities, United States. 
Separation of powers; in France and 

United States, i. 54. 
Sicily. See Italy. 
Siege, state of ; in France, i. 63. 
Simon, Jules ; his cabinet, i. 79. 



452 



INDEX. 



Statutes ; character of, in England and 
France, i. 44-45 ; in Italy, 166, n. 1. 

Statuto, the. See Italy. 

Statthalter, of Alsace-Lorraine, i. 374. 

Stauffenberg, ii. 27. 

Stubbs ; his views on the relations of 
classes in England, ii. 58, n. 1. 

Suffrage ; in France, i. 14, 38, 41 ; in 
Italy, 156-57, 169 ; for the German 
Reichstag, 252 ; for the Prussian 
Landtag, 303 ; for the Kreistag, 325 ; 
in the communes, 326 ; in the cities, 
328 ; in Austria, in the five classes of 
voters, ii. 87-88, 92 ; in Hungary, 
141, 150; in Switzerland, 211, 226, 
235-36. See, also, the smaller Ger- 
man States. 

Switzerland : — 

— Aargau ; introduction of the Ref- 

erendum in, ii. 251 ; its use there, 
262, 270 ; the Initiative in, 285, 
n. 2. 

— Administrative courts ; absence of, 

ii. 196, 220, n. 1. 

— Administrative law ; partly in the 

hands of the Federal Tribunal, 
ii. 216 ; partly of the Federal 
Assembly, 195-96, 217-220. 

— Ador ; his motion for proportional 

representation, ii. 213. 

— Aristocracy; its former control of 

the cities, ii. 242, 247 ; its present 
influence in the forest cantons, 
225. 

— Athens ; compared with Switzerland, 

ii. 333. 

— Basle, Rural ; veto in, ii. 249 ; intro- 

duction of the referendum in, 251 ; 
small attendance thereat, 273 ; the 
initiative in, 281. 

— Berne ; the ancient referendum in, 

ii. 242 ; introduction of the mod- 
ern referendum in, 251 ; its actual 
use, 262, 263, n. 2, 267, n. 2, 270 ; 
smallness of the vote, 271, 274 ; 
use of the initiative, 287, n. 1. 

— Budget ; subject to the referendum 

in Berne and Aargau, ii. 270. 

— Cantons ; their relation to the federal 

government, ii. 184-86 ; method 
of coercing, 197 ; their representa- 
tion in the Council of States, 184, 
208 ; ratification by majority of 
cantons required for changes in 
federal constitution, 191 ; never 
use their right to demand a ref- 
erendum on laws, 253 ; cantonal 
governments, 220 ; their constitu- 



Switzerland : — 

tions, 221 ; frequency of revision, 
221 ; the Executive Council, 226 ; 
method of choosing, 228; repre- 
sentation of minorities, 228, 229, 
232 ; the Great Council, 226 ; dis- 
solution by popular vote, 229 ; re- 
lations between the two councils, 
227; the veto in, 248; the ref- 
erendum in, 250 ; its actual use, 
261 et seq. ; the initiative in, 280 ; 
its actual use, 285 ; half -cantons, 
184. See, also, Landsgemeinde. 

— Catholics, ii. 181 ; form the reaction- 

ary^ party, 308 ; their votes at the 
referendum, 324-25. 

— Chancellor, of the Confederation, ii. 

214, n. 3. 

— Character, of the people ; in its 

effect on parties, ii. 332. 

— Clergymen ; excluded from the Na- 

tional Council, ii. 211. 

— Compulsory voting, ii. 273. 

— Confederation ; history of, ii. 182- 

84 ; nature of, 184 ; executive 
powers of the federal government 
small, 185 ; legislative power 
broad, 187 ; its power to supervise 
the cantons, 186, 188 ; its organs, 
191. 

— Constitution; of 1848, ii. 184; of 

1874, 184, 306-7; process of 
amendment, 190; new initiative 
for, 191, 281,287; constitutions of 
the cantons, 221. (For the text 
of the federal constitution, see ii. 
405.) 

— Council of States, ii. 208 ; election 

and tenure of members, 208-9 ; its 
actual influence, 209-11; com- 
parison with the American Senate, 
208-9. 

— Courts of law ; their authority in 

regard to laws violating a constitu- 
tion, ii. 217, n. 3, 219, 229, n. 3. 
See, also, Federal Tribunal. 

— Diet, of the old Confederation, ii. 

239. 

— Droz, Numa ; his views on the re- 

organization of the Federal Coun- 
cil, ii.205; on the referendum, 278; 
on the new federal initiative, 290 ; 

— Executive. See Federal Council and 

Confederation. 

— Electoral districts ; unfairness of, ii. 

212-13. 

— Federal government. See Confed- 

eration. 



INDEX. 



453 



Switzerland : — 

— Federal Council ; election of mem- 

bers, ii. 193 ; always reelected, 
203, 302-3, 307, 311; selected 
from the Federal Assembly, 204 ; 
privileges of cantons, 204 ; effect 
of method of election on parties, 
318 ; probable effect of direct 
election by the people, 320; mem- 
bers overworked, 205 ; division 
of the work into departments, 193 ; 
the President, 194 ; functions of 
the Federal Council, 195 ; its ju- 
dicial power, 195-96 ; small 
amount of its actual power, 196 ; 
its relation to the cantonal authori- 
ties, 197 ; its relation to the Fed- 
eral Assembly, 197 ; contrast with 
a parliamentary cabinet, 198 ; not 
a partisan body, 200 ; members do 
not resign on political grounds, 
199 ; not always in accord, 201 ; 
merits of the system, 205 ; the 
body is removed from popular 
influence, 206-7 ; provides a limi- 
tation on democracy, 334. 

— Federal Assembly; its relation to 

the Federal Council, ii. 197-200 ; 
its two branches, 192 ; joint sit- 
tings, 214; decides questions of 
administrative law, 217. 

— Federal Tribunal ; its composition, 

ii. 215 ; its jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal cases, 215 ; in questions 
of public and administrative law, 
216-20 ; comparison with the Su- 
preme Court of the United States, 
218 ; it cannot hold statutes un- 
constitutional, 219 ; its judgments 
executed by cantonal officials, 185. 

— French ; their numbers, ii. 180-81 ; 

their form of democracy, 230 ; 
their use of the referendum, 264 ; 
their local government, 235-36 ; 
their tendency in national politics, 
309. 

— Germans ; their numbers, ii. 180-81 ; 

their form of democracy, 230 ; 
use of referendum, 264-65; local 
government, 235 ; tendency in 
politics, 308-9. 

— Gerrymandering ; of electoral dis- 

tricts, ii. 212, 323, 329. 

— Grisons ; old federal organization of, 

and ancient referendum in, ii. 
240.^ 

— Griitliverein, ii. 313. 

— Half-cantons, ii. 184. 



Switzerland : — 

— Initiative ; its nature, ii. 280 ; its 

adoption by the cantons, 280 ; for 
amendments to the federal consti- 
tution r 4.91 r -281-; method of opera- 
tion, 283 ; first experiments in the 
Confederation, 284; smallness of 
its use in the cantons, 285 ; Swiss 
opinion of it, 287-90 ; improbable 
that it will be of real value, 290. 

— Italians ; numbers of, ii. 180-81. 

— Jews ; initiative used to harass, ii. 

284. 

— Kantonsrath, ii. 225-26, n. 2. 

— Kleinerath, ii. 226, n. 3. 

— Landamman, ii. 225. 

— Landrath, ii. 225-26, n. 2. 

— Landsgemeinde, ii. 221 ; procedure 

in, 223 ; its relation to the coun- 
cil, 223-25. 

— Language ; no official, ii. 213-14. 

— Local government, ii. 235 ; the com- 

mune, 235 ; the district, 236. 

— Minority ; representation of, in the 

Federal Council, ii. 201 ; in the 
cantonal executive councils, 228- 
29, 232, 235 ; in the cantonal 
legislatures, 232, 234, n. 1 ; pro- 
posal to introduce it into the Na- 
tional Council, 213. 

— National Council ; its composition, 

ii. 211 ; electoral districts, 212 ; 
sessions, 213, 318 ; debates, 213. 

— Neuchatel; its connection with Prus- 

sia, ii. 183, n. 3 ; adoption of the 
referendum in, 251 ; actual use in, 
265 ; initiative in, 285, n. 2. 

— Officials ; advantages and evils of 

holding them politically responsi- 
ble, ii. 207 ; their liability to suit, 
220. 

— Parties ; how far influenced by race, 

ii. 303, 307, 308-9 ; by religion, 201, 
307-8, 324-25; their relation to 
the government, 200-1, 311 ; lack 
of strict discipline, 312 ; absence of 
party machinery, 313 ; of profes- 
sional wire pullers, 314 ; and of 
national party leaders, 314; sta- 
bility of parties, 314 ; its good 
effect, 316 ; many of the elections 
uncontested, 315 ; relation of na- 
tional and local parties, 314, 319 ; 
causes of the state of parties, 318 ; 
shortness of legislative sessions, 
318 ; method of electing the Fed- 
eral Council, 318-21 ; smallness of 
the constituencies, 319; character 



454 



INDEX. 



Switzerland : — 

and traditions of the people, 332 ; 
the effect of the referendum, 322- 
32 ; how far the votes run on 
party lines, 324 ; rejection of laws 
takes the place of change of parties, 
331 ; existence of independent 
voters at the referendum, but not 
at the elections, 331. 

— Parties, history of ; the Radicals 

and Moderates (1848-50), 301 ; the 
question of the Refugees, 301 ; 
division on new lines on the ques- 
tion of the railroads and of Savoy 
(1852-61), 303; again over the 
question of revising the constitu- 
tion (1864-74), 306; history of 
parties since 1874, 308 ; compari- 
son of their condition before and 
after 1874, 311 ; the Right, 308 ; 
the Left, 308; the Centre, 309; 
stability of parties, 310, 314. 

— Patricians ; in the cities, ii. 225, 242, 

247. 

— Patronage ; absence of abuse of, ii. 

318, 335. 

— President of the Confederation, ii. 

194-95, 327. 

— Proportional representation. See 

Minority representation. 

— Protestants, ii. 181, 310. 

— Races, ii. 180 ; their relation to party 

lines, 303, 307, 308-9 ; 

— Railroads, as a political issue, ii. 

303. 

— Referendum ; arose from the ab- 

sence of representative govern- 
ment, ii. 238, 246 ; in constitu- 
tional questions not a Swiss inven- 
tion, 244 ; the ancient referendum 
in the Confederation, 239 ; in the 
Grisons, 240 ; in the Valais, 241- 
42 ; in Berne, 242 ; in Zurich, 
243 ; the modern referendum, 243 ; 
introduction of the veto, 248 ; of 
the referendum, 247-48, 250 ; op- 
tional and obligatory forms, 250 ; 
application in the Confederation, 
252 ; number of laws rejected, 
253 ; summary of federal laws 
voted on, 255-61 ; number of laws 
rejected in the cantons, 261-64; 
little used in the French cantons, 
264 ; its use spasmodic, 254, 263 ; 
character of laws rejected, 265 ; 
radical measures and labor laws, 
265-69 ; laws that are too compre- 
hensive, 269 ; measures involving 



Switzerland : — 

expense, 269 ; attempt to apply it 
to the budget, 270 ; smallness of 
the vote cast, 271-74 ; absence of 
popular discussion, 274; the ex- 
planatory message, 275 ; cost of 
printing, 274-75 ; effect of refer- 
endum on the sense of legislative 
responsibility, 276 ; on the impor- 
tance of party, 326-28 ; how far 
popular vote runs on party lines, 
322-25 ; how far the parties pre- 
pare the demand for a vote, 325 ; 
rejection of law does not discredit 
the representative, 328-31 ; Swiss 
opinions of the referendum, 277 ; 
views of the parties upon, 249- 
50, 277-78. See, also, United 
States. 

— Regierungsrath, ii. 225, 227, n. 3. 

— Religion. See Catholic and Protes- 

tant. 

— Representative institutions ; did not 

arise spontaneously, ii. 238; im- 
perfection of, 246. 

— Responsibility of officials ; advan- 

tages and evils of, ii. 207; their 
liability to suit, 220 ; effect of the 
referendum on sense of responsi- 
bility, 276. 

— Romance race, ii. 99, 181. 

— Slaughtering of animals ; law on, 

passed by initiative, ii. 284. 

— St. Gall ; the veto in, ii. 248 ; intro- 

duction of the referendum in, 251, 
n. 2 ; frequency of its use, 263 ; 
the initiative in, 285, n. 2. 

— Social conditions ; equality of, ii. 

335. 

— Soleure ; introduction of the refer- 

endum in, ii. 251 ; its actual use, 
262 ; the initiative in, 281. 

— Sonderbund, ii. 183. 

— Ticino, insurrection in, ii. 186, 231 ; 

use of the referendum in, 264, n. 
1, 322, n. 1. 

— Valais ; old federal organization of, 

and ancient referendum in, ii. 241- 
42 ; introduction of the modern 
referendum in, 250 ; the veto in, 
249. 

— Vaud ; introduction of the referen- 

dum in, ii. 251 ; its actual use, 
264, n. 1 ; initiative in, 280, 285, 
n. 1. 

— Veto ; by the people, ii. 248 ; none 

by the executive, 197, 229. 

— Zurich ; the ancient referendum in, 



INDEX. 



455 



Switzerland : — 

ii. 243 ; introduction of the mod- 
ern referendum in, 251 ; its actual 
use, 261, 263, n. 2, 265-67, 269, 
272 ; the initiative in, 281, 285. 

Taafe. See Austria. 
Thiers. See France. 
Three-class system of election ; in 

Prussia, i. 303-7, 326, 328. See, also, 

the smaller German States. 
Thuringen States, government of, i. 

355. 
Tisza. See Hungary. 
Transf ormismo. See Italy. 
Transylvania. See Hungary. 

United States ; separation of powers 
in, i. 54 ; nature of federal govern- 
ment, 243, 245 ; position of the Sen- 
ate, ii. 192-93, 209 ; of the Supreme 
Court, 218 ; referendum for consti- 
tutional questions in, 244, 292 ; for 
kindred subjects, 293 ; for the bank- 



ing acts, 294 ; for local matters, 295, 
299 ; objections to its extension to 
general laws, 296 ; proportional rep- 
resentation in, 233-34; election by 
majority vote in, i. 110 ; effect of 
the nomination of President by 
conventions, ii. 320. 

Vertical and horizontal parties, ii. 65. 
Victor Emmanuel, i. 148. 

Waldeck, government of, i. 352 ; 
transfer of the prince's governmental 
rights to Prussia, 248, 353. 

William I. See Germany. 

William II. See Germany. 

Windischgratz ; cabinet in Austria, 
117. 

Wurtemberg ; relation to the North 
German Confederation, i. 241 ; its 
privileges in the Empire, 250, 267 ; 
government of, 340 ; parties in, 343. 

Zanardelli. See Italy. 



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